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THE  HISTORY  AND  NATURE 

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INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 


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GEORGETOWN  FOREIGN  SERVICE  SERIES 

THE  HISTORY  AND  NATURE 

of 
INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 


Edited  by 
Edmund  A.  Walsh,  S.J.,  Ph.D., 

Regent,  School  of  Foreign  Service, 
GeorgetowTi  University 


Contributors 


Stephen  P.  Duggan 
Michael  I.  Rostovtseff 
Carlton  J.  H.  Hayes 
James  Brown  Scott 
James  LawTence  Laughlin 


John  Bassett  Moore 
Esteban  Gil  Borges 
Leo  S.  Rowe 
Paul  S.  Reinsch 
Edwin  M.  Borchard 


Nfm  fork 
THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1922 

^11  rights  reserved 


PRINTED  IN   THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


Copyright,  1922, 
By  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


Set  up  and  printed.     Published  January,  1922. 


FERRIS  PRINTING  COMPANY 
NEW  YORK 


-r". 


t  UT 


To 

Constantine  E.  McGuire,  Ph.D. 

With  respect  and  appreciation 


COXTKNTS 

Tin:  FIX  DAM  ENTAILS   - 
IX  A  SCIKXTII  IC  STIDV  OF 
IXTKHXATIOXAL  HKLATIOXS 

h 

Stephen  I'.  l)ufJt:an.  IMi.I). 

The  ('olle>;e  of  the  City  of  New  York 

Director  of  the  Institute  of  International  Relations 

1.  Xiitiirc  (if  Dijjlomacy  ...  1 

i.  Ili.slorv  of  Diidoriiacv 4 

3.  The  Aj;rnt.s  of  I)ij)loniary !' 

4.  Lefii.slativc   Iiit(Tvrnli(in  in   the  Comluct  of  Inter- 

national Relations.  1.'^ 

5.  Metliods  of  DipIoniacN  -1 


IXTEUXATIOXAL  UKIATIOXS  IX  THE 
AXCIEXT  WORLD  - 

by 

Professor  Michael  I.  Roslovtscff.  Ph.D..  D.Litt.  (Oxon).  of 
the  University  of  Wisconsin,  formerly  of  the  University  of 
Petroprad;  Moml)cr  of  the  Ilussan  Academy  of  Sciences  and 
Corresponding  McniLK>r  of  the  British  Academy. 

1.  Source  Material  and  Method  of  Approaeh .'H 

"2.  Aneient  and  Modern  \'ie\v  of  War 3.> 

3.  Mean.s    of    I're.serving    IVaee    in    Antiquity.      Tlie 

Ralanee  of  Power 37 

4.  Ancient  Treaties 40 

5.  Relif,'ion  as  an  Infliienee  in  International  Relations  45 

6.  Peace  })v  Arbitration  in  the  Ancient  World 49 

7.  Diplomatic  Agent.s  in  Antiquity 51 

8.  Conflict  lietween  Ri^ht  and  Force ^o 

9.  Period  of  Constant  Flux 57 

10.  The  Roman  Theory  of  International  Relations 61 


CONTENTS 
MEDIEVAL  DIPLOMACY 

by 

Professor  Carlton  J.  H.  Hayes,  Ph.D. 
of  Columbia  University 

1.  The  Medieval  Heritage 69 

2.  Medieval  Churchmen  and  International  Law 74 

3.  The  Truce  of  God,  Chivalry,  Papal  Ambassadors. . .  77 

4.  The  Catholic  Ideal  of  Universal  Peace 81 

5.  Evolution  of  Professional  Diplomacy 85 


/( 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  DIPLOMACY 
IN  MODERN  TIMES 

by 

Hon.  James  Brown  Scott,  A.M.,    .U.D.,  LL.D. 
Secretary  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace 

1 .  Popular  Concept  of  Diplomats  and  Diplomacy 93 

2.  True  Functions  of  Diplomats  and  Diplomacy 95 

3.  The  Modern  State  System  and  the  Law  of  States.  .  96 

4.  The  Balance  of  Power,  Its  Nature  and  Application  99 

5.  The  Balance  of  Power  in  Modern  Times,  The  Holy 

AUiance 107 

6.  The  Content  of  Modern  Diplomacy 110 

7.  Arbitration,  Definition  and  Historical  Application.  .  112 

8.  International    Conferences — The    Ideal    of    Simon 

Bolivar 116 

9.  The  Hague  Conferences 120 

10.  The  United  States  as  an  Exemplification  of  Inter- 
national Organization 124 


CONTENTS 

ECONOMIC  FACTORS 
IN  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

hy 

Professor  James  Laurenc  Laughlin,  Ph.D.  (Harvard),  Ph  D. 
(honoris  causa,  Geissen),  formerly  of  the  University  of 
Chicago;  Director  of  the  Journal  of  Political  Economy. 

1.  Economics  and  Politics 133 

2.  Movements  of  Population 135 

3.  Foreign  Trade  and  Shipping 138 

4.  Economic  Postulates  of  Foreign  Trade 141 

5.  Foreign  Exchange 145 

6.  Financial  and  Industrial  Obstacles  to  International 

Peace 148 


SPECIFIC  AGENCIES  FOR  THE 

PROPER  CONDUCT 

OF  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

hy 

Hon.  John  Bassett  Moore,  LL.D.,  Professor  at  Columbia 
University;  formerly  Counsellor  of  the  Department  of 
State;  Member  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  The  Hague; 
Vice-President  of  the  Inter-American  High  Commission; 
Member  of  the  International  Commission  of  Jurists;  Presi- 
dent of  the  Pan-American  Society  of  the  United  States. 

1.  Amicable  Methods — Negotiations — Good  Offices — 

Mediation — Arbitration 157 

2.  Non- Amicable  Methods.    Non-Forcible,  Rupture  of 

Diplomatic  Relations.  Forcible,  Reprisals — Pa- 
cific Blockade,  War — Limited  War — General 
War 167 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  PRIVATE  LAW 

by 

The  Honorable  Est^ban  Gil  Borges,  LL.D.  (Georgetown) 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Venezuela 

1.  The  Evolution  of  International  Private  Law 185 


LATIN  AMERICA  AS  A 
FACTOR  IN  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

hy 

Hon.  Leo  S.  Rowe,  Ph.D., LL.D.,  Director  General  of  the  Pan- 
American  Union;  President  >  f  the  American  Academy  of 
Political  and  Social  Sciences. 


\.  The  Philosophy  of  American  History 203 

2.  Latin  American  Ideals — Bolivar 205 

3.  Sources  of  Potential  Influence  for  American  States.  208 

4.  Pan-American  Co-operation 210 

5.  The  Role  of  the  Americas 212 


THE  FAR  EAST  AS  A 
FACTOR  IN  INTERNATIONAL  DEVELOPMENTS 

by 

Eon.  Paul  S.  Reinsch,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.,  former  Minister  of  the 
United  States  to  China 

1.  China  before  contact  with  Western  civilization.  . .  .   219 

2.  Present-day  China 220 

3.  Relations  between  China  and  Japan  during  and  after 

the  World  War 223 

4.  China,  Japan  and  Siberia 225 


CONTENTS 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  FACTOR  IN  THE 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

hy 

Professor  Edwin  M.  Borchard,  LL.B.,  Ph.D., 

of  the  Law  School  of  Yale  University 

1.  The  Genesis  of  American  Foreign  Policy 229 

2.  Nature  of  Early  American  Policy 234 

3.  Monroe  Doctrine 235 

4.  Interpretation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 240 

5.  Foreign  Views  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine 244 

6.  Latin  America  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 248 

7.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  Far  East 251 

8.  Indirect  Influence  of  the  United  States  on  World 

Politics,  Neutrality — Recognition  —  Freedom   of 
the   Seas — Minor    Doctrines,  Contributions   and 

Policies 258 

Appendix 295 


PREFACE 

In  order  to  afford  the  students  of  the  School  of  Foreign 
Service  of  Georgetown  University  an  opportunity  to 
supplement  and  illustrate  their  classroom  work  by  a  rapid 
survey  of  the  principal  phases  in  the  history  of  relations 
between  sovereign  states  from  the  earliest  antiquity  down 
to  our  own  times,  the  authorities  of  the  School  have  un- 
dertaken to  invite,  each  year,  a  number  of  distinguished 
scholars,  each  a  master  in  his  respective  field,  to  deliver 
a  special  course~'ot~tectures"on  international  relations. 
The  first  fifteen  of  these  lectures  articulated  into  an 
organic  whole  and  entitled  "The  History  and  Nature  of 
International  Relations,"  were  delivered  in  the  Auditori- 
um of  the  National  Museum,  Washington,  D.  C,  and 
were  open  tO'  the  general  public.  The  presence,  in  grati- 
fying numbers,  of  the  general  public  on  alternate  Friday 
evenings  during  the  winter  and  spring  of  1920-1921 
furnished  abundant  proof  of  the  growing  interest  now 
being  manifested  by  thoughtful  Americans  as  well  in 
theories  of  Political  Science  as  in  the  actual  conduct  of 
our  foreign  relations. 

The  present  volume  reproduces  such  of  the  lectures 
as  have  been  judged  likely  to-  prove  of  permanent  value 
both  for  students  of  the  School  of  Foreign  Service  and 
for  general  readers  seeking  authoritative  guidance 
through  the  tangled  maze  of  world  politics. 

Whether  or  not  it  is  because  the  centre  of  political^ 
gravity  in  international  affairs  is  to  be  found  near,  if  not 
conterminous  with  the  centre  of  financial  gravity,  it  is 
beyond  dispute  that  the  CapiU^l  of  the  United  States,  at 
the  present  time,  has  become  the  focal  point  of  interest 
for  the  civilized  world.  It  was,  therefore,  never  more 
imperative  than  at  the  present  juncture  tO'  foster  scientific 
study  of  the  principles  and  practice  of  international  re- 


PREFACE 

lations  and  even  of  such  preambles  of  the  scienc, 
government  as  a  right  understanding  of  the  origin  of  civil 
society  and  its  first  postulate,  authority,  since  foreign 
policies  will  naturally  be  largely  influenced  by  the  phi- 
losophy underlying  the  decisions  of  those  who  direct  the 
destinies  of  states. 

The  gunfire  of  an  irresponsible  fanatic  at  Sarajevo, 
seven  years  ago,  unloosened  elemental  forces  that  not 
only  swept  crowns  and  thrones  into  the  discard  but  tore 
the  veil  of  respectability  from  a  certain  type  of  imported 
philosophy  extremely  popular  in  American  universities, 
during  the  last  two  generations,  but  not  professed  so  con- 
fidently since  August,  1914.  The  "scrap-of-paper"  so- 
lution of  embarrassing  difficulties  arising  out  of  inter- 
national obligations  is  a  logical  through  brutally  ex- 
pressed corollary  of  the  metaphysics  that  would  substitute 
expediency  and  the  pragmatic  sanction^  for  the  ethical 
basis  of  jurisprudence. 

^'  It  is  hoped  that  the  present  volume  will  clear  a  satis- 
factory approach  to  the  detailed  studies  of  the  various 
aspects  of  international  relations  which  this  series  will 
present  from  time  to  time. 

In  conclusion,  the  Editor  begs  to  express  to  the  Regents 
of  the  Smithsonian  Institution  the  thanks  of  the  author- 
ities of  the  School  of  Foreign  Service  for  the  use  of  the 
Auditorium  of  the  National  Museum;  acknowledgment 
of  great  indebtedness  is  likewise  made  to  Dr.  Constantine 
E.  McGuire  of  the  Inter-American  High  Commission  for 
his  untiring  labors  in  arranging  the  details  of  the  course, 
— tO'  Dr.  J.  Franklin  Jameson,  Department  of  Historical 
Research  of  the  Carnegie  Institution  of  Washington,  for 
his  gracious  words  of  introduction  on  the  occasion  of  the 
first  lecture,  and  to  Mr.  Thomas  H.  Healy,  Secretary  of 
the  School  of  Foreign  Service,  into  whose  capable  hands 
was  entrusted  the  important  but  thankless  task  of  cor- 
recting the  proofs  of  this  publication. 

August  8,  1 92 1. 

Edmund  A.  Walsh 


The  Fundamentals  in  a  Scientific 
Study  of  International   Relations 


THE    HISTORY    AND    NATURE    OF 
INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE   FUNDAMENTALS   IN  A   SCIENTIFIC   STUDY 
OF  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

The  reputations  not  only  of  individuals  but  also  of 
professions  have  suffered  as  a  result  of  the  Great  War. 
Probably  no  profession  has  fallen  more  in  public  esteem 
than  diplomacy.  The  accusations  against  the  diplomatist 
range  from  mere  stupidity  in  not  foreseeing  what  the 
course  of  events  would  be,  to  deliberate  intrigue  in  bring- 
ing about  the  course  of  events.  Practically  every  aspect 
of  diplomacy,  its  aims,  methods,  policies,  and  agents  have 
been  condemned.  No  course,  therefore,  on  the  History 
and  Nature  of  International  Relations  would  be  complete 
without  an  attempt  to  discover  how  modern  diplomacy 
originated,  of  what  its  essential  nature  consists,  whether 
its  methods  are  calculated  to  realize  its  aims,  how  far  its 
agents  can  be  held  responsible  for  results  and  whether  its 
defects  are  sO'  obvious  as  to  suggest  proper  methods  of 
reform.  It  would  be  futile  to  try  to  make  an  exhaustive 
analysis  of  the  subject  in  a  single  paper.  This  chapter, 
therefore,  will  consider  briefly  certain  elements  only 
which  a  scientific  study  should  include  and  the  criteria 
which  a  serious  student  should  employ. 


NATURE  OF  DIPLOMACY 


Diplomacy  is./.'i/i£.jari(?/  managing  the  intercourse,  and 
adjusting  the  rdatwjuhetziiccH  states  hyjiegotiation."    It 

1 


2  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

is  usually  studied  as  the  handmaid  of  international  law, 
but  it  is  in  greater  conformity  to  the  facts  of  history  to 
state  that  international  law  is  the  resultant  of  the  working 
of  diplomacy.  Were  international  law  to  be  entirely  swept 
away,  diplomacy  would  still  survive,  for  states  must  needs 
have  relations  with  one  another.  The  attitude  adopted  by 
one  state  to  another  or  to  others  during  negotiations  is 
determined  primarily  by  self-interest.  It  is  the  duty  of 
the  diplomatist  always  to  keep  the  security  and  dignity  of 
his  state  in  the  forefront  of  negotiations  and  to  enable  it  to 
attain  legitimate  ambitions  by  every  justifiable  means. 
If  a  state  has  a  settled  national  policy  in  foreign  affairs  his 
activities  must  look  to  the  maintenance  of  that  national 
policy.  During  practically  the  entire  nineteenth  century, 
the  British  government  had  as  the  cornerstone  of  its 
foreign  policy  the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  A  British  diplomat  who,  however 
much  he  might  disapprove  the  actions  of  the  Ottoman 
government,  failed  to  uphold  that  policy  would  have  soon 
been  rejected  by  government.  Parliament  and  people. 
Similarly  no  place  can  be  found  in  the  American  diplo- 
matic service  for  an  official  who  neglects  to  maintain  the 
integrity  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  diplomatist  labors 
under  the  consciousness  that  every  foreign  diplomat  with 
whom  he  negotiates,  labors  with  an  aim  in  view  similar 
to  his  own.  The  diplomatist  works,  moreover,  in  a  field 
where  the  unforeseen  may  modify  conditions  at  any 
moment,  but  he  is  nevertheless  held  responsible  for  results. 
He  is  not  a  free  agent.  If  he  is  a  representative  of 
his  country  abroad,  his  actions  and  decisions  may  be 
influenced  and  even  determined  by  telegraphic  orders 
from  home,  however  much  against  his  will.  If  he  is  in 
the  Foreign  Office  at  home,  he  works  in  the  knowledge 
that  he  must  carry  the  legislature  or  its  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  with  him  when  he  is  part  of  a  parlia- 
mentary regime,  or  carry  the  Senate  with  him  if  he  is 
part  of  the  American  system.     This  may  compel  him  to 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  3 

follow  a  policy  and  agree  to  decisions  for  which  he 
personally  has  no  liking. 

''Open  diplomacy"  is  one  of  the  reforms  most  loudly 
demanded  today.  The  complaint  is  made  that  diplo- 
matists bring  negotiations  to  a  conclusion  without  keeping 
the  public  informed  or  without  consulting  the  representa- 
tives of  the  people  who,  they  say,  have  little  to  do  with 
the  conduct  of  foreign  policy  except  tO'  ratify  whatever 
decisions  are  placed  before  them.  Such  criticism  neglects 
to  take  intO'  consideration  the  fact  that  in  foreign  affairs 
one  country  is  dealing  with  matters  that  do  not  concern 
itself  alone.  It  frequently  deals  with  secrets  which  it 
must  share  with  other  countries.  A  premature  disclosure 
might  result  in  the  breaking  off  of  negotiations  altogether 
by  another  power,  for  that  other  power  may  follow 
methods  wholly  at  variance  with  freedom  of  discussion 
and  unrestrained  publicity.  Diplomatic  negotiations, 
moreover,  are  frequently  of  a  delicate  nature,  involving 
national  predilections  which  cannot  be  overlooked.  To 
attempt  to  discuss  everything  in  public  would  often  offend 
national  pride,  arouse  international  antagonisms  and 
render  impossible  the  give-and-take  so  necessary  to  the 
successful  conclusions  of  negotiations,  for  both  sides 
have  rights  to  guard  and  national  points  of  view  to  real- 
ize. A  wise  diplomat  may  render  during  negotiations 
the  greatest  service  to  the  public  interest  by  ignoring 
popular  clamor  for  full  information  even  when  voiced 
in  the  legislature.  Lord  Lyons  did  much  to  solve  a  seri- 
ous situation  when  he  deliberately  and  courageously  re- 
frained from  giving  any  opinion  of  his  own  in  the  Trent 
affair. 

Then,  too,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  in  many  cases 
diplomatic  negotiations  have  to  do  with  subjects  a  knowl- 
edge of  whose  technical  details  requires  special  informa- 
tion or  which  would  have  little  interest  for  the  general 
public,  or  in  which  many  sources  of  valuable  information 
would  dry  up  entirely  were  publicity  given  to  them.     It 


4  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

is  certainly  true  that  a  ministry  which  neglects  to  obtain 
the  support  of  public  opinion  whenever  possible  loses  an 
immense  force  in  securing  the  adoption  of  its  foreign  pol- 
icy. The  real  statesman  is  he  who  will  constantly  seek 
to  instruct  public  opinion  in  his  international  policy  so 
as  to  carry  it  with  him  in  time  of  crisis.  Recent  events 
have  shown  how  readily  public  opinion  will  respond  to 
the  activities  of  the  propagandist  in  such  times.  States- 
men and  diplomatists  are  at  least  partially  informed  on 
international  affairs.  There  would  be  little  profit  in  turn- 
ing from  them  to  an  ill  informed  public  opinion  for  leader- 
ship. Moreover,  it  is  a  question  whether  popular  assem- 
blies are  more  likely  to  keep  the  peace  than  statesmen 
and  diplomatists,  especiall}^  when  laboring  under  the 
stress  of  nationalist  excitement.  It  did  not  prove  so  in 
the  United  States  at  the  time  of  the  Spanish  War.  It  is 
a  question,  therefore,  whether  even  on  the  grounds  of 
theory,  "open  diplomacy"  in  the  extreme  sense  would  af- 
fect the  conduct  of  international  affairs  for  the  better. 
Finally,  as  will  be  considered  at  greater  length  later  in 
this  chapter,  most  governmental  systems  of  today  afford 
the  representatives  of  the  people  fair  opportunity  if  they 
wish  to  use  it,  to  see  to  it  that  the  international  relations 
of  the  country  are  carried  on  not  only  to  advance  the 
national  interests  but  in  accordance  with  good  faith  and 
honorable  conduct.^ 

II 

HISTORY  OF  DIPLOMACY 

Diplomacy  ^yas  originally  the  servant  of  war  when  war 
was  the  normal  state  of  international  intercourse.  It 
was  an  agency  to  secure  without  fighting  the  ends  for 
which   war  was   waged.      Today  the  positions   are   re- 

^No  student  of  diplomacy  should  fail  to  study  carefully  the  discus- 
sions on  publicity  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  policy  as  found  in  Han- 
sard's Parliamentary  Debates  passim  and  in  the  Report  from  the  Select 
Committee  on  the  Diplomatic  Service,  1861.  The  latter  is  an  invaluable 
statement. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  5 

versed,  and  war,  when  it  takes  place,  is  the  outcome  of 
diplomacy.  The  present  status  of  diplomacy  is  the  result 
of  an  evolution  in  which  is  discernible  a  movement  away 
from  a  condition  in  which  falsehood,  chicane,  and  exces- 
sive formalism  prevailed  in  international  relations,  to  one 
characterized  by  honorable  conduct  among  the  negotia- 
tors, and  by  business  methods  in  procedure.  Diplomacy 
is  one  of  the  products  of  the  Renaissance.  Intercourse 
between  nations  existed,  of  course,  from  time  imm^mo- 
riaTf^l  diplomacy,  as  defined  in  this  paper,  viz.:  "The 
art  ofmanaging  tJie  intercourse  and  adjusting  the  rela-  \  ^ 
tions  betzveen  states  by  negotiations"  dates  from  the  rise 
of  permanent  embassies.  Feudalism  had  little  place  for 
diplomacy,  but  _the  Italy  of  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth 
centuries  anticipated,  in  miniature,  Europe  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  Intense  rivalry  existed  between  the  little 
states  into  which  northern  and  central  Italy  were  divi- 
ded, and  for  self-preservation  alliances  and  ententes  were 
necessary  to  maintain  the  balance  of  power.  This  object 
could  not  be  accomplished  by  temporary  embassies,  such 
as  those  of  the  middle  ages,  which  were  sent  to  accom- 
plish some  specific  purpose  and  were  disbanded  immedi- 
ately afterward.  Permanent  representatives  were  neces- 
sary who  were  to  be  "the  eyes  and  ears"  of  their  states 
at  the  foreign  courts.  Of  all  these  early  Italian  states  " 
Venice^jiaid  most  at  stake  and  it  was  natural  that  she 
should  first  estaBIisTi"  permanent  embassies  and  develop 
a  professional  diplomatic  class.  Her  example  was  fol- 
lowed in  course  of  time  not  only  by  all  the  Italian  states 
but  by  the  national  states  that  slowly  developed  in  west- 
em  Europe  such  as  Spain,  France  and  England,  and  by 
the  Empire.  The  permanent  embassy  had  become  the 
normal  agency  of  international  intercourse  by  the  middle 
of  the  sixteenth  century.  But  it  was  looked  upon  as  a 
necessary  evil,  the  home  government  trusting  its  repre- 
sentative abroad  none  too  much  and  the  government  to 
which  he  was  sent  viewing  him  with  extreme  suspicion. 
At  first,  Venetian  ambassadors  were  sent  for  short  terms 


6  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

of  three  or  four  months,  and  the  term  was  only  gradu- 
ally lengthened  to  three  years,  at  which  it  remained  until 
the  Republic  was  abolished  by  Napoleon.  Moreover, 
from  the  very  founding  of  the  permanent  embassy  Venice 
laid  down  rules  to  be  followed  by  its  ambassadors  abroad 
and  required  them  to  make  comprehensive  reports  to  the 
Senate  of  their  observations  and  activities/ 

The  suspicion  with  which  foreign  ambassadors  were 
viewed  at  first  is  well  illustrated  by  the  practice  of  the 
three  great  monarchs  of  the  Renaissance,  Charles  V, 
Francis  I  and  Henry  VHI  of  interpreting  the  phrase 
"ambassador  near  the  court"  to  keep  ambassadors  as  far 
as  possible  away  from  the  court.  Nor  did  these  mon- 
archs scruple  to  open  and  examine  the  correspondence  of 
foreign  ambassadors.  The  diplomatist,  it  must  be  admit- 
ted, had  early  earned  a  bad  reputation,  but  it  is  ques- 
tionable how  justifiably.  The  prudent  suggestions  made 
by  Machiavelli  in  The  Prince  for  the  guidance  of  states- 
men accurately  reflected  the  spirit  of  the  times  though 
they  frequently  were  much  overstepped  in  actual  prac- 
tice by  ambassadors.  Sir  Henry  Wotton's  definition  of 
an  ambassador,  "mi  honest  man  sent  to  lie  abroad  for 
the  good  of  his  country"  is  fairly  descriptive  of  the  atti- 
tude of  his  day,  that  of  James  I.  The  Father  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Grotius,^  whose  great  work  De  Jure  Belli 
ac  Pads  was  published  in  1625,  viewed  the  permanent 
ambassador  with  scant  sympathy  and  maintained  that  he 
had  no  right  of  existence.  The  growth  in  the  impor- 
tance of  the  office,  however,  is  well  illustrated  by  the 
statement  of  Vattel  whose  La  Droit  des  Gens  was  pub- 
lished in  1758,  that,  though  there  is  no  obligation  on  the 
part  of   a   sovereign   to  accept  a  permanent  ambassador 


*The  fifteen  volumes  into  which  these  reports  have  been  collected 
provide  invaluable  material  for  the  student  who  can  read  Italian  and 
is  interested  in  the  history  of  the  states  of  Western  Europe. 

*For  discussion  of  Grotius'  place  in  International  Law,  see  Ap- 
pendix. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  7 

it  is  necessary  as  a  matter  of  convenience,  comity  and 
custom.^ 

The  eighteenth  century  was  the  period  par  excellence 
when  dynastic  interests  controlled  international  rela- 
tions. The  ambassador,  as  the  personal  representative 
of  the  sovereigrij^occupied  a  place  in  the  affairs  of  the 
day  second  only  in  importance  to  that  of  the  sovereign 
himself.  The  ceremoniousness  emphasized  in  official 
life  by  Louis  XIV,  and  copied  from  Versailles  through- 
out Europe,  demanded  certain  qualities  in  an  ambassa- 
dor such  as  smooth  and  attractive  manners,  shrewdness 
and  the  art  of  using  personal  influence  in  managing 
men.  As  these  could  be  acquired  best  at  court,  the  prac- 
tice arose  of  young  men  of  rank  becoming  attached  to 
embassies  for  the  express  purpose  of  learning  the  art 
of  diplomacy.  Diplomacy  became  an  aristocratic  pro- 
fession. At  the  same  time  it  became  a  hierarchial  pro- 
fession. Down  almost  to  the  sixteenth  century  no  dis- 
tinction of  rank  existed  among  the  diplomatic  represent 
tatives  at  a  court  though  various  titl.es  were  used  in  re- 
ferring to  them.  But  the  desire  of  the  rulers  of  big 
states  to  be  differentiated  from  those  of  little  states 
caused  a  distinction  between  Ambassador  and  Resident 
to  develop  during  that  century.  The  process  of  differ- 
entiation determined  not  by  questions  of  function  but  of 
dignity  continued  down  to  the  Congress  of  Vienna  of 
1815, -when  regulations  were  adopted  which  were  con- 
firmed at  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  of  18 18  di- 
viding diplomatic  agents  into  four  classes : 

(i)     Ambassadors,  legates,  nuncios. 

(2)  Envoys  extraordinary  and  ministers  plenipo- 

tentiary. 

(3)  Ministers  Resident  accredited  to   the  sover- 

eign. 


^To  understand  the  real  status  of  the  ambassador  at  the  beginning 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  student  of  diplomacy  should  study 
Callieres  De  la  Manicre  de  negocier  avec  les  souverains,  published  in 
1716  and  which  still  remains  authoritative  in  its  field. 


8  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

(4)     Charges  d'affaires  accredited  to  the  Foreign 
office} 

As  these  ranks  have  only  ceremonial  value,  and  do 
not  affect  either  the  functions  or  powers  of  diplomatic 
representatives,  the  United  States  ignored  them  and  ac- 
credited all  its  principal  diplomatic  agents  as  ministers 
plenipotentiary,  i.  e.,  ministers  of  full  power  and  au- 
thority. In  1893,  however,  Congress  enacted  legisla- 
tion whose  practical  effect  was  to  authorize  the  Presi- 
dent to  conform  to  the  practice  which  prevailed  among 
other  nations.  During  the  nineteenth  century  the  heart- 
burnings formerly  caused  by  the  question  of  precedence 
among  diplomatic  agents  were  extinguished  by  the  sim- 
ple rule  of  seniority  of  appointment  and  in  the  case  of 
signatures  to  treaties  by  an  appeal  to  the  alphabet. 

Th^___FVenc}L-R^valuticm  with  its  emphasis  upon  the 
political  principles  of  nationality  and  democracy  had  a 
profound  influence  upon  the  qualities  demanded  of  a 
diplomatist.  The  ambassador  no  longer  represents  a 
sovereign  to  a  sovereign  but  a  nation  to  a  natijou.    More- 


over, the  nineteenth  century  has  been  one  of  great  in- 
ternational congresses  in  which  the  duty  of  considering 
the  common  interests  of  Europe  or  of  the  world  has 
become  a  function  of  diplomacy.  A  knowledge  of  his- 
tory, geography,  international  law  and  political  psychol- 
ogy became  of  greater  importance  in  the  ambassador 
than  the  personal  qualities  of  suavity  and  astuteness, 
though  these  are  by  no  means  negligible  even  now. 
Again,  the  Industrial  Revolution,  emphasizing  the  place 
of  the  economic  element  in  the  affairs  of  men,  has  re- 
sulted in  the  need  in  the  diplomatist  of  today  of  a 
knowledge  of  such  subjects  as  the  laws  and  conditions 
of  trade  and  the  general  principles  of  international 
finance.  It  must  not  be  overlooked  that  the  commercial 
purposes  of  diplomacy  tend  constantly  to  become  more 


*The  duties,  privileges  and  functions  of  these  diplomatic  agents  are 
discussed  somewhat  in  detail  in  chapter  beginning  on  page  157. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  9 

prominent.  These  qualities  demanded  by  modern  con- 
ditions were  seldom  to  be  secured  by  the  choice  of  a 
diplomatic  agent  dictated  by  favoritism  or  politics. 
Hence  in  nearly  all  the  great  countries  of  the  world 
the  management  of  international  intercourse  has  passed 
into  the  hands  of  a  trained  diplomatic  class.  At  first 
the  method  of  training  was  that  of  apprenticeship,  but 
this  gave  way  later  to  university  preparation  followed 
by  examination.  No  nation  compares  with  France  in 
the  facilities  of  preparation  for  the  diplomatic  career. 
The  Ecole  Libre  des  Science  politiqites  with  its  array  of 
courses  in  history,  geography,  politics,  economics,  in- 
ternational law  and  history  of  diplomacy  and  with  its 
eminent  teachers  drawn  from  the  courts,  the  govern- 
ment service,  and  practical  life  as  well  as  from  the  uni- 
versity provides  today  at  least  eighty  per  cent  of  those 
who  enter  the  French  diplomatic  service.  In  this  de- 
velopment, the  United  States,  chiefly  because  of  the 
comparative  simplicity  of  its  foreign  relations  in  the 
past,  has  lagged  behind  the  other  great  nations.  But 
her  immense  commercial  expansion  and  her  participa- 
tion in  the  solution  of  the  intricate  international  prob- 
lems that  face  the  statesman  of  today  will  compel  her  to 
adopt  the  reform  of  her  diplomatic  service  if  she  is 
properly  to  look  after  the  security,  the  dignity  and  the 
interests  of  the  nation.^ 

Ill 

THE  AGENTS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

The  conduct  of  the  international  relations  of  a  coun- 
try  is   essentially   an   executive   function.      Historically, 


^For  the  further  consideration  of  the  history  of  diplomacy  the  stu- 
dent is  referred  to  Henry  Wheaton,  History  of  the  Lazv  of  Nations  in 
Europe  and  America,  1845;  Debidour,  Historie  diplomatique  de 
I'Europe  contemporaine  1814-1914;  J.  B.  Moore,  American  Diplomacy, 
1905;  D.  J.  Hill,  History  of  European  Diplomacy,  1905;  and  J.  W. 
Foster,  The  Practice  of  Diplomacy,  1906. 


10  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

the  monarch  was  the  state  and  when  his  powers  were 
gradually  distributed  among  the  organs  of  government 
the  duty  of  speaking  and  acting  for  the  state  naturally 
remained  with  the  executive.  Few  will  deny  that  legis- 
latures are  unsuited  to  originate  and  determine  the  for- 
eign policy  of  a  country  and  conduct  delicate  negotia- 
tions, which  are  of  necessity  often  complicated  and 
where  the  issues  involved  may  be  momentous.  In  no 
constitutional  country,  however,  is  the  executive  power 
irresponsible  in  international  relations.  It  is  everywhere 
subject  to  the  intervention  of  the  legislative  power, 
though  the  method  of  intervention  differs.  This  con- 
trol, however,  extends  to  particular  questions  of  foreign 
affairs  rather  than  to  foreign  policy  generally.  In  the 
United  States  each  administration  pursues  policies  with- 
out any  legislative  control  whatever  unless  the  policies 
require  the  passage  of  treaties  or  laws.  For  example, 
the  Taft  administration  encouraged  the  financial  con- 
sortium in  China.  The  Wilson  administration  discour- 
aged it.  And  in  the  countries  organized  upon  the  par- 
liamentary system,  while  the  legislative  control  is  more 
direct,  it  rarely  attempts  to  interfere   with  policy. 

Under  modern  conditions  the  chief  agencies  acting 
for  the  executive  in  the  conduct  of  international  rela- 
tions are: 

(i)  The  Department  of  State  or  Ministry  of  For- 
eign Affadrs. 

(2)  Regular  diplomatic  agents  of  various  grades 
ranging  from  ambassadors  to  charges  d'af- 
faires. 

(3)  Occasional  or  special  agents  appointed  to  realize 
some  particular  object. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  paper  they  need  but  a  very 
brief  discussion. 

(A)  The  Department  of  State  or  Ministry  of  For- 
eign Affairs.     The  public  law  of  every  state,  whether 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  11 

written  or  customary,  provides  for  a  Ministry  of  For- 
eign Affairs  or  a  Department  of  State  composed  of  a 
trained  body  of  permanent  officials  headed  by  a  member 
of  the  cabinet  whose  duty  it  is  to  handle  the  interna- 
tional relations  of  the  country.  As  early  as  the  six- 
teenth century  most  of  the  European  monarchies  had 
established  a  special  branch  of  the  government  for  the 
conduct  of  foreign  affairs,  and  the  office  has  steadily 
grown  in  influence  and  dignity.  Though  the  powers 
of  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  vary  according  to 
the  political  organization  of  different  states,  he  is  near- 
ly everywhere  the  regular  intermediary  between  his 
country  and  foreign  countries  from  whom  all  directions 
and  communications  to  foreign  states  emanate  and  by 
whom  all  directions  and  communications  from  foreign 
states  are  received.  In  Great  Britain,  for  example,  nei- 
ther the  sovereign  nor  parliament  can  give  orders  di- 
rectly to  diplomatic  agents. 

(B)  Regular  Diplomatic  Agents  Abroad.  Since 
the  status  of  ambassadors  and  subordinate  diplomatic 
agents  has  already  been  discussed,  only  their  relations 
with  the  chief  of  the  foreign  office  need  to  be  consid- 
ered here.  Before  the  invention  of  the  telegraph,  the 
position  of  ambassador  was  undoubtedly  one  of  greater 
responsibility  than  today.  A  great  deal  was  left  to  his 
discretion  and  good  judgment  because  by  the  time  in- 
structions were  received  from  home  conditions  might 
so  have  changed  as  to  render  them  out  of  date.  Fre- 
quently he  had  to  act  upon  his  own  initiative  when  a 
difficult  question  arose.  Today  he  can  receive  telegraph- 
ic directions  from  home.  The  result  has  been  to  en- 
able the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  have  a  more 
immediate  control  of  negotiations  than  formerly.  Prob- 
ably the  conduct  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  thereby  become 
more  steady  and  reliable.  And  yet  it  is  a  question 
whether  the  opinion  of  the  man  at  the  distant  post, 
familiar  not  only  with  the  facts  but  with  the  psychology 
surrounding  the  problem,  is  not  as  important  today  as 


12  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

ever.  Official  correspondence  which  must  be  puhlished 
has  become  formal.  For  example,  it  is  now  the  general 
practice  for  diplomatic  agents  abroad  to  repeat  conver- 
sations with  foreign  ministers  of  state  without  com- 
ment. But  there  is  much  unofficial  correspondence  of 
an  intimate  nature  between  the  agent  abroad  and  the 
minister  at  home,  a  correspondence  moreover  which 
usually  remains  private.  The  importance,  therefore,  to 
the  student  of  diplomacy  of  a  study  of  the  memoirs  of 
statesmen  and  diplomatists  is  obvious.  Telegraphic 
communication  has  obviated  the  necessity  of  the  long 
and  detailed  instructions  that  were  formerly  given  to 
diplomatic  agents  abroad.  One  of  the  unfortunate  in- 
cidental results  for  the  student  was  the  discontinuance 
of  such  collections  as  that  mine  of  information  the 
French  Recueil  des  Instructions  domic es  mix  Amhassa- 
deiirs  et  Ministers  de  France  depnis  les  Traites  de  West- 
phalic  jusqu'a  la  Revolution  Frangaise. 

(C)  Occasional  or  Special  Diplomatic  Agents.  Dur- 
ing the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  monarchs 
frequently  sent  secret  agents  abroad,  sometimes  to  real- 
ize a  particular  object,  sometimes  to  report  on  condi- 
tions without  the  knowledge  of  the  regular  representa- 
tive. That  the  latter  practice  had  not  completely  dis- 
appeared even  in  our  own  day  was  made  evident  in  the 
Lichnowsky  revelations.  Experience  justifies  the  belief 
that  the  practice  can  hardly  fail  to  affect  the  diplomacy 
of  the  country  unfavorably,  making  it  uncertain  and 
personal.  When  a  special  agent  is  appointed  today  for 
a  particular  object,  he  is  usually  an  expert  such  as  may 
be  needed  to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  commerce  or  regu- 
late a  boundary  dispute  or  other  matter  outside  the  scope 
of  the  regular  diplomatic  representative.  When  a  spe- 
cial embassy  has  a  merely  ceremonial  character,  it  may 
result  in  the  increase  of  international  good-will.  When 
it  is  of  a  political  nature,  the  speculation  and  even  sus- 
picion that  are  roused  may  render  such  a  result  dubious. 
A   special  agent  of  a  political  nature  is  likely  also  to 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  13 

rouse  resentment  among  the  members  of  the  permanent 

embassy/ 

IV 

LEGISLATIVE    INTERVENTION    IN     THE    CONDUCT    OF    IN- 
TERNATIONAL   RELATIONS 

The  student  of  international  relations  must  not  over- 
look the  fact  that  the  problem  of  control  is  one  of  con- 
stitutional law  and  that  his  study,  therefore,  must  deal 
with  the  internal  structure  of  the  state  as  well  as  its  ex- 
ternal activities.  This  is  particularly  important  in  con- 
sidering what  is  vaguely  called  "secret  diplomacy" ,  a 
term  which  is  variously  defined  but  by  which  the  im- 
pression is  generally  conveyed  that  the  nation  may  be 
committed  to  policies  or  decisions  by  statesmen  or  di- 
plomatists without  the  knowledge  of  its  representatives. 
The  justification  of  the  charge  can  readily  be  tested  by 
a  brief  consideration  of  the  constitutional  prescriptions 
for  the  conduct  of  international  relations  as  found  in 
the  chief  states  of  the  world. 

France — The  French  constitution  in  Article  VIII  pro- 
vides that  "the  President  of  the  Republic  shall  nego- 
tiate and  ratify  treaties  with  foreign  countries  and  com- 
municate their  contents  to  the  two  Houses  as  soon  as  it 
IS  compatible  with  a  due  regard  to  the  security  and  in- 
terests of  the  state.  Treaties  of  peace  and  commerce, 
treaties  zuhich  affect  the  finances  of  the  state,  the  status 
of  persons  and  the  rights  of  property  of  French  citizens 
abroad,  are  only  binding  after  they  have  been  approved 
by  a  vote  of  the  two  Houses.  No  cession,  exchange  or 
acquisition  of  territory  may  take  place  without  a  law 
being  passed  to  authorize  it". 

*The  whole  ground  covered  thus  far  in  this  chapter  is  fully  treated 
in  Le  Guide  Diplomatique,  Martens  (Charles  de)  which  has  been  the 
standard  work.  It  is  to  some  extent  superseded  by  A  Guide  to  Diplo- 
matic Practice,  Satow  (Sir  Ernest)  1917;  an  excellent  summary  of 
the  subject  is  made  in  Diplomacy  and  the  Study  of  International  Relet- 
tions,  Heatley,   (D.  P.),  1919. 


14  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

Parliamentary  control  over  the  conduct  of  interna- 
tional relations  is  vested  primarily  in  the  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Committee  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  which  re- 
ports to  the  Chamber  on  all  questions  which  are  sub- 
mitted to  it.  It  can  demand  that  the  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  refer  to  it  whatever  papers  or  persons  it 
wishes  to  examine.  Should  the  Minister  decline  to  ac- 
cede to  its  request  on  account  of  reasons  of  State,  the 
Committee  usually  acquiesces  in  his  view.  If  the  Com- 
mittee, however,  persists  in  its  demand,  the  matter  is 
brought  before  the  Chamber  and  if  the  Chamber  sup- 
ports the  Committee,  the  almost  inevitable  result  is  that 
the  Ministry  of  the  day  resigns. 

The  second  element  of  legislative  control  resides  in 
the  privileg-e  of  interpellation  respecting  foreign  affairs 
on  the  part  of  individual  deputies  who  usually  speak  in 
the  name  of  some  political  group.  The  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  may  answer  at  once  or  he  may  request 
the  Chamber  to  postpone  consideration  to  a  later  date 
or  to  join  the  question  to  others  of  which  notice  has  been 
given  so  as  to  form  a  general  debate  on  foreign  policy. 
These  interpellations  and  general  debates  afford  excel- 
lent opportunity  for  the  instruction  of  public  opinion. 

The  third  element  of  legislative  control  resides  in  the 
General  Budget  Committee  of  the  Chamber,  the  most 
important  and  powerful  of  all  the  legislative  committees 
which  passes  upon  the  budget  for  foreign  affairs.  It 
seldom  rejects  it.  The  Budget  Committee,  moreover, 
publishes  at  the  end  of  every  year  a  report  on  foreign 
affairs  which  is  a  valuable  record  of  French  policy. 
The  report  is  usually  written  in  a  sympathetic  and  ex- 
planatory tone.  In  fact,  because  of  the  delicate  and 
complicated  nature  of  European  diplomacy  and  the  un- 
usual need  in  France  of  considering  the  security  of  the 
State  above  all  things,  there  has  been  little  desire  or 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  to 
exert  control  over  foreign  policy.  This  has  been  even 
more  true  of  the  Senate  which  has  no  permanent  com- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  15 

mittee  on  foreign  affairs.  Bills  submitted  to  the  Senate 
concerning  international  relations  are  referred  to  a  spe- 
cial committee  or  when  the  matter  is  pressing,  to  the 
Senate  Finance  Committee.  The  French  system  ob- 
tains in  most  of  the  countries  of  continental  Europe. 

Germany — The  Imperial  German  constitution  in  Ar- 
ticle II  provided  that  "the  Emperor  shall  represent  the 
Empire  among  nations,  declare  war  and  conclude  peace 
in  the  name  of  the  same,  enter  into  alliances  and  other 
conventions  with  foreign  countries,  accredit  and  receive 
ambassadors"  Elsewhere  it  was  provided  "that  the 
Chancellor  of  the  Empire',  who  shall  be  appointed  by  the 
Emperor,  shall  be  chairman  of  the  Federal  Council,  and 
shall  conduct  its  business.  .  .  .  The  commands  and  de- 
mands of  the  Emperor  .  .  .  shall  require  for  their  valid- 
ity the  signature  of  the  Chancellor,  who  thereby  as- 
sumes the  responsibility." 

Evidently  under  the  imperial  regime  in  Germany  the 
conduct  of  international  relations  was  an  attribute  of 
the  Chancellor  and  his  responsibility  respecting  them 
was  to  the  organ  of  government  which  gave  him  his 
authority.  What  that  organ  was  was  debatable.  The 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  merely  the  subordinate 
of  the  Chancellor.  What  legislative  control  of  interna- 
tion  relations  was  there,  if  any? 

Article  VIII  of  the  Constitution  provided  "there  shall 
be  appointed  in  the  Federal  Council  a  Committee  on  For- 
eign Affairs  over  which  Bavaria  shall  preside,  to  he 
composed  of  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  kingdoms  of 
Bavaria,  Saxony,  and  Wurtenburg  and  of  tzvo  plenipo- 
tentiaries of  other  states  of  the  Empire,  ivho  shall  be 
elected  annually  by  the  Federal  Council."  This  commit- 
tee existed  solely  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  informa- 
tion on  foreign  affairs  which  was  usually  given  by  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  himself  and  for  providing  means 
for  an  exchange  of  views.  It  had  no  control,  exerted 
little  influence,  and  between  1871  and  1908  met  but 
twice.      As   a  result   of   Emperor   William's    celebrated 


16  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

interview  on  the  international  situation  in  1908  which 
was  published  in  the  London  Telegraph  and  which 
caused  a  demand  in  Germany  that  he  refrain  from  such 
disclosures  in  the  future,  it  became  the  practice  of  Ba- 
varia to  call  meetings  of  the  committee  in  connection 
with  any  foreign  question  of  great  magnitude  and  last- 
ing public  interest. 

Almost  as  slight  was  the  Reichstag's  control  in  inter- 
national relations.  It  had  no  committee  on  Foreign  Af- 
fairs. In  practice  it  could  deal  with  questions  of  for- 
eign policy  first  by  means  of  interpellations.  When  an 
interpellation  signed  by  thirty  members  was  reached  on 
the  order  of  the  day,  the  President  of  the  Reichstag 
asked  the  Chancellor  "whether  and  zvhen"  he  would  an- 
swer the  interpellation.  If  the  Chancellor  consented  to 
answer,  the  interpellator  presented  his  views,  the  Chan- 
cellor or  his  representative  replied  and  a  debate  followed 
if  desired  by  at  least  fifty  members.  But,  previous  to 
1913,  motions  on  the  subject  of  the  interpellation  were 
not  permitted.  In  fact,  the  knowledge  that  the  Chan- 
cellor or  his  representative  would  not  participate  in  the 
debate  on  a  critical  motion,  and  that,  even  if  the  mo- 
tion were  carried  it  would  be  merely  an  academic  ex- 
pression of  opinion,  was  an  effective  check  to  the  pres- 
entation of  such  a  motion.  Few  such  motions  or  inter- 
pellations  were  made   in   practice. 

The  other  method  of  exercising  legislative  control 
of  international  relations  was  by  means  of  the  Budget 
Committee  of  the  Reichstag  to  which  the  estimates  for 
the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  were  submitted.  The 
Committee  had  not  the  right,  however,  to  send  for  per- 
sons, papers  or  records,  but  it  could  and  often  did  re- 
quest the  President  of  the  Reichstag  to  do  so.  Confi- 
dential communications  were  made  to  it  at  the  discre- 
tion of  the  Chancellor.  The  proceedings  of  the  Com- 
mittee were  secret  but  a  verbal  report  was  made  to  the 
Reichstag  and  there  frequently  followed  considerable 
debate. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  17 

It  is  obvious  that,  under  the  Empire,  the  German  con- 
stitution provided  but  sHght  opportunity  for  legislative 
intervention  in  the  conduct  of  international  relations  by 
the  executive  and  that  in  practice  little  interference  took 
place.  The  Constitution  of  the  new  German  Common- 
wealth gives  much  greater  opportunity  for  legislative 
control.  Article  45  reads,  "The  National  President  rep- 
resents the  Commonwealth  in  matters  of  international 
laztK  He  concludes  in  the  na'me  of  the  Commonwealth 
alliances  and  other  treaties  with  foreign  powers.  He 
accredits  and  receives  ambassadors."  Article  35  reads, 
''The  National  Assembly  appoints  a  Standing  Commit- 
tee on  Foreign  Affairs  ivhich  may  also  act  outside  of  the 
sittings  of  the  National  Assembly,  and  after  its  expira- 
tion or  dissolution  until  a  new  National  Assembly  con- 
venes. Its  sittings  are  not  public,  unless  the  Committee 
by  a  two-thirds  vote  otherzmse  provides."  No  provision 
is  made  for  a  similar  committee  in  the  National  Coun- 
cil, which  supersedes  the  Bundesrat  of  the  Imperial 
regime.  The  resemblance  tO'  the  American  system  of 
control  is  obvious,  but  it  is  too  soon  to  pass  judgment 
upon  the  actual  working  of  the  German  republican  sys- 
tem. 

Great  Britain — According  to  the  public  law  of  Great 
Britain,  the  whole  conduct  of  international  relations  is 
vested  in  the  Crown.  The  Ministry  which  acts  in  the 
name  of  the  Crown  and  assumes  responsibility  for  its 
acts  depends  for  its  tenure  upon  maintaining  a  major- 
ity in  the  House  of  Commons.  Its  control  over  foreign 
affairs  is,  therefore,  responsible  in  form  and  has  be- 
come in  practice  more  and  more  prudent.  Parliament 
has  no  committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  and  its  interven- 
tion in  international  relations  is  made  first  through  inter- 
pellations. These  are  answered  in  person  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  or  by  an  Under-Sec- 
retary, usually  with  considerable  frankness.  The  plea 
on  the  part  of  the  Foreign  Secretary  that  fuller  infor- 
mation would  not  be  for  the  best  interests  of  the  State 


18  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

is  generally  accepted.  An  adverse  vote  would  mean  the 
resig-nation  of  the  ministry  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  collective  responsibility.  The  other  method  foi; 
legislative  intervention  in  international  relations  is 
through  the  voting  of  the  foreign  office  budget  when 
international  commitments  may  come  under  discussion. 
Before  the  war  these  discussions  were  not  keen  and  Sir 
Edward  Grey  probably  spoke  wisely  when  he  said  on 
the  occasion  of  one  such  debate  "As  long  as  the  House 
of  Commons  remains  without  some  great  measure  of 
devolution,  its  business  will  he  so  congested  that,  with 
the  best  will  in  the  world,  the  House  would  never  be 
able  to  acquire  that  control  of  imperial  policy  which  it 
cam,  only  acquire  by  frequent  debates  on  important  sub- 
jects." In  proof  of  this,  one  responsible  writer  has  cal- 
culated that  in  the  first  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century 
26  per  cent  of  the  debates  in  the  House  of  Commons 
were  devoted  to  foreign  relations,  whereas  in  the  last 
decade  but  one,  the  per  cent  was  but  eleven.^ 

Apparently  the  House  of  Commons  itself  believes 
that  it  can  exercise  effective  control  over  the  conduct  of 
international  relations  by  the  ordinary  processes  of  leg- 
islation, for  in  March,  19 18,  after  public  opinion  had 
been  much  roused  over  the  disclosures  of  the  secret 
treaties,  it  voted  down  the  following  motion:  "That,  in 
the  opinion  of  this  House,  a  Standing  Committee  of 
Foreign  Affairs  should  be  appointed,  representative  of 
all  parties  and  groups  in  the  House,  in  order  that  a 
regular  channel  of  communication  may  be  established 
between  the  Foreign  Secretary  and  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, which  will  afford  him  frequent  opportunities  of 
giving  information  on  questions  of  foreign  policy  and 
which,  by  allowing  members  to  acquaint  themselves 
more  fully  with  current  international  problems,  will  en- 
able this  House  to  exercise  closer  supervision  over  the 
general  conduct  of  Foreign  Affairs". 

^Thomas  A.  Spaulding,  Federation  and  Empire. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  19 

The  United  States — The  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  provides  Art.  II,  Sec.  2,  Par.  2,  that  the  Presi- 
dent 'Shall  haz'e  pozver,  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
cofusent  of  the  Senate,  to  make  treaties,  provided  two- 
thirds  of  the  Senators  present  concur;  and  he  simll 
nominate  and  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate,  shall  appoint  ambassadors,  other  public  minis- 
ters and  consuls."  No  other  reference  to  the  conduct 
of  international  relations  appears  in  the  Constitution. 
In  1789  there  was  established  by  law  the  Department 
of  State  whose  functions  were  and  still  are  to  corre- 
spond with  and  to  instruct  diplomatic  and  consular 
agents  abroad  and  to  negotiate  with  the  agents  of  for- 
eign countries  in  the  United  States  ''or  to  such  other 
matters  respecting  foreign  affairs  as  the  President  of 
the  United  States  shall  assign  to  the  said  department". 
In  the  United  States,  therefore,  the  conduct  of  interna- 
tional relations  with  the  exception  of  treaties,  is  given 
to  the  executive.  What  methods  of  control  reside  in 
the  legislature? 

The  outstanding  differences  between  the  parliamen- 
,t^ry  system  of  government  and  the  American  is  that  the 
^resident  of  the  United  States  holds  office  for  a  fixed 
period  by  direct  commission  from  the  people  irrespec- 
tive of  the  legislature  while  under  the  parliamentary 
system  the  executive,  i.  e.,  the  ministry,  must  retain  the 
confidence  of  the  legislature  or  be  voted  out  of  office. 
In  the  American  system,  a  cabinet  officer  is  not  and 
cannot  be  a  member  either  of  the  Senate  or  the  House 
of  Representatives.  It  follows  that  the  Secretary  of 
State  cannot  be  interpellated  in  Congress  on  questions 
of  foreign  policy.  His  only  connection  with  either 
House  is  through  the  Committee  of  that  House  which 
deals  with  international  relations,  the  Senate  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  and  the  House  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs,  of  which  two  the  former  is  by  far  the 
more  important  and  influential.  Each  House  in  prac- 
tice depends  on  the  judgment  of  its  Committee  and  as 


20  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

a  rule  votes  its  recommendations.  Either  committee 
can  request  and  the  Senate  committee  sometimes  does 
request  the  appearance  of  the  Secretary  of  State  before 
it  for  information  but  cannot  compel  his  appearance, 
though  he  seldom  refuses  to  appear. 

The  President  transmits  pro  forma  to  the  Senate 
many  papers  as  "Executive  Documents"  because  they 
concern  international  matters  that  should  constitution- 
ally come  before  it.  Either  House  may  call  upon  the 
President  for  other  papers  or  for  information  which 
the  Secretary  of  State  transmits  "if  not  incompatible 
with  public  interest."  Such  requests  frequently  meet 
with  refusal.  This  does  not  prevent  Congress  from  de- 
bating the  subject  should  it  not  agree  with  the  execu- 
tive view  of  the  public  interest,  but  its  ignorance  may 
cause  it  to  hesitate  to  act,  as  in  the  case  with  Mexico 
during  the  last  administration.  In  fact,  except  where 
an  executive  policy  in  international  relations  necessi- 
tates the  voting  of  monies  by  Congress,  there  is  no 
way  of  stopping  the  President  in  his  course  of  action 
until  the  end  of  his  term,  except  of  course  by  the  ex- 
treme method  of  irnpeachment,  which  is  very  hard  to 
apply  in  practice.  Today  few  will  differ  from  Mr.  Bryce 
in  the  judgment  he  expresses  in  his  ''American  Common- 
wealth," viz. : 

*Tn  all  free  countries  it  is  most  difficult  to  define 
the  respective  spheres  of  the  legislature  and  execu- 
tive in  foreign  affairs,  for  while  publicity  and  parlia- 
mentary control  are  needed  to  protect  the  people, 
promptitude  and  secrecy  are  the  conditions  of  diplo- 
matic success.  Practically,  however,  and  for  the  pur- 
poses of  ordinary  business,  the  President  is  indepen- 
dent of  the  House,  while  the  Senate,  though  it  can 
prevent  his  settling  anything,  cannot  keep  him  from 
unsettling  everything.  He,  or  rather  his  Secretary 
of  State,  for  the  president  has  rarely  leisure  to  give 
close  or  continuous  attention  to  foreign  policy,  re- 
tains an  unfettered  initiative  by  means  of  which  he 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  21 

may  embroil  the  country  abroad  or  excite  passion  at 

home."^ 

This  brief  summary  of  the  power  of  legislatures  in 
constitutional  countries  to  intervene  in  the  conduct  of 
foreign  affairs  by  the  executive,  makes  it  fairly  clear 
that  if  the  legislature  wishes  to  use  its  powers,  it  can 
prevent  the  final  disposition  of  an  international  question 
in  a  manner  contrary  to  the  legislative  will.  In  parlia- 
mentary countries  this  can  be  done  promptly,  in  the  Uni- 
ted States  it  may  require  prolonged  delay.  Similarly, 
it  may  be  asserted  that  opportunity  exists  for  the  mem- 
bers of  the  legislature  to  be  fairly  well  acquainted  with 
the  conduct  of  negotiations.  In  parliamentary  coun- 
tries particularly  the  desire  and  the  need  of  the  ministry 
to  win  the  support  of  the  legislature  make  it  anxious 
to  respond  as  frankly  to  legislative  inquiries  as  the  in- 
terests of  the  nation  permit.  The  fact  is  that  until  the 
outbreak  of  the  Great  War  the  majority  of  the  mem- 
bers of  national  legislatures  were  absorbed  in  the  con- 
sideration of  pressing  domestic  problems  and  had  but 
slight  interest  in  foreign  affairs.  This  was  particularly 
true  of  the  more  democratic  states.  It  is  reasonable  to 
expect  that  they  will  be  more  interested  in  the  future, 
and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  press  and  the  public  will 
be  also.  The  statements  issued  by  the  State  Department, 
the  publication  in  the  newspapers  of  important  docu- 
ments and  the  summaries  of  the  debates  in  the  Senate 
on  international  questions  are  sufficient  to  enable  an 
intelligent  citizen  to  form  his  opinion  upon  it  if  he  is 
\i        interested.     Few  hitherto  have  been  interested. 

V 

METHODS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

There  are    manifold    methods    of    diplomatic  action, 


*The  most  illuminating  discussion  of  this  whole  subject  is  found  in 
Parliamentary  Papers  for  1912,  "Treatment  of  International  Questions 
by  Parliaments  in  European  Countries,  the  United  States  and  Japan" 
from  which  I  have  freely  drawn. 


22  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

the  most  important  being  the  negotiation  of  treaties  and 
other  forms  of  international  engagements,  the  arbitra- 
tion of  controversies  that  cannot  be  settled  by  negotia- 
tions, and  the  summoning  of  international  conferences 
or  general  congresses.  The  nature  of  the  problem  that 
has  arisen  and  the  magnitude  of  the  interests  involved 
determine  the  method  that  will  be  employed  in  any  par- 
ticular case.  The  limits  of  this  paper  will  permit  of  but 
a  brief  review  of  certain  aspects  of  the  subject  which 
the  student  of  international  relations  cannot  overlook,^ 

(A)  Treaties.  Treaties  are  in  the  nature  of  con- 
tracts between  states.  Unless  accepted  by  substantially 
all  states,  certainly  by  all  the  first-class  powers,  they  are 
not  international  law  and  their  "sanctity,"  therefore,  is 
simply  the  sanctity  of  a  contract.  Because,  however, 
of  the  importance  of  the  interests  involved  in  the  rela- 
tions between  states,  the  violation  of  a  treaty  is  re- 
garded as  a  flagrant  breach  of  customary  international 
law.  Prdbably  at  least  ninety  per  cent  of  treaties  are 
of  a  non-political  character  dealing  with  practical  prob- 
lems that  arise  in  international  intercourse  and  seldom 
causing  international  friction  of  a  pronounced  kind.  Po- 
litical treaties  embody  the  policy  of  the  state,  i.  e.,  the 
attitude  adopted  by  the  state  in  its  international  relar 
tions  to  secure  its  own  welfare  primarily.  Political 
treaties  are  the  expression  of  that  attitude  as  suggested 
or  permitted  by  the  conditions  existing  at  the  time  of 
their  signature.  They  are  the  chief  determinants  of 
the  reciprocal  rights  and  obligations  of  states,  and  dis- 
putes arising  from  them  are  generally  the  result  of 
changed  political  conditions. 

In  some  states  where  the  constitution  provides  that 
treaties  must  be  submitted  to  the  legislature  for  appro- 
val, a  phrase  is  added  that  the  submission  shall  be  made 
as  soon  as  it  is  compatible  with  a  due  regard  to  the 


*These  methods  form  the  subject  matter  of  the  detailed  study  con- 
tributed by  Professor  John  Bassett  Moore,  pp.  157. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  23 

security  and  interests  of  the  state.  This  not  only  gives 
opportunity  for  the  negotiation  of  "secret  treaties"  but 
for  legahzing  and  regularizing  them.  It  is,  indeed,  a 
question  how  secret  a  secret  treaty  is.  A  secret  treaty 
between  two  or  more  states  is  usually  directed  against 
a  third  party  and  that  third  party  has  every  reason  for 
trying  to  discover  its  character.  The  history  of  the  past 
fifty  years  shows  that  the  opportunities  for  making  that 
discovery  are  so  numerous  that  the  secret  treaty  is  at 
best  only  semi-secret.  The  general  character  of  both 
the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Dual  Alliance  was  known 
long  before  the  Great  War.  The  evil  of  the  secret 
treaty  is  not  that  its  aim  and  even  its  contents  in  a 
general  way  may  not  be  known,  but  that  the  states 
against  which  it  is  directed  cannot  be  certain  how  much 
they  know.  And  since  such  a  secret  treaty  is  almost 
sure  to  generate  a  secret  reply,  the  reply  is  likely  to  be 
more  drastic  in  its  provisions  than  the  original.  Thus 
international  relations  are  made  worse  than  ever.  To 
sweep  away  the  evil,  it  has  been  frequently  suggested 
that  the  principle  be  established  in  public  law  that  se- 
cret treaties  are  void,  and  Article  XVIII  of  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  of  Nations  was  directed  to  that 
end.  The  most  practicable  way  oi  abolishing  secret 
treaties  is  by  amendment  of  the  constitutions  of  those 
states  which  permit  them.  The  prospect  of  such  a  re- 
form does  not  seem  any  too  bright  at  present. 

(B)  Arbitration.  When  a  matter  in  dispute  be- 
tween nations  cannot  be  adjusted  by  direct  negotiation, 
it  may  be  referred  to  arbitrators  agreed  upon  by  the 
parties  to  the  controversy  or  to  the  permanent  tribunal 
of  arbitration  erected  by  the  Hague  Conference.  Arbi-„ 
tration  will  naturally  receive  but  a  passing  reference  in 
a  paper  on  diplomacy  as  it  is  essentially  judicial  in 
character  being  diplomatic  only  in  origin.  Progress  in 
the  means  of  transportation  and  communication  has  im- 
mensely increased  the  intimacy  of  the  intercourse  be- 
tween nations  and  has  caused  the  loss  involved  in  war 


24  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

to  be  appalling"  and  widespread.  The  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, therefore,  has  witnessed  the  growth  of  a  tendency 
to  employ  arbitration  as  the  most  economical  and  endur- 
ing method  for  the  settlement  of  international  contro- 
versies. During  the  nineteenth  century  there  were  more 
than  one  hundred  and  thirty  important  arbitrations  and 
though  the  United  States  Senate  did  not  ratify  the  arbi- 
tration treaties  referred  to  it  in  1904  for  the  submission 
of  judicial  disputes  and  disputes  relating  to  the  inter- 
pretation of  treaties  to  the  Hague  Tribunal,  it  has,  never- 
theless, led  the  way  in  the  employment  of  arbitration. 

The  rejection  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions by  the  United  States  and  the  lack  of  respect  for 
some  of  its  political  provisions  manifested  by  some 
states  that  have  accepted  it  are  fairly  good  evidence  that 
the  world  is  not  yet  ready  for  an  international  system 
in  which  there  is  even  a  suspicion  that  the  independence, 
security,  interests  or  dignity  of  the  individual  State  is 
subject  to  control  or  supervision  by  any  external  influ- 
ence. The  recent  catastrophe,  however,  has  generated  a 
-horror  of  war  among  all  civilized  nations  as  a  means 
of  settling  international  dispute  and  it  may,  therefore, 
reasonably  be  expected  that  arbitration  which  is  volun- 
tary in  its  nature  and  which  avoids  the  objections 
against  both  international  control  and  war  will  be 
viewed  with  increasing  deference  in  the  years  to  come. 
The  rejection  by  the  League  of  Nations  of  any  exten- 
sion of  the  principle  of  voluntary  arbitration  in  its  com- 
mittee's report  on  the  establishment  of  a  Permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice  is  indicative  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  determined  opposition  to  the  obligatory  prin- 
ciple. 

(C)  International  Congresses  and  Conferences.  A 
third  method  of  diplomatic  action  is  the  general  con- 
gress or  conference  which  may  assemble  to  settle  ques- 
tions which  vitally  affect  several  states  or  involve  the 
peace  of  a  continent  or  of  the  world.  The  international 
congress  is  partially  the  result  of  the  existence  of  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  25 

principle  known  as  the  Balance  of  Power  which  has 
been  the  most  potent  single  factor  in  the  development 
of  diplomacy.  As  a  basis  of  action  the  principle  had 
its  origin  in  the  sixteenth  century  and  was  a  result  of 
the  rivalry  of  the  House  of  Austria  and  the  Kings  of 
France.  The  Thirty  Years'  War  in  which  that  rivalry 
played  a  prominent  part  eventuated  in  the  first  Euro- 
pean congresses,  those  of  Miinster  and  Osnabriick, 
which  had  produced  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  of  1648. 
Those  congresses  formed  a  precedent  which  has  been 
freely  followed.  From  the  beginning  of  its  history  the 
Balance  of  Power  has  had  for  its  object  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  independence  and  the  security  of  all  states 
by  organizing  alliances  to  prevent  any  one  state  or 
group  of  states  being  able  to  dominate  and  prescribe 
the  law  to  all  others.  Since  the  close  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  Great  Britain  has  been  the  foremost  champion 
of  the  principle.  However  much  the  principle  may  be 
condemned,  it  is  in  its  essence  a  mere  timely  provision 
against  a  probable  danger  and  it  would  be  unwise  to 
assume  that  it  has  been  superseded.  Unless  the  League 
of  Nations  include  all  the  great  states  of  the  world 
and  unless  its  principles  secure  more  hearty  adherence 
in  their  application  from  the  states  which  have  become 
members,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  condi- 
tions that  necessitated  the  Balance  of  Power  in  the  past 
will  not  exist  in  the  future. 

The  conflict  against  Napoleon  had  as  one  result  the 
recognition  that  Europe  had  common  interests  and  the 
series  of  congresses  that  followed  his  fall  had  as  an 
outcome  the  system  known  as  the  "Concert  of  Europe" 
wherein  the  independence  of  the  individual  state  has 
been,  in  certain  matters,  subordinated  to  the  general 
welfare  of  Europe  as  a  whole.  It  would  be  easy,  no 
doubt,  to  exaggerate  the  effective  influence  of  this  sys- 
tem, but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  recognition  that 
a  controversy  was  a  European  question  to  be  settled  by 
"Europe"   made  for  peace.     "Europe"   in  this  connec- 


26  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

tion  meant  the  Great  Powers  whose  diplomats  when 
they  assembled  in  a  European  congress  understood  func- 
tions that  were  both  legislative  and  administrative  in 
character.  It  has  been  customary  for  a  congress  to  re- 
cord in  its  protocols  the  principles  upon  which  its  con- 
clusions were  based,  and  to  invite  nations  not  represented 
at  the  congress  to  adhere  to  the  results  of  its  delibera- 
tions. It  is  obvious,  therefore,  what  a  great  influence 
upon  the  spirit  and  practice  of  diplomacy  the  Concert  of 
Europe  has  had.  As  long  as  it  functioned,  it  maintained 
peace  and  it  laid  the  foundations  for  an  international  or- 
ganization which  extends  beyond  the  confines  of  Eu- 
rope.^ 

CONCLUSION. 

In  the  study  of  no  subject  dealing  with  human  affairs 
does  the  student  need  a  greater  equipment  of  knowledge, 
discernment,  imagination  and  impartial  judgment  than 
in  the  study  of  diplomacy.  He  must  remember  that  di- 
plomacy deals  with  the  relations  between  nations,  and,  to 
understand  the  reasons  either  for  the  general  policy  pur- 
sued by  a  nation  over  a  long  space  of  time  or  for  its  at- 
titude in  a  particular  international  situation,  he  must  know 
its  constitution,  the  actual  working  of  its  government  and 
the  relative  strength  of  the  political  parties  in  it,  the  na- 
tional aims,  the  national  temperament,  and  the  dominant 
personalities.  In  the  study  of  any  particular  problem  he 
must  try  to  have  access  to  all  the  sources  on  every  side  and 

*The  materials  for  the  study  of  this  caption  are  very  numerous. 
The  collections  of  treaties  and  treaty  documents,  of  which  there  are 
many,  are  of  first  importance.  Koch  et  Scholl,  Historic  abregee  des 
Traites  (from  1648  to  1815)  is  of  value.  The  standard  work  is 
Martens  (G.  F.  de)  Rccueil  dcs  principaux  traites  de  paix,  d'alliance 
.  .  .  depuis  1761  iusau'd  nos  jours  (1808),  which  has  been  brought 
down  to  our  day.  Of  the  very  highest  value  is  Hertslet  (Edward) 
The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty  since  1814.  This  is  an  invaluable  work 
for  the  student.  Moore  (J.  B.)  A  Digest  of  International  Lazv  is  an 
exhaustive  digest  of  the  international  practice  of  the  United  States 
from  its  origin  up  to  1906,  which  should  be  constantly  consulted  by 
the  student.  The  same  author's  International  Arbitrations  is  the 
standard  work  on  the  subject. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  27 

carefully  compare  them,  if  he  is  to  approximate  the  truth. 
Moreover,  he  must  understand  that  despatches  and  official 
documents  never  tell  the  whole  story  and  that,  however 
illuminating'  the  speeches  and  writings  of  the  day  may  be 
to  give  an  understanding  of  the  psychology  of  the  people 
and  their  leaders,  they  will  not  explain  what  has  been  in- 
tentionally omitted  in  official  documents.  Those  must  be 
sought  for  in  the  biographies,  memoirs,  diaries,  and  pri- 
vate letters  of  statesmen  and  diplomatists  and  others  who 
were  in  position  to  know.  And  even  then  much  must  be 
left  to  the  inductive  imagination. 

The  student  thus  equipped  is  prepared  to  engage  in- 
telligently in  the  study  of  a  wonderful  and  magnificent 
drama.  All  the  instincts  and  passions  of  the  individual 
are  in  action  on  a  grand  scale  in  the  intercourse  between 
nations.  The  student  will  probably  learn  to  admire  the 
accomplishment  of  diplomacy  rather  than  to  condemn  its 
failure.  And  he  will,  no  doubt,  conclude  that  as  human 
nature,  with  its  mixture  of  what  is  instructive  and  what  is 
rational,  of  what  is  constructive  and  what  is  destructive, 
is  the  one  constant  factor  in  international  relations  as  it  is 
in  life  generally,  so  diplomacy  will  ever  continue  an  es- 
sential element  in  the  intercourse  between  states  what- 
ever world  organization  may  be  adopted,  just  as  com- 
promises will  ever  be  necessary  in  the  daily  relations  of 
individuals  under  whatever  system  of  morals  and  religion 
they  may  live. 

STEPHEN  P.  DUGGAN. 


Interna "^    -  /   ':^  i  r    ' 


a  « 


CHAPTER  11. 

INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE 
ANCIENT  WORLD 

I 

SOURCE,  MATERIAL  AND  METHOD  OF  APPROACH 

No  exhaustive  treatment  of  international  relations  in 
the  ancient  world  exists  in  scientific  literature.  The  two 
volumes  devoted  tO'  this  subject  by  Coleman  Philippson^ 
are  written  by  an  excellent  lawyer,  a  good  specialist  in 
modern  international  law,  but  a  dilettante  in  the  domain 
of  ancient  history.  On  the  other  hand,  many  special  in- 
vestigations written  by  classical  scholars  chiefly  on  the 
subject  of  international  treaties  and  interstatal  arbitra- 
tion, although  exhaustive  and  sufficient  in  regard  to  the 
special  subject  in  question,  do  not  cover  the  whole  field 
of  international  relations  and  are  silent  on  many  impor- 
tant general  questions.  I  refer  to  the  recent  works  of 
Marcus  Niebuhr  Tod  and  A.  Raeder  on  arbitration  and 
to  the  book  of  Taubler  on  Roman  treaties.^  I  cannot  my- 
self give  in  these  two  short  papers  a  full  account  of  all 
the  important  and  complicated  questions  connected  with 
the  main  problem  of  the  system  of  international  relations 
in  the  ancient  world,  but  I  should  like  to  insist  on  some 
fundamental  points  which  unfortunately  have  been  gen- 
erally mistreated  and  misinterpreted.  My  point  of  view 
is  that  of  a  historian,  and  as  such  I  insist  on  the  treat- 

^The  International  Law  and  Custom  of  Ancient  Greece  and  Rome, 
London,   Macmillan,    1911, 

"Marcus  Niebuhr  Tod,  International  Arbitration  Among  the  Greeks 
Oxford,  1913 ;  A.  Raeder,  L'Arbitrage  International  chea  Les  Hellenes, 
1912 ;  E.  Taubler,  Turferinne  Romanum,  Studio  zur  Entwicklungs- 
gcschicte  des  romer  Reiches,  I  Die  Staatsvertr'dge  und  Vertrags 
V erhdltnisse ;    Berlin-Leipzig,   Teubner,    1913. 

31 


32  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

ment  of  this  question  from  the  historical  point  of  view 
without  modernization,  but,  at  the  same  time,  without  the 
tendency  to  consider  the  ancient  world  as  an  epoch  to- 
tally different  from  our  own  period  and  important  for  a 
historian  only  as  a  matter  of  historical  curiosity. 

The  first  question  one  may  put  to  me  is — why  should 
we  beg^in  the  history  of  international  relations  with  the  so- 
called  classical  epoch,  and  not  with  the  so-called  middle 
ages,  when  the  system  of  European  states,  totally  different 
from  the  system  of  states  which  prevailed  during  the 
classical  period,  was  formed?  I  think  the  question  itself 
implies  a  misinterpretation  of  historical  facts.  The  sys- 
tem of  the  modern  European  States  is  in  no  way  a  crea- 
tion of  the  so-called  middle  ages.  Most  of  the  modern  <\ 
European  States  are  nothing  but  a  development  of  the 
provinces  of  the  Roman  Empire.  The  natural  frontiers  \ 
of  Spain,  France,  Italy,  even  Britain  of  today  are  the 
ancient  frontiers  of  Italy  and  the  western  Roman  prov- 
inces during  the  Roman  Empire.  Modern  Germany 
covers  the  territory  of  the  Roman  province,  Ger- 
mania,  as  it  was  planned  by  the  genius  of  Caesar  and 
Augustus.  Austrian  territory  before  the  war  coincided 
with  the  boundaries  of  the  Roman  Danube  provinces.  On 
the  other  hand  the  foundations  of  civilized  life  in  modern 
Europe  were  laid  during  the  classical  period  and  the  type 
of  our  European  and  American  mentality  was  inherited 
by  us  from  our  classical  predecessors. 

Thus,  if  we  try  to  understand  one  or  the  other  of  our 
fundamental  institutions,  or  if  we  endeavor  to  explain  the 
most  important  features  of  our  political,  economic,  social 
and  intellectual  life,  we  are  bound  to  go  back  to  the  main 
sources,  i.  e.,  to  the  achievements  of  our  classical  prede- 
cessors. 

International  relations  and  the  main  ideas  which  form 
the  substance  of  our  international  law  present  no  excep- 
tion to  this  general  rule.  I  affirm  that  the  type  of  our  in- 
ternational relations,  the  different  tendencies  existing  in 
this  domain  and  the  most  important  moral  and  legal  ideas 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  33 

which  form  the  basis  of  our  international  law  formed  the 
foundation  of  the  international  relations  of  the  ancient 
world  as  well.  I  cannot  discover  any  capital  difference. 
Modern  Europe  moves  on  the  same  lines  on  which  the 
ancient  world  moved  for  centuries.  I  do  not  believe  I  am 
exagg-erating.  I  will  endeavor  to  prove  this  statement  in 
this  paper,  from  the  historical  as  well  as  the  system- 
atic point  of  view.  But  please  do  not  misinterpret  my 
words.  Some  of  the  institutions  and  ideas  I  speak  of 
were  fully  developed  in  the  ancient  world.  Others 
may  be  traced  at  their  very  beginning  only,  and  it 
was  the  destiny  of  later  epochs  to  develop  them  more 
fully. 

Now  the  question  why  some  of  these  institutions  and 
ideas  developed,  while  others  did  not,  is  of  the  greatest 
historical  importance.  If  we  know  the  causes  of  the 
florescence  of  some  institutions  and  of  the  comparative 
debility  of  others  we  may  judge,  perhaps,  of  the  future 
of  our  own  similar  institutions  and  distinsaiish  the  con- 
ditions  under  which  they  are  growing  or  decaying.  For, 
our  own  modern  world  is  still  in  the  process  of  its  ascen- 
dant movement;  we  see  no  signs  of  arrest  or  decay.  The  / 
ancient  world  also  had  its  time  of  uninterrupted  progress  ' 
which  lasted  many  thousands  of  years.  But  the  ancient 
world  accomplished  its  circle  of  evolution  and  experienced 
a  period  of  deep  decay,  a  period  of  return  to  very  primi- 
tive conditions.  And  it  is  highly  instructive  to  see  which 
institutions  among  those  with  which  we  are  concerned 
in  studying  international  relations  have  survived  and 
which  died  out  completely  or  remained  as  mere  survivals, 
and  finally,  though  not  least  important,  it  is  desirable  to 
know  the  causes  of  this  phenomenon. 

As  I  have  already  pointed  out,  the  most  important  de- 
fect of  existing  attempts  to  build  up  a  history  of  inter- 
national relations  is  the  almost  complete  lack  of  histori- 
cal method  in  dealing  with  this  question.  Most  of  the 
general  studies  of  the  history  of  international  law  treat 
the  ancient  period  as  a  whole  and  oppose  it  directly  to 


34  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

our  modern  ideas  and  institutions.  I  am  not  an  enemy 
of  systematic  treatment  nor  of  the  comparative  method  in 
the  investigation  of  juridical  and  political  institutions. 
But  I  feel  that  we  have  a  right  to  require  a  correct  and 
fair  use  of  this  method.  If  one  uses  the  antithesis,  "an- 
cient and  modern",  I  have  the  full  right  to  ask,  "What 
epoch  in  the  evolution  of  the  ancient  world  does  he  mean 
and  what  time  in  the  evolution  of  our  modern  world?" 
For  in  the  history  of  the  oriental  monarchies,  to  cite  one 
instance,  we  have  different  epochs,  as,  e.  g.,  the  epoch  of 
the  great  Pharaohs  of  the  XVIII  dynasty  in  Egypt  (II 
Millennium),  and  the  epoch  of  the  first  five  dynasties  (IV 
Millennium)  which  differ,  one  from  the  other,  as  much  as 
the  Merovingian  epoch  differs  from  the  reign  of  Louis 
XIV  in  the  history  of  the  French  monarchy.  In  the  his- 
tory of  the  Greek  States,  the  period  of  the  Ionian  coloni- 
zation, the  period  of  full  florescence  of  Athens  in  the  V 
and  IV  centuries,  and  the  period  of  the  Hellenistic  Mon- 
archies, present  the  same  enormous  differences  as,  in  the 
history  of  America,  do  the  period  of  colonization,  that 
of  the  civil  war  and  that  of  President  Wilson,  although 
throughout  the  history  of  the  Greek  States  the  general 
political  structure  of  the  city-state  remains  almost  un- 
changed. Again,  contrast  Rome  of  the  early  republic 
with  Rome  of  the  time  of  Cicero  and  Rome  ruled  by  the 
emperors!  There  is  the  same  people,  and  there  are  the 
same  names  for  many  institutions,  but  how  enormous 
are  the  differences!  In  the  history  cf  Germany,  the 
period  of  Arminius,  that  of  Frederick  the  Great  and 
that  of  the  last  Hohenzollern  exhibit  striking  dissimilari- 
ties. 

Hence  it  is  that  we  must  be  very  careful  in  our  com- 
parisons between  the  ancient  and  the  modern  world.  We 
must  not  forget  that  the  modern  world  started  from  quite 
different  conditions  from  those  prevailing  in  the  ancient 
world.  The  modern  world  inherited  from  the  ancient 
a  large  stock  of  ideas  and  institutions  which  helped  it  to 
build  up  its  culture  on  firm  and  advanced  ground. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  35 

II 

THE  ANCIENT  AND  MODERN  VIEW  OF  WAR 

Let  me  bring  forward  one  example  which  will  lead  us 
directly  into  our  own  subject,  ''in  medias  res".  The  fun- 
damental conceptions  of  international  relations  in  the  an- 
cient and  in  the  modern  world  are  utterly  different.  The 
modern  world  considers  the  natural  condition  of  life  in 
our  society  to  be  the  state  of  peace.  War  is  nothing  but 
a  temporary  suspending  of  this  natural  condition  and  is 
regarded  as  an  abnormal  state.  •  Free  intercourse  between 
different  nations  is  normal ;  restrictions  and  limitations  of 
the  rights  of  foreigners  are  abnormal  and  require  serious 
reasons.  Such,  briefly,  are  our  ideas  as  they  developed 
during  centuries  of  existence  of  the  family  of  European 
nations.  But  injhe  ancient  world,  generally,  the  natural 
attitude  of  one  stafF]fowaf3s^"tiol;TTer"was  that  of  poten- 
tial and  actual  enmrty.  Hencer  war,  not  peace,  was  the 
foundation  of  international  relations.  To  quote  one  of  the 
most  authorifat1ve"writers  on  this  subject :  "In  the  ancient 
world  the  foreigner,  from  the  political  point  of  view,  is  an 
enemy.  The  individual,  as  zvell  as  a  state,  comes  out  of 
these  conditions  of  natural  hostility  only  by  means  of  a 
juridical  act,  a  treaty  which  makes  possible  for  the  citizens 
a  free  intercourse  zvith  another  state."  (Tanbler,  opus 
cited,  p.  1.) 

What  are  the  causes  of  this  fundamental  difference? 
Have  we  to  assume  that  ideas  regarding  peace  and  war 
were  totally  different  in  the  ancient  and  the  modern 
world  ?  Can  we  affirm  that  the  ancients  did  not  look  on 
peace  as  a  desirable  thing,  and  as  a  good  in  itself?  Was 
the  ancient  psychology  totally  different  from  our  own? 
By  no  means.  Like  the  modern  world,  ancient  thought 
regarded  peace  as  the  most  desirable  thing  and  peace  con- 
ditions as  the  ideal  conditions  of  life.  They  praised  peace 
in  prose  and  poetry  not  less  than  we  do,  although  they 
had,  as  we  have,  a  full  understanding  of  the  greatness 
of  war  in  itself,  of  its  necessit}^  and  th^  enormous  bene- 


36  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

fits  for  mankind  which  it  sometimes  brought  with  itself. 
"Polemos  pater  ton  ergon,"  says  one  of  the  greatest  Greek 
poets.  I  cannot  trace  in  the  whole  ancient  literature  on 
this  subject  any  difference  in  principle.  Like  other  mat- 
ters, we  inherited  our  ideas  on  peace  and  war  from  the 
ancient  Greeks  and  Romans. 

An  explanation  of  these  different  theoretical  associa- 
tions which  have  had  and  still  have  an  enormous  practical 
value  must  be  sought  in  the  domain  of  historical  evolu- 
tion. As  a  matter  of  fact,  ancient  society  grew  from  con- 
ditions totally  different  from  those  influencing  modern  so- 
ciety. Civilized  life  formed  for  a  long  time  small  islands 
in  the  ocean  of  barbarism.  Thus,  for  an__ancient  civil- 
ized state,  neighbQX-jj^as_jequivalent  _to  foe.  The  ancient 
state  evolved  through  the  process  of  integration  of  petty 
political  formations  and  this  process  assumed  the  form 
of  ever-renewed  wars.  To  this  is  due  the  constant  state 
of  war  between  the  different  civilized  states,  even  of  the 
same  nationality.  The  general  idea  of  war  as  the  natural 
status  influenced  the  forms  of  international  relations  and 
shifted  from  one  focus  of  civilization  to  another.  In  this 
way  the  general  principle  took  firm  root,  although  the 
actual  state  of  things  was  very  often  in  contradiction  to 
this  main  idea,  as,  I  must  add,  our  theory  is  so  often  in 
contradiction  with  the  real  state  of  things. 

How  different  the  history  of  international  relations 
in  the  modern  world !  The  family  of  European  nations 
grew  up  not  from  conditions  of  war  of  all  against  all ; 
modern  European  nations  were  children  of  the  mighty  and 
united  Roman  Empire,  whose  main  foundation  was  gen- 
eral peace  for  the  whole  united  civilized  world.  Orhis  Ro- 
manus  was  for  the  Romans  the  Orhis  Terrartim.  Outside 
of  it  was  barbarism, — no  law,  no  right.  The  natural  con- 
dition of  this  Roman  world-state  was  peace — Pax  Ro- 
nmna.  It  is  symbolic  that  Augustus,  the  creator  of  the 
Roman  world-empire,  erected  on  the  campus  Martins,  the 
field  consecrated  to  Mars,  the  God  of  War,  an  altar  to  the 
deified  peace,  Ara  Pads. 


\  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  37 

This  fundamental  idea  never  died  out.  It  was  inheri- 
ted and  proclaimed  by  the  popes  and  the  emperors  of  the 
middle  aj^es,  the  exponents  of  the  idea  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire,  by  the  French  monarchy,  by  the  Signatories  of 
the  peace  of  Westphalia  and  down  to  our  own  times. 

Although  the  points  of  departure  of  the  ancient  and  the 
modern  world  in  the  domain  of  international  relations 
were  so  utterly  different,  the  forms  in  which  these  rela- 
tions were  expressed  were  almost  the  same,  but  of  course 
they  were  used  differently.  The  treaty  as  such  was  the 
main  basis  of  these  relations  in  the  ancient  world.  With- 
out treaty  no  established  peace  was  possible  and  no  regu- 
lar and  formal  relations  between  the  citizens  of  different 
states  could  exist.  All  was  based  on  treaties;  interstatal 
intercourse,  intercourse  between  foreigners  and  the  state, 
intercourse  between  foreigners  and  individual  citizens,  and 
the  like.  For  this  reason  in  the  study  of  international 
relations  of  the  ancient  world  a  careful  investigation  of 
the  different  extant  treaties  must  form  the  main  founda- 
tion of  our  knowledge.  It  is  a  pity  that  we  are  still  wait- 
ing for  a  continuation  of  the  valuable  and  exhaustive 
collection  of  R.  Von  Scala  containing  all  extant  ancient 
treaties.^  Nevertheless  we  must  try  to  build  up  the  gen- 
eral story  of  international  relations  on  the  ground-work 
of  present  available  evidence. 

Ill 

MEANS  OF  PRESERVING  PEACE THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER 

IN  ANTIQUITY 

The  ancient  world  in  its  international  relations  aimed, 
like  the  modern,  at  building  up,  by  all  means,  a  general 
and  lasting  peace.  But  there  are  two  different  ways  which 
lead  to  this  goal.  Both  have  been  used  by  the  ancient  and 
the  modern  world,  and  neither  was  very  successful.  The  — 
first  was  to  impose  peace  by  force,  a  method  used  by  im-  -^ 

^Rudolf  von  Scala,  Die  Staatsvertrdge  des  Aktertums,  Leipzig,  1898 
(Erstes  Theil). 


22G3i'J 


38  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

perialistic  powers,  whose  aim  was  the  creation  of  a  world- 
state.  All  the  existing  states  had  to  disappear  in  this 
mio-hty  world-state  and  every  attempt  to  recover  liberty 
and  independence  was  regarded  as  rebellion  and  sup- 
pressed by  force  of  arms.  The  second  way  was  that  of 
mutual  recognition  and  mutual  concessions  made  by  dif- 
ferent states  toward  each  other.  This  way  led  to  the 
creation  of  a  balance  of  power,  a  system  of  independent 
and  free  civilized  states  which  were  bound  one  to  another 
by  treaties  and  decided  their  controversies  by  means  of 
peaceful  understanding  (international  or  rather  intersta- 
tal  arbitration)  or  by  means  of  a  regular  war. 

The  history  of  international  relations  in  the  ancient 
world  consists  mainly  in  a  record  of  the  shifting  of  the 
balance  sometimes  towards  the  first  solution,  sometimes 
towards  the  second.  Both  systems  failed  in  the  final  aim. 
As  regards  the  world-state,  Rome  alone  succeeded  in 
cresting  tor  some  centuries  an  almost  general  peace  on 
this'basTs.  IBut  the  price  paid  for  this  general  peace  was 
heavy  enough.  The  results  were,  first,  the  stagnation  of 
all  creative  efforts,  and  afterwards  a  bitter  internal  strug- 
gle which  ended  in  a  complete  exhaustion  and  unheard 
of  decadence  of  civilized  life. 

The  attempts  at  building  up  a  system  of  independent 
states,  a  family  of  states,  were  not  crowned  by  lasting 
success  in  their  main  scope.  Nor  did  they  bring  about 
general  peace  either.  War  after  war  interrupted  the 
peaceful  evolution  of  the  ancient  world  during  the  periods 
of  existence  of  the  balance  of  power.  But  yet,  whereas 
the  epochs  of  the  world-states  were  epochs  of  stagnation 
as  regards  new  ideas  and  new  forms  of  relations  in  the 
international  life,  the  periods  of  the  balance  of  power  were 
great  creative  periods  in  all  domains,  including  the  domain 
of  international  relations  and  international  law.  Differ- 
ent forms  of  treaties  and  alliances,  of  federations,  of  arbi- 
tration, all  the  achievements  in  the  domain  of  private  in- 
ternational law  were  the  results  of  these  short  periods 
when  the  systems  of  free  and  independent  states,  which 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  39 

mutually  recognized  each  other's  mutual  rights,  were  pre- 
vailing. 

Let  me  give  you  a  short  historical  sketch  account  of 
this  shifting  of  historical  balance.  This  account  will  ex- 
plain better  than  any  theoretical  considerations  the  rea- 
sons for  the  difference  between  the  achievements  of  the 
ancient  and  the  modern  world  in  the  realm  of  interna- 
tional relations. 

We  are  hardly  able,  in  the  present  condition  of  our 
knowledge,  to  decide  the  important  question  of  the  origin 
and  first  steps  in  the  development  of  international  rela- 
tions in  the  ancient  world.  As  far  as  w^e  can  judge,  the 
most  ancient  legal  expressions  of  international  relations, 
besides  war,  were  in  the  field  of  civil  international  law, 
defining  the  relations  of  hospitality  between  members  of 
different  states  and  in  the  domain  of  public  international 
law,  comprising  international  or  interstate  treaties.  What 
is  the  origin  of  those  institutions?  There  are  two  at- 
tempts to  solve  this  question.  Some  scholars  affirm  that 
these  two  institutions  developed  out  of  attempts  to  regu- 
late international  communications  in  conditions  of  peace, 
with  the  main  aim  of  establishing  commercial,  social  and 
economic  relations.  Others  point  out  that  the  most  an- 
cient forms  of  treaties  rather  suggest  their  rise  out  of  con- 
ditions of  war,  affecting,  for  example,  a  mitigation  of 
the  cruel  right  of  the  victor  over  the  vanquished,  or  a 
transformation  of  hostages  into  guests  instead  of  slaves, 
or  a  change  from  unconditional  surrender  to  a  kind  of 
treaty  in  the  case  of  decisive  victory,  and  from  a  truce 
to  an  equal  treaty  of  peace  in  the  case  of  an  undecisive 
contest.  I  think  that  of  the  two  factors  each  had  its 
importance,  but  that  war  and  its  regulation  came  first, 
chronologically.  Considerations  of  peace  relations  came 
later  on.  They  helped  to  mitigate  the  general  state  of  war 
of  all  against  all  and  to  establish,  on  the  basis  of  meas- 
ures regulating  war,  a  kind  of  legal  procedure  destined 
to  create  a  peaceful  intercourse. 

In  every  case,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  very  first  steps 


40  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

of  mankind  on  the  way  to  the  development  of  a  civilized 
life  are  marked  by  some  forms  which  tried  to  regulate 
the  interstatal  relations.  But  from  this  starting-  point  it 
is  still  a  long  way  to  generally  accepted  norms  which  were 
recognized  as  such  by  a  common  understanding  of  all  the 
civilized  nations  and  which  were  based  on  common  relig- 
ious sentiment  and  common  moral  feeling. 

IV 

ANCIENT  TREATIES 

The  very  first  attempt  to  create  civilized  and  organized 
political  and  social  life  in  the  ancient  world,  in  the  first 
states  of  Babylonia  and  Egypt,  those  petty  tribal  city- 
states  built  up  by  the  Sumerians  in  Babylonia  and  by  the 
native  population  of  Egypt,  brought  about  the  first  at- 
tempts to  organize  the  interstatal  relations  between  these 
different  independent  states.  Already  in  the  IV  Millen- 
nium B.  C,  as  we  read,  on  a  recently  discovered  cone  of 
King  Entemena  of  Lagash,  a  treaty  of  delimitation  exis- 
ted setting  the  boundaries  between  the  two  cities  Lagash 
and  Umma  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  Kings  of  these 
cities  chose  as  arbitrator  of  this  contest  Mesilim,  the  King 
of  the  neighbor  city  of  Kish.^ 

This  early  period  of  a  balance  of  power  did  not  last 
long.  Very  soon  the  states  of  Babylonia  and  Egypt  uni- 
ted into  huge  monarchical  states  whose  main  preoccupa- 
tion was  to  defend  themselves  from  the  attack  of  wild 
tribes.  But  gradually  along  with  the  two  states  of  Baby- 
lonia and  Egypt  another  series  of  civilized  and  independent 
states  arose  and  effected  for  the  second  time  a  kind  of 
balance  of  power.  Egypt,  the  state  of  the  Hittites  in 
Asia  Minor,  the  Cretan  maritime  power  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, the  powerful  state  of  Mitanni  on  the  upper  course 


'S.  W.  King  and  H.  R.  Hall,  Egypt  and  Western  Asia,  171 ;  M.  N. 
Tod,  Journal  of  Transactions  of  the  Victoria  Idshitate,  XLIV,  296; 
Tod,  Arbitration,  171. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  41 

of  the  Euphrates,  Assyria,  Babylonia,  Elam,  were  the 
chief  members  of  this  system  of  states.  And  around 
them  were  many  minor  states — Palestine,  the  Phoenician 
towns  on  the  Syrian  coast,  the  Philistines,  different  Ara- 
mean  states  in  Syria  and  such  units.  The  big  states  were 
almost  all  equal  in  power;  the  small  ones  sometimes  re- 
tained their  independence  by  cleverly  using  the  disputes 
of  the  big  ones.  Long  and  bitter  wars  did  not  end  in  a 
decisive  victory  for  any  one  of  the  big  powers.  Each  one 
of  them  was  checked  by  various  political  combinations, 
by  different  defensive  and  offensive  alliances,  by  treaties 
and  by  lively  diplomatic  activities  of  each  of  the  above 
named  states.  Quite  recently  we  became  able  to  follow 
step  by  step  the  different  phases  in  the  history  of  this  sys- 
tem of  oriental  states.  The  states-archives  of  the  Egyp- 
tian capital,  Tell-el-Amarna  and  later  the  archives  of  the 
Foreign  Office  of  the  Hittite  Kings  in  Bogaz-Kevi  offered 
an  opportunity  to  read  the  various  diplomatic  letters  writ- 
ten during  many  decades  and  to  study  the  fundamental 
and  quite  elaborate  treaty  of  alliance  between  King  Rame- 
ses  II  of  Egypt  and  Hattusili  II  of  the  Hittites.  The 
treaty  presents  the  most  elaborate  forms  and  contains  even 
the  clause  of  mutual  extradition  of  political  refugees. 
The  treaty  is  dated  of  the  year  1280  B.  C 

Let  me  cite  some  extracts  from  this  venerable  docu- 
ment to  show  you  how  elaborate  it  was  and  how  nearly, 
mutatis  imitandis,  it  resembles  our  own  documents  of  the 
same  type. 

(1)     Introductory  Clause. 

"The  treaty  v/hich  the  great  chief  of  the  Hittites, 
Hattusili,  the  powerful,  the  son  of  Merasar,  the  great 
chief  of  the  Hittites,  the  powerful,  the  grandson  of 
Sapulul,  the  great  chief  of  the  Hittites,  the  powerful, 
made  upon  a  silver  tablet  with  Osymandyas  (Rameses 
II),  the  great  chief  of  Egv^pt,  the  powerful,  the  son  of 
Men-mo-re  (Seti  I),  the  great  chief  of  Egypt,  the 
powerful,  the  grandson  of  Men-pelte-re  (Rameses  I), 
the  great  chief  of  Egypt.     It  is  a  good  treaty  of  peace 


42  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

and  alliance,  setting  peace  (and  alliance)  between  them 
forever." 

(2)  Historical  sketch  of  former  relations  between 
the  Hittites  and  Egypt.  War  and  peace  with  the 
Hittite  King  Mutalla  IV. 

(3)  Peace.  "There  shall  be  no  hostilities  between 
them  forever.  The  great  chief  of  the  Hittites  shall 
not  pass  over  into  the  land  of  Egypt,  forever,  to  take 
anything  therefrom;  Rameses,  the  great  chief  of  Egypt, 
shall  not  pass  over  into  the  land  of  the  Hittites  to  take 
anything  therefrom  forever." 

(4)  Defensive  and  offensive  alliance.  "If  another 
people  (or  state)  should  come,  as  an  enemy,  against 
the  lands  of  Rameses,  the  great  chief  of  Egypt,  and  he 
shall  send  to  the  great  chief  of  the  Hittites,  saying 
'Come  with  me  with  your  army  against  him,'  the  great 
chief  of  the  Hittites  shall  come,  and  the  great  King  of 
the  Hittites  shall  slay  his  enemy.  But  if  it  shall  not 
be  the  desire  of  the  Great  Chief  of  the  Hittites  to 
come,  he  shall  send  his  infantry  and  his  chariotry,  and 
shall  slay  his  enemy. 

Or  if  Rameses,  the  great  chief  of  Egypt,  be  provoked 
against  delinquent  subjects,  when  they  have  committed 
some  other  fault  against  him,  and  he  come  to  slay 
them,  then  the  great  chief  of  the  Hittites  shall  act  with 
the  lord  of  Egypt." 

The  same  stipulation  is  repeated  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  Hittites.  -.^^ ^ 

(5)  Extradition  of  Political  Refugees. 

"If  any  great  men  of  the  land  of  Egypt  shall  flee  and 
shall  come  to  the  great  chief  of  the  Hittites,  from 
either  town,  or  .  .  .of  the  lands  of  Rameses,  the 
great  chief  of  Egypt,  and  they  shall  come  to  the  great 
chief  of  the  Hittites,  then  the  great  chief  of  the  Hittites 
shall  not  receive  them,  but  the  great  chief  of  the 
Hittites  shall  cause  them  to  be  brought  to  Rameses,  the 
great  chief  of  Egypt,  their  lord." 

Similar  clauses  in  the  favor  of  the  Hittites. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  43 

(6)  Religious  sanction.  Witnesses  "of  the  thou- 
sand Gods,  of  the  male  Gods  and  female  Gods."^ 

But  once  more  this  period  of  the  balance  of  power  was 
but  of  short  duration.  Invasions  from  outside  weakened 
most  of  the  states  and  this  weakness  was  used  first  by  the 
Assyrians  and  afterwards  by  the  Persians  to  build  up  on 
the  ruins  of  the  system  of  states  of  the  second  part  of  the 
second  millennium  two  subsequent  enormous  world-states, 
that  of  Assyria  and  that  of  Persia.  Swords  and  arrows 
replaced  treaties  and  international  arbitration  and  during 
the  rule  of  the  Persians,  peace  reigned  over  the  oriental 
world  interrupted  only  by  some  expeditions  against  bar- 
barians (from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Persians)  and  by 
some  internal  uprisings  regarded  by  the  Persians  as  civil 
wars.  The  Persian  world-state  seemed  to  have  decided 
the  future  of  the  ancient  civilized  world. 

Let  me  stop  for  a  moment  at  this  point  in  the  evolution 
of  the  ancient  world.  We  may  see  that  already  the  first 
steps  in  the  development  of  international  relations  pro- 
duced the  most  conspicuous  forms  generally  used  even 
in  the  modern  world  for  the  purpose  of  regulating  these 
relations:  diplomatic  intercoursCj, .^ treaties,_  arbitration. 
But  can  we  speak  for  this  period  of  any  international  law? 
Hardly.  Because,  as  I  already  pointed  out,  international 
law  supposes  a  kind  of  general  agreement  on  some  prin- 
ciples, be  they  of  legal  or  of  moral  and  religious  nature. 
This  was  not  the  case  in  the  oriental  world.  The  sole  de- 
ciding force  was  might.  Of  course  religious  sanction 
of  the  treaties  appears  as  a  constant  phenomenon  of  the 
oriental  treaties.  And  I  think  this  religious  sanction  was 
indeed  an  important  factor. 

The  economic  materialists  will  of  course  contest  this 
statement  and  stubbornly  affirm  that  the  international  re- 


^The  document,  engraved  on  stone,  is  preserved  in  Egypt.  The 
Egyptian  text,  of  which  the  above  is  a  translation,  is  in  turn,  a  transla- 
tion from  a  Babylonian  original,  Babylonian  being  the  diplomatic 
language  of  the  II  Millennium.  Cf.  Langdon  and  Gardiner  in  the 
Journal  of  Egyptian  Archaeology,  VI,  1920,  pp.  179  and  following. 


44  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

lations  of  bourgeois-states,  i.  e.,  of  all  the  states  known  to 
history,  except  the  most  recent  bolshevist  Russia,  were 
the  exponents  of  constant  economic  struggle  caused  by 
"an  insufficient  development  of  productive  forces,  zvhich 
strive  to  direct  towards  the  external  ivorld  the  system  of 
violent  seizure."^  But  the  task  of  arguing  with  this  sect 
is  a  hopeless  one,  and  I  think  that  in  the  domain  of  history 
they  have  lost  their  campaign  entirely  and  finally.  On  the 
question  of  correlation  between  religion  (and  of  course 
morals)  and  economics  I  may  quote  an  incidental  remark 
of  Durkheim  :^  "It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  the  eco- 
nomic factor  is  very  primitive  at  the  dazvn  of  history, 
zvhereas,  religions  life  is  luxuriant  and  all-penetrating. 
Hoiv  therefore  could  the  second  proceed  from  the  first?" 

But  we  must  take  into  consideration  that  religion  shows 
different  stages  in  its  evolution.  All  the  oriental  religions 
remained  purely  national.  The  gods  of  the  different  ori- 
ental monarchies  were  friendly  to  their  nation  only  and 
enemies  of  all  other  nations.  As  long,  for  instance,  as  the 
Assyrian  chief  god,  similar  in  this  respect  to  our  old  ac- 
quaintance, "the  old  German  God",  was  a  sworn  foe  of  the 
Egyptian  Ammon  and  the  Persian  Auramazda,  religious 
sanction  had  but  little  binding  force  and  the  decisive  word 
was  spoken  by  force  of  arms.  Periods  of  "balance  of 
power"  were  under  these  conditions  based  on  correlation 
of  armed  forces  and  militar}^  resources  only.  Morals  and 
religion  had  no  real  importance. 

The  Persian  Kingdom,  as  I  have  already  pointed  out, 
seemed  to  have  created  a  lasting  peace  for  the  world  in 
uniting  all  the  oriental  states  under  the  rule  of  one  King. 
But  the  plans  of  the  Persian  Kings  met,  as  you  know, 
with  a  stubborn  resistance  in  a  corner  of  the  ancient  world 
where  they  hardly  expected  it.  From  the  ruins  of  the 
old  Aegean  civilization  a  system  of  petty  and  proud 
Greek  city-states  arose  around  the  Aegean  sea,  on  the 

'Ciccotti,  La  Filosofia  delta  guerra  e  la  guerra  alia  filosofia,  Milano, 
190S. 
2Rez'.  Philos,  XLIV   (1892),  650. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  45 

Balkan  peninsula,  on  the  islands,  and  in  Asia  Minor.  Each 
of  these  states  created  its  own  community,  had  its  own 
g-ods,  its  own  institutions,  its  own  laws  and  magistrates. 
They  all  claimed  full  independence  and  were  ready  to  die 
for  it.  Better  to  be  exterminated  and  sold  in  slavery  than 
to  submit  to  the  rule  of  a  foreigner! 

This  land  and  this  nation  took  up  the  inheritance  of 
the  oriental  world,  adopted  its  forms  of  international 
relations  and  diplomatic  intercourse,  but  introduced  in  all 
these  forms  a  new  spirit,  a  new  conception,  which  led 
to  conditions,  out  of  which  arose  not  only  international 
relations,  but  a  real  international  law. 


V 

RELIGION    AS    AN    INFLUENCE    IN    INTERNATIONAL    ^ 

RELATIONS 

The  new  aspect  of  international  relations  in  the  Greek 
world  was  a  result  not  only  of  another  period  of  the  bal- 
ance of  power  in  Greece,  but  also — and  mainly — the  re- 
^It  of  great  progress  made  in  the  domain  of  religion  and 
morals,  I  have  already  pointed  out  that  the  Greek  city- 
states  zealously  defended  their  political  and  economic  in- 
dependence. But  this  defense  did  not  prevent  them  from 
a  full  recognition  of  their  unity  ip  respect  of  both  nation- 
ality and  civilization.  The  unity  of  the  Greek  world  as  it 
gradually  developed,  was  based  not  on  an  exclusively  ra- 
cial, but  mainly  on  a  religious,  moral  and  cultural  foun- 
dation. The  Greek  world,  even  in  its  very  beginnings, 
presented  no  national  unity.  From  the  Greek  point  of 
view,  not  every  man  of  Greek  extraction  belonged  to  the 
Greek  civilized  world,  as  opposed  to  the  barbarian ;  but 
every  one  was  Greek  who  believed  in  the  common  Greek 
gods — the  Olympians — for  whom  Zeus  and  Apollo  were 
no  mere  sources  of  power,  but  creators  of  law  and  mor- 
als, for  whom  life  outside  the  ordered  conditions  of  a 


46  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

Greek  "polis",  that  is,  outside  civilization  and  political 
freedom,  could  not  be  imagined ;  for  whom  Greek  sanc- 
tuaries and  games  were  real  centers  not  only  of  national, 
but  also  of  civilized  life.  We  are  too  ready  to  forget 
that  behind  the  curtain  of  Greek  national  life  lay  the  main 
force  of  Greek  creative  power — the  force  which  had  been 
able  to  build  up  a  humanistic  civilization,  common  to  all 
civilized  beings.  Hence  the  cosmopolitan  aspect  of  the 
ancient  world  and  the  world-wide  spread  of  Greek  civili- 
zation. 

The  first  step  on  this  path  was  made  when  out  of  the 
ruin  of  petty  tribal  cults  arose  a  pan-hellenic  religion,  the 
religion  of  the  great  Olympians,  whose  appearance  both 
in  abstract  theory  and  as  commonly  portrayed  was  quite 
Greek  and  cosmopolitan.  The  statue  of  the  Phidian  Zeus 
and  of  his  Athena  are  much  more  human  than  Egyptian 
and  Assyrian  gods,  and  at  the  same  time  they  reflect  in 
their  superhuman,  divine  grandeur  "the  divine" — {To 
Theion) — in  general  much  more  than  the  poor  symbol  of 
the  Persian  Auramazda.  It  is  no  wonder  that  the  classical 
images  of  the  Olympians  became  so  familiar  to  the  whole 
civilized  world  and  that  we  Christians  naturally  turned  to 
the  majestic  model  of  the  Phidian  Zeus  when  we  had  oc- 
casion to  seek  an  artistic  symbol  of  the  Deity.  Hand  in 
hand  with  this  religious  development  went  an  enormous 
progress  made  by  those  deep  thinkers,  the  Greek  philoso- 
phers, in  the  domain  of  morals.  One  result  of  both  these 
progresses  was  the  recognition  by  all  the  Greeks  of  their 
religious  and  cultural  as  well  as  national  unity.  The 
manifestation  of  this  recognition  was  the  community  of 
legal  ideas  in  the  domain  of  both  civil  and  international 
law. 

Never  was  the  ancient  world  so  near  to  surmounting  the 
ancient  belief  in  war  as  the  natural  condition  of  interstatal 
life  as  in  the  VI-IV  century  B.  C.  Never  was  it  so  ready 
to  accept  as  normal  the  condition  of  peace  between  the 
different  Greek  states,  a  theory  altogether  similar  to  our 
own  modern  concept. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  47 

The  main  question  in  the  domain  of  international  law 
was :  How  to  combine  political  independence  and  national 
unity.  The  creative  genius  of  the  Greeks  tried,  beginning 
with  the  VI  century,  to  achieve  it  by  different  means,  part- 
ly borrowed  from  their  oriental  teachers  in  the  domain 
of  civilized  life  and  civilized  habits — treaties  and  arbitra- 
tion, religious  and  political  federations  (amphictiones) , 
— which  prescribed  to  their  members,  in  place  of  war, 
peaceful  solutions  of  their  quarrels  by  means  of  arbitra- 
tion carried  out  by  the  council  of  the  respective  federa- 
tion,— common  sanctuaries  of  the  great  gods — the 'tem- 
ple of  Zeus  at  Olympia,  that  of  Zeus  at  Dodona,  those 
of  Apollo  at  Delphi  and  Delos,  whose  oracles  played  an 
important  part  in  regulating  interstate  relations — common 
games  where  all  the  cities  came  together  to^Jionor  their 
comjiion  gods  by  different  athletic  contests  and  the  like. 
The  main  attempts  were  made  especially  in  the  VI  cen- 
tury. It  seemed  as  if  the  time  was  at  hand  when  Greece 
would  succeed  in  creating  a  real  league  of  Greek  states 
and  Greek  tribes.  The  sixth  century  was  a  great  creative 
epoch  in  the  domain  of  international  relations.  War  and 
force  were  still  the  decisive  factors  of  political  life,  but 
along  with  them,  we  notice  new  ideas  and  new  concepts, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  new  forms  which  converted  these 
ideas  into  practice. 

Let  me  deal  with  some  of  these  forms  more  at  length. 
They  continued  without  change  during  the  whole  period 
from  the  VII  to  the  III  century  B.  C.  The  most  impor- 
tant legal  monuments  of  international  relations  were  of 
course,  the  treaties.  Greece  recognized  and  used  but  one 
form  of  treaty,  that  of  an  equal  treaty  between  two  free 
and  independent  states.  The  Greek  treaties  are  real  Foe- 
dera  aequa.  Take  any  example  you  like  in  the  book  of  Von 
Scala  and  you  will  find  my  statement  fully  confirmed.  The 
sanction  of  all  treaties  was  a  religious  one.  The  symbol  of 
that  sanction  is  the  witness  of  the  treaty,  the  supreme  god, 
the  incarnation  of  supreme  justice — Zeus,  the  guardian  of 
oaths  and  of  good  faith — {Zeus  orkios  kai  pistios). 


48  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

Treaties  were  used  not  only  for  the  purpose  of  regu- 
lating- post  war  conditions,  but  also  as  means  of  creating 
regular  social  and  economic  interstatal  intercourse.  Thus, 
commercial  treaties  were  common  and  always  assumed 
the  same  form.  A  treaty  in  Greece  did  not  usually  lead 
to  relations  of  friendship  or  alliance,  that  is  to  say,  to  an 
assured  federation  of  different  states,  but  rather  to  a  res- 
toration of  conditions  of  peace  between  two  or  more  states. 
This  shows  how  near  the  Greeks  were  to  the  concept  of 
peace  as  a  normal  condition  of  interstatal  life.  This  es- 
tablishment of  peace  might  have  been  agreed  upon  to  last 
forever  or  for  some  years  only.  The  most  eloquent  testi- 
mony for  the  common  recognition  of  a  national  unity  by 
all  the  Greeks  is  the  regular  clause  in  many  treaties  which 
usually  appears  at  the  beginning  of  the  document,  forming 
a  kind  of  introduction.  I  mean  the  clause  about  the  mu- 
tual guarding  of  common  Greek  sanctuaries.  Even  in  the 
period  when  force  began  to  dominate  over  right,  on  the 
eve  of  and  during  the  Peloponnesian  war,  this  idea  found 
an  adequate  expression  in  many  documents.  The  first  point 
in  the  statutes  of  the  projected  league  of  Greek  states 
proposed  by  Pericles  in  447  dealt  with  this  common  guard- 
ianship and  a  common  reconstruction  of  Greek  sanctua- 
ries destroyed  by  the  Persians.  Just  at  the  beginning  of 
the  treaty  between  Athens  and  Sparta  of  April  12,  421, 
which  stipulated  a  peace  for  fifty  years,  we  read :  ''Con- 
cerning the  common  sanctuaries :  Anyone  who  zuants  may, 
unthont  impediment,  sacrifice  (in  the  sanctuaries)  and 
consult  the  oracles  and  send  sacred  embassies  according  to 
ancestral  custom,  by  land  or  sea.  The  sanctuary  and  the 
temple  of  Apollo  in  Delphi  and  the  city  of  DelpJii  shall  be 
autonomous,  independent  in  matters  of  taxation  and  of 
jurisdiction,  both  as  to  the  city  itself  and  as  to  adjacent 
territory,  according  to  ancestral  custom/'^ 

Only  from  this  point  of  view  are  we  able  to  explain 
the  rather  frequent  cases  of  guarantee  of  inviolability  giv- 

^Scala,  Staatsvertrdge,  p.  67,  n.  83). 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  49 

en  to  different  Greek  cities  throug-h  different  treaties  con- 
cluded by  them  with  other  Greek  cities.  Such  was,  for 
example,  the  case  of  Teos  in  193  B.  C.  I  believe  that 
inviolability  was  conceded  to  Teos  because  of  its  holy  and 
famous  temple. 

VI 

PEACE  BY  ARBITRATION  IN  THE  ANCIENT  WORLD 

But  the  most  interesting  movement  in  Greece  in  the  VI- 
IV  century  was  the  movement  towards  settlement  of  in- 
terstatal  disputes  and  misunderstandings  not  by  war,  but 
by  international  arbitration  in  a  peaceful  way.  Arbitra- 
tion was  highly  developed  in  Greece  at  this  period.  We 
find  different  t3^pes  of  the  procedure.  Some  cases  were 
settled  by  compromise,  others  as  the  result  of  a  special 
treaty,  one  of  the  clauses  of  which  asserted  as  obligatory 
the  arbitration  of  all  disputes  arising  out  of  the  treaty  it- 
self. Some  neutral  states,  appointed  on  a  common  under- 
standing of  the  litigants,  were  to  act  as  arbitrators.  Let 
me  introduce  a  brief  sketch  of  the  history  of  this  institu- 
tion taken  from  the  book  of  one  of  the  best  specialists  on 
the  subject,  Marcus  Niebuhr  Tod  (Greek  International 
Arbitration,  Oxford,  1915,  P.   174-178). 

"That  the  Greeks  were  accustomed  to  arbitration 
from  an  early  period  in  their  history,  is  hardly  open  to 
doubt.  Even  if  Pausanias'  story  that  the  Messenians 
offered  to  submit  to  arbitration  their  dispute  with 
Sparta,  which  led  to  the  outbreak  of  the  first  Alessenian 
war,  be  rejected  as  the  fabrication  of  a  later  age, 
reflecting  back  into  the  past  the  procedure  familiar  to 
itself,  we  can  scarcely  call  in  question  the  substantial 
truth  of  the  traditions  which  tell  of  the  arbitrations 
between  Andros  and  Chalcis  and  between  Athens  and 
Mytilene,  both  of  which  episodes  belong  to  the  VII 
Century,  while  the  arbitral  settlement,  early  in  the  VII 
Century,  of  the  struggle  waged  between  Athens  and 
Megara  for  the  possession  of  Salamis  is  assuredly 
historical,  however  much  later  imagination  may  have 
busied  itself  with  embellishing  the  tale  of  Solon's  ad- 


50  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

vocacy  of  the  Athenian  course.  Of  any  essential 
modification  in  the  methods  of  arbitration  between  the 
eadiest  times  to  which  our  records  refer  and  the  close 
of  Hellenic  independence  we  can  discover  no  traces. 
Nor  should  we  be  justified  in  looking  for  such,  since 
arbitral  awards,  though  dealing  normally  with  questions 
which  are  legal  in  their  nature,  are  based  not  upon  law, 
at  least  in  the  Greek  World,  which  knew  no  codified 
international  law,  but  upon  equity,  and  equity  is  far 
more  stable  than  law. 

"By  the  middle  of  the  fifth  century — how  much 
earlier  than  that  we  have  no  means  of  determining — 
the  Greeks  had  taken  a  decided  step  in  advance.  In- 
stead of  awaiting  a  deadlock  and  then  consenting  to 
refer  it  to  arbitration,  they  bound  themselves  on  some 
occasions  by  treaty  to  deal  in  this  way  with  any  dispute 
which  should  arise  out  of  the  failure,  alleged  or  real, 
of  either  of  the  contracting  parties  to  observe  the  terms 
of  the  treaty,  or  indeed  with  any  difference  which  might 
threaten  to  disturb  the  peaceful  relations  between  the 
states. 

"For  awhile  the  sanguine  hopes  of  those  who  looked 
for  great  results  from  this  stipulation  seemed  doomed 
to  disappointment.  Time  after  time  during  the  troubles 
which  thickened  on  the  eve  of  the  Peloponnesian  War, 
the  Athenians  appealed  to  the  compromise  clause  in- 
serted in  the  Thirty  Years'  Peace,  but  in  vain,  and  be- 
fore that  peace  had  lasted  half  its  span  of  years,  Athens 
and  Sparta  were  again  at  war.  .  .  .  Yet  this  failure 
of  arbitration  to  avert  a  disastrous  war  did  not,  as 
some  observers  may  have  feared  at  the  time,  sound  the 
death-knell  of  the  institution.  It  emphasized  the  truth 
that  arbitration  does  not  act  automatically,  that  it  is  an 
instrument  the  efficiency  of  which  lies  in  its  use.  Even 
in  Sparta  there  were  doubtless  many  who  echoed  the 
words  of  Archidamus  that,  since  the  Athenians  offered 
arbitration  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Peace, 
it  was  contrary  to  the  law  to  attack  them,  words  which 
were  probably  recalled  time  and  again  during  the  long 
years  of  futile  war  and  harassing  anxiety  which  fol- 
lowed.    Even  those  who  had  voted  for  war  felt,  in 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  51 

their  calmer  moments,  that  they  had  put  themselves  in 
the  wrong  by  refusing  the  Athenian  invitation  to  settle 
the  dispute  by  arbitration,  and  attributed  to  this  cause 
in  great  part  the  disasters  which  overtook  them  at 
Sphacteria  and  elsewhere.  And  so  we  find  that  arbitra- 
tion clauses  are  inserted  in  the  Year's  Truce  of  423,  in 
the  Peace  of  Nicias  (421)  and  in  the  Alliance  of  418 
between  Sparta  and  Argos." 

In  the  fourth  century  our  evidence  is  more  scanty,  yet 
we  have  some  six  or  seven  examples  for  the  time  before 
Alexander  and  the  scarcity  might  be  explained  by  the 
character  of  our  sources.  There  is  no  Thucydides  to  give 
us  the  text  of  the  more  important  treaties.  Thus,  I  en- 
drely  agree  with  Tod  that  "this  period  was  one  in  mhich 
the  employment  of  arbitration  was  gradually  spreading 
over  the  entire  Greek  World,  and  even  the  smaller  states 
were  becoming  more  familiarized  with  this  mode  of  put- 
ting an  end  to  disputes  with  their  neighbors."  From  the 
Greek  states,  the  habit  extended  even  to  their  so-called 
barbarian  neighbors.  The  most  interesting  case  is  that 
of  the  Romans  and  the  Tarentines.  "The  Tarentines  de- 
manded that  the  Romans  and  Samnites  should  desist  from 
their  war-like  preparations  and  submit  to  them  the  settle- 
ment of  their  differences."  The  answer  of  the  Romans  to 
this  proposal  is  characteristic  enough.  They  paid  no  at- 
tention to  those  whom  they  scorned  as  a  "Vanissima 
gens" — the  most  frivolous  of  peoples  which,  although 
unable  to  settle  its  own  domestic  revolutions  and  discords, 
thinks  itself  competent  to  dictate  to  others  conditions  of 
war  and  peace. 

VII 

DIPLOMATIC  AGENTS  IN  ANTIQUITY 

It  was  in  the  Greek  World  also  that  diplomatic  relations 

not  only  became  constant,  but  that  these  relations  assumed 

regular  and  generally  recognized  forms.     All  interstatal 

business  was  transacted  through  embassies  and  Ambassa- 

\  dors.   To  be  sure  no  permanent  embassies  were  maintained 


52  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

by  the  Greek  states  in  other  states ;  but  such  permanent  em- 
bassies were,  in  the  conditions  of  Greek  Hfe,  both  useless 
and  almost  impossible.  How  many  embassies  was  a  small 
Greek  state  to  maintain,  when  there  were  some  hundreds 
of  independent  states  in  Greece  alone  ?  Nevertheless,  the 
part  played  by  diplomatic  representatives  in  the  ancient 
world  was  important  enough.  It  is  true,  there  existed  no 
professional  diplomats  in  the  Greek  cities  just  as  there 
existed  no  professional  politicians.  Every  citizen  was  per- 
fectly acquainted  with  the  political  situation  and  was 
able  to  carry  out  successfully  important  diplomatic  mis- 
sions. As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  popular  assemblies  were 
very  careful  in  electing  for  these  missions  their  most  ex- 
Derienced  citizens,  men  who  possessed  a  good  knowledge 
of  both  the  actual  political  situation  and  the  peculiar  con- 
ditions of  the  state  to  which  they  were  to  be  sent. 

One  of  the  most  common  tasks  of  the  popular  assem- 
bly was  to  send  and  to  receive  embassies,  to  hear  and 
to  criticize  the  reports  of  embassies  who  came  home  and  to 
give  instructions  to  embassies  going  abroad  as  well  as  to 
discuss  the  proposals  made  by  foreign  ambassadors.  I 
suggest  that  you  read  the  vivid  and  amusing  picture  of 
such  an  assembly  in  Athens,  drawn  by  Aristophanes  in  his 
famous  play  the  "Acharnians,"  where  the  people  are 
shown  receiving  reports  from  their  embassies  which  have 
returned  from  Persia  and  Thrace,  and  questioning  the 
Persian  ambassador,  Shamatarbas,  the  "King's  E5^e,"  in 
a  most  searching  manner.^ 

The  only  difference  between  the  diplomacy  of  antiq- 
uity (Greek  and  Roman  antiquity,  not  that  of  the  Orient) 
and  modern  diplomacy  consisted  in  the  fact  that  ancient 
diplomacy  very  seldom  had  recourse  to^  secret  proceedings 
and  treaties;  almost  all  the  work  was  done  in  co-operation 
with  the  upper  house  and  the  popular  assembly.  It  is  al- 
most needless  to  add  that  the  ambassadors  were  inviolable 
and  exterritorial,  that  is,  exempt  from  the  civil  jurisdic- 


^Botsford,  A  Source-Book  of  Ancient  History,  p.  196  fol. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  53 

tion  of  the  place  where  they  were  temporarily  residing. 
Cicero,  using  of  course  Greek  ideas,  well  expresses  the 
principle  of  the  inviolability  of  ambassadors,  as  follows : 
"The  inviolability  of  ambassadors  is  protected  both  by  di- 
vine and  human  lazv;  they  are  sacred  and  respected  so  as 
to  be  inviolable  not  only  zuhcn  in  an  allied  coimtry,  but  also 
zvhenever  tJiey  happen  to  be  in  the  midst  of  the  forces  of 
enemies."     (Cicero — in  Verr  III.) 

Of  the  greatest  interest  Tire  the  measures  taken  by  the 
Greek  cities  to  protect  the  material  interest  of  aliens  who 
resided  in  their  cities.  We  may  notice  even  a  kind  of  at- 
tempt to  create  some  permanent  representatives  in  foreign 
cities  whose  duties  were  to  watch  over  the  interests  of  both 
the  city  which  they  represented  and  its  individual  citizens. 
I  refer  to  the  well  known  institution  of  the  proxenoi  which 
developed  out  of  the  already  mentioned  relations  of  hos- 
pitality between  individual  citizens  of  different  cities. 
From  the  V  century  on,  the  proxenoi  often  became  of- 
ficial representatives  of  the  city  which  gave  them  the 
rights  of  honorary  citizenship.  They  were  appointed  for 
the  special  purpose  of  acting  as  permanent  consular 
agents.  Sometimes  they  assumed  diplomatic  duties.  One 
of  their  chief  functions  was  to  guide  the  assemblies  and  to 
present  them  to  the  magistrates,  the  council  and  the  popu- 
lar assembly  of  their  city.  We  must  not  forget,  however^ 
that  the  proxenoi  were  always  citizens  of  the  city  in  which 
they  represented  the  interests  of  another  city. 

Still  more  significant  is  the  rich  development  of  inter- 
national jurisdiction.  I  cannot  deal  with  this  point  at 
length.  You  ma}'  find  a  good  survey  of  the  different  kinds 
of  this  jurisdiction  in  Philippson.  Let  me  cite  a  short 
quotation  from  his  valuable  book.  (v.  I,  p.  208.)^ 

"Generally  speaking,  in  time  of  peace,  freedom  of 
intercourse,  and  especially  of  engaging  in  mercantile 
transactions    (epimi.via   corresponding    approximately 


^Philippson,  International  Lazv  and  Custom  of  Ancient  Greece  and 
Rome,  Vol.  I.,  p.  208. 


54  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

to  the  Roman  ius  commcrcU)  was  permitted  between 
the  citizens  of  different  states,  subject  to  the  payment 
of  customs  duties,  port-dues,  etc.,  and  in  some  cases,  to 
restrictions  respecting  the  exportation  and  importation 
of  certain  commodities,  such  as  oil,  grain,  etc.  In 
most  towns,  there  was  a  permanent  court  exercising 
jurisdiction  over  causes  to  which  ahens  were  parties; 
and  this  judicial  organization,  as  well  as  the  presiding 
judges,  were  variously  designated,  so  that  we  hear  of 
the  "Xenicon  dicasterion"  (a  general  name  for  the  for- 
eign court)  Xht'^Xonodikoi"  {2i  general  name  for  the 
presiding  judges),  the  Polemarchos  (the  Athenian 
Archon,  who  took  special  cognizance  of  the  affairs  of 
aliens),  the  "cosmos  xenios"  (of  Cretan  towns),  and 
the  like.  These  institutions  and  magistracies  usually 
existed  apart  from  express  provisions  in  international 
conventions,  but  treaties  were  very  frequently  con- 
cluded either  to  insure  the  due  and  impartial  operation 
of  these  tribunals,  or  to  establish  a  new  mixed  court 
of  judges,  the  coinon  dicasterion,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  nominate  a  third  city,  as  a  "court  of  appeal,"  in 
the  sense  of  a  tribunal  to  which  the  issues  were  sub- 
mitted for  final  decision  after  a  preliminary  exami- 
nation by  the  court  of  first  instance.  As  to  the  law 
that  was  applied  in  the  settlement  of  conflicting  claims, 
sometimes  the  lex  loci  contractus  (the  prevailing  law 
of  the  place  where  the  engagement  in  question  was 
entered  into)  operated,  at  other  times  the  lexdomicilii 
of  the  defendant ;  sometimes,  again,  broad  and  equitable 
principles  were  invoked  in  order  to  effect  a  fair  recon- 
ciliation between  the  contending  legislations  of  the 
States  concerned,  and,  finally,  an  express  judicial  dis- 
pensation might  be  resorted  to  in  virtue  of  an  ad  hoc 
agreement.  At  first  the  alien  suitor  was  obliged  to 
plead  through  the  agency  of  the  proxenus  or  his  patron, 
as  the  case  may  be,  but  with  the  expansion  of  commerce 
and  general  intercourse,  the  increase  of  litigation  and 
the  more  generous  attitude  that  came  to  be  manifested 
towards  non-citizens,  the  foreigner  was,  in  actual  prac- 
tice, and  despite  strict  theory,  commonly  allowed  to 
appear  in  person  and  address  the  court,  and  to  install 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  55 

advocates  to  plead  for  him.  Finally  provision  was 
usually  made  for  the  hearing  of  suits  within  a  certain 
fixed  period,  so  as  to  prevent  an  undue  delay  of 
justice." 

Space  does  not  allow  me  to  deal  with  the  new  ideas  and 
institutions  given  form  and  effect  by  the  Greeks  of  this 
epoch,  in  order  to  mitigate  the  cruel  customs  of  warfare. 
I  refer  to  the  different  guarantees  of  neutrality,  the  regu- 
lations of  the  fate  of  the  prisoners,  the  treatment  of  the 
hostages,  and  so  on.  I  hope  to  be  able  to  devote  a  special 
study  to  this  question. 

Such  were  the  achievements  of  the  Greek  World  in  the 
domain  of  international  relations.  Their  main  aim  was 
gradually  to  transform  Greece  into  a  family  of  states 
where  right  worked  beside  force,  and  we  must  say  that 
right  did  not  always  yield  to  force.  Can  we  honestly 
claim  more  than  that  for  our  own  modern  conditions  ? 


VIII 

CONFLICT    BETWEEN    RIGHT    AND    FORCE 

I  have  already  pointed  out  that  the  Peloponnesian  war 
interrupted  the  quiet  development  of  international  rela- 
tions based  on  religion,  morals,  equity  and  law.  This  war 
undermined  the  foundations  of  international  law  and  led 
the  world  back  to  the  crucial  dilemma; — has  force  to 
yield  to  right,  or  right  to  fcrce^?  We  cannot  deny  that 
the  triumph  of  force  over  right  was  a  result  not  only  of 
the  political  development  of  the  Greek  World,  but  also  of 
a  strong  intellectual  current  headed  by  the  so-called  soph- 
ists who  sought  and  found  theoretical  proof  for  their 
thesis  as  to  the  dominating  part  played  by  force  in  human 
life.  In  international  relations  the  principle  was  worked 
out  as  the  predominance  of  the  interests  of  the  state  over 
the  interests  of  law  and  justice. 

Let  me  bring  forward  some  quotations  from  different 
political  speeches  of  this  epoch  transmitted  to  us  by  Thu- 


56  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

cydides.  They  will  show  how  great  was  the  difference 
between  the  two  points  of  view.  The  Corinthians,  for  ex- 
ample, had  occasion  to  formulate  the  old  principle  of 
Greek  morals.  It  was  on  the  eve  of  the  great  war,  in 
433.  "Do  not  say  to  yourselves  that  one  thing  is  just,  but 
that  in  the  event  of  war  another  thing  is  expedient;  for  the 
true  path  of  expediency  is  the  path  of  right.  .  .  .  To  do  no 
ivrong  to  a  neighbor  is  a<  more  certain  source  of  power 
than  to  gain  a  perilous  advantage  under  the  influence  of  a 
momentary  illusion."  (Thucydides  I,  42.)  The  new  so- 
phistical point  of  view  is  fully  expressed  in  an  answer 
given  in  432  by  the  Athenian  ambassador  in  reply  to  argu- 
ments of  the  Spartan  magistrates  similar  to  those  of  the 
Corinthians  quoted  above.  It  reminds  us  on  one  hand 
of  the  discussion  of  the  same  problem  bv  the  sophist  Thra- 
symachus  and  Socrates  in  one  of  the  dialogues  of  Plato 
(The  Republic  I),  and  on  the  other  hand  of  so  many 
proclamations  and  pamphlets  published  during  the  great 
war  by  the  Germans. 

"An  empire  was  offered  to  us,"  said  the  Athenian 
ambassador.     "Can  you  wonder  that,  acting  as  human 
nature  always  will,  we  accepted  it  and  refused  to  give 
it  up  again,  constrained  by  three  all-powerful  motives 
— ambition,  fear,  interest?     We  are  not  the  first  who 
have   aspired   to   rule ;   the   world   has   ever  held   that 
the  weaker  must  be  kept  down  by  the  stronger.     And 
we  think  that  we  are  worthy  of  power,  and  there  was 
a  time  when  you  thought  so  too ;  but  now,  when  you 
mean  expediency,  you  talk  about  justice.     Did  justice 
ever  deter  anyone  from  taking  by  force  whatever  he 
could?"     (Thuc.  I,  76.) 
The  prevailing  of  these  ideas  brought  with  it  very  im- 
portant results.     First  Athens  and  then  Sparta  domina- 
ted the  Greek  world.    The  balance  of  power  seemed  to  be 
gone  forever  and  force  appeared  to  have  triumphed  over 
right.     And  yet  it  was  not  so.     Although  might  was  the 
deciding  factor  it  was  never  supported  by  public  opinion. 
The  oppressor  was  always  recognized  as  such  and  this 
moral  censorship  made  certain  the  weakness  of  all  im- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  57 

perialist  attempts  based  on  force  alone.  We  have  already 
seen  that  treaty-making  and  arbitration  were  being  de- 
veloped in  spite  of  frequent  wars  and  we  are  not  sur- 
prised therefore  that  Sparta's  victory  over  Athens  did  not 
create  a  lasting  hegemony  for  her.  A  kind  of  balance 
of  power  was  soon  re-established.  But  the  balance  of 
power  of  the  IV  century  B.  C.  was  more  like  a  state  of 
political  anarchy  than  an  order  by  system  of  independent 
states — an  anarchy  which  considerably  weakened  Greece 
as  a  whole  and  enabled  first  the  Persian  King,  and  later 
the  Kings  of  Macedonia,  to  dictate  their  will  to  the  dif- 
ferent political  combinations  which  appeared  and  disap- 
peared in  Greece  like  mushrooms.  This  process  of  com- 
plete disintegration  was  ended  first  by  the  so-called  peace 
of  Antalkides  (386  B.  C.),  which  made  Greece  subject 
to  the  Persian  King,  and  later  by  the  battle  of  Chaeron- 
aea  which  established  Macedonian  domination  in  Greece. 
And  yet  this  troubled  period  in  the  history  of  Greece,  full 
of  wars,  social  unrest  and  revolutions,  was  an  epoch  of 
important  progress  in  the  domain  of  international  rela- 
tions. Hand  in  hand  with  the  growing  process  of  disin- 
tegration went  the  process  of  varied  attempts  to  settle  in- 
terstate conflicts  in  a  peaceful  way.  I  have  already  spo- 
ken of  arbitration.  We  may  notice  the  same  evolution  in 
other  domains.  Diplomatic  intercourse  was  never  before 
so  lively  or  so  elaborate.  Warfare  was  better  regulated 
by  international  understandings  and  by  the  force  of  pub- 
lic opinion  than  in  the  VI  and  V  Century.  New  and  pro- 
gressive forms  of  relations  between  governments  were 
created,  such  as  the  different  federations  of  Greek  cities 
(the  Achaean  and  Aetolian  federations). 

IX 

PERIOD  OF  CONSTANT  FLUX 

The  next  stage  in  the  political  evolution  of  the  ancient 
world  was  the  reestablishment  of  the  world-state  by  Alex- 
ander the  Great.    This  was  the  substitution  for  the  Per- 


58  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

sian  domination  of  a  world-domination  of  Greek  elements 
united  around  the  Macedonian  state.  The  world-mon- 
archy of  Alexander  was  in  no  respect  a  new  political 
form.  Alexander  preserved  all  the  peculiarities  of  the 
Persian  empire.  The  only  change  brought  in  by  him  was 
the  substitution  of  a  new  dominating  class  for  the  old 
one.  The  Greeks  and  Macedonians  replaced  the  Iranians 
as  the  ruling  element.  Greece  remained  legally  free,  but 
in  fact  it  was  simply  a  portion  of  the  new  world-state.  In- 
deed, the  "freedom"  of  Greece  was  strongly  emphasized 
by  the  new  ruler,  but  this  freedom  meant  of  course  pro- 
tection, like  the  freedom  of  the  peace  of  Antalkides  and 
subsequently  the  freedom  of  the  peace  of  Flamininus. 
Alexander's  world-empire  did  not  last  long.  The  disin- 
tegrating forces  within  the  empire  were  too  strong  to 
maintain  the  artificial  unity  of  the  Greek  Occident  and  the 
multi-national  Orient.  Alexander's  empire  soon  fell  to 
pieces  and  out  of  its  ruin  arose  many  powerful  Graeco- 
Oriental  states.  The  leading  powers  were — Syria,  Egypt, 
Macedonia. 

Two  processes  might  be  noticed  during  the  so-called 
Hellenistic  period.  One  led  towards  the  reintegration  of 
the  Persian  and  Macedonian  World-empire,  while  the 
other  opposed  this  movement  towards  centralization  by  all 
means  and  resulted  in  separating  from  the  big  states  new 
political  formations,  both  kingdoms  and  city-states :  Per- 
gamon,  Bithynia,  Galatia,  Pontus,  Cappadocia,  Comma- 
gene,  Armenia,  Parthia,  on  one  side  and  Rhodes,  Sparta, 
Athens,  and  the  Achean,  Aetolian  and  Lycian  federations 
on  the  other.  Thus  there  once  more  reappeared  the 
balance  of  power  which  lasted  this  time  about  two  cen- 
turies and  which  was  as  creative  in  the  field  of  internation- 
al relations  as  had  been  the  earlier  balances  of  power, — 
that  of  the  second  millennium  B.  C.  and  that  of  the  Greek 
city-states  of  the  VI-IV  century  B.  C.  Diplomatic  re- 
lations were  lively  and  constant.  Never  before  was  ex- 
change of  embassies  and  special  envoys  so  regular  and  the 
matters  discussed  by  them  so  complicated.     Never  before 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  59 

were  concluded  so  many  treaties,  which  of  course  were 
broken  sometimes  within  a  few  months  of  the  dates  of 
signature.  Never  before  and  never  after  was  international 
arbitration  in  such  constant  use,  to  be  sure,  principally 
between  the  legally  "free"  but  practically  "protected"  pet- 
ty Greek  states.  Those  who  acted  as  arbitrators  were 
generally  the  mighty  protectors,  the  kings  of  the  great 
Monarchies.  Wars  were  conducted  in  the  most  chival- 
rous manner,  were  of  short  duration,  and  led  generally  to 
new  political  combinations  defined  by  elaborate  treaties. 

The  most  important  process  during  this  period  was  that 
of  a  gradual  formation  of  a  world  civil.  law,  of  a  Reichs- 
recht  or  Jus  Gentium^  The  extreme  mixture  of  races  in 
all  the  new  states,  the  constant  emigration  from  one  cen- 
tre to  another,  the  numerous  colonies  of  "foreigners"  in 
all  the  Hellenistic  states  like  the  Jewish  colonies  in  Egypt, 
Asia  Minor  and  Greece,  called  imperatively  for  the  crea- 
tion of  a  system  of  law  equally  intelligible  to  all  the  con- 
stituent parts  of  the  cosmopolitan  states  of  this  epoch. 
An  intensive  world-commerce  everywhere  required  stand- 
ards calculated  to  facilitate  commercial  relations  and 
based  on  generally  accepted  principles. 

The  main  outline  of  this  new  international  law  was 
taken  from  Athens,  whose  world-commerce  preceded  that 
of  the  Hellenistic  epoch.  The  different  codes  of  laws 
published  in  different  countries  were  practically  all  based 
on  the  Athenian  laws.  Just  as  in  matters  of  language, 
a  kind  of  juridical  common  agreement  {Koine)  guided 
the  decisions  of  the  different  courts  which  acted  in  differ- 
ent countries.  This  enormous  work  was  not  carried  out  to 
the  extent  of  formulating  an  international  civil  law,  but 
it  went  far  enough  to  enable  Rome  during  the  period  of 
her  world-domination  to  build  up  her  system  of  world- 
civil  law  on  a  basis  of  equal  application  throughout  the 
constituent  parts  of  the  Roman  Empire. 

In  one  branch,  however,  we  may  notice  quite  positive 
and  practically  definite  results.  I  mean  the  general  mari- 
time law,  elaborated  and  put  into  general  circulation  by 


60  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

Rhodes,  which  acted  in  this  respect  as  a  kind  of  manda- 
tory of  all  the  Hellenistic  powers  interested  in  the 
safety  of  the  seas  and  in  an  undisturbed  maritime  com- 
merce.^ 

Nevertheless,  we  must  confess  that  the  Hellenistic 
epoch  was  by  no  means  a  triumph  of  right  over  might. 
Force  and  fortune  were  the  watchwords  of  this  epoch. 
But  the  period  in  itself  had  its  great  importance.  Besides 
the  development  of  civil  international  law  which  grad- 
ually assimilated  with  the  civil  law  in  general,  we  witness 
during  this  period  a  spread  of  Greek  ideas  over  all  the 
world.  What  had  been  an  interstate  law  of  Greek  city- 
states  then  became  the  unwritten  code  of  rules  and  cus- 
tom, forming  a  kind  of  foundation  for  the  international 
relations  of  the  whole  civilized  world  both  in  the  Orient 
and  in  the  Occident,  in  Syria  and  Egypt  as  well  as  in 
Carthage  and  in  Italy.  Force  and  the  interests  of  the 
States  played,  of  course,  the  predominant  part  in  the 
complicated  life  of  this  period.  But  the  standard-bearers 
of  this  force  were  Greeks.  They  belonged  to  the  Greek 
World  and  were  brought  up  in  the  principles  of  Greek 
civilization.  Their  mentality  and  their  education  were 
Greek  and  their  ideals  as  well.  We  can  readily  under- 
stand why  Greek  ideas  on  international  relations  formed  a 
kind  of  subconscious  stratum  in  the  acts  of  the  political 
rulers  of  the  Hellenistic  world.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind, 
however,  that  the  most  important  feature  of  the  Hellenis- 
tic age  was  not  any  new  achievements  in  the  field  of  in- 
ternational law,  but  the  gradual  transformation  of  its 
principles  into  institutions  which  helped  to  organize  the 
internal  life  of  the  vast  and  complex  states  of  this 
epoch.  I  need  only  mention  again,  in  this  connection, 
the  use  of  international  arbitration  and  civil  inter- 
national law. 


'S.  W.  Ashburner,  The  Rhodtan  Sea  Law,  Oxford,  1909,  treats  not 
the  Hellenistic  Law  of  Rhodes  but  a  Byzantine  derivation,  as  I  incline 
to  think,  of  the  Hellenistic  original.  On  the  Hellenistic  law,  see  Van 
Gelder,  Geschichte  der  Alten  Rhodier. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  61 

X 

THE  ROMAN  THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

This  process  was  further  developed  by  Rome,  who  in- 
herited from  the  Hellenistic  world  not  only  the  main  ideas 
of  world-power,  but  also  the  various  legal  forms  used  by 
the  Greeks.  But  the  whole  system  of  Rome's  interna- 
tional relations,  although  influenced  by  Greek  achieve- 
ments, was  peculiar  and  independent.  Greek  influence  did 
not  change  its  main  character.  Generally  speaking  the 
Roman  system,  though  quite  elaborate,  was  based  on 
more  primitive  and  more  elementary  conceptions  than 
those  elaborated  by  the  Greeks.  The  main  Roman  idea 
was  theancientone  of  war  as  the  natural  status  of  inter- 
nationar  IntercQiirser 

The  difference  between  Greece  and  Rome  as  regards 
international  relations  found  an  adequate  expression  in  the 
utterly  different  treatment  by  Greece  and  Rome  of  inter- 
national treaties  which  formed  the  basis  of  international 
relations  in  both  countries.  The  Roman  treaty  was  never 
a  treaty  which  contented  itself  v/ith  restoring  peace  be- 
tween herself  and  another  state,  that  is,  their  previous 
normal  relations.  Rome's  treaties  always  created  one  or 
another  kind  of  perpetual  relation  between  the  two  par- 
ties, either  of  friendship  or  of  alliance.  Both  of  these 
relations  were  certain  to  give  rise  to  a  definite  legal  status 
between  the  two  states.  Of  course,  originally  these  legal 
relations  were  elaborated  on  a  basis  of  equality,  and  the 
form  of  the  Roman  treaty  is  that  of  an  equal  treaty  {foe- 
dus  aequum)  between  independent  states.  But  gradually, 
by  means  of  clauses  added  to  the  body  of  the  treaty,  the 
treaty  of  friendship  became  transformed  into  a  treaty 
which  effected  vassalage,  the  treaty  of  alliance  into  a 
treaty  of  dependence.  Both  forms  of  treaties  were,  of 
course,  intendedjXLlasLaiL-indefiniteJime.  Thus  it  came 
about  that  Rome  did  not  know  treaties  limited  in  time, 
but  only  treaties  of  supposedly  unlimited  duration. 


62  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

Another  fundamental  point  in  RjQnian_.inJt£rnational 
pra_ctice_and  theory  was  that  Rome,  in  her  estimate  of 
justice  or  injustice,  of  legahty  or  illegality,  of  all  acts 
of  an  international  character,  took  not  an  international  but 
exclusively^  the _Roman  point  of  view.  The  sole  question 
for  Rome  is  always :  Does  one  or  another  act  correspond 
to  the  political  and  juridical  standards  prevailing  in 
Rome?  Does  it  or  does  it  not  fulfill  the  requirements  of 
Roman  morals  and  religion?  For  Rome  justum  helium 
"the  righteous  war"  was  a  war  declared  by  Rome  with  due 
regard  for  the  usual  religious  and  legal  forms  and  with  all 
the  formalities  prescribed  by  the  body  of  international 
and  religious  customary  principles  elaborated  and  inter- 
preted by  the  College  of  Fetiales.  Every  war  must  have 
had  some  legal  cause,  but  legal  from  the  point  of  view 
of  existing  Roman  law.  Therefore,  the  Romans  were 
right  in  declaring  that  they  never  conducted  any  but 
legal  wars  (iusta  bella).  "Legal"  meant  in  their  mind 
both  legal  from  the  juridical  point  of  view  and  "just" 
from  the  moral  point  of  view.  The  treaties  concluded  by 
the  Romans  were  always  formulated  according  to  a  cer- 
tain type  elaborated  once  for  all  by  themselves.  This  type 
was  regarded  as,  and  intended  to  be,  a  foedus  aeqnum — 
an  "equal  treaty".  But  it  also  would  frequently  comprise 
supplementary  clauses,  which  might  change  the  whole 
character  of  the  treaty.  Nevertheless,  from  the  legal  point 
of  view  the  treaty  was  always  to  be  regarded  as  one  con- 
cluded with  due  regard  for  all  the  forms  of  the  law  of 
Rome. 

From  the  same  point  of  view,  Rome  guided  the  civil 
intercourse  between  herself  and  other  cities.  The  so- 
called  jus  gentium  of  the  Romans  was  nothing  but  Ro- 
man civil  law  adapted  to  the  regulation  of  the  relations 
of  Roman  citizens  and  citizens  of  other  cities  which  were 
friends  and  allies  of  the  Roman  people.  With  men  who 
did  not  belong  to  these  two  categories,  Rome  was  sup- 
posed not  to  have  any  legal  relations  whatever.  We  read, 
for  example,  in  the  Digest  49,  15:     "If  with  certain  na- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  63 

tions  we  have  no  connection  of  friendship  or  hospitality 
and  no  treaty  concluded  in  order  to  establish  friendship, 
the  men  of  these  nations  are  not  our  enemies  (hostes) 
(a  concession  to  Greek  ideas)  but  if  anything  belonging 
to  us  happens  to  come  into  their  possession,  it  becomes 
their  own  and  a  free  man  of  ours  taken  captive  becomes 
their  slave ;  the  same  in  the  case  of  anything  belonging  to 
them  if  it  comes  into  our  hands." 

When  Rome  came  in  close  contact  with  the  Greek  world 
she  adopted  many  details  of  the  Greek  international  usage. 
Rome  made  her  own  the  Greek  system  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions ;  she  modified  many  expressions  in  her  treaties,  she 
used  the  procedure  of  international  arbitration,  as  Persia 
and  the  Hellenistic  monarchies  had  used  it  before  her,  ex- 
clusively regulating  relations  between  her  Greek  allies. 
But  Rome  never  modified  the  essence  of  her  international 
principles  and  never  adopted  the  fundamental  ideas  of 
Greek  international  law. 

By  force  of  arms,  Rome  secured  for  herself  a  unique 
position  in  the  family  of  civilized  nations.  As  the  Roman 
forms  of  international  law  were  well  adapted  to  this  para- 
mount position,  Rome  never  seriously  contemplated 
changing  them,  but  retained  them  throughout  her  history. 
She  ordered  and  expected  to  be  obeyed.  Even  when  she 
acted  as  arbitrator,  she  expected  to  be  obeyed.  Let  me 
cite  but  one  example.  Antiochus  IV,  King  of  Syria,  at- 
tempted to  conquer  Egypt.  He  was  with  his  army  in 
Egypt  and  was  moving  towards  Alexandria.  Suddenly 
his  way  was  barred  by  the  Roman  praetor,  Popillius,  with 
his  staff,  but  without  an  army. 

"Popillius,  the  Roman  praetor,"  says  Polybius 
(XXIX,  II)  (2,  27),  "was  greeted  at  a  great  distance 
by  the  king;  he  did  not  accept  the  hand  which  was 
stretched  towards  him,  but  gave  the  king  tablets,  on 
which  was  written  the  Senatus-consultiim ;  he  de- 
manded that  the  king  should  first  read  the  Senate's  de- 
cision.  .   .   .   After  having  read  this  senatiis-consultum 


64  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

the  king  answered  that  he  must  confer  with  his  friends, 
as  to  how  to  act.  But  Popillius  .  .  .  who  happened 
to  have  in  his  hand  a  vine-stick  traced  a  circle  in  the 
ground  around  Antiochus  and  required  the  king  to 
give  an  immediate  answer.  The  king,  struck  by  this 
haughty  behavior,  after  a  brief  period  of  hesitation, 
declared  that  he  would  do  all  that  was  ordered  by  the 
Roman  people.  ...  It  was  set  forth  in  the  senatus- 
considtum  that  the  king  was  immediately  to  end  the 
war  against  Ptolemy." 

It  was  thus  that  Rome  created  her  world-state.  But 
we  must  not  forget  that  this  state  was  built  up  by  incor- 
poratino;  in  it  all  the  Hellenized  parts  of  the  ancient  world 
and  that  the  western  parts  of  it  were  shaped  according 
to  Greek  models.  In  the  internal  structure  of  her  world- 
state  Rome  introduced  many  principles  which  had  been 
evoked  in  the  international  law  of  the  Greeks,  for  the 
Roman  world-state  was  an  international  state.  Moreover, 
Rome  brought  to  a  point  of  realization  many  Greek  as- 
pirations which  could  never  have  been  accomplished  by 
the  Greek  World.  Common  peace  became  a  reality,  like- 
wise a  world  system  of  civil  law. 

It  is  evident  that  even  after  having  established  her 
world  empire  Rome  had  to  deal  with  neighbors,  both  in 
time  of  war  and  in  time  of  peace.  Therefore  diplomatic 
relations  with  them  never  ceased  to  exist. ^  But  from  the 
point  of  view  of  international  law,  Rome  never  recognized 
the  legal  existence  of  the  German  or  Iranian  states.  She 
never  treated  them  as  her  equals. 

Let  me  conclude  this  paper  on  the  international  law 
of  the  Ancient  world  by  quoting  the  words  of  Augustus, 
the  founder  of  the  Roman  Empire,  as  to  his  international 
achievements.  In  his  statement  to  the  Roman  people, 
which  he  himself  carefully  composed  and  ordered  to  be 

^One  of  the  most  interesting  institutions  of  this  epoch  is  the  corps 
of  diplomatic  interpreters,  the  forerunners  of  our  "dragomans"  in 
Oriental  countries.  Cf.  J.  Snellmann,  De  Interpretitus  Romanoriim, 
Leipzig,  1920. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  65 

engraved,  after  his  death,  on  bronze  pillars  posted  before 
his  mausoleum,  he  said : 

"I  extended  the  frontiers  of  all  the  Roman  provinces 
which  are  bordered  by  peoples  not  subject  to  our 
dominion."  After  having  enumerated  these  conquests 
of  his,  he  proceeds:  "To  me  there  were  often  sent 
embassies  from  India,  such  as  had  never  been  seen  by 
any  one  of  the  Roman  commanders.  Our  friendship 
was  besought  by  embassies  of  the  Bastarmians  and 
Scythians,  of  the  kings  of  the  Sarmatians,  who  dwell 
beyond  the  Tanais  and  further  to  the  east,  of  the  king 
of  the  Albanians,  as  well  as  by  emissaries  of  the  kings 
of  the  Iberians  and  the  Medes."  .  .  .  "To  me, 
Phraates,  the  son  of  Orodes,  sent  all  his  sons  and  grand- 
sons, although  not  vanquished  in  war,  but  in  order  to 
ask  our  friendship  by  giving  us  his  sons  as  hostages. 
During  the  time  I  held  the  office  of  princeps,  peoples 
that  had  never  before  had  any  exchange  of  embassies 
and  friendship  with  us  were  acquainted  with  the  good 
faith  (fides)  of  the  Roman  people." 

The  words  of  Augustus  in  which  the  Roman  concep- 
tion of  her  supremacy  over  the  world  were  so  proudly 
expressed  became  a  kind  of  gospel  for  his  successors. 
The  Roman  theory  which  did  not  recognize  any  equals 
to  the  Empire, — the  only  ''legal"  world-state, — remained 
unchanged  as  long  as  that  empire  endured. 

Such  are  the  essential  features  of  the  development  of 
international  relations  in  the  ancient  world.  Like  our  own, 
they  very  often  change  their  aspect.  Antiquity  had  its 
epochs  of  creative  work  and  its  periods  of  stagnation  and 
decay.  But  some  fundamental  concepts  and  some  gen- 
eral ideas,  once  accepted,  were  never  forgotten.  Al- 
though apparently  the  modern  world  began  its  evolution 
in  somewhat  primitive  conditions,  we  must  not  forget  that 
these  conditions  had  as  their  foundation  all  the  most  im- 
portant ideas  of  the  ancient  world,  and,  first  of  all,  the 
Pax  Romana  and  the  common  Christian  faith. 

MICHAEL  ROSTOVTSEFF. 


Medieval   Diplomacy 


MEDIEVAL  DIPLOMACY 


THE  MEDIEVAL  HERITAGE 

In  spite  of  calumny  against  the  IMiddle  x\ges  on  the  part 
of  a  past  generation  of  modern  historians  and  in  the  teeth 
of  the  resultant  popular  prejudice  nowadays  against  the 
very  word  "medieval,"  there  has  been  in  the  last  century 
an  ever-growing  appreciation  among  scholars  of  the  vast 
debt  which  we  moderns  owe  to  the  Middle  Age.  The  Mid- 
dle Age  is  the  bridge  between  the  Roman  Empire  of  antiq- 
uity and  the  national  states  of  modern  times.  It  is  the 
medium  through  which  antique  culture  has  been  transmit- 
ted to  our  contemporary  world.  Nay,  more ;  it  is  the  liv- 
ing organism  in  which  have  germinated  and  developed 
the  cardinal  institutions  and  customs  of  the  present  day. 
In  a  real  sense  the  Middle  Age  is  the  mother  of  modern- 
ity. 

We  moderns  usually  admit,  since  the  time  of  Chateau- 
briand and  Schlegel  and  Ozanam,  that  the  artistic  and  ro- 
mantic heritage  of  the  Middle  Age  has  been  considerable 
— Gothic  architecture,  illuminated  manuscripts,  tapestries 
and  embroideries,  the  songs  of  the  troubadours,  the  paint- 
ings of  a  Giotto,  the  poems  of  a  Dante.  But  this  is  only 
one  aspect  of  what  present-day  scholars  recognize  as  our 
debt  to  the  Middle  Age.  Mr.  Rashdall  has  attributed  to 
it  the  genesis  of  our  ideas  of  university-organization  and 
university-education.  Dr.  James  J.  Walsh  has  ascribed  to 
it  the  patronage  of  experimental  science  and  remarkable 
progress  in  astronomy,  engineering,  and  medicine.  The 
late  Professor  Maitland  emphasized  the  medieval  charac- 
ter of  the  English  common  law  and  administrative  pro- 

69 


70  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

cedure  as  well  as  the  essential  medievalism  of  our  institu- 
tions of  representative  government  and  trial  by  jury. 
Moreover,  contemporary  political  scientists  are  making 
the  Middle  Age  the  field  of  their  researches  into  the  nature 
of  sovereignty  and  functional  representation ;  and  leaders 
of  the  present  gild  socialist  movement  in  England  are 
seeking  to  solve  social  and  economic  problems  by  re- 
course to  medieval  ideas  and  medieval  practices.  And  no 
sooner  is  a  League  of  Nations  projected  than  students 
of  international  relations  and  diplomacy  turn  back  to  the 
times  which  witnessed  the  most  fruitful  growth  of  these 
things — ^the  Middle  Ages.  ' 

Before  undertaking  to  appraise  the  influence  of  the 
Middle  Age  upon  the  evolution  of  diplomacy  and  inter- 
national relations,  it  is  important  that  we  recognize  cer- 
tain outstanding  characteristics  of  the  period  itself.  One 
of  these  characteristics  is  the  absence  of  any  political  in- 
stitution uniting  all  civilized  peoples  in  a  common  secu- 
lar bond,  such  as  the  Roman  Empire  had  been  in  ancient 
times,  and  the  substitution  of  a  most  bewildering  pro- 
vincialism and  localism.  In  the  fifth  and  sixth  centuries 
of  the  Christian  era  the  Roman  Empire  finally  fell  a  prey, 
so  far  as  central  and  western  Europe  was  concerned,  to 
the  spasmodic  incursions  and  constant  immigration  of 
semi-barbarous  Teutons  from  the  forest  and  swamps  to 
the  north.  These  Teutons,  like  all  primitive  peoples,  were 
clannish  and  quarrelsome;  devoted  to  their  own  folk- 
traditions,  they  cared  little  for  the  traditions  of  cultured 
Greeks  or  cultivated  Latins ;  they  had  neither  the  natural 
bent  nor  the  intellectual  equipment  to  enable  them  to  main- 
tain intact  the  might  and  majesty  of  the  universal  Roman 
Empire.  As  the  Teutons  settled  down  within  the  confines 
of  the  Empire — Angles  and  Saxons  in  Britain,  Franks 
and  Burgundians  in  Gaul,  Visigoths  in  Spain,  and  Lom- 
bards in  northern  Italy — they  acknowledged  no  political 
obedience  save  to  their  tribal  kings  and  to  their  military 
chieftains.  At  the  same  time  they  modified  the  landown- 
ing and  agricultural  system  of  the  Roman  provincials  in 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  71 

accordance  with  their  own  customs  and  adapted  it  to  their 
own  uses.  And  g-radually,  from  this  juncture  of  circum- 
stances, there  evolved  the  distinctively  medieval  institu- 
tions of  the  manor  and  of  feudalism,  and  the  almost  equal- 
ly distinctive  practice  of  private  warfare.  There  is  a  basic 
truth,  as  well  as  a  pun,  in  the  statement  that  the  feud 
was  a  natural  accompaniment  of  feudalism. 

In  other  words,  local  dominion  supplanted  world  do- 
minion in  the  Middle  Age.  The  principle  of  universal 
law  was  pushed  into  the  background.  And  instead  of  re- 
cruiting and  utilizing  legionary  soldiers  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  a  Pax  Romana,  the  kings  and  dukes  and  counts 
of  innumerable  medieval  principalities  armed  their  re- 
spective retainers  and  waged  war  freely  with  one  an- 
other. 

As  the  Middle  Age  progressed  the  worst  of  these  feat- 
ures of  localism  tended  to  disappear.  The  Teutons  were 
gradually  civihzed;  feudalism  was  slowly  subjected  to  a 
central  political  authority;  and  private  warfare  was 
curbed.  Yet  so  ingrained  was  the  spirit  of  provincialism 
in  the  hearts  and  minds  of  medieval  men  generally  from 
the  fifth  to  the  fifteenth  centuries  that  these  later  achieve- 
ments paved  the  way  not  for  the  restoration  of  universal 
empire  and  universal  peace,  but  for  the  establishment  of 
sovereign  national  states  on  the  basis  of  the  tribal  king- 
doms and  for  the  development  of  a  regular  system  of  in- 
ternational relationships,  not  least  notable  among  which 
was  the  relationship  of  war. 

One  of  the  major  characteristics  of  the  Middle  Age, 
then,  is  localism.  But  it  is  localism  in  fact  rather  than  in 
theory.  For  such  medieval  persons  as  cared  for  theories 
— and  there  were  very  many  such  persons — world  domin- 
ion still  appealed  with  irresistible  force  and  logic  as  an 
ideal.  Paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  the  ancient  idea  of 
universal  empire  dominated  the  Middle  Age  side-by-side 
with  actual  feudalism  and  tribal  monarchy.  The  theory 
was  far  more  conservative  than  the  fact,  and  both  were 
equally  characteristic  of  medieval  Europe, 


72  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

Long-  after  the  disruption  and  deliquescence  of  the  Em- 
pire of  the  Caesars,  the  Roman  imperial  concept  survived. 
Greek  rulers  at  Constantinople  called  themselves  Roman 
emperors  and  laid  claim  to  secular  supremacy  until  the 
final  extinction  of  their  little  state  by  the  Ottoman  Turks 
in  1453.  The  stalwart  Prankish  Chieftain  Charlemagne 
temporarily  federated  divers  Teutonic  tribes  and  had  him- 
self crowned  as  Roman  Emporer  in  800.  And  in  962  the 
German  prince,  Otto  the  Great,  was  so  impressed  with 
the  imperial  concept  that  he,  too,  appropriated  the  impe- 
rial title  and,  in  effect,  created  that  Holy  Roman  Empire 
of  the  Germans  which  endured  throughout  the  whole  Mid- 
dle Age  and  as  a  fiction,  down  to  the  time  of  Napoleon 
Bonaparte  in  1806.  The  pretensions  of  this  medieval 
Holy  Roman  Empire  to  secular  supremacy  and  world- 
dominion  were  as  pompous  and  embracing  as  its  actual 
position  was  preposterous.  Neither  the  Holy  Roman  Em- 
peror in  Germany  nor  the  Graeco-Byzantine  Emperor  at 
Constantinople  would  recognize  as  equals  the  sovereigns 
of  the  kingdoms  that  were  growing  up  about  them ;  and 
without  at  least  a  theoretical  equality  of  independent  sov-_ 
ereign  states  international  relations  in  the  modern  sense 
were  impossible.  Localism,  one  characteristic  of  tlie 
Middle  Age,  tended  to  prepare  the  way  for  internation- 
alism ;  the  survival  of  the  imperial  concept,  a  second  char- 
acteristic of  the  Middle  Age,  tended  to  block  or  impede 
that  way. 

The  third  and  last  of  these  medieval  characteristics  to 
which  I  wouTcTespecially  invite  your  attention  is  the  ec- 
clesiastical. Throughout  the  entire  period  from  the  fifth  to 
the  fifteenth  centuries  the  great  bulk  of  Europeans  with 
whom  we  have  to  deal  were  members  of  the  Catholic 
Church,  inheriting  the  religious  truths  and  moral  pre- 
cepts of  Jesus  of  Nazareth,  that  Divine  Revolutionist  in 
the  midst  of  the  ancient  Roman  Empire,  and  living  in 
their  own  day  under  their  priests  and  bishops  graded  in 
a  vast  hierarchy  up  to  the  bishop  of  Rome,  the  Pope, 
Christ's  vicar^on  Earth.    Amid  all  the  changes  which  at- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  73 

tended  Teutonic  immio-ration  and  incursion,  there  was  one 
form  of  authority  which  did  not  chanj^e,  except  to  in- 
crease its  importance.  Not  only  did  the  Church  pre- 
serve ancient  culture  and  convert  and  civilize  the  bar- 
barians but  it  was  the  only  bond  of  union  which  still  held 
tog-ether  the  fragments  of  the  old  Roman  world.  The 
Teutonic  kingdoms  tended  toward  local  isolation,  but  the 
Church  supplied  a  medium  of  general  intercourse.  Every- 
where in  the  West  its  traditions  and  interests  were  iden- 
tical, and  the  turmoil  and  upheaval  of  the  time  only 
strengthened  its  sense  of  solidarity. 

This  point  cannot  be  stressed  too  emphatically.  Just 
when  the  Roman  Empire  was  disintegrating  and  when 
feudalism  was  developing  with  its  localism  and  private 
warfare,  the  persistent  longing  for  universality  found 
fruitful  expression  not  so  much  in  a  Byzantine  Empire 
or  in  a  Holy  Roman  Empire  of  the  German  Nation  as  in 
the  concept  of  Christendom.  And  Christendom,  was  a 
fact,  not  a  theory.  For  the  Catholic  Church  of  the  Mid- 
dle Age,  especially  its  central  agency,  the  Papacy,  di- 
rected the  conscience  of  Europe,  legislated  for  the  newly- 
converted  peoples,  and  drew  to  itself  the  representatives 
of  every  civilized  tribe,  and  in  doing  all  these  things  the 
Papacy  could  not  fail  to  impress  on  Christian  peoples, 
whether  of  Scotland  or  Italy,  whether  of  Spain  or  Hun- 
gary, a  sense  of  their  common  faith.  It  was  the  Papacy 
which,  therefore,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  by  treating 
each  nation  as  a  separate  unit,  expressed  in  a  primate  with 
his  suffragan  bishops,  and  yet  by  legislating  identically 
in  matters  of  faith  arid  morals  for  all  the  nations,  ex- 
pounded a  two-fold  thesis  of  nationalism  and  interna- 
tionalism. The  Catholic  Church  was  by  all  odds  the  most 
important  distinctive  institution  of  the  Middle  Age,  and 
the  Catholic  Church  never  ceased  to  insist  that  the  na- 
tions were  separate  individuals,  yet  members  of  a  Chris- 
tian brotherhood,  that  they  were  moral  persons  yet  sub- 
ject to  the  common  law  of  Christendom. 


74  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

II 

MEDIEVAL  CHURCHMEN  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 

Politically  Europe  was  divided  during  the  greater  part 
of  the  Middle  Age  into  two  Empires — the  Byzantine  and 
the  Holy  Roman — and  a  large  number  of  tribal  king- 
doms. Socially  during  the  same  period  Europe  was  sub- 
divided into  principalities  and  baronies — the  estates  of 
feudal  nobles.  If  these  divisions  and  subdivisions  are 
viewed  as  centrifugal  forces  in  Christendom,  the  Papacy 
and  the  Catholic  Christian  Church  which  it  represented 
and  for  which  it  authoritatively  spoke,  must  be  consid- 
ered as  a  counterbalancing  centripetal  force.  All  Chris- 
tendom continued  to  look  to  Rome  as  the  centre  of  world 
unity,  albeit  now  it  was  the  Rome  of  the  popes  rather  than 
the  Rome  of  the  emperors. 

The  words  of  Christ  to  Saint  Peter  and  the  tradition 
of  the  popes  as  bishops  of  Rome  and  successors  to  the 
Prince  of  the  Apostles  would  suffice  to  explain  why  the 
papacy  was  generally  recognized  and  honored  as  the  re- 
ligious and  moral  head  of  Christendom.  But  apart  from 
strictly  religious  and  theological  considerations,  the  influ- 
ence of  the  papacy  was  undoubtedly  strengthened  by  a 
curious  political  and  territorial  situation.  It  so  happened 
that  the  only  state  in  the  Middle  Age  which  had  direct 
continuity  with  the  ancient  Roman  Empire  was  that  com- 
monly known  as  the  Byzantine  Empire,  with  its  capital  at 
Constantinople ;  and  Rome  was  so  far  away  from  Con- 
stantinople and  so  separated  from  it  by  restless  Teu- 
tonic tribes  that  the  Byzantine  emperors  were  never  able 
to  subject  the  popes  to  their  political  sway.  The  result 
was  that  fairly  early  the  bishops  of  Rome  came  to  exercise 
political,  as  well  as  strictly  ecclesiastical,  power  in  central 
Italy.  Moreover,  the  reestablishment  of  an  empire  in  the 
West,  whether  of  Charlemagne  or  of  Otto  the  Great,  was 
effected  by  papal  action.  And  when  it  is  borne  in  mind 
that  most  of  the  Teutonic  tribesmen  were  converted  to 
Christianity  by  missionaries  despatched  from  Rome,  and 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  75 

that  practically  all  medieval  kings  were  crowned  by 
bishops  of  the  Catholic  Church,  it  is  easy  to  understand 
how  and  why  the  Catholic  Church  and  the  Papacy,  instead 
of  becoming  mere  adjuncts  to  secular  governments,  rose 
superior  to  them  and  served  not  only  as  spiritual  cement 
but  also  as  political  mortar. 

Christendom  of  the  Middle  Age,  like  the  Roman  Em- 
pire of  ancient  times,  was,  in  a  sense,  a  federation  of  many 
nations  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  peace  both  within 
the  federation  and  against  barbarians  outside.  But  while 
the  ancient  emperors  were  primarily  political  and  mili- 
tary autocrats  who  incidentally  utilized  religion  to  serve 
their  ends,  the  medieval  popes  were  first  and  foremost  re- 
ligious and  moral  leaders,  who  from  the  exigencies  of  the 
times  exercised  political  and  even  military  power. 

There  was  another  contrast  between  the  ancient  Ro- 
man Empire  and  the  Medieval  Church  of  special  signifi- 
cance to  us.  The  Roman  Emperors  exercised  direct  polit- 
ical sway  over  so  many  nations  that  they  could  recognize 
no  international  law  in  its  modern  meaning.  In  their 
time  there  was  hardly  an  international  society;  the  Ro- 
man and  Parthian  Empires  between  them  divided  the  civil- 
ized world  in  which  international  relations  on  anything 
like  an  equal  footing  were  possible.  And  the  justly  cele- 
brated Roman  jurists,  who  conferred  upon  posterity  the 
heritage  of  the  Roman  civil  law,  never  worked  out  a  sys- 
tem of  international  law.  To  be  sure,  the  jurists  ex- 
pounded the  ius  gentium  (the  "law  of  nations"),  but  it 
was  common  law  based  on  the  ius  naturale  (the  "law  of 
nature"),  for  the  benefit  of  foreigners  living  within  the 
Empire,  rather  than  international  law  in  its  modern  sig- 
nificance. On  the  other  hand,  the  Catholic  Church  of  the 
Middle  Age  exercised  universal  political  dominion  so  in- 
directly and  with  so  many  qualifications  that  it  could  not 
and  would  not  arrest  the  growth  of  theoretically  equal 
and  sovereign  states  throughout  Europe.  Such  state  con- 
stituted potentially  an  international  society  within  which 
real  international  law  could  develop. 


76  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

It  was,  in  fact,  the  Catholic  Church  which  laid  and 
blessed  the  corner-stone  of  modern  international  law.  A 
famous  Spanish  churchman  early  in  the  seventh  century, 
Saint  Isidore,  archbishop  of  Seville,  in  his  great  encyclo- 
pedic work  popularly  called  "The  Etymologies"  reserves 
the  term  ius  gentium  for  what  we  should  now  describe  as 
international  law,  so  that  here  for  the  first  time  we  find 
that  term  fairly  translatable  by  "law  of  nations."  All  the 
remaining  matter  of  the  ins  gentium  of  the  Roman  jurists, 
namely,  the  law  common  to  all  nations  {ius  commune  om^ 
nium  nationum) ,  he  incorporates  in  ius  naturale.  In  other 
words,  Isidore  of  Seville  distinguishes  clearly  between  the 
ius  naturale  and  the  ius  gentium.  The  latter,  he  says,  has 
to  do  with  "the  occupation  of  territory,  the  building  and 
fortification  of  cities  and  castles,  wars,  captivities,  enslave- 
ments, the  recovery  of  rights  of  postliminy,  treaties  of 
peace  and  others,  the  scruple  which  protects  ambassadors 
from  violence,  and  prohibitions  of  marriage  between  per- 
sons of  different  nationality." 

Isidore's  definition  of  ius  gentium  and  his  distinction 
between  "natural  law"  and  the  "law  of  nations"  were  of 
lasting  importance,  because  they  were  accepted  by  his 
numerous  later  commentators  and  in  the  twelfth  century 
were  incorporated  in  Gratian's  great  code  of  canon  law. 
Henceforth  they  were  truisms  of  ecclesiastical  jurispru- 
dence. 

In  numerous  ways  the  Catholic  Church  contributed  in 
the  Middle  Age  to  the  development  of  international  law. 
Aside  from  sanctioning  Isidore's  distinctions  and  defini- 
tions, the  Church  performed  a  peculiarly  significant  serv- 
ice by  her  constant  efforts  to  curb  private  warfare  and  to 
impress  upon  the  minds  of  her  children  the  value  of  law 
and  of  peaceful  methods  of  settling  disputes.  The  pax  ec- 
clesiae,  which  as  a  definite  institution  is  first  heard  of  at 
three  ecclesiastical  synods  held  in  different  parts  of  south- 
ern and  central  France  in  990,  was  intended  to  lessen  the 
evils  of  private  warfare  by  placing  non-combatants  under 
the  special  protection  of  the  Church ;  it  forbade,  under  pain 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  11 

of  excommunication,  every  act  of  private  warfare  or  vio- 
lence ag'ainst  ecclesiastical  buildings  and  their  environs, 
and  ao^ainst  certain  classes  of  persons,  such  as  clerics,  pil- 
grims, merchants,  women  and  peasants  and  against  cattle 
and  agricultural  implements.  The  pax  ccclesiae  speedily 
spread  throughout  France  and  Burgundy,  and  diocesan 
leagues  began  to  be  organized  for  its  maintenance.  The 
bishop  or  count  on  whose  lands  the  peace  was  violated 
was  vested  with  judicial  authority,  and  was  directed,  in 
case  he  was  himself  unable  to  execute  sentence,  to  sum- 
mon to  his  assistance  the  laymen  and  even  the  clerics 
of  the  diocese,  all  of  whom  were  required  to  take  a  sol- 
emn oath  to  observe  and  enforce  the  peace. 


Ill 


THE  TRUCE  OF  GOD,  CHIVALRY,  PAPAL  AMBASSADORS 

A  most  interesting  supplement  to  the  pax  ecclesiae  was 
provided  in  the  eleventh  century  by  the  formulation  of 
what  is  known  as  the  Truce  of  God.  In  1027  at  the  call 
of  their  bishop  a  synod  of  local  clergy  and  laity  met  in 
the  country  of  Roussillon,  in  the  Pyrenees,  and  agreed 
that  no  man  should  assail  another  on  the  Lord's  Day.  In 
1040  a  larger  assembly  of  prelates  and  nobles,  under  the 
presidency  of  the  archbishop  of  Narbonne,  extended  the 
truce  from  the  Wednesday  evening  to  the  Monday  morn- 
ing of  every  week,  as  well  as  during  the  seasons  of  Lent 
and  Advent,  the  three  vigils  and  feasts  of  the  Blessed 
Virgin  and  those  of  the  Twelve  Apostles  and  a  few  other 
saints.  The  Truce  of  God  in  this  form  was  decreed  for 
Flanders  in  1063,  was  introduced  into  Germany  in  1082, 
and  was  instituted  in  southern  Italy  in  1089.  In  1095 
Pope  Urban  II  decreed  it  for  all  Christendom,  adding  a 
guarantee  of  safety  to  all  who  might  take  refuge  at  a 
wayside  cross  or  at  the  plough.  The  Truce  of  God  was 
reaffirmed  by  many  councils,  such  as  that  held  at  Rheims 


78  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

by  Pope  Calixtus  II  in  1119,  and  the  Lateran  Councils  of 
1 123,  1 139,  and  1 1 79. 

The  means  employed  for  enforcing  the  Truce  of  God 
remained  essentially  the  same :  spiritual  penalties,  such  as 
excommunication,  special  ecclesiastical  tribunals,  sworn 
leagues  of  peace,  and  assistance  from  the  temporal  power. 
Pope  Urban  II,  for  example,  prescribed  that  the  oath  of 
adherence  to  the  truce  be  taken  every  three  years  by  all 
men  above  the  age  of  twelve,  whether  noble,  burgess, 
villein  or  serf. 

Of  the  pa.v  ecclesiae  in  general,  and  of  the  Truce  of  God 
in  particular,  the  direct  results  were  disappointing.  For  not 
only  was  the  diocesan  militia  always  very  imperfect,  but 
feudal  society,  so  long  as  it  retained  political  power,  was 
inherently  hostile  to  the  principle  and  practice  of  private 
peace.  The  indirect  results,  however,  cannot  be  overes- 
timated. For  what  in  this  sphere  the  Church  failed  to  do 
itself,  it  eventually  inspired  the  rulers  of  the  several  states 
to  do,  and  "ecclesiastical  peace"  proved  to  be  the  fore- 
runner and  prerequisite  to  "royal  peace."  The  provisions 
of  the  Truce  of  God  were  often  incorporated  verbatim  in 
municipal  and  district  statutes,  such  as  the  laws  of  Barce- 
lona (1067).  In  1085  Henry  IV  approved  the  extension 
of  the  truce  to  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  and  in  the  fol- 
lowing century  imperial  laws  prohibited  private  warfare 
altogether.  In  1257  Saint  Louis  forbade  all  private  wars 
in  his  French  lands. 

Not  only  by  the  Truce  of  God,  which  during  these  cen- 
turies the  Church  endeavored  to  impose  upon  the  bellicose 
feudal  barons,  but  in  the  realm  of  justice  also,  a  like  in- 
fluence was  exerted  both  by  precept  and  example.  In  the 
courts  of  the  feudal  lords,  the  judgment  of  God  was 
sought  by  the  trial  of  battle,  where  litigants,  witnesses, 
and  judges  decided  the  case  by  some  form  of  physical 
combat.  But  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts,  justice  was  de- 
termined by  the  methods  and  prescriptions  of  the  canon 
law,  which  always  relied  upon  reason  and  equity.  And 
here  again,  prior  to  the  revival  of  Roman  law  in  western 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  79 

Europe,  the  canon  law  of  the  Catholic  Church  must  be 
credited  with  inspiring  and  fostering  the  growth  of  royal 
justice  and  royal  law. 

Hand  in  glove  with  the  Truce  of  God  and  with  the 
Canon  Law  went  the  Catholic  teaching  of  chivalry  and  the 
Catholic  preaching  of  the  Crusades.  While  the  Church 
was  using  its  authority  and  example  to  ameliorate  the 
abuses  of  private  warfare  in  Europe,  it  was  elevating  and 
consecrating  the  power  of  the  sword  by  means  of  the  cru- 
sades and  the  spirit  of  chivalry.  "By  its  protection  of  the 
helpless  and  innocent,  which  was  made  the  ambition  of  the 
Christian  Knight,  chivalry  was  at  the  same  time  ennobling 
the  practice  of  arms  and  preparing  the  forces  which  were 
to  overthrow  feudalism  as  a  social  institution.  The  rec- 
ognition of  the  rights  of  the  humble,  the  association  of 
the  crusaders  in  a  common  cause,  the  formation  of  codes 
of  honor,  the  emancipation  of  men  from  feudal  obliga- 
tions as  a  reward  for  their  heroic  deeds,  the  return  to 
their  places  of  origin  of  a  new  class  of  free  men,  were  all 
to  constitute  a  new  leaven  for  the  reorganization  of  so- 
ciety. A  new  spirit,  more  rejfined  and  more  enlightened, 
was  borne  back  to  feudal  Europe  from  the  battlefields  of 
Asia."  (Hill,  History  of  Diplomacy,  I,  271.)  The  Cru- 
sades which  made  war  a  weapon  of  common  defence 
rather  than  an  instrument  of  mutual  destruction,  tended 
in  conjunction  with  the  operation  of  the  canon  law  and 
the  pax  ecclesiae,  to  supplant  the  reign  of  force  by  a  reign 
of  law. 

It  was  not  alone  in  securing  the  supremacy  of  law  or 
in  laying  the  foundation  for  international  law,  that  the 
Catholic  Church  of  the  Middle  Age  performed  most  sig- 
nal services.  Diplomacy,  too,  owes  much  to  the  Church, 
especially  to  the  Papacy.  From  early  times  it  became  cus- 
tomary for  the  pope  to  despatch  special  envoys  (legati) 
from  Rome  to  attend  ecclesiastical  councils  or  to  investi- 
gate conditions  in  outlying  provinces,  and  as  time  went 
on  and  the  papacy  found  itself  compelled  to  assume  cer- 
tain political  and  judicial  powers,  its  legates  discharged 


80  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

political,  as  well  as  strictly  ecclesiastical,  functions.  In  view 
of  the  special  importance  attaching  to  the  relations  between 
the  Papacy  and  the  Byzantine  Empire,  particularly  after 
the  Teutonic  invasions,  the  popes  maintained  more  or  less 
permanent  ambassadors  at  the  imperial  court  at  Constan- 
tinople, who  were  called  apocrisiarii  or  responsales.  The 
first  of  these  apocrisiarii  seems  to  have  been  Julian,  Bishop 
of  Cos,  accredited  by  Saint  Leo  the  Great  to  Emperor 
Marcian  (450-457).  Thenceforth  for  three  centuries,  un- 
til relations  between  Rome  and  Constantinople  were  sev- 
ered on  account  of  the  iconoclastic  troubles,  there  were  al- 
ways, apart  from  a  few  brief  intervals,  papal  apocrisiarii 
at  the  Byzantine  court.  The  pope  likewise  maintained  a 
permanent  apocrisiarins  at  the  court  of  the  exarch  at  Ra- 
venna; and  in  turn,  at  least  during  the  reign  of  Gregory 
I,  the  archbishop  of  Ravenna  had  a  special  responsalis  at 
the  papal  court.  That  the  procedure  and  etiquette  attend- 
ing the  diplomatic  intercourse  of  the  Byzantine  Emperors 
with  other  rulers  throughout  the  Middle  Age,  owed  much 
to  ecclesiastical  influence,  is  clearly  demonstrated  on  the 
pages  of  that  curious  manual  and  guidebook  De  ceremo- 
niis — ^a  monument  in  the  history  of  diplomacy — which 
the  Emperor  Constantine  VII  (Porphyrogenetus)  dicta- 
ted in  the  tenth  century. 

Throughout  the  later  middle  ages  the  popes  frequently 
sent  special  ambassadors  (Icgati  a  latere,  if  they  were  car- 
dinals; legati  missi,  if  they  were  below  cardinalitial  rank) 
to  the  Ploly  Roman  Emperor  and  to  the  kings  of  Eng- 
land, France,  Castile,  Aragon,  Naples,  Hungary,  etc.  Al- 
though these  ambassadors  were  sent  for  particular  eccle- 
siastical purposes,  the  monarchs  to  whom  they  were  ac- 
credited gradually  adapted  the  practice  to  their  own  ends. 
In  diplomacy,  as  in  the  establishment  of  law  and  the  sup- 
pression of  private  war,  the  European  states  profited  by 
the  example  of  the  Catholic  Church. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  81 

IV 

THE  CATHOLIC  IDEAL  OF  UNIVERSAL  PEACE 

Midway  in  the  Middle  Age — let  us  say  in  the  twelfth 
century — one  might  have  been  justified  in  concluding, 
from  what  has  been  said,  that  a  most  promising  interna- 
tional society  was  taking  form  under  the  auspices  of  the 
jCatholic  Christian  Churclj.  Tribes  were  becoming  crys- 
tallized into  nations.  Nations  were  becoming  consoli- 
dated as  independent  and  sovereign  states  under  kings. 
The  kings,  in  concert  with  the  ecclesiastical  authorities, 
were  building  up,  within  their  respective  dominions,  a  sys- 
tem of  law  and  justice,  and  were  curbing  private  welfare. 
Among  the  new  states,  moreover,  commercial  and  diplo- 
matic intercourse  was  developing,  and  already  there  ex- 
isted the  embryo  of  an  international  federation,  a  league  of 
free  Christian  nations.  For  such  a  league  the  ground- 
work was  prepared  in  the  community  of  national  inter- 
ests provided  by  the  common  Catholic  faith  and  by  the 
universal  similarity  of  institutions  and  methods  through- 
out Christendom,  in  the  great  co-operative  enterprise  of 
the  Crusades,  and  in  the  growing  practice  of  submitting 
international  disputes  to  papal  arbitration. 

It  is,  from  my  standpoint,  a  tragedy  of  the  Middle  Age 
that  on  this  groundwork  no  superstructure  of  an  effective 
international  league  w-as  reared.  The  tragedy,  as  I  con- 
ceive it,  or  the  simple  failure,  as  we  can  all  agree  to  call 
it,  may  be  explained  fairly  easily.  It  is  traceable  to  three 
major  facts. 

In  the  first  place,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the 
Catholic  Church  of  the  Middle  Age,  as  of  antiquity  or  of 
modern  times,  was  primarily  a  spiritual  and  moral  teacher. 
Only  incidentally  did  it  concern  itself  with  political  and 
economic  and  international  questions.  If  it  had  devoted 
itself  as  insistently  to  political  science  and  public  law  as 
to  moral  and  dogmatic  theology,  it  might  conceivably  have 
accomplished  as  much  in  fashioning  a  League  of  Nations 
as   in  Christianizing  and  civilizing  barbarous  Teutonic 


82  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

tribesmen.  But  such  was  not  the  commission  which  the 
CathoHc  Church  received  from  its  Divine  Founder.  Un- 
der the  circumstances  it  is  astonishing  that  the  contribu- 
tions of  the  Church  and  the  Papacy  to  international  rela- 
tions and  diplomacy  were  as  great  and  lasting  as  they 
were,  rather  than  that  they  were  not  greater  still.  When 
one  recalls  the  primitive  and  warlike  nature  of  the  Euro- 
pean peoples  with  whom  the  Church  had  to  deal  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Middle  Age,  and  when  one  remembers 
that  throughout  the  whole  period  there  were  no  railways 
or  steamships  or  telegraphs  or  telephones  and  only  a  few 
good  roads  and  a  most  imperfect  postal  system,  one  can 
appreciate  how  miraculous  would  have  been  the  creation  at 
that  time  of  an  effective  League  of  Nations.  That  sort 
of  miracle  did  not  occur,  even  in  an  age  of  faith. 

Secondly,  the  tendency  of  the  Teutonic  tribes  to  be- 
come national  independent  states,  theoretically  equal,  and 
the  contemporaneous  tendency  of  the  Catholic  Church  to 
serve  as  a  cement  holding  these  national  states  together, 
were  alike  impeded  by  the  surviving  concept  of  universal 
secular  dominion,  especially  by  the  pretensions  and  am- 
bitions of  the  Holy  Roman  Emperors.  In  particular  after 
the  revived  study  of  the  Roman  Law  in  the  twelfth  cen- 
tury, the  old  imperial  notions  were  resuscitated  and  ex- 
ploited by  persons  who  were  seeking  to  undermine  the  • 
popular  foundations  of  national  monarchy  or  to  abridge 
the  customary  rights  of  the  Church.  It  was  this  spirit, 
for  example,  which  induced  the  Emperor  Frederick  Bar- 
barossa  in  1158  to  reaffirm  as  his  cardinal  principle  the 
dictum  of  the  Roman  Civil  Law  that  Quod  principi  placuit 
legis  habet  vigorem.  It  was  unnoted  at  the  time  that  the  .., 
pretensions  of  Frederick  Barbarossa  not  only  were  in  con-  •  . 
tradiction  to  both  the  Teutonic  and  ecclesiastical  tradi- 
tions, but  were  even  in  excess  of  the  powers  which,  in 
strict  legality,  had  belonged  to  the  ancient  Roman  Em- 
perors, for  those  powers  had  been  limited  by  the  theory  in 
back  of  the  Roman  Civil  Law,  that  the  emperors'  au- 
thority was  ultimately  derived  from  the  people. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  83 

In  general  contention  for  the  new  imperial  claims  as 
against  those  of  the  pope  or  of  the  national  monarchs, 
many  celebrated  medievalists  employed  tongue  and  pen. 
Among  their  number  were  Dante  (1265-1321),  Marsi- 
lius  of  Padua  (c.  1270-c.  1342),  and  William  of  Ockham 
(c.  1280-C.  1349).  The  Church  and  the  Papacy  did  not 
lack  defenders,  but  the  ecclesiastical  champions,  such  as 
Bernard  of  Clairvaux  (i  090-1 153),  Augustinus  Trium- 
phus  (d.  1328),  and  Aegidius  Romanus  {c.  1247-1316), 
were  so  obsessed  by  the  controversial  spirit  that  some- 
times they  grossly  overstated  papal  ambitions.  But  it  was 
in  action  as  well  as  in  words  that  the  struggle  between 
popes  and  emperors  was  joined.  Developing  under  Pope 
Gregory  VII  in  the  eleventh  century,  it  raged  almost  con- 
tinuously during  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries  and 
far  into  the  fourteenth.  An  Innocent  III,  a  Boniface 
VIII,  and  a  John  XXII,  labored  to  secure  a  vast  theo- 
cratic federation  on  the  one  hand,  while  on  the  other  a 
Henry  VI,  a  Frederick  II,  and  a  Louis  IV,  endeavored  by 
every  means  at  their  disposal  to  erect  a  world-dominion 
to  which  church  and  nations  alike  would  be  subjected. 

The  Emperors  failed  dismally  in  their  conflict  with  the 
Popes.  Thanks  to  ecclesiastical  opposition,  Europe  was 
saved  from  a  return  to  Caesarism ;  and  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  endured  only  as  a  shadowy  bond  of  union  for  the 
German  nation.  But  the  Papacy  had  to  pay  dearly  for  its 
victory.  It  had  to  pay  with  exile  from  Rome,  with  the 
"captivity"  at  Avignon  from  1309  to  1377,  with  a  great 
schism  from  1378  to  141 7,  and  with  resulting  loss  of  in- 
fluence and  prestige.  And  the  protracted  struggle  be- 
tween emperors  and  popes  powerfully  aided  the  city- 
states  of  Italy  and  the  national  states  of  western  Europe 
to  consolidate  each  its  own  power,  and  to  repudiate  not 
only  any  world-dominion  on  the  part  of  a  Holy  Roman 
Empire,  but  any  theocratic  federation  of  Christendom 
which  the  Catholic  Church  might  champion. 

Herein  is  to  be  sought  the  third  major  fact  which  mili- 
tated against  the  fruition  of  earlier  medieval  dreams.    It 


84  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

is  the  intensification  of  nationalism  and  national  exclu- 
siveness.  In  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries  both 
the  city-states  of  Italy  and  the  national  monarchies  of 
Western  Europe  evolved  in  the  direction  of  jealous  ex- 
clusiveness  and  autocracy.  The  development  of  vernacu- 
lar languages  and  literatures  and  the  invention  of  printing 
served  to  render  people  in  a  given  country  conscious  of 
what  was  peculiar  to  themselves  rather  than  of  what  was 
common  to  all  peoples  throughout  Christendom.  At  the 
same  time  improved  means  of  communication  and  the  in- 
troduction of  firearms  enabled  monarchs  to  centralize  their 
administrations  and  to  consolidate  their  realms.  The  era 
of  absolutism  was  approaching. 

But  still  the  surviving  concept  of  imperialism  bore  fruit. 
For  Italian  city-states  were  no  sooner  freed  from  foreign 
domination  than  they  reached  out,  like  Venice,  to  establish 
by  force  of  arms  an  empire  in  Greece  and  in  the  East ;  and 
the  national  monarchies  of  the  West  were  no  sooner  con- 
solidated at  home  than  the  kings  utilized  their  augmented 
resources  to  wage  wars  of  aggrandizement  against  fellow- 
monarchs.  An  illustration  of  the  change  which  had  come 
over  European  minds  in  this  connection  is  afforded  by 
pamphlets  of  that  French  lawyer  and  reforming  "crank," 
Pierre  Dubois,  who  lived  in  the  first  part  of  the  four- 
teenth century.  Dubois  had  in  mind  the  truly  medieval 
purpose  of  recovering  the  Holy  Land  from  the  Moham- 
medans, and  for  this  purpose  he  urged  the  cessation  of 
war  within  Christendom  and  the  co-operation  of  all  Chris- 
tian peoples.  But  he  departed  fundamentally  from  ear- 
lier medieval  ideas  when  he  advocated  as  head  of  his 
league  and  leader  of  his  crusade  neither  the  Pope  nor  the 
German  Emperor,  but  the  king  of  France.  French  princes 
were  to  be  seated  on  the  thrones  of  Europe  and  the  East ; 
the  Church  was  to  be  secularized  and  subordinated  to  the 
state ;  and  France  was  represented  as  divinely  chosen  to 
execute  God's  will  in  exterminating  the  infidel,  in  reform- 
ing the  papacy,  and  in  bestowing  peace  upon  the  world. 
The  federation  of  nations  and  the  Crusades  themselves 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  85 

were  to  be  undertaken  for  the  greater  glory  of  France. 
This  is  fierce  nationahsm;  this  is  rampant  impcriaHsm. 
It  is  essentially  modern,  not  medieval. 

Feudal  warfare  practically  ceased  in  the  fourteenth 
and  fifteenth  centuries,  but  international  and  inter-im- 
perialistic warfare  took  its  place.  To  the  cessation  of  the 
former  the  Catholic  Church  had  contributed  potently. 
Against  the  rise  of  the  latter  the  Church,  weakened  by 
its  conflict  with  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  was  now  pow- 
erless to  act.  At  the  fag-end  of  the  Middle  Age  ap- 
peared the  European  state-system,  with  its  balance  of 
power,  its  vague  iits  gentium,  and  its  diplomatic  usages. 

V 

EVOLUTION  OF  PROFESSIONAL  DIPLOMACY 

Professional  diplomacy  was  one  attribute  of  the  new 
order  of  international  society  which  the  close  of  the  Mid- 
dle Age  ushered  into  Europe.  There  had  been  embassies 
and  negotiations,  of  course,  throughout  the  entire  Mid- 
dle Age,  as  in  ancient  times,  but  the  embassies  in  the 
main  had  been  only  temporary  missions  directed  to  a 
particular  end  and  conducted  by  ecclesiastics  or  nobles 
of  a  dignity  appropriate  to  each  occasion;  these  were  nei- 
the  permanent  diplomatic  agents  nor  a  professional  dip- 
lomatic class.  So  long  as  Europe  was  predominantly  feu- 
dal, there  was  little  room  for  diplomacy. 

In  northern  and  central  Italy,  however,  feudalism  had 
never  taken  root  and  in  the  struggles  of  the  peninsula 
diplomacy  had  early  played  a  part  as  important  as  war. 
There  had  been  alliances  and  counter-alliances,  veritable 
balances  of  power,  so  that  medieval  Italy  anticipated  in 
miniature  the  modern  state-system  of  Europe.  As  the 
Italian  cities  increased  in  wealth  and  importance  as  a 
result  of  their  growing  commerce  with  the  East  during 
the  later  Crusades,  their  diplomacy  waxed  more  signifi- 
cant and  the  diplomatic  career  became  correspondingly 
more  honorable  and  more  attractive.     In  the  thirteenth 


86  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

and  fourteenth  centuries  Florence  counted  among  her  en- 
voys Dante,  Petrarch,  and  Boccaccio,  and  subsequently 
could  boast  of  agents  such  as  Guicciardini  and  Machia- 
velli.  Papal  Rome,  too,  continued  to  be,  as  in  earlier 
centuries,  a  nursing-mother  of  diplomatists.  But  in  me- 
dieval Venice  the  immediate  origins  of  modern  secular 
diplomacy  are  to  be  sought. 

Venice  occupied  a  strategic  position  in  respect  of  the 
Byzantine  Empire,  the  city-states  of  Italy,  and  the  coun- 
tries of  western  Europe.  From  Constantinople  undoubt- 
edly the  Venetians  learned  much  of  the  conduct  of  diplo- 
matic missions,  and  as  early  as  the  thirteenth  century  the 
Republic  began  to  lay  down  a  series  of  rules  for  the 
guidance  of  its  ambassadors.  In  1236  envoys  to  the  court 
of  Rome  were  forbidden  to  procure  a  benefice  for  any 
one  without  the  approval  of  the  Doge.  By  a  law  of  1268, 
an  ambassador  was  not  allowed  to  be  accompanied  by  his 
wife,  lest  she  divulge  his  business,  but  he  was  required  to 
take  his  own  cook,  lest  he  be  poisoned.  By  another  law 
of  the  same  year,  any  present  received  from  a  foreigner 
was  required  to  be  deposited  with  the  state,  until  the  en- 
voy's return  from  his  mission.  No  diplomatic  agent  was 
sent  into  a  foreign  territory  where  he  had  property,  nor 
was  he  allowed  a  single  day's  absence  from  his  post. 
In  1288,  it  was  decreed  that  ambassadors  should  de- 
posit, within  fifteen  days  of  their  return,  a  written  account 
of  the  replies  made  to  them  during  their  mission,  together 
with  anything  they  might  have  seen  or  heard  to  the  honor 
or  in  the  interests  of  the  republic.  This  decree,  renewed 
in  I2q6,  1425,  and  1533,  was  the  origin  of  the  famous 
reports  of  the  Venetian  ambassadors  to  the  Senate,  which 
now  constitute  a  store-house  of  information  for  the  his- 
torian of  the  Renaissance  and  the  Reformation. 

In  the  thirteenth  century,  two  or  three  months  were 
considered  a  very  long  period  for  an  ambassador  to  reside 
at  a  foreign  court.  In  the  fifteenth  century  Venice  ex- 
tended the  period  of  an  embassy  to  two  years,  and  in  the 
sixteenth  century  to  three  years.    The  first  known  instance 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  87 

of  a  permanent  embassy  was  that  established  at  Genoa,  in 
I4S5»  by  Francesco  Sforza,  duke  of  Milan.  Thence- 
forth a  re^^ular  diplomatic  service  developed  rapidly 
throuo^hout  Christendom.  For  example,  in  1460,  the  duke 
of  Savoy  sent  a  permanent  envoy  to  the  papal  court ;  in 
1494  Milan  is  already  represented  by  a  permanent  ambas- 
sador at  the  French  court;  and  in  1496,  Venice  is  sim- 
ilarly represented  both  in  England  and  at  the  court  of 
the  Emperor  Maximilian. 

The  art  of  diplomacy,  developed  by  Venice  and  other 
Italian  cities  in  the  later  middle  ages,  was  eagerly  seized 
upon  by  those  monarchs  of  western  Europe  who  were  zeal- 
ously undertaking,  at  the  close  of  the  fifteenth  century 
and  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth,  to  consolidate  and 
aggrandize  their  national  states — Louis  XI  of  .France, 
Henry  VII  of  England,  and  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  of 
Spain.  These  monarchs  practiced  statecraft  unburdened 
by  the  weight  of  too  many  conscientious  scruples.  By 
hook  or  by  crook  they  willed  to  increase  their  personal 
power  and  to  extend  the  frontiers  of  their  states.  If  diplo- 
macy failed  them,  they  went  to  war.  If  they  were  un- 
successful in  war,  they  resorted  to  diplomacy.  And 
whether  in  war  or  in  diplomacy,  the  first  instrument  was 
stratagem  and  dissimulation.  "To  reign  is  to  dissimu- 
late," was  the  principle  laid  down  by  Louis  XI,  and  in 
sending  ambassadors  to  the  dukes  of  Guyenne  and  Brit- 
tany the  French  king's  instructions  were,  "If  they  lie  to 
you,  lie  still  more  to  them." 

Twenty-five  years  after  the  death  of  Louis  XI,  Ma- 
chiavelli,  the  Florentine  historian,  publicist  and  diploma- 
tist, gathered  in  The  Prince  and  The  Discourses  on  Livy 
the  principles  which  underlay  the  practice  of  his  day; 
namely,  that  ordinary  rules  of  private  morality  are  not 
applicable  to  public  affairs  and  particularly  are  not  ap- 
plicable to  intercourse  between  states.  In  vain  did  the 
Pope  condemn  the  teachings  of  Machiavelli  (1559).  Fran- 
cis I,  the  French  monarch  who  allied  himself  in  the 
sixteenth  century  now  with  German  Protestants  and  now 


88  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

with  Mohammedan  Turks,  and  who  was  the  first  mon- 
arch to  estabHsh  a  completely  organized  diplomatic  ma- 
chinery, did  most  to  give  Machiavelli's  principles  a  Euro- 
pean extension.  By  the  close  of  the  sixteenth  century 
diplomacy  had  become  frankly  "Machiavellian."  Despite 
ecclesiastical  protests,  "Machiavellian"  was  generally  ad- 
mitted in  theory  as  well  as  in  practice.  Etienne  Dolet, 
who  was  burned  for  atheism  in  1546,  in  his  De  officio  le- 
gati  (1541),  advises  ambassadors  to  surround  themselves 
with  close-mouthed  servants,  to  employ  vigilant  spies, 
and  to  set  afoot  all  manner  of  fictions,  especially  when 
negotiating  with  the  papal  court  or  with  the  Italian 
princes.  Germonious,  archbishop  of  Tarantaise,  another 
precursor  of  Grotius,^  in  his  De  legatis  principum  et  popu- 
lorum  (1627),  after  a  vigorous  denunciation  of  lying  in 
general,  argues  that  special  lies  are  permissible  for  the 
safety  or  convenience  of  princes. 

The  Protestant  Revolution  of  the  sixteenth  century  and 
the  consequent  disruption  of  Christendom  split  and  weak- 
ened the  one  force  which  might  possibly  have  offered 
resistance  to  rampant  nationalism,  greedy  imperialism, 
and  immoral  diplomacy.  With  the  revolt  of  northern  Eu- 
rope against  the  Papacy  and  the  Catholic  Church,  the  last 
bulwark  of  medieval  internationalism  w^ent  down  in  ruins, 
and  there  arose  full-grown  in  its  stead  the  state-system 
of  modern  Europe  with  all  its  faults  and  all  its  vices.  The 
events  of  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  brought 
into  bold  relief  the  truth,  as  Mr.  David  Jayne  Hill  puts 
it,  "that,  as  in  the  constitution  of  single  states  the  disso- 
lution of  monarchy  presents  no  other  alternative  than 
anarchy  or  self-government,  so  in  the  relations  of  inde- 
pendent sovereignties,  war  and  diplomacy  become  the  in- 
evitable substitutes  for  empire"  (Hill,  1158).  When  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire  failed  to  exercise  a  general  secular 
dominion,  as  it  failed  in  the  fourteenth  century,  and  when 
the  Papacy  was  no  longer  universally  recognized  as  a 
tribunal  of  last  resort,  as  befell  in  the  sixteenth  century, 

Tor  discussion  of  Grotius,  see  Appendix. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  89 

the  security  of  nations  henceforth  became  wholly  de- 
pendent upon  armed  force  on  the  one  hand,  or  upon  intel- 
lig-ent  association  for  mutual  safety  upon  the  other.  Un- 
happily for  modern  Europe,  the  aspiration  after  territo- 
rial ag-g'randizement  became  the  passion  of  the  g^reater 
states  at  the  very  moment  when  the  Catholic  Church,  the 
traditional  g-uardian  of  peace  and  international  comity, 
was  least  able  to  defend  the  rights  and  liberties  which  it 
had  sought  to  protect.  Intelligent  association  for  mutual 
support  was  accordingly  pushed  into  the  limbo  of  for- 
gotten dreams.  And  international  war  has  loomed  larger 
than  international  peace  in  the  annals  of  modern  history. 

CARLTON  jpTia.  HAYES. 


(    0 


The  Development  of  Modern 
Diplomacy 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY 


POPULAR  CONCEPT  OF  DIPLOMATS  AND  DIPLOMACY 

We  are  all  more  or  less  familiar  with  Sir  Henry  Wot- 
ton's  definition  of  an  ambassador  as  "a)i  holiest  man,  sent 
to  lie  abroad  for  the  good  of  his  country."  This  famous 
jest,  looked  upon  as  an  indiscreet  revelation  of  the  truth, 
was  written  by  the  British  Ambassador  to  Venice,  in  an 
album  of  a  friend,  in  the  Year  of  Grace  1604.  It  cost 
the  witty  diplomat  his  post,  and  has  tended  not  a  little 
to  the  discredit  of  diplomacy. 

The  ambassador  does  not  stand  or  "lie"  alone,  as  Wot- 
ton  would  no  doubt  have  put  it.  "To  lie  like  a  physi- 
cian" is  a  well-known  charge  in  Latin  as  well  as  in  Eng- 
lish, and  we  of  the  law  are  frequently  reminded  of  the 
epitaph  intended  no  doubt  as  a  compliment  in  a  special 
case,  but  applied  generally  and  humorously  to  a  class : 
"Here  lies  an  honest  lawyer".  The  doctor  and  the  lawyer 
may  object  to  the  company  which  the  proverb  makes  them 
keep.  The  ambassador,  however,  given  the  suspicion  in 
which  he  is  held,  may  well  be  content  to  associate  upon  a 
footing  of  equality  with  these  worthies,  for  in  the  popu- 
lar mind  he  is  and  always  has  been  primus  inter  pares. 

And  yet  it  is  only  fair  to  say  of  each  and  of  every 
group  of  persons  forming  a  class  or  profession,  that 
they  are  not  only  the  outgrowth  of  their  day  and  genera- 
tion, but  that  they  represent  the  standard  of  their  times 
and  that  they  are  as  they  are  because  that  standard  makes 
or  allows  them  to  be  so.  An  ambassador  wlio  represented 
a  Court  in  the  Middle  Ages  or  in  the  last  few  hundred 
years  is  not  to  be  blamed  if  his  standard  is  not  higher 
than  that  of  the  Court  whose  servant  or  agent  he  is.  In 


94  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

the  natural  course  of  things  we  can  not  expect  water  to 
rise  above  its  level.  It  is  better,  although  harder,  to  dis- 
infect the  source  than  to  criticise  the  stream. 

We  are  attracted  by  virtues  or  defects,  particularly  the 
latter,  that  strike  the  eye  of  the  careless  observer.  Most 
of  us  do  not  take  the  time  or  the  trouble  to  look  below 
the  surface  of  things.  An  ambassador,  we  say,  is  a  use- 
less sort  of  person  because,  like  the  mole,  he  works  in  the 
dark,  or  more  elegantly  expressed,  his  usefulness  is  hidden 
from  the  public  eye.  Truth  is  not  in  him,  we  are  inclined 
to  add,  because  betimes  acting  under  instructions  from  his 
superiors,  or  with  their  approval,  he  goes  beyond  the 
truth,  is  found  out  and  is  taxed  with  a  lie.  Of  course 
such  conduct  can  not  be  justified,  and  yet,  as  long  as  we 
permit  two  standards  of  conduct — one  for  the  State  and 
one  for  the  individual — we  need  not  be  surprised  if  a  pub- 
lic servant,  in  what  he  conceives  to  be  the  interest  of  his 
country,  will  permit  himself  to  do  and  to  say  what  no 
amount  of  pressure  or  profit  would  force  him  to  do  or  to 
say  as  an  individual.  It  is  not  long  since  that  a  distin- 
guished statesman,  one  Bismarck  by  name,  forged  a  tele- 
gram to  produce  a  war,  boasted  of  it  in  his  lifetime  and 
stated  the  circumstances  in  his  Memoirs,  to  be  published 
after  his  death. 

Some  say  that  an  ambassador  is  an  idle,  frivolous  person, 
to  whom  trifles  are  the  serious  things  of  life,  because  in 
times  past  he  has  been  over-mindful  of  his  dress  and  of 
his  personal  appearance,  has  been  a  stickler  for  prece- 
dence, and  has  been  ostentatious  beyond  the  standard  of 
his  critics.  These  are  matters  of  form,  not  of  substance. 
They  are  trifles  in  themselves,  but  they  are  not  little  things 
when  States  are  concerned.  Precedence  claimed  by  one 
whose  qualities  do  not  entitle  him  to  it  is  indeed  foolish; 
precedence  to  the  same  person  as  the  representative  of  a 
State  is  a  different  matter.  In  this  day  and  generation, 
men  of  breeding  give  to  women  the  place  of  honor,  but 
the  President  of  the  United  States  and  every  diplomatic 
representative  in  the  City  of  Washington  assumes  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  95 

place  of  honor  as  the  representative  of  his  country.  There 
is  a  reason  for  most  things,  natural  or  artificial,  and  al- 
though we  may  not  share  it  we  should  not  deny  it. 

Finally,  it  is  said  that  diplomacy  is  a  failure.  It  does 
fail  betimes,  but  its  failures  are  known  and  chronicled — 
its  many  successes  pass  unnoticed.  It  is,  however,  not 
too  much  to  say  that  the  timely  intervention  of  the 
diplomat  settles  many  a  claim  which  might  become  a 
dispute,  settles  many  a  dispute  quietly  without  any  knowl- 
edge of  it  reaching  the  public,  and  that  the  cases  which 
diplomacy  fails  to  adjust  are  few  in  number  and  are  so 
difficult  that  human  ingenuity  is  unequal  to  the  task,  or 
the  conflicting  interests  of  States  prevent  agreement. 
It  is  only  the  noise  that  the  ear  notices. 

II 

TRUE  FUNCTIONS  OF  DIPLOMATS  AND  DIPLOMACY 

The  truth  is,  the  diplomat  is  a  necessity,  he  is  not  merely 
an  ornament,  if  there  is  to  be  more  than  one  State  in  the 
world.  The  State,  being  an  artificial  person,  can  not  com- 
municate of_  itself  with  another  State.  It  speaks  by  the 
mouHTof^n  agent.  Two  States  existing  must  come  into 
contact.  The  relations  external  to  themselves  are  foreign ; 
they  are  international  relations.  And  there  are  not  two, 
there  are  many  States.  When  intercourse  was  the  excep- 
tion, not  the  rule,  an  agent,  whether  he  be  called  an  am- 
bassador or  a  minister,  could  be  sent  for  the  special  occa- 
sion. When  the  States  became  numerous  and  their  con- 
tact frequent,  embassies  or  missions  were  correspondingly 
frequent.  When  it  was  recognized  that  an  ambassador 
or  a  minister  residing  within  a  country  permanently  or 
for  an  indefinite  period  of  time,  might  prevent  the  dis- 
putes which  special  missions  were  sent  to  adjust,  nations 
began  to  appoint  ambassadors  or  ministers  to  reside  per- 
manently in  those  countries  with  which  they  had  most 
frequent  intercourse.  The  Church  was  first  drawn  upon, 
as  itsjnembers  possessed  the  qualities  required;  then  law- 


96  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

yers,  in  an  age  in  which  the  Church  was  less  powerful, 
and  the  relations  of  nations  were  determined  according  to 
rules  of  lawiWe  thus  have  a  class,  and,  the  class  justify- 
ing itself,  we  ha^^e  a  profession,  so  that  today  every  State 
recognized  as  a  member'^of  the  Society  of  Nations,  has 
a  diplomatic  service.  In  the  older  States  it  is  a  career ;  in 
the  younger  States  appointments  are  frequently  made  from 
the  outside,  and  even  in  the  other  States,  they  are  some- 
times so  made.  And  there  will  be  a  diplomatic  service 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  minister  of  foreign  af- 
fairs directs  foreign  relations  and  in  many  instances  con- 
ducts them,  and  notwithstanding  the  annihilation  of  dis- 
tance through  the  telegraph,  and  the  telephone,  as  long  as 
men  transact  their  business  by  word  of  mouth  and  face  to 
face.  The  method  of  conducting  foreign  relations  may 
change ;  it  has  changed  to  meet  changing  conditions,  but 
the  trained  man  with  the  trained  mind,  in  open  as  in  se- 
cret diplomacy,  in  democracies  as  in  other  forms  of  gov- 
ernment, will  be  needed,  and  if  we  are  wise,  will  be  em- 
ployed and  prized. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  conception  of  diplomacy 
in  the  past,  whatever  criticism  may  have  been  made  of  its 
practitioners,  it  is  today  what  Sir  Ernest  Satow,  formerly 
an  able  envoy  extraordinary  and  minister  plenipotentiary 
of  Great  Britain,  has  declared  it  to  be :  "The  application 
of  intelligence  and  tact  to  the  conduct  of  official  relations 
betzi'een  the  government  of  independent  states,  extending 
sometimes  also  to  their  relations  with  vassal  states." 

III. 

THE  MODERN  STATE  SYSTEM  AND  THE  LAW  OF  STATES 

Using  diplomacy  as  "the  principles  of  international  law 
applied  to  the  relation  of  States",  and  such  it  assuredly  is, 
we,  in  modern  times,  find  ourselves  confronted  with  two 
terms  requiring  consideration. 

The  State  slowly  came  into  being  during  the  Middle 
Ages  and  was  recognized  much  as  it  is  today  by  the  Con- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  97 

grcss  of  Westphalia.  The  law  of  nationsslowlv;  came 
into  _bei.ii^  during  the  same  period,  becauseTasTlTeTaw  of 
States,  it  pre-supposes  their  existence,  and  the  modern 
law  of  nations  was  recognized  at  approximately  the  same 
time  in  the  form  and  shape  given  to  it  by  Grotius^  in  "The 
Lazv  of  War  and  Peace"  published  in  1625,  that  is  to  say, 
during  the  Thirty  Years'  War  which  the  Congress  of 
Westphalia  ended. 

There  could  be  no  States  in  the  modern  sense  of  the 
term  when  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  which  has  been 
wittily  said  to  have  been  neither  holy  nor  Roman,  claimed 
not  merely  the  first  place,  but  that  all  States  were  subor- 
dinate to  and  dependent  upon  it.  There  could  be  no  States 
in  the  modern  sense  of  the  term  when  a  great  spiritual 
organization  claimed  supremacy  not  merely  in  matters 
spiritual,  but  in  material  matters  as  well.  Out  of  the  con- 
flict of  these  two  great  organizations,  and  from  the  incon- 
sistent claims  of  the  States  of  the  then  world,  taking  sides 
and  changing  sides  as  their  interest  dictated,  the  modern 
State  emerged.  By  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia,  or  of 
jVIunster  (the  Catholic  powers  negotiated  at  Munster — 
the  Protestant  at  Westphalia,  two  cities  some  fifty  miles 
apart,  but  signed  the  same  24th  day  of  October,  1648)  the 
new  order  of  things  was  recognized. 

For  the  present  purposes,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that 
a  territory,  large  or  small,  with  a  population  large  or 
small,  under  a  government  of  a  monarch,  prince  or  eccle- 
siastic, was  recognized  as  a  State  and  entitled  to  all  the 
right  of  a  State;  that  is  to  say,  the  State,  irrespective  of 
its  origin,  irrespective  of  its  religion,  irrespective  of  its 
form  of  government,  was  recognized.  Primarily  tlie  boun- 
daries of  Germany  were  settled,  and  with  slight  changes 
they  remained  as  then  settled  until  the  dissolution  of  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire  in  1806.  The  independence  of  Hol- 
land, long  a  fact,  was  recognized  as  such;  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  Swiss  Cantons,  long  a  fact,  was  likewise 


^For  discussion  of  Grotius,  see  Appendix. 


98  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

recognized  as  such.  All  of  the  European  States  with  the 
exception  of  Great  Britain,  Poland,  Muscovy  and  Tur- 
key, were  parties  to  the  agreement,  and  even  of  these. 
Great  Britain  and  Poland  were  considered  as  allies  and 
thus  were  brought  within  the  influence  of  the  treaty. 
It  was  intended  to  be  a  universal  settlement  and  it  largely 
was;  it  was  intended  to  be  a  permanent  settlement  and 
it  was,  for  upon  its  foundation  reposes  the  modern  State 
with  the  modern  law  of  nations. 

With  the  conflicting  claims  to  supremacy,  lay  or  spirit- 
ual, law  was  impossible,  because  the  superior  could  pre- 
scribe the  rule  of  conduct  which  we  call  law,  for  the 
inferior  States  according  to  its  pleasure.  The  inferior 
States  might  have  been  equal  in  the  sense  of  the  Roman 
Law  which  truly  and  brutally  says  that  "slaves  are  equal 
among  themselves" ;  but  they  would  not  and  could  not 
have  been  equal  with  their  superiors,  and  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  international  law  is  the  equality  of 
right  of  every  State  with  territory  large  or  small,  with 
a  population  large  or  small,  under  a  government  of  its 
own  choice.  This  law  grew  with  and  as  the  State;  and 
the  system  of  law,  like  the  system  of  States,  came  into 
being  approximately  at  one  and  the  same  time.  We  date 
both  from  Westphalia. 

How  was  the  system  of  States,  and  how  was  the  sys- 
tem of  law,  to  be  preserved?  This  has  been  the  great 
problem  since  Westphalia.  It  is  still  the  problem.  There 
are  apparently  two  ways  of  solving  it — one  by  force,  the 
other  by  justice.  The  world  has  tried  the  first,  the  bal- 
ance of  power  through  force;  it  is  beginning  to  try  the 
second — the  administration  of  justice  through  the  instru- 
mentalities of  justice.  This  is  a  generalization,  and  I  am 
aware  of  the  witty  remark  of  a  French  professor,  that 
"all  generalizations  are  false,   including  this  one." 

First,  as  to  the  balance  of  power.  For  whether  we 
speak  of  the  equilibrium  of  Europe,  or  whether  we  speak 
of  the  European  concert,  we  speak  in  terms  of  the  bal- 
ance of  power,  and  the  principle  of  the  balance  of  power 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 


e 


is  inevitable,  unless  States  are  organized  upon  some  other 
method  than  power.  They  can  only  escape  from  it  by 
some  organization  upon  a  different  principle.  We  would 
have  had  the  theory  and  practice  of  the  balance  of  power 
in  this  Western  World  of  ours  had  not  the  representa- 
tives of  the  States  in  conference  assembled  at  Philadel- 
'  phia,  in  1787,  rejected  size,  rejected  power,  and  formed 
.the  Union  of  States  upon  principles  of  justice,  with  ap- 
propriate agencies  for  its  administration.  Before  the  law 
all  men  are  equal ;  before  the  law  all  States  are  equal. 
In  the  domain  of  justice  there  is  neither  large  nor  small, 
powerful  nor  weak.  There  are  only  equals  in  right, 
equals  in  duty,  and  the  rights  and  duties  are  not  deter- 
mined by  the  sword,  but  weighed  in  the  balance  of  jus- 
tice.    Will  the  world  ever  take  America  seriously? 

IV. 

THE  BALANCE  OF  POW^ER ITS  NATURE  AND  APPLICATION 

If  the  world  consisted  of  but  a  single  State,  there 
w^ould  be  no  external  questions  and  there  would  be  no 
question  of  the  balance  of  power.  If  the  world  were  com- 
posed of  two  States,  they  would  have  disputes,  but  they 
would  not  dispute  as  to  the  balance  of  power.  If  there 
were  three  States  coming  into  contact,  they  might  and 
they  would.  With  every  addition  to  the  States,  the  bal- 
ance of  power  would  become  more  pressing  and  more 
complex.  Alliances  would  be  formed  to  maintain  it,  war 
would  be  made  to  re-create  it.  The  principle  is  apparently 
as  old  as  the  first  three  States. 

What  is  this  principle  and  how  is  it  applied?  Let 
Hume  answer  the  question.  In  his  Essays — Moral,  Polit- 
ical, and  Literary,  published  in  1752,  he  speaks  of  the 
balance  of  power,"  asking  "whether  the  idea  of  the  balance 
of  power  be  owing  entirely  to  modern  policy,  or  whether 
the  phrase  only  has  been  invented  in  these  later  ages?" 
The  answer  which  he  gives,  supported  by  an  unfortunate 


100  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

wealth  of  illustrations,  is  that  the  idea  was  ancient  and 
that  the  phrase  only  was  modern : 

In  all  the  politics  of  Greece,  the  anxiety,  with  regard 
to  the  balance  of  power,  is  apparent,  and  is  expressly 
pointed   out    to    us,    even    by   the    ancient    historians. 
Thucydides  represents  the  league,  which  was  formed 
against  Athens,  and  which  produced  the  Peloponnesian 
was»  as  entirely  owing  to  this  principle.     And  after  the 
decline   of    Athens,   when    the   Thebans    and    Lacede- 
monians disputed  for  sovereignty,  we  find,  that  the 
Athenians  (as  well  as  many  other  republics)   always 
threw    themselves    into    the    lighter    scale,    and    en- 
deavoured to  preserve  the  balance.     They  supported 
Thebes  against  Sparta,  till  the  great  victory  gained  by 
Epaminondas  at  Leuctra ;  after  which  they  immediately 
went  over  to  the  conquered,  from  generosity,  as  they 
pretended,  but  in  reality   from  their  jealousy  of  the 
conquerors. 
Such  was  the  practice  of  the  Greeks.     The  principle 
upon  which  they  relied  is  stated  by  Hiero,  King  of  Syra- 
cuse, who,  although  an  ally  of  Rome,  sent  assistance  to  the 
Carthaginians  during  the  war  of  the  auxiliaries : 

"Esteeming  it   requisite,"   says   Polybius,   "both   in 
order  to  retain  his  dominions  in  Sicily,  and  to  preserve 
the  Roman  friendship,  that  Carthage  should  be  safe; 
lest  by  its  fall  the  remaining  power  should  be  able, 
without  contrast  or  opposition,  to  execute  every  pur- 
pose and  undertaking.     And  here  he  acted  with  great 
wisdom   and   prudence.     For   that   is   never,   on    any 
account,  to  be  overlooked ;  nor  ought  such  a  force  ever 
to  be  thrown  into  one  hand,  as  to  incapacitate  the 
neighbouring  states  from  defending  their  rights  against 
it." 
Upon  this  statement  of  principle  Hume  himself  says,  and 
rightly:  "Here  is  the  aim  of  modern  politics  pointed  out 
in  express  terms."    And  here  are  some  examples  of  it  in 
modern  politics :     In  the  Sixteenth  Century,  the  House 
of  Hapsburg  as  King  of  Spain,  with  its  vast  dominions, 
and  as  Holy  Roman  Emperor,  lay  heavy  upon  the  world 
and  threatened  to  crush  it.    Francis  I  of  France,  drawing 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  101 

upon  the  Eastern  World,  as  Canning-  undoubtedly  would 
have  put  it,  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  Old, — meaning 
Europe,  concluded  a  Treaty  with  Turkey  to  make  head- 
way against  the  House  of  Hapsburg.  It  was  checked,  but 
it  was  not  humbled.  It  was  still  a  menace. 

The  partition  of  the  empire  which  took  place  upon 
the  abdication  of  Charles  V,  of  Germany,  of  Charles  I, 
as  he  also  was  of  Spain,  simplified  the  problem.  A  branch 
of  the  House  of  Hapsburg,  however,  had  the  empire 
which  had  become  hereditary  in  the  family;  a  branch  of 
the  House  of  Hapsburg  had  the  Spanish  dominions.  The 
Treaty  of  the  Pyrenees  of  1659,  between  Spain  and 
France,  left  Spain  indeed  a  factor,  as  the  Treaty  of 
Westphalia  had  left  Austria  and  the  Empire  a  factor, 
but  not  a  menace  as  of  other  days.  A  new  sun  had 
arisen,  and  so  conscious  of  its  power  that  the  monarch 
of  this  new  menace  called  himself  Le  rot  soldi.  Louis 
XIV  of  France,  for  the  reference  is  to  him,  sought  to 
wield  the  sceptre  which  during  the  centuries  has  fallen 
from  the  grasp  of  w^orld  conquerors.  He  sought  to 
overrun  and  to  annex  the  Spanish  provinces  now  form- 
ing the  kingdom  of  Belgium.  He  sought  to  annex  Al- 
sace, in  which  he  succeeded  and  to  extend  his  domains 
to  the  Rhine,  in  which  he  failed  in  large  part.  Wherever 
he  turned,  a  coalition  to  preserve  the  balance  of  power 
faced  him,  and  eventually  broke  his  haughty  spirit.  Had 
he  thought  less  of  his  family  and  more  of  France,  he 
could  have  rounded  out  his  domains  with  tlie  consent  of  the 
Powers  of  that  day,  without  disturbing  what  they  would 
have  considered  under  the  circumstances,  the  balance  of 
powder.  He  married  Maria  Theresa,  daughter  of  the 
otherwise  childless  King-  of  Spain,  and  renounced  the 
Spanish  throne  for  their  offspring,  on  condition  that  the 
dowry  should  be  paid.     It  never  v.'as. 

The  situation  was  simple.  The  Spanish  monarch  did 
not  want  the  dismemberment  of  Spain.  Louis  XIV 
wanted  Spain  for  a  descendant  and  was  more  than  willing 
to  accept  for  himself  certain  portions  of  the  inheritance. 


102  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

Europe  was  as  unwilling  to  have  the  Crowns  of  France 
and  Spain  united  as  it  had  been  to  have  the  Crowns  of 
Austria  and  Spain  united  on  the  same  head.  To  prevent 
this  a  Treaty  of  Partition  proposed  by  Louis  XIV  was 
signed  at  The  Hague  in  1698,  between  France  and  the 
then  maritime  Powers,  England  and  Holland,  by  which, 
to  quote  Mr.  Wheaton,  "Spain,  the  Indies,  Belgium  and 
Sardinia  were  assigned  to  the  electoral  prince  of  Bavaria; 
the  kingdom  of  Naples  and  Sicily,  the  Spanish  places  and 
islands  upon  the  coasts  of  Tuscany,  the  marquisate  of 
Final,  and  the  province  of  Guipuzcoa,  to  the  Dauphin  of 
France;  and  the  Milanese  to  the  Archduke  Charles." 

The  King  of  Spain,  Charles  II,  resented  this  attempt 
to  dispose  of  his  dominions  while  he  was  still  living,  and 
made  a  will  by  which  he  appointed  the  Electoral  Prince 
of  Bavaria  his  universal  heir,  hoping  to  preserve  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Spanish  monarchy  at  the  expense  of  the 
German  branch  of  his  own  house.  However,  the  Prince 
of  Bavaria  died,  upsetting  the  plans  alike  of  France,  Eng- 
land, and  Holland  on  one  hand,  and  Charles  II  of  Spain, 
on  the  other.  Therefore,  a  second  Treaty  of  Partition 
between  the  same  parties  was  concluded  in  1700,  by  which 
the  Archduke  Charles  was  substituted  for  the  Prince  of 
Bavaria  who  had  previously  died,  in  the  inheritance  of 
Spain,  the  Indies,  Belgium  and  Sardinia.  The  Dauphin 
of  France  received  the  spoils  under  the  first  treaty,  to 
which  were  added  for  good,  or  rather  for  better  measure, 
the  duchies  of  Lorraine  and  Bar.  But  Charles  II  of 
Spain  was  again  dissatisfied  and  for  the  same  reasons. 
He  therefore  made  a  second  will,  this  time  in  favor  of 
the  Duke  d'Anjou,  grandson  of  Louis  XIV  and  grandson 
of  his  own  daughter,  Maria  Theresa.  Charles  II  had 
no  male  heirs,  hence  the  treaties  of  the  European  Pow- 
ers, hence  his  own  testaments. 

But  again  the  unexpected  happened.  The  Holy  Roman 
Emperor  Joseph  I  died  without  male  heirs,  and  his  broth- 
er, the  Archduke  Charles,  succeeded  him.  If  the  second 
Treaty  of  Partition  should  stand,  the  German  branch  of 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  103 

the  House  of  Hapsburg  would  unite  Austria,  the  Empire, 
and  the  Spanish  dominions  under  his  scepter.  The  result 
of  it  all  was  a  change  of  front,  the  Partitioners  accept- 
ing as  the  lesser  of  the  two  evils,  the  grandson  as  the 
King  of  Spain,  with,  however,  the  express  provision  that 
the  Crown  of  Spain  should  never  be  united  to  that  of 
France.  Louis  XIV  had  been  so  worsted  in  the  war 
that  he  was  glad  in  his  old  age  to  accept  and  to  retain 
the  kingdom  of  France,  somewhat  enlarged  indeed  by 
his  previous  conquests,  but  shorn  of  the  conquests  which 
he  had  hoped  to  make.  The  Spain  of  the  grandson  like- 
wise suffered.  Belgium,  Milan  and  Naples  were  severed 
from  the  Spanish  monarch  and  settled  upon  the  house  of 
Austria. 

"The  peace  of  Utrecht,"  Mr.  Wheaton  says,  "was  for 
France  what  that  of  Miinstcr  had  been  for  the  house  of 
Austria."  It  was  unfortunate  for  France,  perhaps  it  was 
unfortunate  for  the  world,  that  Louis  XIV  accepted  the 
throne  of  Spain  for  his  grandson,  instead  of  contenting 
himself  with  the  spoils  of  Partition  which  the  Powers 
of  the  day  were  willing  to  accord  him.  The  French  his- 
torian, Mignet,  with  whom  impartiality  was  a  religion, 
with  accuracy  as  a  necessary  consequence,  has  shown  in 
the  introduction  to  his  edition  of  the  Documents  Relating 
to  the  Spanish  Succession,  that  Louis  XIV  not  only  vio- 
lated the  faith  of  treaties  in  accepting  the  Crown  of 
Spain  for  his  grandson,  but  that  he  departed  from  all 
sound  rules  of  policy.  "Louis  XIV  had,"  to  quote  Mig- 
net, "to  choose  between  a  Crown  for  his  grandson  or  an 
aggrandizement  of  his  domains  maintained  by  Europe;  be- 
tween the  expansion  of  his  system  in  the  Pyrenees  and 
the  Alps  by  the  establishment  of  a  branch  of  his  house  in 
Spain  and  in  Italy,  and  an  expansion  of  his  own  proper 
Power ;  between  the  honor  of  the  royalty  and  the  advan- 
tage of  his  kingdom;  between  his  family  and  France." 

Just  as  th^treaty  gf.Westphalia^  was  rerieivfid.and  con- 
firmed, in  every  treaty  of  peace  between  the  Central  States 
of  Europe  "until  the  French  Revolution,  so  the  Treaties 


104  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

of  Utrecht  were  renewed  and  confirmed  in  every  succes- 
sive treaty  of  peace  between  the  great  continental  and 
maritime  powers  until  the  Peace  of  Luneville,  in  1800.  It 
was  omitted  for  the  first  time  in  the  Peace  of  Amiens, 
concluded  in  1803,  when  a  new  and  a  greater  sun  had 
arisen  upon  the  political  firmament. 

Such  is  the  practice  of  Europe.  What  was  the  theory 
by  which  it  was  justified?  Let  one  of  the  greatest  mas- 
ters of  international  law  answer  the  question,  just  as  an 
appeal  has  been  made  to  Hume,  a  noted  philosopher. 

In  his  Law  of  Nations,  published  in  1758,  Vattel  has 
this  to  say : 

It  is  asked  whether  the  aggrandizement  of  a  neigh- 
boring State,  in  consequence  of  which  a  Nation  fears 
that  it  will  one  day  be  oppressed,  is  a  sufficient  ground 
for  making  war  upon  it ;  whether  a  Nation  can  with 
justice  take  up  arms  to  resist  the  growing  power  of 
that  State,  or  to  weaken  the  State,  with  the  sole  object 
of  protecting  itself  from  the  dangers  with  which  weak 
States  are  almost  always  threatened  from  an  over- 
powerful  one. 
This  just  man  felt  that  the  question  presented  difficulties 
of  a  perplexing  nature  to  "those  who  seek  at  all  times 
to  unite  justice  with  prudence,"  but  that  it  presented  "no 
difficulties  to  the  majority  of  statesmen."    His  answer  to 
the  question  "whether  war  may  be  maintained  for  this 
purpose"  is  that 

Since  war  is  only  permissible  in  order  to  redress  an 
injury  received,  or  to  protect  ourselves  from  an  injury 
with  which  we  are  threatened,  it  is  a  sacred  rule  of  the 
law  of  nations  that  the  aggrandizement  of  a  State  can 
not  alone  and  of  itself  give  any  one  the  right  to  take 
up  arms  to  resist  it. 
But  he  did  not  stop  with  this  statement.  He  went  fur- 
ther, saying: 

As  soon  as  a  State  has  given  evidence  of  injustice, 

greed,  pride,  ambition,  or  a  desire  of  domineering  over 

its  neighbors,  it  becomes  an  object  of  suspicion  which 

they  must  guard  against. 

He  next  puts  the  pertinent  question  which  is  indeed  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  105 

crux  of  the  matter :  "Are  we  to  delay  avertin£^  our  destruc- 
tion until  it  has  become  inevitable?"  And  in  this  con- 
nection he  refers  to  a  familiar  illustration : 

Had  Charles  II,  King  of  Spain,  instead  of  settling 
the  succession  upon  the  Duke  of  Anjou,  appointed 
Louis  XIV  himself  as  heir,  had  he  thus  tamely  suf- 
fered the  union  of  the  House  of  Spain  to  that  of 
France,  it  would  have  meant,  according  to  all  the  rules 
of  human  foresight,  nothing  less  than  delivering  all 
Europe  into  servitude,  or  at  least  putting  it  in  a  most 
precarious  condition. 
He  next  asks : 

If  an  unlcnown  man  takes  aim  at  me  in  the  middle  of 
a  forest,  I  am  not  yet  certain  that  he  wishes  to  kill  me ; 
must  I  allow  him  time  to  fire  in  order  to  be  sure  of  his 
intent?     Is  there  any   reasonable  casuist  who   would 
deny  me  the  right  to  forestall  the  act?     But  presump- 
tion becomes  almost  equal  to  certitude  if  the  Prince 
who  is  about  to  acquire  enormous  power  has  already 
given  evidence  of   an   unbridled   pride  and   ambition. 
In  the  imaginary  case  mentioned  above,   who  would 
have  dared  counsel  the  European  states  to  allow  Louis 
XIV  to  make  such  a  formidable  addition  to  his  power? 
Vattel  now  speaks  as  a  man  "zvho  seeks  at  all  times 
to  unite  justice  idth  prudence,"  and  resolves  the  doubts 
which  he  has  raised  in  the  series  of  questions  which  he 
has  put;  he  supposes  that  the  powerful  State  is  both  just 
and  prudent  in  its  conduct,  and  he  asks  if,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, we  should  idly  look  upon  its  rapid  increase 
of  power  and  lay  ourselves  open  to  the  designs  which  it 
may  seek  to  realize. 

The  example  of  the  Romans  is  a  good  lesson  for  all 
sovereigns.  If  the  most  powerful  States  of  that  day 
had  united  together  to  watch  over  the  movements  of 
Rome,  to  set  limits  to  her  progress,  they  would  not 
have  successively  become  subject  to  her. 
However,  Vattel  as  a  lover  of  justice  and  prudence 
did  not  advocate  force  in  first  instance : 

"There  are  gentler  means,  which  are  always  lawful. 
The  most  efficacious  of  these  is  an  alliance  of  other  less 


106  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

powerful  sovereigns,  who,  by  uniting  their  forces,  are 
enabled  to  counterbalance  the  sovereign  who  excites 
their  alarm."  This  could  be  accepted  by  all  the  states 
of  his  day. 

"Europe  forms  a  political  system  in  which  the  nations 
inhabiting  this  part  of  the  world  are  bound  together  by 
their    relations    and    various    interests    into    a    single 
body.    .    .   The  constant  attention  of  sovereigns  to  all 
that  goes  on,  the  custom  of  resident  ministers,  the  con- 
tinual negotiations  that  take  place,  make  of  modern 
Europe  a  sort  of  Republic,  whose  members — each  in- 
dependent, but  all  bound  together  by  a  common  interest 
— unite  for  the  maintenance  of  order  and  the  preserva- 
tion of  liberty." 
"This,"  he  adds,  "is  what  has  given  rise  to  the  well- 
known  principle  of  the  balance  of  power,  by  zuhich  is 
m-eant  an  arrangement  of  affairs  so  that  no  State  shall  be 
in  a  position  to  have  absolute  mastery  and  dominate  over 
the  others." 

To  maintain  the  balance,  "no  State  should  be  much 
superior  to  the  others",  and  "all  the  States,  or  at  least 
the  larger  part,  should  be  about  equal  in  strength. "_  How 
can  the  balance  be  preserved?  As  it  was  impossible,  he 
recognized,  to  trim  the  States  so  that  they  would  be  ap- 
proximately equal,  nations  would  have  to  rely  upon  al- 
liances— the  method  of  Europe,  he  said,  "at  the  present 
day",  or  a  method  soon  to  be  tried,  and  now  again  on 
trial.  "Confederations  would",  in  his  opinion,  "be  a  sure 
means  of  preserving  the  balance  of  powder  and  thus  main- 
taining the  liberty  of  nations,  if  all  sovereigns  were  con- 
stantly aware  of  their  true  interests,  and  if  they  regulated 
their  policy  according  to  the  welfare  of  the  State." 

This  may  be  said  to  be  the  language  of  the  theorist, 
although  Vattel  was  a  diplomat  by  profession,  speaking 
from  experience  and  with  a  knowledge  of  practice.  How- 
ever, Count  Kaunitz,  Chancellor  of  Austria,  was  cer- 
tainly a  man  of  affairs  and  in  his  circular  note  of  July 
17,  1 79 1,  he  advocated  that  the  Powers  make  common 
cause  against  the  French  Revolution  for  the  purpose  of 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  107 

preserving  ''public  peace,  the  tranquillity  of  States,  the  in- 
violability of  possessions,  and  the  faith  of  treaties." 

V 

THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER  IN   MODERN   TIMES — THE  HOLY 

ALLIANCE 

It  is  immaterial  to  present  purposes  whether  the  wars 
of  the  French  Revolution  were  provoked  by  Europe  or 
were  declared  by  France.  The  victory  of  French  arms 
broug"ht  with  it  an  aggressive  policy.  The  generous  ideas 
of  the  first  days  spent  themselves.  Bonaparte  mastered 
the  Revolution,  and  he  set  about  to  master  Europe.  He 
succeeded  for  the  time,  but  he  ultimately  went  the  way 
of  the  world  conquerer.  Coalition  after  coalition  was 
formed  to  prevent  the  aggrandizement  of  France,  and  in 
the  end,  they  were  successful.  The  victors  met  at  Vienna 
in  the  course  of  1814  and  15,  just  a  century  after  the 
Congress  of  Utrecht,  and  almost  a  hundred  years  before 
the  Conference  at  Paris.  Austria,  Great  Britain,  Prus- 
sia and  Russia  set  about  the  reconstruction  of  Europe. 
The  victim  was  at  first  excluded  from  their  councils,  but 
the  skill  of  Talleyrand  opened  the  door  of  the  Council 
Chamber  to  France.  These  five  Powers  proceeded  to  re- 
dress the  balance  and  Alexander  of  Russia,  in  language 
which  sounds  strangely  familiar  to  us  of  the  present, 
argued  that  the  outcome  of  the  war  was  to  be  not  only 
the  liberation  of  France,  but  the  universal  triumph  of 
"the  sacred  rights  of  humanity."  ''To  attain  this  it  zvould 
he  necessary  'after  having  attached  the  nations  to  the 
greatest  interests  of  their  subjects,  to  fix  the  relations 
of  the  states  amongst  each  other  on  more  precise  rules, 
and  such  as  it  is  to  their  interest  to  respect.'" 

A  general  treaty  was  to  form  a  basis  of  the  relations 
of  the  States  composing  the  "European  Confederation," 
and  although  "it  was  no  question  of  realizing  the  dream 
of  universal  peace,  would  attain  some  of  its  results  if,  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  general  war,  it  were  possible  to  es- 


108  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

tablish  on  clear  principles  the  prescriptions  of  the  rights 
of  nations." 

And  in  both  the  form  of  question  and  answer,  which 
sounds  but  of  yesterday,  the  Autocrat  of  all  the  Russias 
continued : 

"Why  could  not  one  submit  to  it  the  positive  rights 
of  nations  .  .  .  insert  the  obligations  of  never  begin- 
ning war  until  all  the  resources  which  the  mediation 
of  a  third  party  could  offer  have  been  exhausted, 
having  by  this  means  brought  to  light  the  respective 
grievances,  and  tried  to  remove  them?  It  is  on  such 
principles  as  these  that  one  could  proceed  to  a  general 
pacification,  and  give  birth  to  a  league  of  which  the 
stipulations  would  form,  so  to  speak,  a  new  code  of 
the  law  of  nations,  which  sanctioned  by  the  greater 
part  of  the  nations  of  Europe,  would  without  difficulty 
become  the  immutable  rule  of  the  cabinets,  while  those 
who  should  try  to  infringe  it  would  risk  bringing  upon 
themselves  the  forces  of  the  new  union." 

Such  is  the  origin  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  drafted  by 
Alexander  I  of  Russia,  approved  in  first  instance  by  the 
Emperor  of  Austria,  the  King  of  Prussia,  proclaimed  on 
September  26,  181 5,  at  a  great  review  of  the  allied  troops 
on  the  Champ  des  Vertus,  near  Paris.  To  the  Treaty  or 
Declaration  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  the  name  of  every 
European  sovereign  with  the  exception  of  the  Pope,  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  and  Great  Britain  is  subsequently  ap- 
pended, 

Mr.  W.  A.  Phillips,  a  leading  authority  on  this  sub- 
ject, and  whose  masterly  work  on  the  "Confederation  of 
Europe"  issued  in  the  first  month  of  19 14,  was  at  the 
disposal  of  statesmen  of  that  day,  says : 

"In  popular  parlance,  which  has  found  its  way  into 
the  language  of  serious  historians,  the  'Holy  Alliance' 
soon  became  synonymous  with  the  combination  of  the 
great  powers  by  whom  Europe  v/as  ruled  in  concert 
during  the  period  of  the  congresses,  and  associated  with 
the  policy  of  reaction  which  gradually  dominated 
their  counsels.     For  the  understanding  of  the  inner 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  109 

history    of    the    diplomacy    of    this    period,    however, 
a  clear  distinction  must  be  drawn  between  the  1  ioly 
Alliance   and   the    Grand   or   Quadruple    (Quintuple) 
Alliance.     The  Grand  Alliance  was  established  on  defi-    ^y^ 
nite  treaties  concluded  for  definite  purposes,  of  which 
the  chief  w-as  the  preservation  of  peace  on  the  basis  of 
the  territorial  settlement  of  1815.     The  Holy  Alliance 
was  a  general  treaty — hardly  indeed  a  treaty  at  all — 
which   bound  its   signatories  to  act  on   certain  vague 
principles  for  no  well-defined  end ;  and  in  its  essence 
it  was   so   far   from   necessarily   reactionary   that   the 
emperor  Alexander  at  one  time   declared  that  it  in- 
volved the  grant  of  liberal  constitutions  by  princes  to 
their  subjects.     Its  main  significance  was  due  to  the\ 
persistent  efiforts  of  the  Czar  to  make  it  the  basis  of  the 
"universal  union"  or  general  confederation  of  Europe, 
which  he  wished  to  substitute  for  the  actual  committee 
of  the  great  powers,  efiforts  which  were  frustrated  by 
the  vigorous  diplomacy  of  Castlereagh.  acting  as  the 
mouthpiece  of  the  British  government." 
We  have  just  emerged  from  a  great  war,  in  which 
the  most  powerful  of  European  States — certainly  from 
the  military  point  of  view  the  most  pow'erful  State  of 
the  w^orld — deliberately  attempted  to  impose  its  domina- 
tion, its  culture,  its  conception  of  liberty,  upon  the  rest  of 
the  world.     This  war  had  been  foreseen.     To  the  Triple 
Alliance,  which  included  Germany,  its  satellite,  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  its  questionable  ally,  Italy,  three  other  Pow- 
ers, France,  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  opposed  the  Triple 
Entente.     The  assassination  of  the  heir  apparent  to  the 
throne  of  Austria-Hungary  and  his  morganatic  wife  by  a 
subject  of  that  monarchy,  although  of  Serbian  race,  led 
Austria-Hungary  to  incriminate  Serbia,  and  alleging  a 
lack  of  compliance  with  an  ultimatum  demanding  an  ac- 
ceptance within  forty-eight  hours,  Austria-Hungary  de- 
clared war  against  Serbia  on  July  28,    1914,  although 
that  little  country  offered  to  submit  the  outstanding  dis- 
pute to  arbitration.    Russia  espoused  the  cause  of  its  Slav 
neighbor;   Germany  appeared   in   shining  armor  at  the 
side  of  its  ally,  and  declared  war  against  Russia  on  the 


110  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

1st  of  August.  On  the  3rd  of  August,  Germany  de- 
clared war  against  France,  without  any  aggressive  action 
on  the  part  of  that  country,  invaded  Luxemburg  and  Bel- 
gium, whose  neutrality  it  had  promised  to  preserve,  be- 
cause of  which  Great  Britain  declared  war  against  Ger- 
many on  the  4th  of  August,  and  little  by  little  the  world 
was  at  war. 

The  German  army  rushing  through  Luxemburg,  rush- 
ing through  Belgium,  in  its  effort  to  strike  at  the  very 
throat  of  France,  unprepared  for  an  attack  through  these 
neutral  countries,  was  checked  at  the  Marne,  on  the  ever 
memorable  sixth  day  of  September,  19 14: 

"Who  knows,"  said  Duruy,  writing  in  1873,  when 
his  devoted  country  lay  prostrate  at  the  feet  of  Bis- 
marck, "who  knows  but  that  the  broken  sword,  left  in 
our  hands  after  a  sudden  misfortune,  may  not  one  day 
be  required  to  defend  universal  liberty  against  brutal 
ambitions?"  And,  "France  has  at  least,"  he  added, 
"the  right  to  remember  that  she  succeeded  three  times 
in  arresting  or  breaking  a  menacing  power,  that  of 
Charles  V,  of  Philip  II,  and  of  Ferdinand  of  Austria." 

An  armistice  was  accorded  Germany  at  her  own  re- 
quest on  November  11,  1918,  and  the  world  is  slowly 
emerging  from  the  shadow  of  German  domination.         \^***^*^ 

The  power  of  Prussia  has  indeed  been  broken.  How 
is  the  balance  of  power  to  be  restored  and  maintained? 
The  Conference  at  Paris  proposed  a  League  of  Nations 
which  at  present  seems  to  be  a  military  and  economic  al- 
liance of  the  four  Great  Powers.  Will  it  succeed  ?  Pos- 
terity alone  can  tell. 

VI 

THE  CONTENT  OF   MODERN   DIPLOMACY 

"Now  that  is  an  intolerable  doctrine,  which  some 
authorities  have  handed  down,  that  by  the  Law  of 
Nations  arms  may  rightly  be  taken  up  in  order  to 
weaken  a  power  which  is  increasing  and  which,  if  in- 
creased too  much,  might  inflict  injury.  I  confess  that 
in  a  deliberation  about  war  this  may  also  come  into 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  111 

consideration,  not  from  the  point  of  view  of  justice, 
but  from  the  point  of  view  of  utiUty ;  so  that,  if  a  war 
be  just  on  other  grounds,  it  may  likewise  be  judged 
to  have  been  undertaken  prudently  on  this  ground ; 
and  this  is  precisely  the  meaning  of  the  authorities  cited 
on  this  matter.  But  that  the  possibility  of  suffering 
violence  gives  the  right  to  inflict  violence,  is  contrary 
to  every  notion  of  equity.  Such  is  human  life,  that 
complete  security  is  never  apparent  to  us.  Protection 
against  uncertain  fears  must  be  sought  from  divine 
providence  and  blameless  caution,  not  from  force." ' 

In  these  words,  a  great  Dutchman,  whose  name  is  fa- 
miliar to  us  in  its  Latinized  form  of  "Grotius",^  pays  his 
respects  to  the  principle  of  the  balance  of  power,  and  to  it 
opposes  a  principle  which,  although  not  so  popular,  is, 
nevertheless,  making  its  way  in  the  world. 

Force  has  been  opposed  to  force,  and  force  in  large 
or  small  quantities  has  not  maintained  peace.  It  can 
not,  unless  peace  is  in  some  way  connected  with  force, 
so  as  to  emerge  from  the  clash  of  opposing  force.  Force 
is  material,  and  its  fruits  are  material  victories.  Peace, 
we  have  at  least  learned  within  national  lines,  is  the  con- 
sequence of  justice.  It  is  the  perfected  fruit  of  justice, 
and  agencies  exist  in  abundance  for  the  administration  of 
justice,  or  at  least  that  portion  of  it  which  we  call  rules 
of  law. 

Grotius  states  that  "protection  against  uncertain  fears 
must  he  sought  from  divine  providence  and  blameless 
caution."  Whether  Divine  Providence  will  listen  to  us 
in  our  distress,  is  not  for  us  to  determine,  although  we 
may  hope  for  protection  if  we  conduct  ourselves  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  dictates  of  Divine  Providence.  "Blame- 
less caution"  he  does  not  define,  and  we  need  not  dwell 
upon  it.  We  would  not  be  straining  language  if  we 
should  say  that  it  implied  having  our  quarrel  just  and 
then  settling  it  by  justice.     Grotius  himself  was  in  favor 

^Grotius,  De  Jure  Belli  ac  Pads,  Lib.  11.,  Cap.  1,  Sec.  17. 
2For  discussion  of  Grotius,  see  Appendix. 


112  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

of  arbitration;  he  was  also  a  believer  in  the  submission 
of  disputes  between  nations  to  conferences  of  the  States. 
Tested  by  its  fruits,  the  balance  of  power  did  not  seem 
to  him  to  be  an  agency  of  peace.  On  the  contrary,  peace 
is  the  offspring  of  arbitration  between  nations,  just  as 
peace  within  nations  is  the  inevitable  outcome  of  judicial 
decision.  It  is  often  a  consequence  of  conferences.  Arbi- 
tration developing  into  judicial  decision,  irregular  confer- 
ences developing  into  conferences  of  the  nations,  meeting 
at  stated  periods,  are  the  content  of  modern  diplomacy, 
and  are  destined,  as  we  hope,  to  succeed  where  the  balance 
of  power  has  failed. 

I  shall  now  ask  your  attention  to  each  of  these  in  turn. 

VII 

ARBITRATION DEFINITION  AND  HISTORICAL  APPLICATION 

Probably  there  is  no  better  definition  of  arbitration — 
certainly  there  is  none  from  a  higher  source,  than  that 
given  by  twenty-six  nations  of  the  world  in  the  confer- 
ence assembled  at  The  Hague  in  1899,  and  approved 
eight  years  later  by  fortyrfour  nations,  in  the  Second 
Conference  of  The  Hague.  According,  therefore,  to  the 
consensus  of  opinion,  international  arbitration  is,  to  quote 
the  exact  language  of  these  twO'  bodies :  "the  settlement 
of  diiferences  betzveen  States,  by  judges  of  their  ozmt 
choice,  and  on  the  basis  of  respect  for  law." 

Arbitration  has  an  ancient  and  honorable  history.  In 
this  very  course  of  lectures  you  have  heard  to  what  ex- 
tent it  flourished  chiefly  among  the  Greek  States  of  antiq- 
uity, and  how  it  was  resorted  to  in  the  Middle  Ages.  It 
is  said  to  be  the  shield  and  buckler  of  the  weak,  and 
yet,  curiously  enough,  the  chief  treaties  of  arbitration  con- 
cluded in  the  Seventeenth  Century  were  those  to  which 
Oliver  Cromwell,  Lord  Protector  of  England,  was  a 
party.  The  first  treaty  of  arbitration  in  the  modern  se- 
ries was  the  Jay  Treaty,  concluded  by  the  United  States 
with  Great  Britain  in  1794,  in  the  course  of  a  war  or 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  113 

series  of  wars,  from  which  Great  Britain  was  to  emerge 
as  the  strongest  of  nations.  And  the  strength  of  Great 
Britain  has  not  declined,  for  in  our  own  day,  with  our 
own  eyes,  we  have  seen  it  with  its  back  to  the  wall,  emerge 
from  a  desperate  conflict  stronger  than  ever.  It  is  a  fact 
that  of  all  countries,  Great  Britain  has  to  its  credit  more 
arbitrations  than  any  other  nation.  The  United  States 
may  have  been  weak  in  1794,  when  it  proposed  that  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  should  arbitrate  their  out- 
standing differences.  It  has  grown  with  the  years,  and 
in  its  strength,  as  well  as  in  the  days  o!  its  weakness,  it 
stands  for  arbitration,  and,  with  the  exception  of  Great 
Britain,  has  more  arbitrations  to  its  credit  than  any  other 
nation.  These  two  together  made  modern  arbitration; 
they  have  been  its  chief  practitioners,  and  the  world  has 
been  the  beneficiary.  Therefore,  it  is  not  fair  to  say  that 
only,  weak  nations  desire  arbitration,  although  that  would 
be  a  sufficient  justification  for  it. 

There  were  some  powerful  nations  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  and  in  the  first  fourteen  years  of  the  Twentieth, 
who  regarded  it  as  the  refuge  of  the  weak.  Germany 
prevented  a  general  treaty  of  international  arbitration 
from  being  concluded  at  the  Second  Hague  Conference. 
Its  then  powerful  Ally,  Austria-Hungary,  supported  it 
against  the  opinion  of  the  world.  They  tried  the  sword. 
Republican  Germany  and  mutilated  Austria,  if  it  remains 
independent,  will  doubtless  be  willing  to  try  arbitration 
in  the  future.  Mo^^*^'* 

But  to  come  back  to  Cromwell.  On  April  5,  1654, 
he  concluded  the  so-called  Treaty  of  Westminster,  be- 
tween England  and  the  Netherlands,  in  which,  among 
other  things  it  was  provided :  that  the  losses  suffered  by 
the  seizure  and  detention  of  English  effects  in  Denmark 
since  May  18,  1652,  were  to  be  made  good  according  to 
an  appraisement  of  certain  "arbitrators  indifferently  cho- 
sen", and,  in  case  of  a  failure  to  adjust  differences  within 
a  period  of  three  months,  they  were  to  be  submitted  "to 
the  judgment  and  Arbitration  of  the  Protestant  Swiss 


114  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

Cantons".  An  award  was  rendered  by  the  Commissioners, 
and  under  the  30th  article  of  the  same  treaty,  losses  of 
the  East  and  West  India  Companies  were  settled  in  the 
same  manner.  It  is  worth  while  noting,  in  passing,  that 
in  those  days  Holland  was  very  far  from  a  "weak"  coun- 
try. 

Another  treaty  of  Westminster  was  concluded  on  July 
10,  1654,  between  England  and  Portugal,  providing  that 
demands  on  account  of  losses  were  to  be  referred  to  arbi- 
tration for  settlement.  The  Commission  was  to  be  com- 
posed of  two  Englishmen  and  two  Portuguese,  and  on 
failure  to  agree,  the  cases  left  undecided  were  to  be  re- 
ferred to  a  member  of  the  Lord  Protector's  Council,  to  be 
nominated  by  the  Protector  himself,  and  whose  decision 
was  to  be  final.  Portugal  was,  at  this  period,  a  weak 
power,  otherwise  it  would  not  have  accepted  such  person 
as  Cromwell  should  be  pleased  to  appoint. 

The  case  was  different  with  the  Treaty  of  Westmin- 
ster of  November  3,  1655,  between  Cromwell,  of  the 
British  Commonwealth,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Louis  XIV, 
on  the  other.  However,  the  two  High  Contracting  Par- 
ties agreed,  by  article  twenty-four,  to  submit  to  three 
Commissioners  the  legality  of  captures  made  by  the  two 
countries  from  1640.  In  case  of  their  inability  to  agree, 
the  City  of  Hamburg  was  to  delegate  Commissioners, 
whose  award  was  to  be  made  within  four  months,  and 
was  to  be  final. 

Finally,  the  Treaty  of  Westminster,  of  July  15,  1656, 
between  Cromwell,  it  may  be  said,  on  the  one  hand  and 
Sweden  on  the  other,  provided  that  three  Commissioners 
should  be  delegated  on  each  side,  to  adjust  differences  and 
to  settle  the  losses  arising  from  capture  made  during  the 
war  between  England  and  the  Netherlands. 

It  would  be  a  waste  of  time  to  speculate  what  might 
have  happened  if  the  views  of  that  great  man  had  domi- 
nated the  conduct  of  nations, — less  interesting  perhaps, 
but  certainly  as  useless  as  Pascal's  statement  to  the  ef- 
fect that  "If  the  nose  of  Cleopatra  had  been  shorter,  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  115 

whole  face  of  the  earth  would  have  been  changed."  Crom- 
well's practice  was  not  followed,  and  Cleopatra's  nose  was 
— as  it  was. 

In  the  last  quarter  of  the  Eighteenth  Century,  these 
United  States  of  America  came  into  being,  and  with  them 
the  doctrine  that  government  derives  its  just  power  from 
the  consent  of  the  governed,  and  that  justice  should  ol> 
tain  between  States  as  it  does  between  men.  The  recog- 
nition of  the  independence  of  these  States  was  contained 
in  the  Treaty  of   1783,  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States.     It  was  alleged  that  neither  of  them  lived 
up  to  their  obligations  under  this  treaty,  and  that  acts 
of  lawlessness  were  committed  by  each,  which  brought 
them  to  the  verge  of  war.    To  avert  this  calamity,  Presi- 
dent Washington,   who  believed  and  said  that  all  dis- 
putes between  nations  should  be  settled  by  peaceful  means, 
sent  John  Jay,  then  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
to  England,  to  effect,  if  possible,  a  settlement.     This  he 
did,  and  the  treaty  which  appropriately  bears  his  name, 
provided  in  its  fifth  article  for  a  Commission  to  decide 
which  was  the  River  Saint-Croix  intended  by  the  Treaty 
of  1783.     In  this  the  Commission  was  successful.      The 
sixth  article  provided  that  a  Commission  should  deter- 
mine the  losses  suffered  by  British  creditors  because  of 
the  failure  on  the  part  of  the  American  States  to  live  up 
to  the  agreement  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace.     The  Commis- 
sion awarded  three  hundred  thousand  dollars,  and  broke 
up.     The  United  States  subsequently  paid,  in  addition, 
a  lump  sum  of  three  million  dollars,  in  satisfaction  of  all 
these  demands.     The  seventh  article  provided  that  the 
claims  of  Americans  for  unlawful  capture  or  destruction 
of  their  property  upon  the  high  seas,  committed  by  Great 
Britain  during  the  revolutionary  wars  then  raging,  should 
be  submitted  to  a  comm.ission  of  five,  and  that  the  claims 
of  British  subjects  for  a  failure  of  the  United  States  to 
protect  them  within  their  jurisdiction,  or  because  of  the 
failure  to  prevent  France  from  making  unlawful  captures, 
should  be  submitted  to  the  same  commission.    The  various 


116  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

claims  were  to  be  decided  upon  their  merits  and  accord- 
ing "to  justice,  equity,  and  the  laws  of  nations".  Awards 
were  made  in  favor  of  and  against  each.  The  five  Com- 
missioners,— of  whom  the  Chairman,  John  Trumball,  was 
curiously  enough  a  former  Colonel  in  the  Continental 
Army  and  Aid-de-Camp  to  General  Washington,  and  Mr. 
Jay's  Secretary  of  Legation  at  the  time  of  his  appoint- 
ment, and  a  portrait  painter  of  repute — were  so  success- 
ful that  they  not  only  settled  the  disputes  between  the 
two  countries  justly,  but  convinced  nations  of  the  advan- 
tage of  arbitration. 

Since  then  there  have  been  many  treaties  of  arbitra- 
tion during  the  course  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  there 
have  been  innumerable  cases  adjusted  by  arbitration,  and 
in  the  first  decade  of  the  Twentieth  Century  the  world 
was,  as  it  were,  surrounded  with  a  net  of  arbitration 
treaties.  The  instrument  of  peace  was  there,  but  it  was 
not  a  self-starter;  it  needed  to  be  set  in  motion.  Unfortu- 
nately, it  could  be  said  of  arbitration  as  Cardinal  Fleury 
said  to  the  Abbe  St.-Pierre  anent  his  plan  for  perpetual 
peace :  ''You  have  forgotten  mi  essential  article,  that  of 
sending  luissionaries  to  touch  the  hearts  of  princes  and  to 
persuade  them  to  accept  your  vieius." 

VIII. 

INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCES,  THE  IDEAL  OF  SIMON 

BOLIVAR 

To  quote  again  the  first  expounder,  if  not  the  father  of 
International  Law,  our  friend  Grotius,^  who  says  in  his 
book  on  The  Law  of  Nations,  published  in  1625,  during 
the  Thirty  Years  War  : 

"It  would  be  useful  and  indeed  it  is  almost  necessary, 
that  certain  Congresses  of  Christian  Powers  should  be 
held,  in  which  the  controversies  which  arise  among 
some  of  them  may  be  decided  by  others  who  are  not 


Tor  discussion  of  Grotius,  see  Appendix. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  117 

interested ;  and  in  which  mea.^ures  may  be  taken  to 
compel  the  parties  to  accept  peace  on  equitable  terms." 
The  remedy  prescribed  by  the  physician  was  tried  in 
the  Cono-resses  of  Westphalia  and  Munster,  in  1648,  which 
put  an  end  to  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  It  has  also  been 
tried  on  later  occasions,  notably  in  the  Congress  of  Utrecht 
and  of  Vienna;  and  in  a  series  of  congresses  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century,  one  at  J^ati*  in  1856,  ending  the 
Crimean  War,  another  at  Berlin  ending  the  Russo-Turk- 
ish  War,  and  culminating  mTne  Conferen^f  pi-  Pa^i'g  of 
1 9 19.  In  all  of  these  congresses  or  conferences,  some 
principles  of  international  law  have  been  discussed,  laid 
down,  and  accepted.  But  these  principles  were  few  in 
number;  they  were  incidental,  showing  at  most  what  a 
conference  could  do  if  it  met  in  time  of  peace  for  this  pur- 
pose, instead  of  meeting  at  the  end  of  war.  They  were, 
how-ever,  war  congresses,  animated  by  a  spirit  of  venge- 
ance, in  which  indeed,  measures  were  taken,  to  quote  Gro- 
tius,  "to  compel  the  parties  to  accept  peace".  They  were 
not,  however,  his  kind,  as  the  peace  imposed  was  not  "on 
equitable  terms".  Grotius  evidently  meant  a  conference 
meeting  under  circumstances  when  equities  could  be  con- 
sidered. Controversies  between  some  of  the  nations  were 
to  be  submitted  and  decided  by  these  conferences,  not  by 
the  parties  in  dispute,  but  by  others,  which  were  not  in- 
terested. Jn  his  conception^  \h(^  Stnfps  of  Europe  were 
tLoal^ed  upon  as  niembers  of  a  yreat  family,  or  great  so- 
ciety,  or  great  commonwealth,  or  of  a  great  repuDliC^— 
the  term  is  indifferent — and  because  of  the  fact  that  all 
were  affected  to  a  more  or  less  degree  by  a  resort  to  arms, 
the  powers  affected,  though  not  parties  to  the  controversy, 
were  to  determine  the  conditions  of  peace  upon  equitable 
terms,  because  of  the  general,  not  of  the  specific  inter- 
est. It  was  not  to  be  a  Congress  meeting  at  stated  terms, 
it  was  to  meet  from  time  to  time,  in  case  of  need,  but 
when  it  did  meet  and  was  in  session,  it  was  apparently 
to  be  an  assembly  w^hich  could  treat  a  dispute  of  a  legal 
nature  according  to  rules  of  law,  and  of  an  equitable  na- 


118  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

ture  accordin_of  to  what  would  be  considered  just  and  fair. 
There  have,  unfortunately,  been  very  few  gatherings  of 
this  nature,  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  his  proposal. 
The  best  example  was  but  of  yesterday,  when,  in  1884,  a 
conference  of  interested  Powers  met  at  Berlin,  under  Bis- 
marck's presidency,  to  settle  the  disputes  between  Powers 
claiming  African  territory,  laid  down  rules  of  conduct 
for  such  Powers,  and  provided  for  their  peaceful  settle- 
ment. This  Conference  proved  that  the  idea  of  Grotius 
was  not  Utopian,  and  it  is  perhaps  not  too  much  to  say 
that  it  has  kept  the  peace  in  Africa  which  might  have 
been  broken,  and  given  rise  to  wars,  as  was  the  case  for 
generations  in  the  recently  discovered  and  thinly  settled 
tracts  of  America. 

However,  the  idea  which  Grotius  may  have  had  in 
mind  was  more  clearly  expressed  and  brought  to  the  at- 
tention of  thinking  people  by  one  who  was  not.  like  Gro- 
tius, a  writer  on  international  law  and  a  master  of  inter- 
national relations.  He  had  not  held,  as  Grotius,  the  post 
of  an  Ambassador.  This  obscure  person  was  from  the  New 
World.  His  voice  was  the  voice  of  the  New  World; 
his  spirit  was  of  the  New  World.  He  was  the  mouth- 
piece of  the  new  diplomacy  and  he  proposed  the  confer- 
ences of  nations  to  be  held  in  time  of  peace,  to  preserve 
peace — to  take  from  the  large  domain  of  justice,  its  prin- 
ciples, and  to  state  them  in  rules  of  law  for  the  conduct 
of  nations.  His  plan  has  been  tried  and  found  workable, 
although  perhaps  those  who  called  into  being  the  confer- 
ence which  he  advocated  were  unconscious  that  such  a 
man  as  William  Ladd  ever  lived. 

What  was  the  plan  ?  The  precedent  which  caused  Ladd 
to  propose  his  plan  was  American.  Simon  Bolivar,  the 
Liberator  of  South  America,  as  he  is  called,  proposed  a 
meeting  of  the  Latin-American  States,  hardly  out  of  the 
cradle.  The  meeting  of  their  representatives  was  to  be 
held  at  Panama.  The  United  States  was  invited,  and, 
after  much  controversy,  our  participation  in  the  confer- 
ence was  authorized,  but  our  delegates  were  appointed 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  119 

when  it  was  too  late.  The  conference  failed.  From  the 
Panama  incident,  "The  inference  to  he  deduced,"  Mr. 
Ladd  said,  "is,  that  the  governments  of  Christendom  are 
udlling  to  send  delegates  to  any  such  Congress,  whenever 
it  shall  be  called  by  a  respectable  state,  zvell  established 
in  its  own  government,  if  called  in  a  time  of  peace,  to  meet 
at  0'  proper  place."^  He  was  not,  however,  satisfied  with 
representatives  of  the  Christian  powers.  Perhaps  he  had 
doubts  as  to  their  Christianity.  Ambassadors  were  to  be 
appointed  in  addition,  of  "civiHzed  nations",  which  might 
care  to  send  them.  He  did  not  prescribe  "the  proper 
place."  Th_e  Czar  of  all  the  Russias  did  that  forty-eig-ht 
years  later,  m"ic:^98.  Ijowever  many  ambassadors  or  rep- 
resentatives a  nation  might  send,  it  would  only  have  one 
vote.  They  therefore  were  to  meet  on  a  plane  of  equality. 
They  would  discuss  measures,  and  only  such  were  to  be 
adopted  as  all  the  nations  should  agree  to,  and  those  States 
only  were  to  be  bound  which  should  subsequently  ratify 
them.     Certain  subjects  were  not  to  be  discussed. 

"The  Congress  of  Nations  is  to  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  internal  affairs  of  nations,  or  with  insurrections, 
revolutions,  or  contending  factions  of  people  or  princes, 
or  with  forms  of  government,  but  solely  to  concern  them- 
selves with  the  intercourse  of  nations  in  peace  and  war."^ 
What  measures  were  to  be  discussed  ?  Mr.  Ladd  did  not 
leave  his  readers  in  doubt,  and  it  will  be  obvious  to  you 
that  he  outlined  the  program  of  the  two  Hague  Confer- 
ences. 

The  purpose  of  the  conference  was  to  settle  "the  prin- 
ciples of  international  law  by  compact  and  agreement,  of 
the  nature  of  a  mutual  treaty,  and  also  of  devising  and 
promoting  plans  for  the  preservation  of  peace,  and  amelio- 
rating the  condition  of  man."^    Here  is  his  program  : 

1.     To  define  the  rights  of  belligerents  towards  each 


William  Ladd,  An  Essay  on  a  Congress  of  Nations  for  the  Adjust- 
ment of  International  Disf>ntes  Without  Resort  to  Arms,  1840,  Edi- 
tion of  1916,  New  York,  p.  57. 

'Ibid,  Advertisement,  p.  xlix. 


120  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

other;  and  endeavor,  as  much  as  possible,  to  abate  the 
horrors  of  war,  lessen  its  frequency,  and  promote  its 
termination. 

2.  To  settle  the  rights  of  neutrals,  and  thus  abate 
the  evils  which  war  inflicts  on  those  nations  that  are 
desirous  of  remaining  in  peace. 

3.  To  agree  on  measures  of  utility  to  mankind  in  a 
state  of  peace;  and 

4.  To  organize  a  Court  of  Nations.  These  are  the 
four  great  divisions  of  the  labors  of  the  proposed  Con- 
gress of  Nations.^ 

>^  IX. 

THE  HAGUE  CONFERENCES 

The  first  of  these  congresses,  called  The  Plague  Con- 
ference, met  in  1899,  in  a  time  of  profound  peace,  and  did 
settle  some  of  the  principles  of  the  law  of  nations  "by  com- 
pact and  agreement,  of  the  nature  of  a  mutual  treaty". 
It  expressed  itself  strongly  and  unequivocally  in  favor  of 
arbitration  for  the  settlement  of  disputes,  and  it  created 
the  so-called  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration,  w^hich  is  in 
reality  a  list  or  panel  of  judges,  from  which  a  special  tri- 
bunal or  commission  can  be  appointed,  whenever  States  in 
dispute  may  be  wise  enough  to  lay  their  disputes  before 
judges  of  their  own  choice,  for  the  decision  of  their  con- 
troversies upon  the  basis  of  respect  for  law. 

The  second  of  the  Conferences  met  at  The  Hague  in 
1907,  and  attempted  in  accordance  with  Mr.  Ladd's 
fourth  division,  "to  organize  a  Court  of.  Nations."  The 
Court  was  not  made,  but  progress  w^as.  A  draft  conven- 
tion for  the  so-called  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice  w^as  adop- 
ted by  the  Conference,  with  their  recommendation  to  the 
Powers  to  agree  upon  a  method  of  appointing  the  judges, 
and  thus  constitute  it. 

A  Committee  of  Jurists  met  at  The  Hague  the  sum- 
mer of  1920  to  do  this.     The  Council  of  the  League  of 

^Essay  on  a  Congress  of  Nations,  pp.  10-11. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  121 

Nations  adopted  their  project  with  shght  modifications,  on 
October,  27th  1920,  and  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of 
Nations  adopted  the  project,  with  some  changes  on 
December  13,  1920.  By  rejecting  the  principle  of  com- 
pulsory jurisdiction,  they"  reverted  practically  to  the 
proposed  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice  of  1907. 

In  one  respect,  this  is  to  be  regretted,  as  the  Court  of 
the  Nations  might  have  been  constituted  like  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  in  which  State  may  sue  State 
without  a  special  agreement  to  the  question  in  dispute 
which  is  often  difficult  to  frame.  It  is  unfortunate,  like- 
wise, that  a  nation  can  not,  as  a  State  of  the  American 
Union  can,  sue  a  State  and  obtain  a  judgment  against  the 
defendant  even  though  it  does  not  appear  and  answer. 

However,  the  first  step  was  taken  in  1907,  and  our 
French  friends  tell  us  that  "It  is  only  the  first  step  that 
counts".  A  second  step  was  taken  in  1920,  and  a  very 
long  one,  for  an  agreement  was  reached  in  the  Advisory 
Committee  and  approved  by  the  Council  and  the  Assem- 
bly of  the  League  of  Nations,  upon  an  acceptable  method 
of  appointing  the  judges.  Many  a  step  remains  to  be 
taken  to  supply  law  for  the  Court  and  to  enlarge  its  juris- 
diction. But  peace  can  only  result  in  this  practical  world 
of  ours,  from  an  infinite  series  of  little  steps.  The  na- 
tions are  unwilling  to  make  a  leap  in  the  dark.  They  fear, 
as  do  the  sensible  people  of  which  they  are  composed, 
to  fall  in  the  ditch.  Many  conferences  of  the  nations 
must  be  called  to  meet  to  take  these  steps.  A  third  of 
The  Hague  series  was  due  in  191 5 — that  is  to  say,  eight 
years  after  the  adjournment  of  the  Second,  in  1907,  as 
the  nations  had  agreed  to  a  third  at  approximately  this 
time.     But  the  war  came  instead. 

Will  further  conferences  take  place?  If  so,  when 
and  what  will  be  their  general  program?  The  Advisory 
Committee  of  Jurists  that  drafted  the  Court  project  at 
The  Hague  last  summer,  unanimously  recommended  a 
series  of  conferences  to  be  called  "Conferences  for  the 
Advancement  of  International  Law",  to  meet  as  succes- 


122  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

sors  to  the  first  two  Hague  Conferences,  at  stated  times, 
to  continue  the  work  left  unfinished;  and  the  Committee 
recommended  further  that  the  first  of  the  series  be  held 
as  soon  as  practicable  for  the  purposes  which  they  were 
bold  enough  to  state  as  follows : 

1.  To  restate  the  established  rules  of  international 
law,  especially,  and  in  the  first  instance,  in  the  fields 
affected  by  the  events  of  the  recent  war. 

2.  To  formulate  and  agree  upon  the  amendments 
and  additions,  if  any,  to  the  rules  of  international  law 
shown  to  be  necessary  or  useful  by  the  events  of  the 
war  and  the  changes  in  the  conditions  of  international 
life  and  intercourse  which  have  followed  the  war. 

3.  To  endeavor  to  reconcile  divergent  views  and 
secure  general  agreement  upon  the  rules  which  have 
been  in  dispute  heretofore. 

4.  To  consider  the  subjects  not  now  adequately 
regulated  by  international  law,  but  as  to  which  the 
interests  of  international  justice  require  that  rules  of 
law  shall  be  declared  and  accepted. 

If  the  world  wants  these  conferences  to  meet  at  stated 
periods  to  take  up  the  work  of  the  world  interrupted  by 
the  war  and  where  the  war  left  it,  they  may  do  so. 

In  1787,  our  own  Benjamin  Franklin  wrote  to  a  friend 
in  Europe : 

I  send  you  enclos'd  the  propos'd  new  Federal 
Constitution  for  these  States.  I  was  engag'd  4  Months 
of  the  last  Summer  in  the  Convention  that  form'd  it. 
It  is  now  sent  by  Congress  to  the  several  States  for 
their  Confirmation.  If  it  succeeds,  I  do  not  see  why 
you  might  not  in  Europe  carry  the  Project  of  good 
Henry  the  4th  into  Execution,  by  forming  a  Federal 
Union  and  One  Grand  Republick  of  all  its  different 
States  &  Kingdoms;  by  means  of  a  like  Convention; 
for  we  had  many  Interests  to  reconcile.^ 
We  are  inclined  to  dwell  upon  our  rights,  at  the  ex- 
pense of  our  duties,  which,  however,  our  neighbors  do  not 

'Letter   of    Benjamin    Franklin    to   Mr.    Grand,    October   22,    1787. 
Documentary  History  of  the  Constitution,  Vol.  IV.,  pp.  341-342. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  123 

always  overlook.  Nations  which  are  made  up  of  the  same 
men  and  women,  more  or  less  artificially  grouped,  are 
likewise  inclined  to  look  upon  their  rights  as  free,  sover- 
eign, and  independent  States.  We  must  not,  however, 
deceive  ourselves.  We  have  rights,  but  they  are  use- 
less unless  it  be  the  duty  of  others  to  recognize  and  re- 
spect them;  otherwise,  we  would  live  in  a  state  of  an- 
archy. It  is  the  same  with  nations,  and  for  the  same 
reasons.  Therefore,  a  problem  of  the  new  diplomacy  is 
to  devise  some  form  of  organization, — call  it  a  society,  an 
association,  or  a  league  of  nations,  if  you  please — which, 
while  recognizing  the  right  of  nations,  and  safeguarding 
them,  shall  at  the  same  time,  state  the  duties  of  nation 
to  nation,  to  the  end  that  we  may  live  in  an  ordered  world 
— ordered,  be  it  said,  not  from  above,  not  from  below, 
but  by  the  States  themselves,  in  the  exercise  of  their  free- 
dom, sovereignty,  and  independence. 

Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  reach  this  goal ; 
by  men  of  vision,  whom  the  world  calls  dreamers ;  by 
statesmen  usually  out  of  office  and  spending  the  rem- 
nant of  their  days  in  dignified  retirement;  latterly,  by 
hard-headed  men  of  affairs,  with  the  vision  of  the  dream- 
er, but  without  the  experience  of  the  statesmen.  Persons 
interested  in  this  sort  of  thing  are  familiar  with  the 
"great  design  of  Henry  IV",  devised  by  his  great  Minis- 
ter, Sully,  living  in  retirement  after  his  master's  death; 
with  Penn's  "Plan  of  a  European  Diet"  at  the  close  of 
the  seventeenth  century,  by  which  the  forces  of  the  mem- 
bers were  to  be  united  in  one  strength,  and  to  be  used 
against  the  recalcitrant  bent  upon  breaking  the  peace; 
with  the  project  of  the  good  Abbe  de  Saint-Pierre,  in  the 
first  quarter  of  the  eighteenth  century,  which  he,  like  Sul- 
ly, foisted  upon  Henry  IV,  and  which  is  a  tractate  on 
perpetual  peace,  which  he  sought  to  usher  into  a  war- 
ridden  world ;  with  Kant's  "Perpetual  Peace",  appearing 
during  the  French  Revolution  and  during  the  last  dec- 
ade of  the  eighteenth  century,  advocating  republican,  that 
is,  constitutional  or  representative  government;  with  the 


124  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

Holy  Alliance  of  Alexander  I  of  Russia,  proposing  a 
League  of  Nations,  the  members  of  which  were  to  be 
kept  in  order  by  armed  force ;  and  with  the  more  modest 
proposals  of  The  Hague  Conferences,  by  which  the  na- 
tions regarded  themselves  as  forming  a  society  to  be  gov- 
erned by  justice  and  equity,  recorded  in  instruments  nego- 
tiated by  them,  and  to  be  applied  in  their  mutual  inter- 
course. These  projects,  however  much  they  differ,  have 
one  point  in  common;  that  all  provide  for  a  union  of 
States,  with  duties  as  well  as  rights. 

But  I  do  not  intend  to  speak  of  these  projects  or  any  of 
them.  I  would  crave  your  indulgence  for  some  closing 
remarks  upon  the  one  Union  of  States,  extending  over  a 
vast  area,  controlling  the  actions  of  multitudes  of  men 
and  women  which,  surviving  its  framers  and  standing  the 
test  of  time,  may  profitably  be  considered  when  questions 
of  international  organization  are  discussed. 


X. 

THE  UNITED   STATES  AS  AN   EXEMPLIFICATION   OF  INTER- 
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION 

Thirteen  British  colonies  of  North  America,  from  New 
Hampshire  on  the  North,  to  Georgia  on  the  South,  de- 
clared, on  July  4,  1776,  their  independence  by  deputies 
duly  authorized  thereto  and  representing  them  at  the  time 
in  that  distinguished  Revolutionary  body  known  as  The 
Continental  Congress,  then  in  session  at  Philadelphia. 
Heretofore,  they  had  been  colonies,  and  called  themselves 
such ;  hereafter,  they  were  States,  and  called  themselves 
such.  They  were  united,  some  say,  in  1774,  by  the  Ar- 
ticles of  Association — others  that  they  were  united  by  the 
Declaration  of  Independence.  The  purpose,  however,  for 
which  they  were  united  was  to  secure  under  the  Articles 
of  Association  a  redress  of  grievances ;  under  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence,  a  recognition  of  their  independence 
by  the  mother-country.     The  union  was  temporary.     It 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  125 

was  not  satisfactory.  They  felt  that  they  needed  to  be  ( 
drawn  together  closer  and  upon  a  permanent  basis.  There- 
fore, a  Committee  of  Congress  drafted  Articles  of  As- 
sociation for  a  league  of  friendship,  permanent  in  its  na- 
ture, which  they  called  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  and 
in  the  second  article  the  States  declared  themselves  to  be, 
"sovereign,  free  and  independent",  and  possessed  of  every 
power  which  they  did  not  expressly  grant  to  the  United 
States  in  Congress  assembled. 

The  important  point  to  bear  in  mind  is  that  these  States  ^  - 
thought  themselves  to  be  free,  sovereign  and  independent,  \ 
and  therefore,  they  stated  themselves  to  be  such.  The  Ar- 
ticles of  Confederation  bound  each  State  only  from  the 
date  of  its  approval.  The  last  of  the  thirteen  States  ap- 
proved of  them  on  March  i,  1781,  from  which  date  there 
was  a  union  in  law,  as  well  as  in  fact,  of  the  thirteen 
American  States. 

The  union,  however,  had  many  grave  defects,  the  chief 
one  being  that  it  did  not  work,  or  at  least  that  it  did  not 
work  to  their  satisfaction.  The  farsighted  among  them 
therefore  proposed  a  more  perfect  union.  And  what  was 
this  to  consist?  Of  States,  in  place  of  the  less  perfect 
union  of  States. 

For  this  purpose  each  of  the  States,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Rhode  Island,  which  abstained  in  the  exercise  of 
its  sovereignty,  freedom  and  independence,  sent  delegates 
to  meet  other  delegates  of  the  States  of  this  imperfect 
union,  in  order  to  make  the  Articles  of  Confederation  ade- 
quate for  the  exigencies  of  the  Union.  They  were  to 
have  met  on  the  second  Monday  in  May,  in  Philadelphia. 
A  majority  of  the  States  were  not  represented  until  the 
25th,  when  they  met.  The  delegates  were  appointed  by 
the  legislatures  of  the  different  States;  they  acted  under 
instructions  from  their  respective  States.  Their  first  act 
was  to  elect  a  Chairman,  one  George  Washington.  Dele- 
gate from  Virginia,  and  a  Secretary.  They  thereupon 
proceeded  to  examine  the  credentials  of  the  different  mem- 
bers, in  order  to  see  that  they  were  entit^kd  to  represent 


126  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

their  States  for  the  purpose  in  mind.  Little  by  Httle, 
the  Deleg-ates  of  all  the  States  arrived,  with  the  exception 
of  Rhode  Island.  Twelve  States  were  therefore  repre- 
sented. The  Conference,  called  the  Federal  Convention, 
adjourned  on  September  17,  1787,  having  drafted  the  Ar- 
ticles of  Union  which  we  call  the  Constitution  of  the  Uni- 
ted States. 

The  Delegates  of  this  memorable  assembly  apparently 
had  trouble  with  the  Preamble,  inasmuch  as  only  twelve 
of  the  thirteen  States  were  represented,  and  feared  that 
some  of  the  States  might  not  ratify  the  instrument,  for 
it  was  to  be  presented  to  each  of  the  States  to  be  consid- 
ered by  a  convention  in  each  of  the  States,  specially  called 
for  that  purpose. 

The  Constitution  had  made  the  ratification  of  nine  States 
necessary  for  the  government  thereunder  to  go  into  ef- 
fect— not  for  all  of  the  States,  but  merely  for  the  nine 
or  more  which  might  have  ratified  it.  Two  held  out,  and 
were  therefore  foreign  States.  One  of  these,  North  Caro- 
lina, came  in  in  1789.     Rhode  Island  toddled  in  in  1790. 

How  was  the  Preamble  to  begin?  All  the  drafts  save 
the  last  reported  by  the  Committee  on  Style,  on  Septem- 
br  12,  began  with  "We  the  People  of  the  States  of  New 
Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island",  etc.,  down  to 
and  including  Georgia.  That  is  to  say,  they  enumerated 
the  thirteen  States,  beginning  with  the  most  northern  and 
ending  with  the  most  southern.  Should  the  thirteen  be 
included,  when  only  nine  might  ratify,  and  when,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  two  out  of  the  thirteen  did  not,  until  after 
the  Constitution  and  the  government  under  it  went  into  ef- 
fect? Some  clever  draftsman,  probably  Gouverneur  Mor- 
ris, who  was  a  member  of  the  Committee  of  Style  and 
Arrangement,  and  to  whose  facile  pen  the  excellent  liter- 
ary style  of  the  instrument  is  accredited,  solved  the  diffi- 
culty by  striking  out  all  the  names  of  the  States,  and  ( 
inserting,  "United"  before  "States",  so  that  the  Const!-  I 
tution,  instead  of  reading,  "We  the  People  of  the  States 
of  New  Hampshire",  etc.,  read  now,  reads  and  ever  will 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  127 

read,  "We  the  People  of  the  United  States".  We  should 
not,  however,  overlook  the  fact  that  it  was  the  people  of 
the  States;  it  was  the  people  of  each  of  the  States  that 
ratified  the  Constitution;  it  is  the  people  of  each  of  the 
States  that  elect  the  members  of  the  Senate  and  the  House 
of  Representatives,  and  it  is  the  electors  chosen  by  the 
people  within  each  of  the  States  who  elect  the  President 
of  these  United  States. 

As  that  Prince  of  Jurists,  the  great  Chief  Justice  Mar- 
shall, said  in  one  of  his  greatest  cases,  decided  in  1819:^ 

No  political  dreamer  was  ever  wild  enough  to  think 
of  breaking  down  the  lines  which  separate  the  States, 
and  of  compounding  the  American  people  into  one 
common  mass.  Of  consequence,  when  they  act,  they 
act  in  their  States. 

Because  of  this,  their  experience  is  valuable  to  people 
of  foreign  States,  who  also  act,  when  they  act,  within  their 
States.  Each  State  of  the  American  Union  has  two  Con- 
stitutions. One  is  local,  dealing  with  those  matters  that  , 
begin  and  end  within  the  boundaries  of  the  State.  It  1 
may  be  amended  whenever  the  people  so  desire.  The  sec-  1 
ond  Constitution  is  not  local,  but  general.  It  deals  with  ' 
matters  that  may  begin  within  a  State,  and  extend  be- 
yond it,  or  which  arise  without  the  States,  and  yet  affect 
them,  as  in  the  case  of  foreign  affairs.  This  constitution 
is  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  ratified  by  each 
of  the  States,  and  declared  by  Article  6,  Section  2,  thereof, 
to  be  the  supreme  law  of  each  of  the  States.  It  cannot 
be  amended  or  modified,  or  varied  by  any  State.  They 
adopted  the  Constitution  as  a  whole.  Article  5  of  which 
provides  that  amendments  to  the  Constitution,  to  be 
effective,  must  be  "ratified  by  the  Legislators  of  three- 
fourths  of  the  several  States,  or  by  Conventions  in  three- 
fqurths  thereof."  The  Constitution  is  not,  therefore,  to  be 
like  the  law  of  the  Medes  and  the  Persians.  It  changes 
with  the  changing  moods  of  three-fourths  of  the  States. 


^McCuUough  v.  Maryland,  4  Wheaton,  316,  403. 


128  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

The  States  created  the  government  of  the  United  States 
as  their  agent  for  the  purposes  which  they  stated  expressly 
or  by  necessary  implication,  and  for  none  others.  Addi- 
tional powers  may  be  added  by  amendment.  The  Legisla- 
tive branch,  consisting  of  a  Senate  and  a  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives, has  certain  specified  powers;  the  Executive 
branch,  whereof  the  President  is  the  head,  has  prescribed 
duties ;  the  Judicial  branch,  of  which  the  Supreme  Court 
is  the  head,  has  certain  jurisdiction.  Any  group  of  for- 
eign States  wishing  to  follow  the  example  of  the  Ameri- 
can states  can.  They  do  not  need  to  confide  so  many 
powers  upon  the  government  of  their  creating  unless  they 
want  to  do  so.  But  there  are  two  things  of  fundamental 
importance  which  they  should  do,  if  they  want  their  union 
to  outlive  its  makers :  they  should  eliminate  the  question 
of  large  and  small  States,  as  the  wise  men  of  the  Federal 
Convention  did,  by  providing  that  one  of  the  chambers, 
which  we  call  the  Senate,  should  represent  the  States 
equally,  and  that  a  second  chamber,  which  we  call  the 
House  of  Representatives,  should  represent  the  States 
according  to  population.  In  this  way,  each  branch  would 
have  a  veto  upon  the  abuse  of  power  by  the  other,  and  by 
means  of  a  conference  committee  between  the  two  houses, 
there  would  be  passed  under  the  pressure  of  public  opin- 
ion such  legislation  as  was  needed. 

The  second  requisite  is  that  to  the  extent  of  its  granted 
powers,  the  government  of  the  Union  should  act  upon  each 
member  of  the  State.  States  cannot  act  themselves,  they 
must  act  by  agents.  An  agent  attempting  to  do  an  act 
contrary  to  the  fundamental  law  can  be  restrained.  As 
the  act,  therefore,  is  not  committed  by  the  State,  but  by 
an  individual,  the  State  is  not  involved,  merely  the  person 
claiming  authority  which  he  does  not  possess,  whether 
that  be  under  the  statute  of  a  State  in  conflict  with  the 
act  of  Union,  or  due  to  a  false  interpretation  of  the  act 
of  Union.  This  simple  principle,  new  in  political  science, 
when  it  was  devised  by  the  wise  men  of  the  Federal  Con- 
vention,   has   made    it  unnecessary  to  coerce  sovereign 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  129 

States,  which  the  wisest  of  that  assembly,  Messrs.  Mason 
and  Madison,  Hamilton  and  Ellsworth,  knew  was  impos- 
sible, and  said  so  both  in  and  out  of  Convention. 

To  interpret  the  Act  of  Union  and,  in  so  doing,  to  assure 
to  the  government  of  the  Union  its  full  rights,  to  protect 
the  States  of  the  Union  in  the  exercise  of  their  rights,  and 
to  define  the  duties  of  each,  in  their  appropriate  spheres, 
we  have  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

The  nations  have  made  a  beginning.  We  are  familiar 
with  conferences  at  The  Hague.  They  can  meet  at  stated 
intervals,  submitting  their  acts  to  each  nation  for  rati- 
fication, and  binding  only  those  that  so  ratify.  This  would 
prove  itself  to  be  in  the  course  of  time  no  mean  legisla- 
ture. A  committee  appointed  by  the  nations  might  act 
in  the  interval  of  the  conference,  and  exercise  such  powers 
with  which  the  nations  in  conference  should  vest  it.  A 
Court  of  the  Nations  could  be  created,  indeed,  it  ap- 
parently has  been  created  by  act  of  the  Assembly  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  on  the  13th  day  of  December,  1920. 

If  Europe  should  wish  to  follow  Dr.  Franklin's  advice, 
the  way  is  still  open.  Should  all  the  nations  wish  to  fol- 
low in  the  footsteps  of  the  conferences  which  have  met  at 
The  Hague,  and,  without  creating  a  close  union,  organ- 
ize the  world  upon  the  basis  of  justice  and  the  rules  of  law, 
this  can  also  be  done. 

In  either  event,  the  experience  of  the  United  States  will 
be  helpful.  For  this  country  of  ours  was  founded,  as 
James  Russell  Lowell  has  so  beautifully  said,  "By  men 
with  empires  in  their  brains." 

JAMES  BROWN  SCOTT. 


Economic    Factors  in   International 

Relations 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  IN  INTERNATIONAL 

RELATIONS 

I. 

ECONOMICS   AND    POLITICS 

Of  our  domestic  issues  perhaps  eight  out  of  ten  are  dis- 
tinctly economic  in  character.  Likewise,  in  our  interna- 
tional relations  the  proportion  is  probably  as  great.  Eco- 
nomic forces  directly  affect  the  course  of  trade  between 
different  peoples,  the  intercourse  of  their  governments  and 
the  activities  of  their  consular  and  diplomatic  representa- 
tives. The  very  fact  that  a  country  becomes  commercially 
great  in  itself  creates  wider  and  more  important  relations 
with  the  rest  of  the  world,  in  the  management  of  which  the 
best  trained  economic  minds  are  constantly  needed. 

It  was  economic  development,  a  growth  of  wealth  and 
commerce,  that  brought  Venice  to  leadership  in  the  Medi- 
terranean. "He  hath  an  argosy  hound  to  Tripolis,"  said 
Shylock,  "another  to  the  Indies;  I  understand,  moreover, 
upon  the  Rialto  he  hath  a  third  at  Mexico,  a  fourth  for 
England."  This  international  character  of  her  trade  and 
the  diversity  of  the  world's  coins  which  poured  mto  her 
markets  directly  forced  the  solution  of  a  common  means  of 
payment  and  the  first  issue  of  notes  by  the  Bank  of  Venice. 
It  was  the  hunt  for  wealth  and  the  precious  metals  which 
sent  Columbus  adventuring  to  the  New  World.  The  con- 
sequent stream  of  silver  from  America  and  its  effect  on 
Europe  during  the  reign  of  Charles  V.  set  in  train  the 
theory  of  a  favorable  or  unfavorable  balance  of  trade  (de- 
pending on  whether  or  not  a  country  maintained  an  excess 
of  imports  in  specie),  the  error  of  which  has  not  disap- 
peared even  to  this  day.  Then,  again,  international  con- 
tacts were  made  by  the  Hanseatic  League,  with  its  seat 

133 


134  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

at  Liibeck;  and  later  the  wide-flung  fleets  of  the  Dutch 
brought  new  international  relations,  especially  with  Eng- 
land. In  recent  years,  the  most  prominent  example  of  all' 
has  been  the  extension  of  British  economic  relations  with 
every  country  in  the  world.  So  that,  at  least  as  one  of  the 
reasons,  diplomatic  missions  to  the  Court  of  St.  James 
become  of  the  most  conspicuous  importance — that  is,  when 
we  are  not  considering  mere  social  relations.  Why  is  it 
that  contracts  and  bills  of  exchange  all  over  the  world, 
in  every  port  of  the  distant  seas,  have  been  drawn  in  terms 
of  pounds  sterling?  The  most  casual  observation  thus 
shows  us  how  economic  forces  function  in  endless  variety 
between  nations. 

Indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  mere  adroit  politician 
and  bargainer,  even  though  trained  in  the  formal  diplo- 
matic conventions,  can  properly  handle  the  issues  con- 
stantly arising  out  of  the  increasingly  economic  character 
of  international  forces.  Either  he  must  be  economically 
competent,  or  he  must  rely  on  the  so-called  "expert"  on 
subjects  in  which  he  may  easily  be  deceived.  With  the 
yearly  expansion  of  industry  and  wealth,  of  rapid  means 
of  communication  and  transport,  these  economic  mat- 
ters push  to  the  fore  with  such  dominating  persistence 
that  they  will  not  be  denied. 

We  have  a  striking  illustration  in  point  at  the  present 
moment  in  the  difficulty  of  settling  on  the  amount  of  the 
reparation  to  be  paid  by  Germany  to  the  Allies.  In  the 
beginning  of  the  discussions  at  Paris  as  to  what  could  be 
exacted  from  the  defeated  enemy,  a  grave  error  was  com- 
mitted by  attempting  to  fix  the  amount  by  reference  to 
Germany's  wealth  and  income.  As  a  consequence  very 
exaggerated  sums  became  possible  to  the  imagination  of 
the  victors.  French  financial  policy  was  seriously  affected 
by  false  expectations ;  and  Lloyd  George  went  to  his  elec- 
torate in  the  memorable  election  of  December,  1918, 
promising  them  indemnity  for  the  largest  part  of  British 
war  expenditures.  The  report  by  the  economic  section, 
however,  showed  conclusively  that  the  sum  must  bear  direct 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  135 

relation  not  to  statistics  of  wealth  but  only  to  Germany's 
producing-  power.  It  is  obvious  that  a  proportional  part 
of  German  wealth  in  the  form  of  mines,  furnaces,  mills  or 
farms  could  not  be  handed  over  as  reparation.  There 
could  be  taken  only  a  part  of  the  output  from  these  and 
other  productive  sources.  Nor  could  she  pay  in  this  out- 
put of  goods  unless  she  could  get  the  cotton,  copper,  rub- 
ber, and  like  materials  to  be  used  in  her  productive 
processes.  Eggs  cannot  be  laid  if  hens  are  cut  off  from 
food.  On  the  settlement  of  this  matter  of  the  German 
reparation  and  the  removal  of  the  uncertainty  attached  to 
it  hangs  much  of  the  economic  readjustment  of  Europe; 
and  the  solution  would  directly  affect  the  foreign  ex- 
changes and  our  own  industrial  recovery.  The  insistency 
of  an  economic  understanding  of  the  most  pressing  and 
practical  international  question  today  is  only  too  painfully 
evident.^ 

II. 

MOVEMENTS  OF  POPULATION 

When  we  seek  the  fundamental  economic  forces  under- 
lying our  necessary  mtematio-naFrelafions  we  come  first 
tothe^rnovements  of  population.  These  are  primary 
causes  of  international  reaction.  Impelled  by  the  pressure 
of  numbers  on  subsistence  there  were  the  early  incursions 
of  the  Goths  and  Vandals  over  eastern  and  southern 
Europe  and  the  surge  of  the  northern  Teutons  over  Ger- 
many, France  and  Spain.  But  in  modern  days,  questions 
of  immigration  and  emigration  touch  very  sensitive  inter- 
national nerves.  These  are  so  numerous  and  so  obvious 
that  it  is  not  possible  to  be  exhaustive  in  this  paper.  At 
the  best  we  can  only  hope  to  be  suggestive  in  a  way  to 
stir  reflection  and  open  the  path  to  individual  study.  _ 

One  interesting  form  of  international  relations  arising 


*Cf.  J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace  (\9), 
and  Bernard  Baruch.  There  is  a  review  of  Baruch's  book  by  Keynes 
in  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  Dec.  4,  1920. 


136  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

out  of  immigration  to  the  United  States  from  Italy  and 
its  reaction  on  the  foreign  exchanges  has  appeared  since 
the  European  War.  The  ItaHans  who  have  come  to  the 
United  States  and  to  South  America  have  been  indus- 
trious and  thrifty.  A  part  of  their  savings  have  in  the 
past  been  sent  back  to  Italy.  From  the  United  States  some 
$80,000,000  and  from  Argentina  some  $50,000,000  have 
been  annually  returned  home.  During  the  war  Italy 
placed  an  external  loan  with  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  of  about  $2,500,000,000,  the  interest  on  which, 
at  5  per  cent.,  would  amount  approximately  to  the  sum 
which  she  could  expect  as  a  credit  in  the  international 
account  from  her  emigrants.  That  is,  Italy  needed  to 
import  coal  and  raw  materials  to  keep  her  industries  going 
and  her  workmen  employed.  It  was  vitally  important  for 
a  country  with  a  surplus  of  labor  to  be  able  to  send  emi- 
grants to  other  countries  and  to  receive  back  their  savings, 
especially  in  this  critical  time  of  readjustment.  But  at  the 
present  time,  either  as  a  protection  against  Bolshevistic 
immigrants,  or  as  a  means  of  reducing  the  competition  for 
employment,  attempts  have  been  made  to  stop  immigra- 
tion for  a  period.  Such  measures,  however,  are  not 
simple  in  their  effect  and  are  certain  to  complicate  our 
international  relations. 

One  other  case  may  be  mentioned  wherein  the  ques- 
tion of  immigration  has  created  at  this  very  time  a  diffi- 
cult international  situation.  Inter-racial  problems  have 
been  introduced  by  the  coming  of  the  Japanese,  Chinese 
and  Hindo  immigrants  to  the  Pacific  Coast.  In  the  pas- 
sage by  California  of  legislation  discriminating  against 
Asiatic  immigrants  in  regard  to  property  and  civil  rights, 
internal  economic  issues  openly  clashed  wnth  our  interna- 
tional relations.^  The  agitation  against  the  Japanese 
laborers  originated  with  the  labor  unions.  Their  purpose 
was  obviously  to  restrict  the  numbers  of  those  who  might 


*Cf.    H.   A.   Millis,    The   Japanese   Problem   in   the    United   States 
(1915)  ;  J.  F.  Steiner,  The  Japanese  Invasion  (1917). 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  137 

compete  with  American  laborers.  It  was  a  contest  be- 
tween economic  standards  of  livin.e;-.  As  contrasted  with 
Americans  the  Japanese  were  superior  in  thrift  and  often 
in  industry  and  patient  agricuhural  skill.  Willing  to  sub- 
sist on  less  and  to  work  harder,  they  excited  the  animosity 
of  those  who  believed  that  when  beaten  in  open  competi- 
tion they  could  protect  their  economic  position  by  legisla- 
tion. The  fundamental  error  in  this  attitude,  quite  too 
common  in  the  policies  of  the  leaders  of  ''organized  labor," 
is  the  supposition  that  employment  is  increased  by  restric- 
tion of  production.  It  is  folly  to  hold  that  there  is  only 
a  limited  amount  of  work  and  that  it  can  be  distributed 
among  a  restricted  monopoly  of  laborers  in  the  form  of 
higher  wages,  for  each.  On  the  contrary,  greater  effi- 
ciency and  lowered  cost  of  production  have  been  proved 
by  long  economic  experience  to  be  the  basis  and  reason 
for  higher  wages.  If  the  Japanese  increase  productive 
efficiency  and  turn  out  more  wealth  at  lowered  costs,  they 
enlarge  the  volume  of  goods,  thereby  increasing  the  mar- 
gin from  which  capital  can  be  saved,  increasing  also  the 
trade  and  commerce  of  the  country,  its  transportation  and 
shipping,  and  inevitably  extending  the  demand  for  labor 
of  all  kinds.  For  temporary  freedom  from  competition 
(which  is,  after  all,  not  real)  the  labor  organizations  are 
willing  to  lose  a  future  gain  arising  from  enlarged  general 
prosperity  and  greater  employment. 

The  statesman,  however,  in  acting  upon  public  ques- 
tions, is  obliged  to  consider  not  only  the  economic,  but  the 
ethical  and  political  elements  of  the  case.  Unfortunately, 
while  the  appeal  to  economics  gives  an  unequivocal  an- 
swer, racial  prejudice  and  selfish  politics  have  entered  into 
the  local  problem  so  as  to  confuse  the  issue.  Moreover, 
under  our  form  of  government,  in  making  treaties  with 
foreign  countries,  the  United  States  cannot  control  the 
action  of  a  State  in  certain  reserved  powers.  Hence  an 
individual  State  on  the  sea  coast  may  greatly  interfere 
with  a  national  foreign  policy.  From  the  Japanese  point 
of  view,  their  direct  opposition  is  to  the  discrimmation 


138  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

as  to  civic  and  property  rights  against  them  which  does  not 
hold  against  other  people.  We  have  allowed  Germans  to 
hold  property  and  obtain  civic  rights  in  our  land.  Why 
not  the  Japanese? 

III. 

FOREIGN  TRADE  AND  SHIPPING 

As  we  enter  further  into  our  subject  we  find  that  the 
immediate  and  inevitable  economic  contact  of  one  country 
with  another  is  through  its  foreign  trade  and  its  shipping. 

From  the  very  beginnings  of  our  national  existence 
equality  of  treatment  between  American  and  foreign  ships 
became  a  burning  issue.  To  meet  the  British  Navigation 
Acts,  we  discriminated  in  1789  in  favor  of  our  ships  by 
tonnage  duties,  and  in  the  same  year  by  customs  duties. 
The  regulations  against  foreign  vessels  in  our  coastwise 
trade  have  been  so  stringent  that  since  181 7  Americans 
have  maintained  a  strict  monopoly  in  that  trade.  In  the 
foreign,  as  contrasted  with  our  coastwise,  shipping,  we 
soon  found  we  could  not  apply  discriminating  treatment  in 
our  favor  without  meeting  with  drastic  retaliation  from 
foreign  countries.  When  our  ships  entered  foreign  ports 
they  were  likewise  met  by  discriminating  duties  against  us. 
The  crass  assumption  that  we  could  sell  without  buying 
was  finally  given  up  about  1830.  It  reappears  now  only 
in  the  occasional  offer  of  a  bill  by  some  callow  statesman 
from  Buncombe  County. 

During  the  Napoleonic  wars  the  Order  in  Council  of 
1793,  the  Blockade  of  1806,  the  Berlin  Decree,  another 
British  Order  in  Council,  and  the  Milan  Decree,  inflicted 
heavy  losses  on  neutral  American  shipping.  Thereupon,/ 
Jefferson,  with  an  exaggerated  conceit  as  to  the  impor- 
tance of  our  commerce  to  European  combatants,  created 
the  Embargo  Act  of  1807,  which  ruined  our  commerce 
but  did  not  prevent  war.  Then  came  the  Non-Intercourse 
Act  ( 1809),  followed  later  by  the  War  of  18 12.  Nor  did 
we  get  the  principle  that  "free  ships  make  free  goods" 
inserted  in  The  Treaty  of  Ghent.     We  tried  the  experi- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  139 

ment  of  extreme  nationalism,  but  without  much  of  the 
gain  that  might  have  arisen  from  a  more  flexible  system 
of  economic  co-operation  with  the  rest  of  the  world. ^ 

On  matters  of  shipping,  the  American  mind  has  re- 
mained largely  provincial  and  unprogressive.  The  whole 
story  is  too  long  to  be  taken  up  here ;  but  it  may  be  per- 
mitted to  present  one  modern  instance  of  the  way  in  which 
our  international  relations  are  at  this  very  moment  being 
shaken  by  questions  involving  our  shipping  policy.  A 
vigorous  chauvinism  on  our  part  has  led  to  an  attitude  on 
Panama  Canal  tolls  for  American  ships  that  is  very  much 
questioned  by  foreign  countries.  Just  as  the  Suez  Canal, 
so  does  the  Panama  Canal  touch  the  shipping  and  com- 
merce of  all  nations.  If  we  wish  equal  treatment  for  our 
ships  passing  through  the  Suez  Canal,  other  commercial 
countries  would  likewise  expect  equal  treatment  for  their 
ships  passing  through  the  Panama  Canal.  In  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  Treaty  (April  19,  1850)  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  it  was  agreed  as  a  matter  of 
course  that  in  any  canal  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
Oceans  "any  rights  or  advantages  in  regard  to  commerce 
or  navigation"  shall  be  offered  "on  the  same  terms  to  the 
citizens  or  subjects  of  the  other"  (Art.  1.)  ;  and  that  "its 
neutrality  shall  be  guaranteed  so  that  the  said  Canal  may 
forever  be  open  and  free"  (Art.  V).  This  convention 
was  superseded  by  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  of  Novem- 
ber 18,  1901.  Following  the  rules  of  the  Suez  Canal  (as 
of  October  28,  1888),  the  United  States  agreed  that  (Art. 
III.,  I): 

""~"  "The  canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of 
commerce  and  of  war  of  all  nations  observing  these 
rules,  on  terms  of  entire  equality,  so  that  there  shall  he 
no  discrimination  against  any  such  nation,  or  its  citi- 
zens or  subjects,  in  respect  of  the  conditions  or  charges 
of  traffic,  or  otherwise. 

On  this  solemn  international  covenant,  the  United  States 


*Coman,  Industrial  History  of  the  United  States  (1910),  Ch.  V.,  VI. 


140  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

was  given  a  free  hand  in  the  construction,  "as  well  as  the 
exclusive  right  of  providing  for  the  regulation  and  man- 
agement of  the  canal"  Art.  II). 

It  will  be  recalled  that  by  our  navigation  laws  only- 
American  ships  were  allowed  in  our  coastwise,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  our  foreign,  trade.  Then,  in  preparation 
for  the  opening  of  the  canal  August  15,  19 14),  Congress 
passed  the  Panama  Canal  Act,  August  24,  1912,  which 
provided  (Sec.  5)  that,  "No  tolls  shall  be  levied  upon  ves- 
sels engaged  in  the  coastwise  trade  of  the  United  States''^ 
Such  a  provision,  of  course,  raised  the  question  whether, 
by  excepting  these  American  ships  from  tolls,  we  had  vio- 
lated our  solemn  agreement  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty 
of  1 901.  Could  it  be  said  that  the  termini  of  the  Panama 
Canal  were  coastwise  ports  of  the  United  States?  Evi- 
dently not,  for  foreign  ships  were  admitted.  On  what 
grounds  could  we  justify  the  exemption?  Whatever  the 
basis,  this  exemption  was  repealed  by  Congress  in  the  Act 
of  June  15,  1914.  Senator  Elihu  Root's  speech  (63d 
Cong.)  showing  that  we  were  morally  bound  to  repeal 
this  exemption  will  remain  one  of  the  remarkable  pro- 
nouncements in  a  very  exciting  debate.  The  repeal  went 
through  by  the  influence  of  President  Wilson  (in  spite  of 
the  Baltimore  platform)  in  favor  of  freer  trade.  At  this 
period,  also  (August  18,  1914),  an  Act  was  passed  to 
encourage  the  regisration  of  foreign-built  vessels  under 
the  American  flag  by  suspending  the  age  of  vessels  (five 
years)  applying  for  registry,  and  other  restrictions  as  to 
nationality  of  officers,  survey,  inspection  and  meas- 
urement. 

We  know  that  President  Harding,  while  President- 
elect, visited  the  Panama  Canal  with  the  purpose  (if  cor- 
rectly reported)  of  recommending  the  restoration  of  the 
exemption,  which  was  mentioned  in  the  Republican  plat- 
form. The  position  of  Mr.  Harding  is  evidently  that  of 
the  protectionists  who  have  long  worked  to  eliminate 
foreign  competition  both  in  ship  building  and  in  ship  oper- 
ation.    The  presence  of  this  matter  in  the  platform  was 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  141 

not  to  satisfy  any  hostility  to  Great  Britain,  but  to  give 
cheaper  rates  to  the  lumber  industry  and  a  few  other  inter- 
ests on  the  Pacific  Coast.  Very  few  members  of  the  com- 
mittee on  resolutions  at  the  Republican  convention  knew 
this  plank  was  in  the  platform.  In  order  to  give  an  ad- 
vantage to  certain  Pacific  Coast  interests,  at  the  expense  of 
others  in  the  Mississippi  Valley,  on  the  general  theory  of 
protection,  a  domestic  economic  question  has  been  allowed 
to  create  an  embarrassing  policy  inconsistent  with  our 
treaty  relations  with  Great  Britain. 

Now  that  the  end  of  the  war-stimulation  of  ship  build- 
ing is  past,  and  a  surplus  of  ships  is  lying  idle  in  our  ports 
as  well  as  in  many  ports  throughout  the  world,  we  are 
likely  to  hear  more  of  the  protectionist  measures  to  aid 
shipping  by  subsidies  and  bounties,^  which  have  hitherto 
been  repudiated  by  American  voters. 

IV 

ECONOMIC  POSTULATES  OF  FOREIGN  TRADE 

The  very  existence  of  foreign  trade  between  nations 
arises  from  fundamental  economic  principles.  One  of 
the  earliest  developments  in  industry  was  the  recognition 
of  the  advantages  flowing  from  division  of  labor,  which, 
of  course,  are  familiar  to  you  all.  It  was  an  expression 
of  the  need  for  men  to  overcome  the  innate  centrifugal 
tendencies  of  individualism  in  favor  of  co-operation  in 
work,  which  would  result  in  greater  satisfactions  for  less 
effort.  That  one  man,  or  one  group,  should  specialize  and 
gain  skill  in  producing  one  article  or  even  a  certain  part 
of  one  article,  has  enormously  multiplied  the  productive 
power  of  industry  and  added  uncounred  comforts  even  to 
the  poorest  ranks  of  society.  International  trade  is  but  an 
application  of  the  principle  of  division  of  labor  to  the 
wider  industrial  operations  of  different  countries  with  their 

'W.  T.  Dunmore,  Ship  Subsidies  (1907). 


142  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

various  characteristics  of  soil,  climate  and  racial  devel- 
opment. 

There  will  be  no  such  trade  unless  there  is  a  mutual 
gain.  Hence  international  trade  arises  out  of  the  fact 
that  one  country  possesses  a  relative  advantage  in  the  pro- 
duction of  one  commodity  (A)  while  another  country  has 
a  relative  advantage  in  a  different  commodity  (B).  By 
exporting  A  to  pay  for  an  import  of  B  the  first  country 
gains  by  not  having  to  produce  B  in  which  it  has  the  rela- 
tive disadvantage ;  and  the  other  country  gains  conversely 
by  putting  its  productive  effort  into  B,  in  which  it  has  a 
relative  advantage,  and  obtaining  the  imported  commodity 
A  at  the  cost  of  producing  B.  This  operation,  based  on 
reciprocal  advantages  in  some  articles  relatively  to  others 
at  home,  is  what  is  known  as  the  working  of  the  Doctrine^ 
of  Comparative  Costs.  It  is  the  cause  of  the  existence 
of  all  international  trade.  Under  it,  the  vast  exchanges 
of  goods  between  nations  goes  on,  and  the  international 
relations  arising  from  this  commerce  have  become  numer- 
ous and  intricate ;  but  yet  they  must  conform — whether 
we  realize  it  or  not  in  our  daily  transactions — to  the  sim- 
ple economic  principle  just  described.  Any  domestic 
policy  adopted  in  ignorance  of  its  working  is  sure  to  be 
visited  with  inevitable  failure. 

As  usually  happens  in  the  experience  of  both  men  and 
nations  the  definite  and  unequivocal  results  of  purely  eco- 
nomic forces  are  not  allowed  to  take  place  unhindered  by 
the  interference  of  selfish,  private  or  nationalistic  inter- 
ests. The  reciprocal  gains  from  international  trade  are 
fully  reaped  only  when  no  obstacles  are  introduced  to 
check  the  free  movement  of  goods  between  countries.  But 
tariffs  on  the  importation  of  foreign  goods,  export  duties 
on  home  products,  restrictions  on  the  movements  of  the 
precious  metals  used  in  settling  international  balances — 
to  say  nothing  of  resolutions  and  actual  warfare — all 
work  to  reduce  the  mutual  gains  naturally  issuing  from 
foreign  trade.  There  comes  a  conflict  between  economic 
forces  and  those  of  a  nationalistic,  political,  or  racial  char- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  143 

acter.  In  the  long  run  economic  forces  assert  themselves, 
but  for  the  time  being  there  is  usually  a  perturbation  due 
to  the  conflict  of  these  forces.  As  a  consequence  interna- 
tional relations  are  in  a  constant  state  of  unrest,  requir- 
ing of  those  in  charge  of  foreign  affairs  a  penetrating  eco- 
nomic insight. 

For  instance,  the  moment  the  United  States  Congress 
takes  up  the  question  of  imposing  protective  tariffs  on  the 
products  of  Argentine  seeking  a  market  here,  a  serious 
conflict  of  interests  arises.  If  one  of  our  industries  wishes 
to  shut  out  competition  from  an  exporter  in  Argentine, 
then  an  Argentinian  firm  in  another  industry  has  a  basis 
for  asking  his  country  to  keep  out  an  American  commodity 
by  import  duties.  There  can  be  no  economic  or  interna- 
tional gain  by  such  retaliation.  It  cuts  directly  at  the 
operation  of  the  principle  of  comparative  costs.  If  we  do 
not  admit  the  goods  of  other  countries  in  which  they  have 
an  advantage  they  cannot  pay  for  our  exports  to  them. 
No  country  can  expect  to  sell  abroad  any  and  all  com- 
modities, and  then,  if  pinched  by  high  costs  in  certain 
goods  in  which  we  are  at  a  relative  disadvantage,  ask  for 
protective  duties  or  subsidies  on  them.  If  costs  are  rela- 
tively high,  that  alone  proves  we  are  employing  our  labor 
and  capital  at  a  disadvantage,  and  to  keep  on  is  kicking 
against  the  pricks.  Therefore,  that  industry,  which  asks 
for  artificial  support  in  protective  duties  under  a  false 
chauvinism  is  working  against  our  national  welfare  as  a 
whole  just  as  much  as  he  who  burns  up  a  warehouse. 
What  he  is  paid  for,  by  insurance  or  by  taxes,  the  country 
as  a  whole  loses. 

At  this  very  time,  also,  politicians,  representing  the  un- 
thinking demands  of  our  farmers,  propose  to  lay  duties 
on  imported  farm  products.  Here  comes  in  the  working 
of  comparative  costs.  We  have  a  relative  advantage  in 
wheat  and  corn  because  of  our  extensive  cultivation  and 
the  liberal  use  of  agricultural  machinery  as  compared  with 
Europe;  but  hemp  and  flax,  for  example,  require  much 
labor  in  intensive  cultivation  and  make  little  use  of  ma- 


144  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

chinery.  Our  farm  labor  yields  more  wheat  and  corn  for 
its  efforts  than  it  does  in  growing  flax  and  hemp.  Hence 
we  import  hemp  and  flax  for  fine  goods,  even  under  protec- 
tive duties.^  Protective  duties  on  wheat  and  corn  would 
be  futile,  because  we  export  them.  Such  duties  would  not 
raise  the  prices  to  our  farmers,  because  they  are  fixed  in 
the  markets  of  the  world,  and  yet  it  is  seriously  proposed 
by  heavy  duties  to  prevent  Canadian  wheat  entering  our 
country.  The  proposal  is  absurd.  Two  rivers  flowing 
side  by  side  into  the  gulf  affect  the  level  of  the  sea  just 
the  same  as  they  would  if  one  river  were  diverted  into  the 
channel  of  the  other  and  poured  out  their  joint  volume 
through  one  mouth.  Canadian  wheat  will  enter  the 
world's  market  by  its  own  channels  and  affect  the  world 
price  just  as  much  as  if  it  travelled  part  of  the  way  on  our 
railways  and  ships. 

Any  producer  of  goods  can  go  on  only  if  he  finds  a 
buyer.  Under  division  of  labor  one  man's  product  is  his 
means  of  buying  the  goods  of  another.  In  our  modern 
industrial  organization  no  industry  can  live  in  and  for 
itself.  It  can  exist  only  by  a  system  of  exchange  of  goods 
one  for  the  other.  That  is,  the  interdependence  of  indus- 
tries one  upon  another  is  the  logical  and  inevitable  con- 
sequence of  that  separation  of  occupations  with  its  inten- 
sive specialization  which  is  the  characteristic  difference  of 
modern  from  primitive  industry.  Successful  and  in- 
creased production  of  desired  goods  by  one  means  an 
increased  effective  demand  for  the  goods  of  all  others. 
The  prosperity  of  the  one  stimulates  prosperity  of  the 
others  in  the  chain  of  exchange;  the  disaster  of  the  one 
brings  loss  to  the  others. 

This  interdependence  of  our  domestic  industries  one 
upon  the  other  holds  quite  as  truly  of  one  commercial 
nation  upon  another.  America  cannot  sell,  if  Europe  and 
foreign  lands  cannot  buy.     Never  was  that  simple  truth 


'Cf.  F.  W.  Taussig,  Tariff  History  of  the  United  States,  4th  Ed., 
pp.  364-409. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  145 

more  evident  than  it  is  today  when  we  look  abroad  over 
the  turbulent  countries  lately  emerging  from  the  World 
War.  Our  products  need  foreign  markets.  In  no  better 
way  can  we  illustrate  the  active  influence  of  economic  fac- 
tors in  our  international  relations  than  by  an  examination 
and  explanation  of  the  present  commercial  and  industrial 
conditions  affecting  our  trade  and  credit  relations  with 
foreign  countries.  We  shall  not  have  to  proceed  far  before 
we  come  to  see  that  the  complicated  political  and  interna- 
tional questions  now  up  for  settlement  by  the  League  of 
Nations  are  entirely  dominated  by  fundamental  economic 
considerations. 

V. 

FOREIGN  EXCHANGE 

In  the  settlement  of  transactions  between  nations  a 
peculiar  language  has  sprung  up  descriptive  of  interna- 
tional payments  naturally  different  from  that  in  use  in  our 
dom.estic  operations ;  but  the  functions  to  which  they  apply 
are  essentially  the  same.  Instead  of  dollars  and  checks 
at  home,  we  hear  in  international  usage  of  pounds,  francs, 
or  crowns  and  bills  of  exchange.  In  our  domestic  trade 
the  values  of  goods  are  offset  against  each  other  by  the 
clearing  of  checks  drawn  on  deposit  accounts ;  but  in  inter- 
national trade  the  instrument  used  is  a  bill  of  exchange, 
[t  keeps  the  international  account  opeivwHiTe"'3eBits  and 
credits  on  all  kinds  of  items  are  allowed  to  be  offset, 
saving  the  transmission  of  gold  on  industrial  transactions, 
and  allowing  its  shipment  only  for  the  settlement  of  bal- 
ances. The  economic  relations  between  different  coun- 
tries at  any  given  time  can  be  read  clearly  in  the  state  of 
the  foreign  exchanges  and  its  rates.  At  the  present  day 
the  working  of  the  market  for  bills  of  exchange  between 
the  United  States  and  Europe  is  a  matter  of  vital  con- 
cern. If  A  sells  coal  to  France  or  Italy,  in  what  is  he  to 
be  paid?  Gold  will  not  be  sent  him.  for  various  reasons 
I  need  not  go  into.    As  compared  with  our  dollar,  francs 


146  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

and  lire  are  now  at  a  very  heavy  discount,  A  has  a  claim, 
say,  for  $10,000,  the  price  of  his  coal.  By  a  bill  of  ex- 
change drawn  on  the  foreign  buyer  he  can  sell  that  claim 
to  a  New  York  bank  dealing  in  foreign  exchange.  That 
number  of  dollars  would  today  be  worth  140,000  to 
170,000  francs  (instead  of  51,800  at  the  pre-war  par). 
To  pay  three  times  as  many  francs  as  before  the  war  for 
the  same  coal,  solely  because  of  the  higher  rate  of  ex- 
change between  francs  and  dollars,  makes  coal  very  high 
to  the  French.  The  same  process  goes  on  for  all  imports 
into  France  or  into  other  countries  whose  exchange  is  at 
a  discount.    Such  a  situation  produces  great  distress. 

If,  however,  a  Frenchman  could  export  to  New  York 
silk  goods  worth  here  $10,000,  he  could  by  a  bill  of  ex- 
change drawn  on  the  American  buyer  sell  his  claim  on 
New  York  to  the  French  buyer  of  coal  and  the  import 
would  be  paid  for  by  the  export.  The  value  of  one  ship- 
ment would  offset  the  other.  Or,  as  generally  explained, 
Jf  all  exports  and  imports  just  balance,  exchange  would 
(other  things  being  equal)  rernain  at  par?"  But  the  prac- 
tical operations  are  not  so  simple  as  that.  Besides  the 
movement  of  goods,  bills  are  drawn  on  other  items  in  the 
international  account,  such  as  the  sale  of  securities,  trav- 
ellers' expenses,  freight  charges,  or  settlement  of  debts; 
and  when  all  these  credits  and  debits  are  offset,  even  the 
balance  may  be  carried  along  without  a  shipment  of  gold. 

Now,  if  all  these  items  were  today  in  equilibrium,  would 
the  rate  of  exchange  between  France  and  the  United 
States  ,sett.le  about  par  ?  I  think  not.  There  are  two  dis- 
tinct elements  now  affecting  the  rate  of  exchange,  (i) 
If  French  imports  greatly  exceed  her  exports  she  can 
normally  settle  that  balance  against  her  only  (a)  by  send- 
ing goods,  or  (b)  sending  gold,  or  (c)  obtaining  credit 
by  the  sale  of  bonds  to  the  creditor  country.  France  and 
all  the  belligerents  need  the  food  and  raw  materials  we 
export  in  order  to  produce  the  goods  which  they  can  send 
out  in  payment.  As  everyone  knows,  exceptional  efforts 
are  being  made  through  the  formation  of  foreign  finance 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  147 

companies  to  give  Europe  long-term  credits  when  buying 
materials  and  food  from  us.  Only  in  that  way  can  she 
increase  her  exports  of  goods.  There  is  already  a  very 
marked  gain  in  English,  Belgian  and  French  exports. 
But  even  when  these  exports  of  goods  begin  to  equal  the 
imports  of  goods,  we  will  not  have  seen  the  end  of  the 
great  discounts  of  foreign  exchange.  On  this  very  point 
there  is  need  of  an  important  concentration  of  attention 
both  here  and  in  Europe. 

The  reason  why  the  heavy  discount  on  fordgn  exchange 
is  likely  to  remain,  even  after  production  of  exports  has 
grow^n,  resides  in  the  second  element  affecting  the  ex- 
charge.  (2)  Xhat  is  the  depreciation  of  the  current 
money  in  Europe  due  to  inconvertibility  into  gold.  In 
France  (to  revert  to  our  illustration)  redemption  of  Bank 
of  France  notes  was  taken  away  in  August,  1914.  In 
addition,  mainly  through  making  advances  to  the  State, 
the  issue  of  these  notes  was  increased  from  6  to  37  bil- 
lion francs  (or,  at  nominal  par,  from'  $1,210  to  $7,536 
millions)  from  June  30,  19 14,  to  January  15,  1920. 
Until  these  notes  can  be  so  reduced  in  quantity,  through 
repayments  by  the  State  to  the  Bank,  that  the  gold  reserve 
of  5,579  million  francs  (or  $1,116  millions)  is  sufficient 
to  maintain  redemption  of  the  notes  in  gold,  these  incon- 
vertible notes  will  circulate  at  a  discount.  Such  redemp- 
tion is  likely  to  be  delayed  from  10  to  20  years.  Mean- 
while, bills  payable  in  francs — whether  there  is  an  equi- 
librium between  French  exports  and  imports  or  not — will 
be  worth  no  more  than  the  value  of  the  inconvertible  paper 
francs  in  which  they  are  payable.  Consequently,  the 
American  who  exports  goods  worth  $10,000  to  France 
will  expect  to  receive  for  his  bill  as  many  more  than  the 
par  of  51,800  francs  as  will  give  him  an  equivalent  for 
his  $10,000  in  gold.  If  a  Frenchman  can  buy  a  dollar 
with  8  francs  (instead  of  14  to  17,  as  now),  even  after 
such  a  recovery,  he  will  have  to  use  80,000  francs  to  buy 
a  bill  on  New  York  for  $10,000.  That,  of  course,  means 
an  equivalent  discount  on  French  bills  of  exchange.    And 


148  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

this  discount  in  the  exchanges  will  exist  for  reasons  wholly 
independent  of  the  equilibrium  between  exports  and  im- 
ports ;  for  these  reasons  have  to  do  with  the  possibility 
of  redemption  of  the  franc  in  gold.  The  bill  of  exchange 
— the  medium  of  exchange  in  international  trade — will 
remain  at  a  discount  unless  it  is  redeemable  in  gold,  just 
as  any  domestic  medium  of  exchange  (like  our  green- 
backs) would,  if  not  convertible  into  gold.  In  short, 
while  it  is  of  the  first  importance  to  aid  Europe  by  credits 
to  rehabilitate  her  industries  and  increase  her  exports,  with 
which  she  can  pay  for  her  imports,  the  difficulties  due  to 
the  depreciation  of  the  franc  as  compared  with  our  dollar 
will  still  remain.  Very  little  recognition  seems  now  to  be 
given  to  this  second  element  affecting  the  rate  of  foreign 
exchange.  It  will  continue  to  increase  the  cost  of  her  im- 
ports to  Europe  and  afford  a  premium  on  our  exports. 
It  would  be  much  as  if  a  gold  standard  country  (like  the 
United  States)  were  trading  with  a  country  having  a 
fluctuating  silver  standard. 

VI. 

FINANCIAL    AND   INDUSTRIAL    OBSTACLES    TO    INTER- 
NATIONAL  PEACE 

As  a  final  illustration  of  the  influence  of  economic  fac- 
tors* on  our  international  relations  we  find  it  in  the  over- 
whelming difficulties  now  checking  the  industrial  recov- 
ery in  Europe  and  the  settlement  of  the  terms  of  peace. 
Those  of  us  here,  in  the  comparative  prosperity  and  secur- 
ity of  the  United  States,  have  little  conception  of  the  pro- 
digious tasks — financial  and  industrial — which  confront 
the  peoples  of  the  belligerent  nations.  Great  Britain  and 
Belgium  have  made  the  most  progress;  but  France  and 
especially  Italy,  with  central  and  southeastern  Europe, 
are  face  to  face  with  tasks  to  daunt  the  ablest  statesmen. 
To  top  it  all,  they  are  treading  on  the  red-hot  gridiron  of 
radical  revolutionary  excitations.  We  are  fast  reaching 
the  point  when  it  is  beginning  to  be  generally  understood 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  149 

that  the  diplomatic  and  political  policies  must  be  mainly 
subordinated  to,  and  interpreted  by,  economic  considera- 
tions. At  the  bottom  of  the  deplorable  European  uncer- 
tainty and  confusion  lies  the  question  of  the  economic  re- 
habilitation of  industry.  What  methods  can  be  adopted 
to  bring  it  about? 

Behind  the  courteous  language  of  diplomacy  we  must 
understand  that  there  is  no  sentiment  in  the  negotiations 
for  peace  and  the  economic  readjustment.  We  are  wanted 
in  Europe  because  it  is  hoped  we  can  be  induced  to  bear 
the  burden  of  financing  its  people  during  this  critical 
period.  And  although  we  spent  in  the  war  about  $34,000,- 
000,000,  without  hope  of  any  recompense  but  safety  from 
the  aggressions  of  Germany,  Europe  still  looks  to  our 
comparative  superiority  in  resources  for  rehabilitation. 
It  is  not  because  we  are  liked,  but  because  we  can  grant 
credits,  that  we  are  sought  for.  It  is  practically  an  eco- 
nomic matter.  But,  besides  a  moral  obligation  to  succor 
distress  among-neighbors  it  is  wise  for  us  to  see  the  facts 
just  as  they  are.  Whatever  we  do  we  need  not  expect 
gratitude. 

Stand  with  me,  if  you  please,  in  the  town  of  Lens,  in 
the  coal  district  of  northern  France,  a  short  time  after 
the  armistice.  Where  once  there  stood  1 1,000  houses  there 
are  only  roads  cleared  through  a  desert  of  battered  bricks 
and  ruins;  not  one  house  is  standing;  not  one  coal  shaft 
can  be  worked.  In  the  cold  winter  rain  a  one-horse  load 
of  household  goods  pitifully  carries  an  old  woman  on  top, 
exposed  to  the  storm,  and  a  boy  leads  the  gaunt  little 
horse.  What  is  the  process  of  reconstruction?  Freedom 
from  war,  and  the  opportunity  to  get  to  work  again.  The 
old  woman  and  the  boy  clear  up  a  corner  against  a  wall, 
pile  up  the  loose  bricks  in  three  wnlls,  cover  the  top  with 
stray  pieces  of  corrugated  iron,  for  a  stable.  They  find 
shelter  in  a  cellar  or  a  dug-out.  and  make  a  fire.  They 
are  pioneers  in  an  old  land.  The  next  evening  is  seen 
the  age-old  miracle  of  hope  triumphant  over  despair  when 
the  horse  and  plough  rise  over  the  hill  against  a  crim- 


150  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

son  sunset,  turning  up  the  soil  of  the  battle  ground.  This 
I  have  seen.  It  is  typical  of  reconstruction  whether  on 
the  farm  or  in  the  factory.  There  must  be  peace,  freedom 
from  upheaval,  and  steady,  persistent  work.  Getting  on 
with  the  barest  necessaries  of  life,  soon  you  begin  to  see 
new  houses,  shell-torn  roofs  repaired,  chimneys  smoking. 
Under  such  enforced  saving,  a  few  comforts  and  non- 
essentials soon  appear  here  and  there. 

The  labor  force  is  less  than  of  old.  But  after  Germany 
was  forced  to  disgorge  its  stolen  machinery,  the  repaired 
factories  were  ready  to  work.  Then,  who  will  provide 
the  raw  cotton,  the  wool,  the  jute,  the  copper,  the  rubber, 
and  the  coal  to  set  the  man  at  work  and  produce  the  goods 
by  which  imports  can  be  purchased  ?  If  Europe  had  been 
at  once  given  a  start  by  credits  to  buy  materials  and  re- 
store transportation  she  ought  now  to  be  humming  with 
industry.  Food  is  yet  needed  until  the  land  is  again  pro- 
ducing with  fertilizers  as  of  old.  This  is  the  reason  why 
our  bread  stuffs,  our  materials  and  our  coal  are  still  pour- 
ing into  Europe  in  a  large  volume.  But  how  can  they 
pay  us?  Suppose  they  are  granted  credit.  At  the  matur- 
ity of  a  credit,  how  can  they  pay?  Only  in  goods.  There- 
fore, the  solution  is  one  of  productive  power  to  be  built 
up  by  labor  and  capital  in  the  varied  forms  of  material, 
equipment,  machinery  and  transportation. 

How  goes  the  struggle  for  this  rehabilitation?  Have 
peace  and  order,  after  war,  been  given  to  Europe  so  that 
she  can  give  all  her  energy  to  developing  her  productive 
power?  Here  is  the  crux  of  the  whole  matter.  What  is 
going  wrong  now  after  more  than  two  years  since  the 
armistice?  Let  us  face  the  actual  situation,  much  affected 
by  wrong-headed  blundering  at  the  expense  of  suffering 
to  millions  of  innocent  people.  ( i )  In  the  first  place,  a 
vague,  new  experiment  in  a  League  of  Nations  ought  to 
have  been  separated  from  the  immediate  establishment  of 
peace.  The  organization  to  enforce  the  terms  of  peace 
and  to  establish  law  and  order  should  have  been  sep- 
arately worked  out,  taking  the  necessary  deliberation  with- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  151 

out  delaying  peace.  (2)  That,  however,  is  a  matter  of 
the  past.  We  must  take  the  situation  as  its  exists.  .In- 
stead of  an  obvious  need  for  order  in  which  to  restore 
the  ravages  of  war  and  to  stimulate  production,  we  find  ' 
the  military  and  naval  expenditure  of  Europe  still  enor- 
mously and  criminally  high,  still  wasting  the  productive 
resources  of  an  exhausted  world.  (3)  An  abnormal  ex- 
penditure, without  regard  to  the  actual  revenues,  without 
balancing  the  budget  either  by  increasing  taxation  or  by 
cutting  down  national  expenses,  is  sadly  common.  It 
seems  like  the  doings  of  bedlam.  (4)  Worst  of  all,  the 
currencies  and  credit  of  Europe  have  been  so  extended 
on  unsound  assets  or  on  a  mere  fiat  issue  that  trade  in 
goods  between  nations  is  inevitably  crippled.  The  Ger- 
man mark,  for  instance,  is  almost  as  worthless  as  our  old 
Continental  currency.  The  Reichsbank  holds  only  about 
1,100  millions  of  marks  in  gold  ($275  millions  at  nominal 
par)  for  some  64,000  millions  of  notes  ($16,000  millions 
at  nominal  par).  This  is  hopeless  bankruptcy  for  a  bank 
of  issue.  (5)  Finally,  the  actual  amount  of  the  indemnity 
to  be  paid  by  Germany  has  long  remained  unsettled  to  the 
confusion  of  French  and  other  budgets.  Either  Germany 
must  be  allowed  to  import  materials  and  develop  her  pro- 
duction of  goods  for  export,  or  France  must  be  content 
with  a  bankrupt  Germany  unable  to  pay  any  indemnity. 
In  conclusion,  what  methods  of  relief  can  be  adopted? 
We  may  dismiss  those  that  assume  the  cancellation  of  war 
debts  due  the  United  States,  as  well  as  those  proposed  at 
the  Brussels  Conference  for  an  international  bank  in- 
tended to  raise  credits  on  possible  resources  of  crippled 
countries,  since  internal  conditions  make  these  assets  un- 
bankable ;  or,  an  international  syndicate  for  the  investiga- 
tion, organization  and  control  of  transactions  to  obtain 
raw  materials.  The  only  other  proposal  at  the  Brussels 
Conference,  and  which  appears  in  the  same  general  form 
in  that  of  Sir  Robert  Home  (Jan.,  1 921),  is  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  an  importing  country  should  support  a  bond 
to  be  given  by  the  importer  in  payment  (or  as  security) 


152  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

for  foreign  goods.  This  is  one  of  the  various  attempts 
to  get  governmental  credit  when  the  credit  of  the  import- 
ing borrower  cannot  stand  on  its  own  legs.  Much  the 
same  idea  appears  also  in  the  (Brussels-Geneva)  scheme 
of  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  (Dec,  1920). 
The  essential  idea  in  all  of  these  plans  is  a  demand  for 
governmental  aid  which  also  turns  up  in  our  revival  of 
the  War  Finance  Corporation,  at  the  urgency  of  our 
farmers  who  wish  to  sell  bread-stuffs  abroad. 

All  of  these  proposals  are  only  palliatives.  They  ex- 
tend promises  to  pay.  It  is  true,  like  a  push  behind  a  dam- 
aged automobile,  they  may  start  the  wheels  going;  but, 
if  the  damage  is  internal,  the  machine  will  soon  stop  again. 
The  remedy  must  be  applied  to  the  restoration  of  the  pro- 
pelling force  within.  In  economic  terms,  that  means  for 
permanent  effect  the  building  up  of  productive  power,  the 
first  condition  must  be  the  establishment  of  order  and 
freedom  of  opportunity  for  labor.  Not  only  does  this 
imply  the  cessation  of  war  and  the  heavy  expenditure  asso- 
ciated therewith,  but,  above  all,  the  removal  of  revolu- 
tionary socialism  which  is  throttling  the  possibilities  of 
steady  production.  The  activities  of  fanatical  agitators 
to  overturn  the  industrial  system  create  the  very  reason 
why  capital  will  be  alienated  from  co-operating  with  labor 
in  production  and  why  credit  will  not  be  granted  to  dis- 
turbed industries.  When  Europe  quiets  down  and  turns 
to  normal  efforts  to  produce,  the  credit  system  will  quickly 
respond  to  her  needs.  Of  course,  materials  and  coal  ate 
now  essential,  and  credit  is  needed  to  procure  them.  If 
this  were  all  of  the  situation,  there  would  be  little  diffi- 
culty in  obtaining  from  private  sources  the  desired  credit 
without  an  appeal  to  governmental  aid.  An  fond,  the 
Government  can  supply  credit  only  by  resort  to  private 
sources.  If  the  application  is  a  doubtful  case,  unsatisfac- 
tory to  private  lenders,  then  it  is  likely  that  we  shall  have 
an  appeal  for  governmental  help.  The  true  remedy  for 
unsettled  Europe  is  to  drop  politics,  international  rivalries 
and  revolutionary  plots,  and  go  hard  to  work.     With  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  153 

recovery  of  economic  normality,  international  difficulties 
would  rapidly  dwindle;  such  things  as  matters  of  ex- 
change would  soon  take  care  of  themselves,  especially  if 
measures  are  undertaken  to  reduce  and  redeem  the  note 
issues. 

Men  appointed  for  political  reasons  should  have  no 
place  in  our  diplomatic  service  in  these  days  when  eco- 
nomic questions  have  such  paramount  importance.  Not 
only  should  long  training  and  the  chance  of  a  permanent 
career  be  the  well-known  conditions  to  entrance  into  this 
service,  but  everyone  who  represents  our  country  as  a  con- 
sul or  a  minister  or  an  ambassador  should  be  trained  how 
to  think  on  economic  questions.  Economic  conditions  in 
all  classes  of  people,  everywhere,  in  all  countries,  directly 
affect  their  state  of  mind  and  color  all  our  international 
relations. 

J.   LAWRENCE  LAUGHLIN. 


I 


Specific  Agencies  for  the  Proper  Con- 
duct of  International  Relations 


SPECIFIC  AGENCIES  FOR  THE  PROPER  CON- 
DUCT OF  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

L 

AMICABLE  METHODS 

The  subject  which  I  have  undertaken  to  treat  in  the 
present  course  on  the  history  and  nature  of  international 
relations  I  interpret  as  embracing  all  the  various  agencies 
or  methods  of  international  intercourse.  Thus  inter- 
preted, it  embraces  both  amicable  methods,  including 
negotiation,  good  offices,  meditation,  and  arbitration ;  and 
non-amicable  methods,  including  the  withdrawal  of  diplo- 
matic relations,  retorsion  and  retaliation,  the  display  or 
use  of  force,  pacific  blockade,  reprisals,  and  war. 

Practitioners  of  private  law,  who  are  accustomed  to 
think  of  law  only  as  it  is  administered  by  municipal  or 
domestic  courts,  are  often  inclined  to  deny  legal  classifi-' 
cation  to  the  rules  and  methods  by  which  international 
relations  are  conducted.  Perhaps  we  may  say  that,  in 
proportion  as  one  has  occasion  to  deal  with  international 
affairs,  he  ceases  to  be  controlled  or  misled  by  such  a  con- 
ception. In  the  sense  that  force  cannot  always  be  imme- 
diately and  effectively  applied  in  the  international  sphere 
to  the  accomplishment  of  a  particular  object,  and  that 
definite  and  common  agencies  are  not  provided  in  advance 
for  its  application,  the  administration  of  intcrnatiojial  law 
differs  from  the  administration  of  municipal  law. '«  But  it 
by  no  means  follows  that  law  and  agencies  for  the  ad- 
ministration of  law  do  not  exist  in  the  international 
sphere.  In  reality,  organization  exists  in  the  domain  of 
international  relations  and  is  made  effective  through  its 
own  appropriate  agencies  and  methods. 

157 


158  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

(a) 

NEGOTIATION 

The  ordinary  method  of  conducting  international  rela- 
tions is  that  of  negotiation,  which  we  may  call  the  normal 
legal  mode  of  international  intercourse.  This  process  is 
carried  on  by  the  duly  appointed  official  representatives  of 
governments.  In  ordinary  circumstances  these  represen- 
tatives are  the  regular,  permanent  diplomatic  represen- 
tatives, but  when  the  exigencies  of  the  case  seem  to  require 
it,  special  or  additional  representatives,  official  or  unoffi- 
cial, are  employed. 

By  the  rules  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  as  amended  by 
the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  diplomatic  agents  are 
divided  into  four  classes  : 

( 1 )  Ambassadors,  legates  and  nuncios ; 

(2)  Envoys,  and  ministers  plenipotentiary; 

(3)  Ministers  resident; 

(4)  Charges  d'affaires. 

Legates  and  nuncios  are  the  representatives  of  His 
Holiness,  the  Pope,  while  ambassadors  constitute  the  high- 
est rank  among  the  representatives  of  civil  and  political 
powers.  The  most  highly  esteemed  privilege  of  the  am- 
bassador is  that,  as  the  peculiarly  personal  representative 
of  the  head  of  his  a\^n  State,  he  is  supposed  on  all  occa- 
sions to  have  a  right  of  access  to  the  head  of  the  State  to 
whom  he  is  accredited,  together  with  the  happy  and  com- 
fortable privilege,  so  conducive  to  tranquil  slumber  in 
the  later  morning  hours,  of  compelling  his  diplomatic  col- 
leagues of  inferior  rank  to  wait  for  access  to  the  secre- 
tary of  state  or  minister  of  foreign  affairs  so  long  as  there 
is  an  ambassador  within  sight  or  sound. 

In  one  respect  the  ambassador  shares  titular  but  illu- 
sive honors  with  the  envoy  or  minister  plenipotentiary. 
The  ambassador's  proper  full  title  is  "Ambassador  Ex- 
traordinary and  Plenipotentiary/'  while  the  envoy's 
proper  full  title  is  "Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  159 

Plenipotentiary."  In  reality,  neither  the  one  nor  the  other 
is  either  extraordinary  or  plenipotentiary.  These  titles 
have  come  down  from  the  days  when  special  rather  than 
permanent  missions  were  the  rule,  and  when  ambassadors 
and  envoys  were  actually  invested  with  full  powers,  in 
order  to  meet  the  extraordinary  occasions  which  called 
for  their  appointment.  Today  the  usual  powers  and  cre- 
dentials of  ambassadors  and  envoys  suffice  only  for  ordi- 
nary occasions.  No  government  would  dream  of 
concluding  a  treaty  with  an  ambassador  or  envoy  unless 
he  had  a  special  full-power.  The  minister  resident,  like 
the  ambassador  and  the  envoy,  is  entitled  to  an  audience 
of  the  head  of  the  State  on  the  presentation  of  his  cre- 
dentials; but  the  envoy  and  the  minister  resident  can 
claim  no  such  right  in  the  subsequent  conduct  of  their 
business. 

Charges  d'affaires  are  divided  into  two  classes  :  ( i ) 
Heads  of  missions,  and  (2)  persons  temporarily  in  charge 
in  the  absence  of  the  head  of  the  mission.  The  first  class 
merely  represents  the  lowest  rank  of  permanent  diplo- 
matic representation.  Neither  class  is  entitled  to  access 
to  the  head  of  the  State,  but  is  accredited  or  presented  to 
the  secretary  of  state  or  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 

Immunity  from  ordinary  legal  process  belongs  alike  to 
all  persons  possessing  a  diplomatic  character.  This  immu- 
nity is  sometimes  called  extraterrito.  iality  and,  when,  in- 
terpreted in  the  sense  of  this  highly  metaphorical  word,  is 
often  greatly  exaggerated.  It  is  sometimes  said  that  dip- 
lomatic representatives  are  wholly  exempt  from  legal  obli- 
gation, and  that  their  residences  are  foreign  ground.  Such 
conceptions  are  creatures  of  the  imagination.  They  have 
no  foundation  in  international  law  or  practice.  No  man  is 
above  the  law,  in  the  sense  of  being  exempt  from  the  duty 
to  obey  it.  The  fact  that  a  diplomatic  officer  is  exempt 
from  the  service  of  ordinary  legal  process,  rather  than 
from  the  duty  of  obedience  to  the  law,  is  readily  dem- 
onstrated by  the  fact  that  if,  after  his  commission  of  an 
act  which  the  law  criminally  forbids,  his  government  with- 


160  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

draws  his  immunity,  he  can  be  prosecuted  for  his  offense 
subject  to  the  exercise  of  what  may  be  called  preventive 
power,  employed  for  the  purpose  of  forestalling  or  stay- 
ing the  violation  of  laws  and  policing  regulations  made 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  life  and  property  from  de- 
struction or  injury.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  proper  to 
repeat  that  persons  having  a  diplomatic  character  are  not 
subject  to  ordinary  legal  process  for  the  enforcement  of 
legal  liabilities,  either  civil  or  criminal.  This  is  a  rule  of 
international  law,  and  the  statutes  of  the  United  States 
provide  for  its  enforcement  by  the  courts,  with  appro- 
priate penalties  for  its  violation. 

Diplomatic  officers  are  not  the  only  agents  of  the  State 
of  whom  international  law  takes  cognizance.  Such  agents 
comprise  consuls,  officers  in  command  of  the  armed  forces 
of  the  State,  military  or  naval,  and  commissioners  or 
other  persons  employed  for  special  objects.  But  these 
non-diplomatic  agents  do  not  by  virtue  of  their  official 
character  enjoy  immunity  from  legal  process  unless  it  is 
specially  provided  for. 

Before  passing  to  other  topics,  it  is  proper  to  mention, 
in  connection  with  the  appointment,  recall  or  dismissal  of 
diplomatic  agents  the  question  of  personal  acceptability. 
In  this  relation  we  use  the  technical  terms  persona  grata 
and  persona  non  grata.  Objections  may  be  made  to  re- 
ceiving a  diplomatic  officer,  or  to  his  remaining  at  his  post, 
on  the  ground  that  he  either  is  or  has  become  personally 
unacceptable.  The  reason  of  this  rule  is  that  the  chief 
object  of  diplomatic  intercourse  is  the  cultivation  of  good 
relations,  and  that  the  attainment  of  this  object  is  of  more 
importance  than  the  personal  fortunes  of  an  individual. 
Except  in  extraordinary  emergencies,  which  seemed  to 
compel  immediate  action,  it  has  been  the  rule,  where  a 
minister  has  become  unacceptable,  to  seek  for  his  recall. 
But,  if  his  recall  should  be  refused,  his  dismissal  would 
not  then  furnish  a  legal  ground  of  complaint.  Some- 
times controversies  on  the  subject  have  arisen  from  the 
fact  that  it  was  alleged  or  believed  that  personal  unac- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  161 

ceptability  was  assigned  as  a  cover  for  a  different  and 
unavowed  reason. 

(b) 

GOOD  OFFICES 

The  term  good  offices  is  used  in  the  double  sense  ( i ) 
of  the  unofficial  representation  or  advocacy  of  interests  of 
a  particular  government,  and  (2)  the  exercise  of  the  func- 
tion of  an  impartial  adviser  of  the  parties  to  a  dispute. 

The  first  sense  is  illustrated  by  the  extension  by  a  diplo- 
matic officer  with  the  consent  of  his  own  government  and 
the  assent  of  the  government  to  which  he  is  accredited,  of 
unofficial  protection  to  the  citizens  of  a  third  country, 
as  has  for  many  years  been  done  by  diplomatic  and  con- 
sular representatives  of  the  United  States,  by  instruction 
of  their  government,  in  behalf  of  citizens  of  Switzerland. 
Yet  another  illustration  is  the  unofficial  representation, 
by  a  neutral  diplomatist,  of  the  interests  of  one  behigerent 
at  the  capital  of  the  other  belligerent  in  time  of  war. 

An  illustration  of  the  second  sense  is  where  a  diplo- 
matic officer  acts  as  a  friendly  intermediary  and  counsellor 
of  two  or  more  governments  with  a  view  to  compose  a 
difference  between  them.  Such  action  necessarily  presup- 
poses the  assent  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  and  is  indeed 
usually  preceded  by  an  invitation  from  them,  collectively 
or  individually  .  The  employment  of  good  offices,  in  this 
sense,  is  naturally  a  matter  of  much  delicacy,  and  a  diplo- 
matic officer  who  is  either  called  upon,  or  seems  likely  to 
be  called  upon,  to  act  in  such  a  capacity  should  be  careful 
to  avoid  anything  that  might  tend  to  affect  his  impar- 
tiality or  to  expose  it  to  suspicion. 

Good  offices  have  been  employed  for  many  purposes 
and  on  many  important  occasions.  Not  only  have  they 
been  used  to  adjust  ordinary  dift'erences,  but  they  have 
been  employed  to  end  war  as  well  as  to  avert  hostilities. 

There  is  yet  another  sense,  not  falling  within  either 
of  the  two  preceding  categories,  in  which  the  term  good 
offices  is  used,  and  that  is  in  indicating  the  special  char- 


162  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

acter  of  a  government's  interposition  in  behalf  of  one  of 
its  citizens  in  presenting  his  claim  against  a  foreign  gov- 
ernment. It  is  common  to  speak  of  intervention  in  behalf 
of  private  claimants.  This  is  in  fact  one  of  the  recognized 
forms  of  intervention,  and  it  implies  that  the  government 
presents  the  claim  as  a  matter  of  legal  right,  and  its  re- 
quest for  redress  is  considered  as  a  "demand",  although 
in  ordinary  circumstances  the  word  is  not  used.  Some- 
times, however,  governments  are  asked  by  their  citizens 
to  present  claims  which  may  not  have  a  strictly  legal 
foundation,  or  which  may  have  arisen  out  of  an  alleged 
breach  of  contract.  The  government  of  the  United  States 
has  constantly  taken  the  position  that  persons  who  con- 
tract with  foreign  governments  should  take  into  account 
and  assume  the  risk  of  such  governments'  disposition  or 
ability  to  perform  what  they  may  promise  to  do.  In  such 
cases,  where  the  claimant's  request  for  aid  has  seemed  to 
be  specially  meritorious,  the  United  States  has  presented 
his  claim  to  the  foreign  government  by  way  of  "good  of- 
fices", thus  indicating  that  the  claim  is  presented  in  a 
friendly  sense  and  in  the  hope  that  it  may  be  properly 
considered  and  adjusted,  but  without  a  direct  and  spe- 
cific request  for  its  admission  and  settlement.  Action  in 
this  sense  has  sometimes  been  described  as  "unofficial  good 
of^ces",  but  the  word  "unofficial"  has  been  used  only  ac- 
cidentally, or  perhaps  for  the  purpose  of  emphasizing 
the  unofficial  character  of  the  proceeding.  The  word  un- 
official is  in  such  a  relation  superfluous,  since  the  employ- 
ment of  good  ofifices  is  essentially  an  unof^cial  act.  There 
is  no  such  thing  as  "official"  good  ofifices,  and  the  term 
is  never  applied  to  the  process, 

(c) 

MEDIATION 

Sir  James  Mackintosh  once  defined  a  mediator  as  "a 
common  friend,  zvho  counsels  both  parties  with  a  weight 
proportioned  to  their  belief  in  his  integrity  and  their  re- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  163 

sped  for  his  power.  "But,"  said  Sir  James,  "he  is  not  an 
arbitrator,  to  whose  decision  they  submit  their  differences, 
and  whose  award  is  binding  on  them."  In  substance 
mediation  is  an  exercise  of  good  offices.  The  distinctive 
meaning  which  the  term  conveys  is  that  the  proceeding 
is  attended  with  a  certain  formahty,  with  special  em- 
phasis on  the  advisory  or  recommendatory  phase.  •  Not 
infrequently  a  mediation  resembles  an  arbitration,  except 
in  the  vital  point  that  it  does  not  result  in  a  decision. 

One  of  the  most  remarkable  mediations  of  the  United 
States  is  that  which  was  begun  in  1866  and  concluded 
in  1872  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  to  a  close  the  war 
between  Spain  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  allied  republics 
of  Peru,  Chile,  Bolivia,  and  Ecuador  on  the  other.  As 
early  as  December  20,  1866,  Mr.  Seward  instructed  the 
diplomatic  representatives  of  the  United  States  near  the 
belligerent  governments  to  propose  that  a  conference 
should  be  held  at  Washington.  Spain  was  willing  to  ac- 
cept the  proposal  on  certain  conditions.  Bolivia  and 
Ecuador  were  disposed  to  do  w^hatever  Chile  and  Peru 
might  agree  upon.  Chile  and  Peru  were  wilHng  to  ac- 
cept only  on  certain  conditions,  one  of  which  was  that 
Spain  should  acknowledge  that  the  bombardment  of  Val- 
paraiso was  a  violation  of  international  law.  This  Spain 
refused  to  do,  and  Mr.  Seward's  first  effort  was  thus 
unsuccessful ;  but,  as  the  war  itself  eventually  fell  into 
a  state  of  "technical  continuance,"  he  renewed  his  propos- 
als on  March  27,  1868.  Spain  substantially  accepted. 
Chile  thought  that  the  conclusion  of  a  definitive  peace 
would  be  impossible,  but  intimated  a  readiness  to  enter 
into  a  truce,  which  would  offer  to  neutrals  all  the  guar- 
antees and  securities  which  they  could  properly  claim. 
Bolivia  concurred  in  Chile's  views;  Peru  and  Ecuador 
were  disposed  to  accept  unreservedly.  On  October  22, 
1869,  Mr.  Fish,  as  Secretary  of  State,  renewed  the  invi- 
tation for  a  conference.  Such  a  conference  was  opened  at 
the  Department  of  State  October  29,  1870,  under  the 
presidency  of  Mr.  Fish.     Owing  to  th^  question  as  to  the 


164  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

bombardment  of  Valparaiso,  it  was  found  to  be  impossi- 
ble to  conclude  a  formal  peace;  but  on  April  ii,  1871, 
the  deleg-ates  in  the  conference  agreed  upon  and  signed  an 
armistice  by  which  the  de  facto  suspension  of  hostilities 
between  the  belligerents  was  "converted  into  a  general 
armistice  or  truce,"  which  was  to  "continue  indefinitely" 
and  could  not  be  broken  by  any  of  the  belligerents  "save  in 
three  years  after  having  expressly  and  explicitly  notified 
the  other,"  through  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
"of  its  intention  to  renew  hostilities" ;  and  it  was  provided 
that,  during  the  continuance  of  the  armistice,  all  restric- 
tions on  neutral  commerce  which  were  incident  to  a  state 
of  war  should  cease. 

This  was  a  very  remarkable  document,  especially  in  the 
fact  that,  as  a  pledge  to  refrain  from  hostilities,  it  was 
more  effective  than  a  treaty  of  peace.  Treaties  of  peace, 
although  they  often  contain  pledges  of  perpetual  amity, 
are  usually  interpreted  in  this  regard  as  declarations  of 
a  present  intention  rather  than  of  a  continuing  obliga- 
tion, the  parties  preserving  the  "sovereign"  right  there- 
after freely  to  choose  between  peace  and  war.  The  armis- 
tice of  1 87 1  precisely  limited  their  freedom  of  action  in 
that  particular. 

In  recent  days  there  has  been  an  anxious  agitation  con- 
cerning the  Island  of  Yap,  which  seems  to  have  been 
destined  to  play  the  part  of  a  storm  center.  Thirty-five 
years  ago  a  dispute  concerning  it  gave  rise  to  one  of  the 
most  interesting  mediations  of  modern  times.  This  dis- 
pute grew  out  of  the  action  of  a  German  Admiral  who  in 
1884  raised  the  Imperial  flag  over  the  Island  as  a  sign  of 
occupation.  In  order  that  our  thoughts  may  be  clarified 
perhaps  I  should  state  that  Yap  is  one  of  the  Caroline 
Islands  and  that  the  Caroline  Islands  are  in  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  The  act  of  the  German  Admiral  provoked  in 
Spain  an  outbreak  of  popular  violence  which  was  marked 
by  attacks  on  the  German  Embassy  and  the  German  Con- 
sulate at  Madrid.  In  order  to  avert  hostilities,  Prince 
Bismarck  proposed  the  submission  of  the  matter  to  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  165 

mediation  of  His  Holiness  the  Pope.  This  proposal 
the  'Spanish  Government  accepted  and  on  October  22, 
1885,  His  Holiness  as  mediator  presented  to  the  two  gov- 
ernments certain  propositions  by  which  the  sovereignty  of 
Spain  over  the  Caroline  and  Pelew  Islands  was  con- 
firmed, but  by  which  Germany  acquired  special  commer- 
cial rights,  together  with  the  right  to  establish  a  naval 
station  and  a  coal  depot  in  the  islands.  In  conformity 
with  the  recommendation  of  His  HoHness,  his  proposi- 
tions were  embodied  by  Germany  and  Spain  in  a  protocol 
which  was  signed  by  their  Ambassadors  at  Rome  on 
December  17,   1885. 

In  the  discussion  of  good  offices  we  have  seen  that  con- 
siderations of  propriety  and  of  dehcacy  have  tended  to 
embarrass  and  prevent  the  employment  of  the  process. 
The  Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International 
Disputes  concluded  at  The  Hague  on  July  29,  1899,  un- 
dertook to  remove  this  difficulty  by  stipulating  that  in  case 
of  serious  disagreement  or  conflict,  before  an  appeal  to 
arms,  the  signatory  powders  should  as  far  as  possible  have 
recourse  to  the  good  offices  or  mediation  of  one  or  more 
friendly  powers;  that  an  offier  of  mediation  might  be 
made  by  powers,  strangers  to  the  dispute,  on  their  own 
initiative,  even  during  the  course  of  hostilities,  and  that 
the  exercise  of  this  right  should  never  be  regarded  by  any 
of  the  parties  to  the  conflict  as  an  unfriendly  act.  These 
stipulations  denoted  on  the  part  of  their  authors  the  pos- 
session of  an  intelligent  and  practical  understanding  of 
the  nature  of  international  relations  and  tended  to  enlarge 
the  opportunity  for  the  exercise  of  the  mediatorial  func- 
tion. 

id) 

ARBITRATION 

The  term  arbitration,  in  private  law,  is  often  used  to 
denote  an  extra-judicial,  or  even  an  extra-legal,  proceed- 
ing of  a  conciliatory  nature.  This  is  not  and  never  has 
been  the  meaning  of  the  term  in  international  law,  and 


166  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

international  arbitration  never  has  been  understood  or 
practiced  in  this  sense.  The  signatories  of  The  Hague 
Convention  were  altogether  justified  in  including  in  its 
stipulations  the  declaration  that  ''international  arbitration 
has  for  its  object  the  settlement  of  differences  between 
states  by  judges  of  their  own  choice,  and  on  the  basis 
of  respect  for  law";  and  in  conformity  with  this  declara- 
tion they  consistently  "recognized"  arbitration  as  "the 
most  effective,  and  at  the  same  time  the  most  equitable, 
means  of  settling  disputes"  of  a  "legal  nature"  which  di- 
plomacy had  failed  to  settle. 

The  supposition  that  international  arbitrators  have 
shown  a  tendency  to  make  diplomatic  compromises,  that 
they  have  failed  to  apply  legal  principles  and  to  give 
weight  to  legal  precedents  is  entertained,  we  must  assume, 
by  those  who  have  not  comprehensively  studied  the  actual 
record  of  arbitral  proceedings.  No  doubt  the  utterances 
and  complaints  of  disappointed  litigants  have  also  contrib- 
uted to  produce  misconceptions.  There  is  a  common  say- 
ing among  members  of  the  Bar  that  if  an  attorney  loses 
his  case  he  is  hardly  to  be  censured  if  he  gratifies  his 
sense  of  disappointment  by  railing  at  the  court. 

In  reality  there  is  manifest,  among  some  of  those  who 
discuss  the  subject,  a  tendency  to  misconceive  and  over- 
rate what  is  called  the  "judicial"  element  in  the  conclu- 
sions of  municipal  courts,  as  well  as  to  misconceive  and 
overrate  the  element  of  "compromise"  involved  in  the  con- 
clusions of  international  arbitrators.  While  the  decisions 
of  international  arbitrators,  like  the  decisions  of  municipal 
courts,  have  the  character  of  final  judgments,  and  are  in 
this  sense  alike  "judicial,"  we  are  safe  in  affirming  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  in  the  affairs  of  men  as  purely 
"judicial"  deliverances,  based  on  "pure  law,"  without  any 
element  of  compromise.  Such  things  are  not  of  this 
world.  Why  do  courts  divide?  Why  do  judges  dissent? 
Why  does  the  single  judge  hesitate  and  reserve  his  de- 
cision, and,  when  he  eventually  renders  it,  confess  the 
doubts  that  have  troubled  him  and  have  rendered  the  re- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  167 

suit  uncertain?  The  answer  to  these  inquiries  is  found 
in  the  fact  that  such  are  the  processes  of  human  thought. 
Our  conclusions  represent  the  anxious  balancing  of  con- 
flicting considerations  and  the  effort,  if  we  be  honest,  to 
give  most  weight  to  those  that  may  seem  to  us  to  be  the 
most  meritorious.  It  is,  therefore,  no  reproach  to  inter- 
national arbitrators,  nor  does  it  impeach  their  integrity 
of  purpose  or  the  judicial  character  of  their  action,  to  ad- 
mit that,  as  human  beings  determining  human  disputes, 
they  have  not  been  exempt  from  the  limitations  of  hu- 
man thought.  Moreover,  as  one  to  whose  lot  i^'  has  fallen 
actually  to  examine  the  work  of  international  arbitra- 
trs,  from  the  earliest  times  to  the  latest,  I  am  prepared 
to  pronounce  unjustified  the  invidious  imputation  to  them 
of  a  disposition  to  substitute  diplomatic  compromises  for 
conclusions  based  on  law  and  justice. 

II 

NON-AMICABLE  METHODS 

Writers  have  been  more  or  less  accustomed  to  group  all 
methods  short  of  war  as  "pacific".  Such  a  division,  in- 
volving a  special  and  much  enlarged  use  of  the  word 
"pacific,"  necessarily  produced  misconceptions,  and  I  have 
therefore  ventured  to  depart  from  it.  I  have,  therefore, 
divided  methods  of  redress  into  the  two  general  classes 
of  Amicable  and  Nonamicable,  the  nonamicable  processes 
including  those  that  do  not  and  those  that  do  involve 
the  use  of  force. 

{a) 

NON-FORCIBLE 

Rupture  of  Diploinatic  Relations 

As  the  first  example  of  nonamicable  methods  I  may 
mention  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations.  The  with- 
drawal of  diplomatic  representation,  unless  for  a  cause 
personal  to  the  representative,  denotes  dissatisfaction  with 


168  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

the  conduct  of  the  g-overnment  with  which  ordinary  inter- 
course is  thus  ended  or  restricted.  It  thus  indicates  the 
existence  of  a  state  of  ill-feeHng  which  is  hkely  to  in- 
crease unless  the  cause  of  it  is  removed.  Between  na- 
tions, as  between  individuals,  the  results  of  continued  ill- 
feeling  never  can  be  confidently  foretold.  There  is  also 
the  possibility  that  they  may  lead  to  exasperation,  and 
that  under  the  stress  of  nervous  tension  blows  may  be  ex- 
changed. While  such  results  may  not  occur,  it  is  not  wise 
wholly  to  exclude  it  from  the  range  of  possibility. 

RETORSION^  RETALIATION 

Retorsion  has  been  defined  as  "the  appropriate  answer 
to  acts  which  it  is  within  the  strict  right  of  a  state  to  do," 
but  which,  if  not  indicative  of  a  spirit  of  unfriendliness, 
places  the  citizens  of  foreign  states  under  special  and  in- 
jurious disabilities.  If  the  foreign  states  whose  citizens 
are  thus  injured  replies  by  imposing  similar  disabilities, 
this  is  called  "retorsion".  Retorsion  may,  therefore,  be 
called  retaliation  in  kind.  It  is  employed  largely  in  mat- 
ters of  commerce,  specially  where  deferential  or  discrimi- 
nating duties  are  imposed  on  the  citizens,  the  vessels  or 
the  produce  or  manufactures  of  the  foreign  state. 

We  distinctively  use  the  word  retaliation  where  the 
countervailing  measure  exceeds  the  injury  which  it  is 
sought  to  redress  or  to  stay.  The  range  of  retaliation  is 
not  precisely  defined.  It  may  take  the  form  of  menace 
or  actual  use  of  force,  and  in  its  latter  aspect  brings  it 
within  categories  hereafter  to  be  discussed. 

In  the  early  international  relations  of  the  United  States 
much  was  heard  of  measures  of  embargo  and  non-inter- 
course. Both  these  measures  may  be  regarded  as  falling 
under  the  head  of  retaliation. 

By  Joint  Resolution  of  Congress  of  March  26,  1794,  an 
embargo  was  laid  for  thirty  days  on  all  ships  and  vessels 
in  ports  of  the  United  States  bound  for  any  foreign  port 
or  place.  The  immediate  cause  was  the  British  Order  in 
Council  of  November  6,    1793,   restrictive  of  maritime 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  169 

commerce.  On  April  i8,  1794,  the  embargo  was  extended 
to  the  25th  of  the  following  month,  and  by  an  Act  of 
May  22,  1794,  the  exportation  of  munitions  of  war  was 
prohibited  for  a  year,  while  their  importation  free  of  duty 
was  authorized  for  two  years.  This  condition  of  things 
was  brought  to  an  end  by  the  Jay  Treaty  towards  the 
end  of  1794. 

The  same  retaliatory  device  was  revived  by  Jefferson, 
under  whose  presidency  a  law  was  passed  on  December 
22,  1807,  forbidding  the  departure  of  vessels  from  the 
United  States,  foreign  vessels  being  allowed,  however,  to 
depart  either  loaded  or  in  ballast  on  receiving  notice  of 
the  act.  This  measure  was  intended  to  redress  and  to 
prevent  the  injuries  inflicted  on  American  commerce  un- 
der Napoleon's  Berlin  Decree  of  November  21,  1806.  and 
the  British  Blockade  Decrees  and  Orders  in  Council. 

The  embargo  was  eventually  repealed  by  the  Act  of 
March  ist.  1809,  which  substituted  a  policy  of  non-inter- 
course. These  measures  of  embargo  and  non-intercourse 
may  be  considered  as  precursors  of  the  War  of  181 2. 

FORCIBLE 

Reprisals 

Reprisals,  says  Vattel,  are  used  between  nation  and 
nation  in  order  to  do  themselves  justice  when  they  can- 
not otherwise  obtain  it.     Thus, 

"If  a  nation  has  taken  possession  of  what  belon.^s  to 
another;  if  it  refuses  to  pay  a  debt  or  repair  an  injury, 
or  to  make  just  satisfaction,  the  latter  may  seize  what 
belongs  to  the  former  and  apply  it  to  its  own  advantage, 
till  it  obtains  full  payments  of  what  is  due,  tosfcther 
with  interest  and  damages,  or  keep  it  as  a  pledge  till 
the  offending  nation  has  made  satisfaction.  The  effects 
thus  seized  are  preserved,  while  there  is  any  hope  of 
obtaining  satisfaction  or  justice,  but  when  hope  dis- 
appears they  are  confiscated  and  then  the  reprisals  are 
accomplished." 


170  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

This  is  a  vivid  picture  of  reprisals  as  they  have  usually 
been  conceived. 

In  former  times  it  was  not  uncommon  for  a  sovereign 
to  authorize  his  subject  forcibly  to  seek  and  obtain  his 
own  redress.  For  this  purpose  he  issued  to  his  subject 
what  was  called  a  letter  of  reprisal.  Such  letters  were 
issued  even  in  times  of  nominal  peace,  but  the  use  of 
them  necessarily  tended  to  obscure  the  distinction  between 
peace  and  war.  For  this  reason  the  granting  of  letters 
of  private  reprisal  fell  into  disuse  more  than  one  hundred 
years  ago,  and  the  reprisals  that  have  been  made  during 
the  past  century  have  been  national  measures  carried  out 
by  national  agencies. 

As  reprisals  involved  the  employment  of  force,  they 
necessarily  tended  to  result  in  war,  and  if  we  examine  the 
history  of  reprisals  we  find  that  they  usually  resulted  in 
war  where  the  nation  to  which  they  were  applied  was 
physically  able  to  resist. 

An  early  example  of  this  tendency,  exhibiting  a  blend 
of  private  and  of  public  reprisals,  is  narrated  by  Ward  in 
his  History  of  the  Lazv  of  Nations  (1795),  I  294-296. 
Although  some  of  the  details  are  amusing,  the  results 
were  most  serious  and  perhaps  we  may  say  that  in  this 
regard  the  affair  was  rather  human.  According  to  Ward, 
in  1792  two  sailors,  the  one  Norman,  the  other  English, 
quarrelled  in  the  Port  of  Bayonne  and  began  to  fight  with 
their  fists,  and  the  Englishman  being  the  weaker  is  said 
to  have  stabbed  the  other  with  his  knife.  The  local  mag- 
istrates failing  to  intervene,  the  Normans  applied  to  their 
King,  who  authorized  them  to  take  their  own  revenge. 
This  they  did  by  putting  to  sea  and  seizing  an  English 
ship,  some  of  whose  crew  they  hung  up  to  the  masthead, 
together  with  some  dogs.  The  English  instantly  retalia- 
ted ;  two  hundred  Norman  vessels  scoured  the  English 
seas  hanging  all  the  seamen  they  could  find,  while  the 
English  seized  the  Normans  and  put  them  to  death  with- 
out quarter.  "The  affair  then,"  says  Ward,  "became  too 
big  for  private  hands,  and  the  governments  interposing 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  171 

in  form,  it  terminated  in  that  unfortunate  war,  which  by 
the  loss  of  Guienne,  entailed  upon  the  two  nations  an  end- 
less train  of  hostilities  till  it  was  recovered." 

It  would  exceed  the  limits  of  my  time  and  space  to 
narrate  examples  of  reprisal  during  the  past  hundred 
years,  such  as  the  famous  case  of  Don  Pacifico,  the  pro- 
ceeding-s  against  Mexico  in  1861  resulting  in  an  attempt 
by  the  French  to  set  up  an  empire  in  that  country,  and 
various  other  instances  the  history  of  which  may  readily 
be  found  in  the  books.  There  is  one  case,  however,  to 
which  I  desire  particularly  to  advert  because  it  has  so 
often  been  misconceived  and  mistaken.  I  refer  to  the 
bombardment  of  Greytown  by  the  U,  S.  S.  Cyane  in  July 
1854.  This  case  has  been  cited  as  a  precedent  for  the 
occupation  by  the  United  States  of  Vera  Cruz  in  19 14, 
but  no  citation  could  be  wider  of  the  mark.  When  Grey- 
town  was  bombarded,  the  community,  as  it  was  called, 
was  not  definitely  under  the  jurisdiction  or  subject  to  the 
control  of  any  recognized  sovereignty.  "It  did  not,"  said 
President  Pierce  in  his  annual  message  of  December  4, 
1854,  explaining  the  action  of  the  United  States,  "pro- 
fess to  belong  to  any  regular  government,  and  had,  in 
fact,  no  recognized  dependence  on  or  connection  with  any- 
one to  which  the  United  States  or  their  injured  citizens 
might  apply  for  redress  or  which  could  be  held  respon- 
sible in  any  way  for  the  outrages  committed."  lliere  is 
more  in  President  Pierce's  message  to  the  same  effect,  but 
it  is  useless  to  make  further  quotations  since  the  passage 
cited  clearly  states  the  point  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  justified  its  action  on  the  ground  that  it 
was  dealing  with  an  organized  political  society,  to  which 
competency  to  exercise  the  rights  and  to  discharge  the 
obligations  of  a  government  is  imputed. 

PACIFIC  BLOCKADE 

To  "pacific  blockade"  I  give  a  separate  heading  with- 
out intending  to  intimate  that  the  subject  is  entitled  to  an 
independent  classification.     Different  opinions  have  been 


172  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

expressed  as  to  the  nature  of  the  measure,  and  indeed  as 
to  whether  it  may  properly  be  admitted  to  exist ;  but  this 
difference  may  be  due  to  the  combination  of  words  in 
the  title;  the  word  "blockade"  having  been  used  to  desig- 
nate a  well-recogni;^ed  belligerent  operation.  Nor  does 
the  word  "pacific"  fortunately  qualify  a  measure  of  open 
force  and  coercion.  But,  if  we  close  our  eyes  to  the  in- 
appropriateness  of  the  words  and  consider  the  nature  of 
the  process,  we  may  see  that  we  have,  under  the  title 
"Pacific  Blockade,"  merely  a  form  of  reprisal.  Repris- 
als, although  classified  as  a  measure  short  of  war,  in  the 
sense  that  they  do  not  proceed  upon  the  assumption  of  the 
present  existence  of  the  legal  condition  of  things  called 
a  state  of  war,  are  not  otherwise  "pacific" ;  and  so  with 
pacific  blockade.  If  the  measure  is  not  extended,  as  is 
belligerent  blockade,  to  the  citizens,  vessels  and  property 
of  third  powers,  it  presents  nothing  exceptionable  from 
the  legal  point  of  view,  so  long  as  reprisals  continue  to 
be  acknowledged  as  a  legal  process. 

Calvo  cites,  as  the  first  example  of  pacific  blockade, 
the  action  of  France,  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  in  1827, 
in  obstructing  access  to  the  coasts  of  Greece,  where  the 
Turkish  armies  were  encamped,  the  representatives  of  the 
three  powers  continuing  to  assure  the  Sultan  of  their 
friendship,  and  to  declare  that  peace  was  unbroken,  al- 
though the  measure  they  adopted  served  to  paralyze  his 
armies.  In  June,  1831,  a  French  fleet,  in  order  to  obtain 
reparation  for  injuries  done  to  French  subjects  in  Por- 
tugal during  the  reign  of  Dom  Miguel,  "blockaded"  a 
number  of  points  on  the  Portuguese  coast  and  captured 
a  large  number  of  Portuguese  ships.  A  state  of  war  did 
not  ensue,  and  on  July  14,  1831,  a  treaty  was  promptly 
concluded  by  which  reparation  was  promised  to  French 
subjects,  while  all  Portuguese  ships  of  war  and  of  com- 
merce that  had  been  captured  by  the  French  fleet  were 
restored.  In  1833  France  and  Great  Britain,  with  a  view 
to  compel  the  assent  of  the  Netherlands  to  the  recognition 
of  the  Kingdom  of  Belgium  under  the  treaty  of  London, 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  173 

blockaded  Dutch  ports,  and  a  state  of  war  did  not  follow. 
In  1838,  however,  when  France  instituted  a  pacific  block- 
ade of  certain  Mexican  ports,  the  Mexican  Government, 
resentino:  the  act,  declared  war,  and  expelled  French  sub- 
jects from  its  territory.  On  the  other  hand  Mexican  men- 
of-war  as  well  as  merchant  vessels  were  seized  by  the 
French,  and  the  fortress  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa  was  re- 
duced. The  quarrel  between  the  two  countries  was  ter- 
minated by  the  treaty  of  March  9,  1839,  by  which  it  was 
agreed  to  submit  to  a  third  power  the  decision  of  the 
questions  ( i )  whether  Mexico  could  claim  restitution  of 
the  Mexican  ships  of  war  captured  by  the  French  after 
the  surrender  of  the  fortress  of  Ulloa  or  compensation 
therefor;  (2)  whether  indemnities  could  be  claimed  for 
Frenchmen  who  had  been  expelled  from  Mexico;  and 
(3)  whether  Mexican  ships  and  cargoes  sequestrated 
during  the  blockade  and  subsequently  captured  by  the 
French  in  consequence  of  the  declaration  of  war  ought  to 
be  considered  as  legally  acquired  to  the  captors.  The 
Queen  of  Great  Britain,  who  was  chosen  as  arbitrator, 
decided  on  August  i,  1844,  that,  after  the  departure  of 
the  French  plenipotentiary  from  Mexico,  followed  by  hos- 
tile operations  on  the  part  of  the  French  against  the  for- 
tress of  Ulloa  and  the  Mexican  fleet,  and  the  actual  dec- 
laration of  war  by  the  Mexican  Government,  and  the 
expulsion  of  French  subjects  from  its  territory,  there  was 
a  state  of  war  between  the  two  countries,  and  that  neither 
restitution  of  the  vessels  and  cargoes  mentioned  nor  the 
payment  of  indemnities  could  be  exacted. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  as  well  as  most  picturesque 
cases  of  pacific  blockade  is  that  which  the  British  Gov- 
ernment conducted  against  Brazil,  in  the  sixth  decade  of 
the  last  century,  on  a  demand  for  reparation  for  the 
plundering  of  the  British  barque  Prince  of  Wales  on  the 
Brazilian  coast  in  1861,  and  a  further  demand  for  re- 
dress for  what  was  termed  an  outrage  on  three  officers 
of  the  British  man-of-war  Forte  by  the  Brazilian  guard 
at  Tijuca  Hill,  near  Rio  de  Janeiro.     As  the  British  de- 


174  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

mands  were  refused,  the  British  admiral  instituted  a 
pacific  blockade  of  the  port  of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  and  seized 
and  detained  five  Brazilian  vessels  as  an  act  of  reprisal. 
It  was  subsequently  arranged  that  the  claim  in  the  case 
of  the  Prince  of  Wales  should  be  paid  under  protest  and 
the  captured  vessels  released,  the  Brazilian  Government 
assuming  responsibility  for  any  losses  which  might  have 
resulted  to  the  citizens  of  third  countries,  and  that  the 
case  of  the  Forte  should  be  submitted  to  arbitration.  As 
arbitrator,  the  parties  chose  Leopold  I,  King  of  the  Bel- 
gians. The  so-called  outrage  began  with  the  arrest  by 
the  Brazilian  guard,  at  Tijuca  Hill,  of  three  officers  of 
the  British  admiral's  flag-ship,  the  Forte,  these  officers 
being  a  lieutenant,  a  mid-shipman,  and  the  chaplain.  It 
appeared  that  these  officers,  at  seven  o'clock  in  the  even- 
ing, as  they  were  passing  the  police  guard-house,  on  their 
way  down  the  hill,  were  accosted  by  a  sentinel,  who  ad- 
vanced and  inquired  as  to  their  identity.  Here  the  ac- 
counts begin  to  diverge.  On  the  part  of  the  British  it 
was  alleged  that  the  action  of  the  Brazilian  police  was 
aggressive  and  violent,  particularly  with  regard  to  the 
chaplain,  and  that  all  three  officers,  besides  having  been 
treated  with  great  brutality,  were  incarcerated  over  night 
under  circumstances  of  peculiar  indignity.  The  BraziHan 
Government,  on  the  other  hand,  represented  that  the  com- 
plainants had  dined  at  a  certain  hotel,  where  they  had 
"two  bottles  of  Bordeaux  and  one-half  bottle  of  cognac" ; 
that,  on  their  way  down  the  hill,  they  attempted  to  "un- 
horse an  equestrian" ;  that,  when  they  were  accosted  by 
the  guard,  they  "began  to  strike  him  with  their  sticks," 
and  compelled  him  to  summon  aid ;  that,  even  after  they 
were  "deposited"  in  the  guard-house,  they  showed  them- 
selves "haughty  and  scornful" ;  and  that,  although  they 
"were  not  completely  drunk,"  they  "appeared  not  to  be 
in  full  possession  of  their  mental  faculties."  These  alle- 
gations, it  is  only  just  to  say.  the  complainants  altogether 
denied,  although  they  admitted  that  the  officer  of  the 
guard,  when  they  were  locked  up,  provided  them  with 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  175 

paper  and  with  a  pack  of  cards,  and  offered  to  one  of 
them  a  bed.  The  demands  for  redress  made  upon  the 
BraziHan  Government  were  (i)  that  the  ensign  of  the 
guard  be  dismissed  from  the  service,  (2)  that  the  sentry 
who  was  said  to  have  begun  the  attack  be  adequately  pun- 
ished, (3)  that  an  apology  be  made  by  the  Brazilian 
Government,  (4)  that  the  chief  of  police  of  Rio  de  Janeiro 
be  publicly  censured  for  certain  acts  prior  to  the  com- 
plainants' release.  On  June  18,  1863,  the  arbitrator  ren- 
dered an  award,  in  which,  after  reciting  the  proofs  submit- 
ted by  the  parties,  held  that,  in  the  manner  in  which  the 
Brazilian  laws  were  applied  in  the  case,  there  had  been 
neither  premeditated  nor  actual  offense  towards  the  Brit- 
ish Navy.  It  should  be  stated  that,  after  this  decision 
was  rendered,  the  British  Government  sent  a  representa- 
tive on  special  mission  to  Rio  de  Janeiro  to  express  regret 
for  the  circumstances  under  which  the  friendly  intercourse 
between  the  two  countries  was  suspended,  to  disavow  any 
intention  to  offend  the  dignity  of  Brazil,  and  to  propose 
the  renewal  of  diplomatic  relations.  The  Emperor  re- 
ceived these  assurances  with  an  expression  of  satisfaction ; 
diplomatic  relations  were  restored,  and  the  incident  was 
ended. 

Further  examples  of  pacific  blockade  may  be  found  in 
the  books,  and  in  this  relation  I  would  particularly  com- 
mend a  late  edition  of  Hall's  work  on  International  Law. 
and  Holland's  Studies  in  International  Lazu.  Both  these 
eminent  authorities  reached  the  conclusion  that,  so  long 
as  the  measure  is  not  extended  to  the  prohibition  of  access 
to  the  citizens,  vessels  and  property  of  third  countries, 
no  valid  objection  can  be  made  to  pacific  blockade  as  a 
measure  of  reprisal. 

WAR 

Much  confusion  ma)^  be  avoided  by  bearing  in  mind  the 
fact  that  the  term  war  is  used  in  two  senses,  comprehend- 
ing (i)  acts  of  hostility,  or  war  de  facto,  by  one  nation 
against  another  without  a  formal  declaration,  and  (2)  the 


176  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

legal  condition  of  things  called  a  state  of  war,  in  which 
the  parties  prosecute  their  claims  avowedly  as  belligerents. 
Nothing  could  be  more  unfounded  or  more  misleading 
than  the  supposition  that  a  government  cannot  be  said  to 
commits  acts  of  v/ar,  or  to  make  war,  unless  war,  or  a  state 
of  war,  has  been  declared  or  otherwise  admitted  to  exist. 
Whether  the  acts  of  a  government  are  to  be  deemed  acts 
of  war  depends  on  their  nature  and  not  on  what  it  may 
see  fit  to  call  them.  When  one  government  prosecutes 
its  claims  against  another  government  by  force,  it  com- 
mits acts  of  war,  even  though,  as  in  the  case  of  reprisals, 
a  declared  or  avowed  state  of  war  may  not  have  super- 
vened, and  hence  we  find  that  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  in  reserving  to  the  Congress  the  power 
to  declare  war,  also  expressly  reserved  to  it  the  power 
to  authorize  reprisals.  In  1883  the  project  for  the  build- 
ing of  a  tunnel  under  the  English  Channel,  to  connect 
England  and  France,  was  killed  by  the  publication  by 
Lieut.  Col.  Maurice,  then  of  the  British  War  Office,  of 
his  small  volume  entitled  ''Hostilities  Without  Declara^ 
Hon  of  War,"  in  which  he  showed  that  in  the  hundred 
and  seventy-one  years,  from  1700  to  1870,  inclusive,  in 
the  almost  innumerable  wars  that  had  taken  place,  there 
were  less  than  ten  clear  cases  of  a  "declaration  of  war" 
prior  to  hostilities,  although,  when  a  state  of  war  was 
eventually  declared  or  admitted  to  exist,  it  was  held  to  re- 
late back  to  the  commencement  of  hostilities.  It  may  be 
superfluous  to  say  that,  if  two  nations  declare  war  against 
one  another,  the  legal  condition  of  things  called  a  state 
of  war  then  comes  into  existence,  although  no  actual 
force  whatever  may  as  yet  have  been  employed.  On 
the  other  hand,  force  may  be  employed  by  one  nation 
against  another,  as  in  the  case  of  reprisals,  and  yet  no 
"state  of  war"  may  arise.  In  such  a  case  there  may  be 
said  to  be  acts  of  war,  but  no  state  of  war.  The  distinc- 
tion is  of  the  first  importance,  since,  from  the  moment 
when  a  state  of  war  supervenes,  third  parties  become  sub- 
ject to  the  performance  of  the  duties  of  neutrality  as  well 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  177 

as  to  all  the  inconveniences  that  result  from  the  exercise 
of  bellig-erent  rights. 

In  treating  of  war  we  may  at  once  exclude  the  subject 
of  private  wars,  which  are  no  longer  recognized,  and  may 
confine  our  attention  to  public  war. 


LIMITED  WAR 

Writers  have  been  accustomed  to  speak  of  two  kinds 
of  war,  "perfect"  and  "imperfect."  The  former  described 
the  condition  in  which  the  whole  nation  is  said  to  be  at 
war  with  another  nation  and  all  the  members  of  each  are 
authorized  to  commit  hostilities  against  all  the  members 
of  the  other  in  every  case  permitted  by  the  laws  of  war; 
the  latter,  the  condition  in  which  hostilities  are  limited  as 
to  places,  persons,  and  things.  For  the  terms  "perfect" 
and  "imperfect,"  I  have  ventured  to  substitute  the  terms 
general  and  limited.  To  ascribe  to  war  perfection,  unless 
indeed  it  should  result  in  utter  annihilation  of  one  of  the 
parties,  seems  inappropriate,  while,  to  ascribe  to  it  im- 
perfection for  falling  short  of  that  goal,  might  justify  the 
reproach  of  inhumanity.  In  reahty,  limited  war  is  war, 
and  is  as  nearly  perfect  as  any  other  kind,  as  far  as  it 
goes. 

One  of  the  best-known  examples  of  a  limited  war,  which 
happens  to  be  furnished  by  our  own  history,  is  the  con- 
dition of  things  which  existed  between  the  United  States 
and  France  from  1798  to  1800.  Engagements  took  place 
at  sea-,  vessels  were  captured,  and  prisoners  were  taken. 
In  the  case  of  one  of  the  captures  (Bas  v.  Tingy,  4  Dall. 
37),  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  held  that, 
as  Congress  had  raised  an  army,  stopped  all  intercourse, 
dissolved  all  treaties,  built  and  equipped  ships  of  war,  and 
commissioned  privateers  the  two  countries  were  "in  fact 
and  in  law  at  war";  that  an  American  vessel  fighting 
with  a  French  vessel,  to  subdue  and  make  her  a  prize,  was 
"fighting  with  an  enemy  accurately  and  technically  speak- 


178  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

ing^" ;  and  that  the  provisions  of  the  law  relating  to  prizes 
made  in  war  were  applicable  to  the  case. 

GENERAL  WAR 

General  war  is  not  limited  as  to  places,  persons,  and 
things,  but  authorizes  all  acts  permitted  by  the  laws  of 
war  against  the  enemy's  state  and  its  members.  It  may 
be  said  that,  in  this  sense,  war  is  merely  general  re- 
prisals carried  on  by  states  which  have  resolved  to  con- 
duct their  contention  by  force. 

In  considering  the  cases  in  which  the  use  of  violence 
against  persons  or  property  may  or  may  not  be  permitted 
by  the  laws  of  war,  we  are  confronted  with  two  theories 
of  the  nature  of  war.  According  to  what  we  may  call  the 
original  theory,  all  persons  belonging  to  the  enemy,  in- 
cluding women  and  children,  may  lawfully  be  attacked  and 
killed  and  their  property  destroyed.  This  comports  with 
what  I  venture  to  call  the  annihilative  or  extirpatory  con- 
ception of  the  object  in  view.  This  conception  is  exempli- 
fied in  the  old  rule  that  it  is  permissible,  if  not  meritori- 
ous, to  put  all  the  inhabitants  of  a  besieged  city  to  the 
sword,  to  say  nothing  of  the  commendations,  in  earlier 
writers,  of  the  use  of  violence  against  all  persons  and 
property  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  other  hand,  towards  the  end  of  the  last  century 
there  was  propounded  a  different  theory,  formulated  in  the 
well-known  sentence  of  Rousseau,  that  war  is  a  relation, 
not  of  individual  to  individual,  but  of  state  to  state,  and 
that  men  are  enemies,  not  as  individuals,  but  only  as  agents 
of  the  state.  This  theor}^  has  been  formally  accepted  by 
many  governments  and  has  to  a  certain  extent  been  in- 
corporated in  their  legislation.  It  has  not  been  accepted 
by  the  British  Government,  nor  has  it  been  accepted  by 
the  Government  of  the  United  States.  From  this  circum- 
stance we  are  not  by  any  means  to  infer  that  these  two 
governments  have  sought  to  give  full  effect  to  the  earlier 
rule  in  their  practice.     Both  have  accepted  and  advoca- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  179 

ted  ameliorations  of  the  earlier  rule,  and  have  advocated 
and  accepted  such  ameliorations  as  a  part  of  the  modern 
law  of  war,  just  as  the  governments  which  have  accepted 
the  rule  that  war  is  a  relation,  not  of  individual  to  in- 
dividual, but  of  state  to  state,  have  not  consistently  car- 
ried out  the  theory  in  all  is  logical  consequences.  In  this 
way  the  nominal  adherents  of  the  earlier  theory  and  the 
nominal  adherents  of  the  later  theory  have  been  able  to 
a  great  extent  to  meet  on  common  ground. 

No  doubt  the  subject  which  has  chiefly  served  to  keep 
the  two  schools  apart  is  that  of  the  liability  of  private 
property  at  sea  to  capture  and  confiscation.  Almost  two 
centuries  ago  advanced  nations  discarded  the  capture  and 
confiscation  of  enemy  private  property  on  land.  They 
did  this  perhaps  not  so  much  on  grounds  of  "humanity" 
as  on  grounds  of  enlightened  public  policy,  in  order  that 
men  might,  after  the  clash  of  arms  was  over,  be  enabled 
to  resume  the  pursuits  of  civilized  life,  instead  of  perish- 
ing in  unproductive  wastes  or  roaming  the  forests,  after 
the  manner  of  wild  animals,  for  food.  But,  because  of 
the  usefulness  of  ships  as  instruments  of  war,  and  of  the 
relief  of  internal  stress  by  foreign  commerce,  strong  mari- 
time powers  manifested  an  unwillingness  to  abandon  the 
capture  of  private  property  at  sea,  and,  as  the  logical 
starting  point  of  the  proposed  exemption  was  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  doctrine  of  individual  enmity,  they  refused  to 
accept  the  new  theory.  The  statement  is  constantly  reit- 
erated that  the  United  States,  in  1856,  proposed  to  the 
powers  the  abolition  of  the  capture  of  private  property  at 
sea.  This  statement  is  true  only  in  a  strictly  quahfied 
sense.  The  United  States  did  not  propose  to  do  away 
either  with  the  law  of  contraband  or  with  the  law  of 
blockade.  Thus  limited,  the  effect  of  the  proposal,  had 
it  been  accepted,  would  have  been  much  slighter  than 
is  generally  imagined.  The  history  of  wars,  including 
that  of  the  last  great  war,  demonstrates  that  "measures 
of  blockade",  whatever  this  may  mean,  and  contraband 
lists  may  readily  be  so  extended  as  to  reduce  the  exemp- 


180  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

tion  of  private  property  from  maritime  capture  to  negli- 
g-ible  proportions.  It  is  therefore  evident  that,  if  the 
American  proposal  of  1856  had  been  accepted,  its  value 
would  have  depended  on  the  power  and  the  will  of  neu- 
trals to  make  it  practically  effective. 

Wars,  whether  limited  or  general,  may  end  either  de 
facto  or  by  virtue  of  treaties  of  peace.  For  both  modes 
international  law  provides  appropriate  rules.  Where  war 
is  not  purely  de  facto,  the  rights  of  the  parties  are  deter- 
mined by  the  rule  of  uti  possidetis;  where  the  war  ends 
by  a  treaty,  this  rule  may  also  be  invoked,  where  noth- 
ing is  expressed  to  the  contrary.  It  may  be  superfluous 
to  remark  that  it  belongs  to  each  independent  state,  in 
the  exercise  of  its  sovereign  rights,  to  decide  for  itself 
whether  it  will  end  a  war  in  the  one  or  the  other  of  these 
two  modes. 

At  the  present  moment  a  writer  or  speaker  who  ven- 
tures to  discuss  international  relations  seems  to  lay  him- 
self open  to  the  charge  of  incompleteness  of  thought  if  he 
fails  to  present  or  to  commend  some  proposal  by  which 
war  is  to  be  imrhediately  and  finally  abolished.  Whether 
this  expectation  proceeds  from  a  desire  to  end  the  numer- 
our  armed  conflicts  still  going  on,  or  from  a  wish  to  pre- 
serve a  fancied  condition  of  peace  which  does  not  in  fact 
exist,  I  am  obliged  to  regard  it  as  essentially  impulsive  and 
superficial.  At  a  meeting  of  the  so-called  League  to  En- 
force Peace  held  at  Philadelphia  in  June,  191 5,  an  emi- 
nent speaker  expressed  disappointment  that  certain  per- 
sons whom  he  named  had  not  presented  a  plan  for  the 
termination  of  the  war  then  raging  in  Europe.  Much 
sounder  was  the  view  expressed  by  the  late  James  J.  Hill, 
when,  on  the  outbreak  of  the  war  early  in  August,  1914, 
in  response  to  the  request  of  a  reporter  for  an  opinion 
as  to  when  the  war  would  end,  he  sententiously  replied : 
"Young  man,  you  can  ask  more  fool  questions  in  five 
minutes  than  I  can  answer  in  a  week.  The  war  will  end 
when  somebody  gets  licked."  As  the  war  progressed  in 
area  and  in  intensity,  orators  often  spoke  of  it  as  "a  warv 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  181 

to  end  war."  Whether  those  who  used  such  phrases 
have  now  fors^otten  them,  it  is  immaterial  and  would  be 
unkind  to  inquire.  The  intoxicating-  effects  of  ilhisive 
phrases  are  beyond  the  reach  of  prohibitory  legislation. 
No  war  ever  has  been  or  ever  will  be  fought  to  end  all 
war.  Wars  proceed  from  definite,  concrete  causes  con- 
nected with  conflicts  of  opinion  or  of  interest  by  which 
the  passions  of  men  are  excited.  The  conflicts  may  be 
far  less  vital  or  important  than  the  parties  suppose  them 
to  be.  They  may  indeed  be  altogether  unimportant,  ex- 
cept in  the  particular  that  they  produce  the  nervous  ten- 
sion which  impels  human  beings  to  resort  to  force.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  differences  may  be  of  a  profound  and 
far-reaching  character,  such  as  to  produce  a  deep  sense 
of  injustice  and  unrest.  Whether  in  such  conditions  the 
tendency  of  men  in  the  mass  to  seek  their  ends  by  vio- 
lence can  be  restrained,  is  always  a  matter  of  conjecture. 
While  threats  or  combinations  of  force  conceivably  may 
exert  a  restraining  influence,  they  may  also  have  the  oppo- 
site effect,  and  never  can  be  counted  upon  with  entire 
confidence.  The  late  Count  Hayashi,  in  his  Secret  Me- 
moirs (pp.  226-227),  is  represented  as  having-  written 
that  the  Japanese  public  is  ordinarily  rather  cool,  and  in- 
deed almost  indifferent,  toward  foreign  affairs,  but  that, 
w^hen  something  happens  to  force  attention  in  that  direc- 
tion, "then  at  once  the  public  seems  to  get  intoxicated,  as 
though  drunk  with  alcohol,  and  it  behaves  as  if  it  zvere  not 
able  to  discriminate".  Count  Hayashi  need  not  have  im- 
puted this  tendency  to  his  own  people  as  a  peculiarity. 
The  same  tendency  to  get  excited  at  the  prospect  of  a  fight, 
whether  between  dogs,  between  individual  men,  or  be- 
tween nations,  more  or  less  characterizes  all  people.  When 
an  acute  international  situation  arises,  the  possibility  of  a 
physical  contest  at  once  comes  into  view.  Sudden  excite- 
ments thus  spring  up,  and  the  capacity  to  think  clearly 
and  to  reason  calmly,  instead  of  being  popularly  com- 
mended, may  expose  to  suspicion  and  even  to  censure  the 
few  who  still  retain  it.     In  such  a  condition  of  things. 


182  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

the  precipitation  of  a  war  is  not  a  difficult  task.  Wars 
will  diminish  in  proportion  as  men,  when  confronted  with 
apparent  conflicts  of  opinion  or  of  interest,  come  to  think 
first  of  peaceful  rather  than  of  forcible  solutions.  To  the 
attainment  of  this  end  the  systematic  employment  of  peace- 
ful and  tranquillizing  methods,  such  as  good  offices,  me- 
diation, and  arbitration,  is  necessarily  helpful. 

The  extent  to  which  such  agencies  or  methods  may  be 
successfully  employed  may  be  said  to  depend  rather  upon 
the  disposition  of  the  parties  to  accept  them  than  upon  the 
nature  of  the  dispute.  If,  for  instance,  arbitration  has 
failed  to  prevent  a  certain  war,  it  by  no  means  follows  that 
arbitration  could  not  have  settled  the  dispute  to  the  sat- 
isfaction of  the  parties,  if  they  had  been  willing  to  try 
it.  Wars  have  often  grown  out  of  disputes  far  less  seri- 
ous and  complicated  than  some  of  those  which  arbitra- 
tion has  actually  settled.  In  the  future,  just  as  in  the 
past,  the  preservation  of  peace,  internal  as  well  as  exter- 
nal, will  continue  to  depend  on  the  cultivation  of  a  spirit 
of  justice  and  of  toleration,  and  the  exemplification  of  that 
spirit,  by  men  and  by  nations,  in  their  dealings  with  one 
another. 

JOHN  BASSETT  MOORE.^  /^. 


"The   Evolution   of  Private 
International   Law" 


"THE    EVOLUTION    OF    PRIVATE    INTERNA- 
TIONAL LAW" 

AN   ADDRESS   DELIVERED  ON   THE  OCCASION   OF  THE  CON- 
FERRING OF  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  LAWS 
ON  ESTEBAN  GIL  BORGES,  MINISTER 
OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  OF 
VENEZUELA 

(In  pursuance  of  its  plan  to  train  the  students  of  the 
School  of  Foreign  Service  not  only  in  the  theory  of 
Foreign  Service  but  also  in  its  practice,  Georgetown  Uni- 
versity sent  a  group  of  eighteen  (i8)  students  to  Vene- 
zuela in  the  summer  of  1920  to  become  acquainted  with 
the  people  and  to  study  the  economic  conditions  of  the 
country.  This  trip  was  a  signal  success,  due  to  a  large 
extent  to  the  many  official  courtesies  extended  by  the 
Government  of  Venezuela.  Hence,  when  Dr.  Esteban 
Gil  Borges,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations  of  Vene- 
zuela, arrived  in  the  United  States  at  the  head  of  a  special 
mission  in  April,  192 1,  Georgetown  University  conferred 
upon  the  Minister  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Laws.  The 
paper  given  below  was  read  by  Dr.  Borges  on  this 
occasion. ) 

In  private  international  law  there  is  evolving  a  national 
tendency  which  has  had  a  rather  full  theoretical  develop- 
ment in  these  recent  years,  particularly  in  Germany  and 
in  Italy.  It  is,  perhaps,  the  prevailing  doctrine  in  tlie 
English  speaking  countries. 

This  tendency  is  not  an  exceptional  fact  in  private  inter- 
national law,  but  it  is  common  in  the  evolution  of  all  sys- 
tems of  law.  Private  international  law  tends  to  become 
a  law  of  the  state  just  as  in  other  times  private  law  was 

185 


186  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

the  law  of  the  race,  in  the  case  of  the  barbarian  peoples, 
and  was  the  law  of  the  city  in  the  Greek  and  Latin  forms 
of  society,  and  the  law  of  the  land  in  the  period  of  feudal 
social  org-anization. 

At  certain  moments  in  the  course  of  history  the  ju- 
ridical ideals  of  mankind,  as  it  exists  in  one  or  another 
g-roup,  are  so  energetically  expressed  that  they  take  on 
the  form  of  a  legal  system  exclusive  in  character.  Prog- 
ress has  lengthened  the  radius  of  this  orbit  from  the  ethnic 
unit  to  the  city,  from  the  city  to  the  province,  from  the 
province  to  the  nation.  In  Rome  this  exclusive  charac- 
ter of  the  law  dominates  the  Law  of  the  Quirites.  The 
law  of  the  feudal  period,  in  its  turn,  was  as  exclusive  in 
nature  as  the  Roman  law  of  the  early  times.  The  doctrine 
of  territorial  sovereignty,  absolute  in  character,  was  ex- 
clusive in  a  way  analogous  to  that  which  had  marked  the 
effect  of  the  Law  of  the  Quirites  on  Roman  institutions. 
In  Rome,  there  was  the  exclusiveness  of  the  city  as  against 
all  that  lay  without,  while  within  the  city  there  was  the 
exclusiveness  of  the  patrician  class  as  against  the  plebeian 
class.  In  the  middle  ages,  the  attitude  of  exclusion  was 
that  of  the  feudal  estate  on  the  one  hand  as  against  all  that 
lay  outside,  while  within  the  unit  of  sovereignty  the  law 
of  the  lord  was  exclusive  as  against  that  of  the  vassal. 

Civil  law  was,  in  the  cities  of  Greece  and  Rome,  the 
element  which  fused  the  antagonistic  interests  of  classes 
and  castes  into  a  social  unit  more  embracing  than  that 
of  the  tyrannies,  despotic  monarchies  and  military  oli- 
garchies of  the  Orient.  The  national  law  in  modern  times 
was,  in  turn,  the  element  which  fused  into  a  still  more 
inclusive  unity, — that  of  the  State, — the  antagonistic  in- 
terests of  the  provinces  as  they  had  existed  during  the 
feudal  period. 

In  Rome  the  city  limit  was  the  frontier  of  law.  The  law 
was  the  child  of  the  city.  The  foreigner  was  the  enemy. 
The  city  was  juridically  a  community  isolated  within  its 
hills. 

In  the  society  of  the  middle  ages  there  was,  as  in  Rome, 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  187 

a  certain  antag-onism  operating  within  each  social  group. 
The  feudal  castle  and  medieval  town  were  as  hostile  to 
each  other  as  had  been  the  patrician  and  plebeian  classes 
in  Rome,  but  over  and  above  this  hostility  prevailed  the 
hostility  against  the  foreigner.  The  doctrine  of  territorial 
sovereignty  was,  as  we  have  said,  the  Law  of  the  Quirites, 
translated  into  terms  of  feudal  law. 

Periods  of  time,  often  centuries  long,  were  necessary 
in  order  that  progress  should  break  down  these  boundaries 
limiting  the  effect  of  law  set  up  by  the  caste,  the  race,  the 
city,  and  the  feudal  estate,  in  turn.  In  Rome,  the  political 
work  of  the  Empire,  the  philosophical  contribution  of 
Stoicism,  the  spiritual  reform  of  Christianity,  were  neces- 
sary to  bring  about  the  transformation  of  the  Law  of  the 
City  into  the  Law  of  Nations.  In  our  modern  times  the 
political  achievement  of  monarchy,  the  philosophical  in- 
fluence of  the  Natural  Law  School  and  the  grinding  proc- 
ess of  revolution  were  all  required  to  change  the  law  of 
the  province  into  the  law  of  the  nation. 

The  social  forces  which  transformed  the  categories  of 
human  society  likewise  transformed  its  law.  Rome  ex- 
perienced a  profound  modification  in  its  legal  ideas  when 
those  social  forces  made  of  the  City  of  Quirites  the  Re- 
public of  the  Praetors  and  Tribunes,  and  then,  later,  trans- 
formed the  Republic  into  a  cosmopolitan  empire. 

Legal  categories  have  suffered  a  like  transformation  at 
the  beginning  of  our  modern  period.  Analogous  to  the 
reaction  against  the  principles  of  feudal  society  is  the 
reaction  in  law,  particularly  in  the  field  of  private  inter- 
national law.  One  of  the  manifestations  of  this  reaction 
was  that  of  the  theory  of  statutes.  The  glossators  who 
formulated  the  statutory  theory  were  the  heirs  of  Latin 
tradition. 

The  legal  theories  of  Italy  were  the  children  of  Roman 
cosmopolitanism. 

Legal  ideas  and  influences  have  roots  not  only  in  the 
loose  surface  earth  of  theories,  but  they  also  have  roots 
deep  in  the  historic  subsoil  of  the  Western  races.    These 


188  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

ideas  and  instincts  are  the  result  of  an  historic  evolution 
which  has  at  times  lasted  centuries.  In  the  middle  ages 
we  have  seen  the  countries  of  the  Roman  Law  develop 
in  the  direction  of  the  personality  of  law,  while  those 
which  lay  outside  the  influence  of  Latin  civilization  de- 
veloped rather  towards  the  territorial  concept  of  law.  Lat- 
er, we  have  seen  two  other  elements  in  conflict :  on  the 
one  hand,  the  leg-al  customs  of  feudalism,  and  on  the 
other,  what  was  left  of  the  legal  system  of  the  invaders. 
'J'he  fundamental  principle  of  the  one  was  territorial  sov- 
ereignty, while  the  key  of  the  other  was  the  law  of  the 
race.  The  two  principles  carried  on  a  long  struggle,  and 
historical  conditions  determined  the  victory  in  each  in- 
stance. 

France  and  Germany  were  feudal  countries  and  they 
were  controlled  by  the  system  of  territorial  sovereignty. 
Italy  was  a  country  of  small  republics,  organized  munic- 
ipally and  saturated  with  Latin  traditions ;  and  Italy  was 
dominated  by  the  theory  of  the  glossators.  Roman  law 
and  local  customary  law  were  locked  in  this  great  struggle. 
The  institutions  of  society  swung  now  towards  the  im- 
perial idea,  that  is,  the  idea  fundamentally  Roman,  and 
now  towards  the  feudal  idea,  fundamentally  the  product 
of  the  individualistic  spirit  of  the  Germanic  Race.  The 
systems  of  private  international  law  survive  all  the  inci- 
dents of  this  mighty  struggle,  from  which,  as  a  sort  of 
compromise  formula,  there  emerged  the  statutory  theory. 
But  this  harmonizing  formula  had  still  further  to  ad- 
just itself  to  the  social  conditions  of  the  nations,  and 
from  it  there  arose  in  turn  systems  so  different  in  charac- 
ter as  that  of  the  Italian  jurists  of  the  thirteenth  century, 
that  of  the  French  jurists  of  the  sixteenth  century,  and 
that  of  the  Dutch  jurists  of  the  seventeenth  century.  The 
doctrine  of  Bartolo  is  altogether  different  from  the  theory 
of  Dumoulin  and  D'Argentre,  and  this,  in  turn,  differs 
from  those  of  Voet  and  Huber.  In  this  connection  Lau- 
rent was  able  to  say,  "There  is  no  vestige  of  the  cosmopol- 
itanism which  characterized  the  glossators  to  be  found 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  189 

among  the  statutory  theorists,"  and,  again,  that  "The  stat- 
utory jurists  are  already  French,  Belgian,  German."^ 

The  reason  for  this  difference  in  interpretation  of  the 
same  system  of  law  is  to  be  found  in  the  controlling  ideas 
which  characterized  each  of  the  peoples,  and  also  in  the 
diversity  of  their  social  institutions.  Law  has  been  pro- 
foundly affected  by  social  conditions  and  mental  aptitudes. 
In  Italy,  which  was  a  country  primarily  municipal  in  its 
social  structure  and  fundamentally  Roman  in  its  juridical 
development,  the  dominant  theory  was  that  of  the  glossa- 
tors. In  France,  on  the  other  hand, — a  feudal  country, 
the  land  of  the  contumes, — the  prevailing  law  was  the  law 
which  ran  with  the  land,  although  there  was  discernible 
an  occasional  tendency  towards  adoption  of  the  Italian 
system.  Again,  in  the  Netherlands  and  Belgium,  which 
were  countries  of  provincial  autonomy,  the  governing 
principle  in  law  was  that  of  absolute  territoriality. 

The  transformation  of  the  doctrine  of  personality  of 
law  is  another  example  of  the  profound  modification  by 
which  experience  shapes  ideas  which  may  have  had  the 
same  source,  and,  at  the  outset,  the  same  nature.  The 
idea  of  the  personality  of  law  has  in  our  modern  systems 
of  law  the  same  function  which  it  had  in  the  early  cen- 
turies of  the  middle  ages  among  the  invaders  of  the  Ra- 
man Empire.  In  both  systems  of  law,  the  function  seems 
to  have  been  identical  although  the  ground  for  its  opera- 
tion seems  to  have  changed. 

Laine  and  Laurent  have  denied  that  these  two  systems 
had  an  identical  origin  and  a  close  relationship.  "We  must 
not,"  says  Laurent,  "confuse  the  personal  law  of  the  Ger- 
manic peoples  with  the  personal  law  or  statutory  law  of 
French  legal  theory.  In  our  system,  one  law  governs 
all  those  who  are  members  of  a  single  state.  The  Code 
Napoleon  governs  all  Frenchmen  whatever  may  have 
been  their  racial  origin.  Generally  speaking,  laws  are 
without  authority  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  territory 


^Laurent— Dr.  civ.  int.  1—257-258. 


190  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

over  which  the  legislator  exercises  jurisdiction.  Some 
laws,  however,  which  deal  with  the  status  and  capacity 
of  persons  continue  to  govern  even  Frenchmen  living  in 
foreign  lands ;  and  these  laws  are  called  personal  because 
they  refer  to  the  person  and  no  Frenchmen  can  escape 
them  by  departing  from  his  native  land.  .  .  .  Among  the 
barbarian  peoples  the  personal  law  was  the  national  law 
of  every  man."^  "The  personal  laws  of  the  French,"  re- 
marks Laine,  "are  nothing  else  than  their  territorial  laws 
following  them  into  foreign  countries.  Today  all  laws 
which  are  called  personal  from  the  point  of  view  of  con- 
flict of  laws  are  really  territorial  laws,  that  is  to  say,  they 
are  precisely  the  opposite  of  the  personal  laws  of  the  bar- 
barian peoples." 

The  basis  of  the  notion  of  personality  of  law  has,  in 
fact,  been  transformed.  Among  the  barbarians  the  crite- 
rion was  the  race,  while  in  modern  law  it  is  territorial. 
Its  function,  however,  in  our  judgment,  remains  the  same, 
and  in  one  and  the  other  case  to  a  greater  or  less  extent 
it  implies  the  application  of  a  national  law  in  a  foreign 
country.  Among  the  barbarians  it  was  the  law  of  the 
tribe  while  among  the  peoples  of  today  it  is  the  law  of 
the  nation.  What  has  changed  is  the  form  of  the  State ; 
the  basis  of  law  in  the  system  of  the  invaders  was  the 
ethnic  unit,  while  in  the  modern  world  it  is  chiefly  the 
geographic  unit. 

Neither  the  personality  of  law  among  the  barbarians 
nor  the  territoriality  of  law  in  feudal  Europe,  nor  the  com- 
promise formulas  of  the  statutory  jurists,  nor  again  the 
personality  of  law  in  our  modern  juridical  system  can. 
be  conceived  as  purely  theoretical  notions  capable  of  iso- 
lation from  historical  realities.  These  concepts  take  their 
origin  directly  in  the  diversity  of  social  institutions,  racial 
characteristics  and  stages  of  evolution  of  the  States.  The 
personality  of  law  directly  corresponds  to  a  notion  of  a 
state  resting  squarely  on  an  ethnic  unit ;  the  "law  of  the 


^Laurent,  Dr.  civ.  int.  I — 168. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  191 

land  rests,  in  turn,  on  a  concept  of  a  state  founded  on  the 
basis  of  a  geographic  unit ;  while  the  personahty  of  mod- 
ern law  finds  its  basis  in  a  theory  of  the  state  resting  on 
the  principle  of  nationality. 

The  work  of  centuries  cannot  be  changed  in  a  day. 
The  personality  of  law  is  destined  long  to  remain  an 
element  in  the  legal  systems  of  those  states  which  ac- 
cepted the  Roman  law  and  the  Latin  theory  of  the  State ; 
the  territorial  character  of  law  will  likewise  remain  im- 
bedded in  the  legal  systems  of  those  States  which  adhered 
to  the  Germanic  law  and  the  feudal  relations. 

Race,  historical  environment,  ideas,  instincts,  preju- 
dices, political  interests,  national  passions, — all  these  are 
coefficients  with  evident  influence  on  the  formation  of  law 
and  in  a  less  direct,  but  none  the  less  certain  manner  on 
the  formation  of  scientific  doctrines.  In  order  to  esti- 
mate the  possibility  of  a  reform  which  would  bring  about 
a  uniformity  of  ideas  in  the  teaching  and  principles  of 
positi-ve  law,  we  must  take  account  of  the  historic  factors. 
Scientific  thought  by  itself  would  create  nothing  but  ab- 
stract concepts.  For  example,  if  we  were  to  try  to  recon- 
cile the  Italian  theory  of  the  personality  of  law  and  the 
territorial  theory  which  prevails  in  the  English  speaking 
world,  we  should  have  to  wipe  out  all  the  past  of  these 
peoples  and  erase  from  the  national  life  of  some,  centu- 
ries of  feudal  traditions,  and  from  that  of  others,  centuries 
of  Roman  traditions. 

In  private  international  law  we  find  essential  dififerences 
between  the  countries  of  the  civil  law  and  those  of  the 
common  law,  and  these  differences  originate  in  large  part 
in  the  historic  development  of  these  two  systems  of  law. 
"Our  English  concept  of  the  law,"  says  Harrisson, 
"preserves  us  from  the  fantastic  sophism  which  govern 
most  of  the  law  on  the  Continent,  that  is  to  say,  the 
idea  that  from  international  private  law  we  can  con- 
struct a  universal  system  based  on  the  meditation  of 
juries  and  imposed  by  the  force  of  the  logical  strength 
on  the  different  tribunals  of  Europe.     For  us  in  Eng- 


\ 


192  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

land,  notions  of  jurisprudence  are  derived  from  prac- 
tical decisions  and  not  dogmatic  theories."^ 

"Systems  of  legislation,"  says  Laine,  "may  be  divided 
into  two  groups;  on  the  one  hand,  the  system  v^hich 
exist  in  France,  Italy,  and  Germany,  and  on  the  other, 
the  systems  of  England  and  America.  The  first  group 
has  as  its  common  element  the  Roman  law,  which  can- 
not be  found  in  the  second;  conversely,  the  second 
group  has  the  feudal  law,  which  is  not  to  be  found  in 
the  first.  Consequently,  between  these  two,  systems  of 
legislation  there  is  a  profound  difference  for  a  double 
reason." 

The  positive  law  of  the  United  States  has  been  com- 
posed by  jurisprudence  and  federal  legislation.  In  mat- 
ters of  private  international  law,  Anglo-American  juris- 
prudence still  clings  to  the  concepts  of  the  Dutch  jurists  of 
the  eighteenth  century.  The  doctrine  of  absolute  terri- 
torial sovereignty  permeates  its  rigorous  attitude  towards 
the  foreigner  and  the  foreign  law. 

The  application  of  the  foreign  law  is  not  admitted,  but 
it  is  tolerated  on  the  basis  of  comity  and  as  a  matter  of 
liberalism.  ("Ex  comitate";  "Liberaliter";  V.  Comm.  ad 
Pandectas  Lib.  I— T.  IV— "De  Statutis.") 

The  theory  of  the  "Lex  Situs"  is  the  basis  of  the  private 
international  law  of  the  English  speaking  peoples.  This 
theory  is  applied  to  all  juridical  relations,  persons,  status 
and  capacity,  property  and  all  its  ramifications,  contracts 
and  criminal  law. 

"It  is  of  the  highest  importance,"  says  Minor,  "that 
every  question  coming  to  a  court  for  decision  shall  have 
a  'situs'  somewhere,  and,  generally  speaking,  every  ques- 
tion which  arises  will  be  settled  by  the  law  of  the  State 
where  this  'situs'  is  located.  Whatever  interests  may  be 
ventilated  before  a  tribunal,  whether  they  have  been 
created  by  the  voluntary  action  of  an  individual  or  have 
an  origin  without  his  voluntary  action  but  rather  as  a 


^Harrisson,  Journ.  de  Dr.  Int.  Prive,   1880,  p.  548. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  193 

result  of  the  operation  of  law,  such  an  Interest  must  have 
its  'situs'  indicated  by  the  individual  or  determined  by 
the  law.  Marriage,  contract,  inheritance,  and  crime — 
each  of  these  things  has  its  'situs,'  and  it  is  the  law  of  the 
'situs'  which  governs  it.  . .  .  One  of  the  principles  of  science 
is  that  every  state  is  sovereign  within  its  own  jurisdic- 
tion. Consequently,  every  state  may  forbid  the  applica- 
tion of  foreign  laws  within  its  boundaries.  It  follows 
that  when  effect  is  given  to  a  foreign  law  it  is  because  tem- 
porarily the  national  law  withholds  its  supreme  authority 
in  favor  of  the  foreign  law,  which,  for  the  moment  and 
with  particular  reference  to  a  specific  case,  is  converted  by 
the  will  of  the  State  into  its  national  law."^  i  j 

In  the  British  Empire  the  difference  between  the  jurid- 
ical standards  of  the  home  country  and  the  constituent 
States  of  the  Empire,  and  in  the  United  States,  the  dif- 
ference between  the  federal  and  state  laws,  has  resulted 
in  a  tendency  somewhat  similar  to  that  which  prevails  in 
private  international  law;  and  these  differences  have  con- 
ferred predominating  influence  on  the  theory  of  territo- 
rial sovereignty. 

These  differences,  profound  in  character, — which  dis- 
tinguish systems  of  private  international  law  prevailing 
on  the  European  continent  and  in  England, — and  the  dif- 
ferences between  the  civil  law  of  the  Spanish  American 
countries  and  the  common  law  of  the  United  States  in 
America,  are  to  be  attributed  less  to  the  fondness  of 
thinkers  for  this  or  that  theoretical  construction,  than  to 
peculiarities  in  the  historical  development  of  the  respec- 
tive juridical  standards. 

After  the  dissolution  of  the  Roman  Empire,  the  varie-  ' 
ty  in  law,  based  on  the  criterion  of  race,  persisted.  From 
the  eleventh  through  the  twelfth  century,  the  commercial 
relations  and  the  renaissance  of  Roman  Law  in  the  cities 
of  Italy  modified  the  concept  of  law  in  the  units  of  civil 
society  which  there  existed.    As  Westlake  remarks,  in  the 

'Minor,  Conflict  of  Laws,  Boston,  1901,  p.  6. 


194  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

application  of  foreign  laws,  principles  of  justice,  deter- 
mined by  reason,  were  observed/ 

The  feudal  system  brought  to  the  Western  World  a 
new   concept   of   private   international   law.^     This    fact 
was  the  starting  point  for  two  distinct  systems  of  law  on 
the  Continent.    According  to  one,  the  law  of  the  land  was 
to  be  applied  to  every  controversy,  while  according  to  the 
other,  there  could  be  applied  to  a  particular  case  a  foreign 
juridical  principle  if  the  nature  of  the  case  so  required. 
/'     By  reason  of  the  geographic  isolation  of  England  and 
f  the  unity  of  its  judicial  organization,  that  country  was 
\\^somewhat  remote  from  this  conflict  of  legal  systems.  The 
Norman  conquest  resulted  in  the  organization  of  a  strong 
monarchy  and  a  parliament  with  genuine  legislative  au- 
thority.    As  Brunner  declares,  the  Curia  Regis  from  the 
beginning  displayed  an  unaccustomed  capacity  for  cen- 
tralizing the  legal  and  administrative  system  of  the  coun- 

These  elements  constituted  a  uniform  and  exclusive  sys- 
tem of  territorial  law,  a  closed  system  in  which  there  was 
no  room  for  the  variety  of  points  of  view  given  expression 
by  French,  Italian,  Dutch  and  German  jurisconsults  in 
settling  conflicts  between  their  several  customary  or  stat- 
utory systems, 
p  Anzilotti  puts  it  well  when  he  says :  "In  England,  the 
'  statutory  theory  was  late  in  coming  into  use,  and  it  was 
adapted  in  such  a  way  to  the  common  law  that  it  was 
almost  transformed.  In  all  the  other  countries  on  the 
Continent  the  principles  and  conclusions  of  this  theory 
were  admitted.  It  is  true  that  they  were  regarded  from 
different  and  even  opposite  points  of  view." 

England  remained  in  this  geographic  and  legal  isola- 
tion down  to  the  period  of  revolution.  At  the  end  of  the 
sixteenth  century  the  commercial  relations  between  Eng- 

^Westlake,  International  Lazv,  4th  Ed.  p.   15. 

^Sumner  Maine,  Ancient  Law,  p.  108. 

*Brunner  and  Hastings,  Sources  of  the  Law  of  England. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  195 

land  and  the  Continent  grew  very  much  more  close.  This 
was  particularly  the  case  between  England  and  the  Low 
Countries.  The  Dutch  publicists  of  \he  school  of  Gro- 
tius,  Rodemberg,  of  the  two  Voets,  and  of  Ruber,  enjoyed 
great  prestige. 

English  jurisprudence  found  its  doctrines  particularly 
applicable  to  the  legal  system  of  England,  and  as  applica- 
tion of  foreign  law  was  regarded  as  a  limitation  of  ter- 
ritorial sovereignty,  this  obstacle  was  overcome  by  the 
acceptance  of  the  principle  of  comity  of  nations. 

The  comitas  gentium  is  still  in  England  and  tlie  United 
States  the  basis  for  the  application  of  foreign  law.  Brit- 
ish jurisprudence  and  that  of  the  United  States  have  been 
in  this  regard  altogether  conservative.  In  1895,  a  decision 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  declared  that 
the  principle  of  reciprocity  was  an  indispensable  requisite 
for  the  carrying  out  of  foreign  decisions  for  "the  comitas 
gentium  of  the  United  States  called  for  nothing  more."^ 

Recently  there  has  developed  a  tendency  looking  to  the 
conciliation  of  the  two  systems  of  private  international 
law,  namely,  to  that  of  Europe  and  to  that  of  the  English 
speaking  countries.  The  Conference  of  the  International 
Law  Association,  at  its  meeting  in  Heidelberg  in  191 1, 
declared  "that  there  ought  to  be  established  an  Interna- 
tional Commission  with  a  view  to  recommend  mutual 
concessions  between  the  systems  of  law  of  the  continent 
and  the  English  speaking  peoples  so  as  to  bring  them 
closer  to  uniformity." 

The  difference  in  the  basis  of  international  law  between 
the  countries  of  Roman  tradition  and  those  of  feudal 
traditions  are  not  so  profound  as  to  compel  us  to  abandon 
our  hope  of  reaching  a  compromise  which  will  eliminate 
the  divergencies.  National  peculiarities  which  took  shape 
by  reason  of  racial  differences  are  today  of  less  influence 
than  they  were  in  the  evolutionary  period  of  law,  while 

iCf.  Beale,  Harvard  Law  Review,  23;  Wharton,  Conflicts  of  Law- 
356-357;  and  New  York  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  Par.  1756. 


196  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

those  peculiarities  due  to  geographical  reasons  have  been 
modified  by  reason  of  the  improvement  of  communications 
and  means  of  closer  contact  between  peoples ;  while,  finally, 
those  due  to  differences  in  social  institutions  are  being 
gradually  wiped  out  by  reason  of  the  expansion  of  a  sin- 
gle ideal  of  civilization  which  makes  identical  the  princi- 
ples of  moral  and  juridical  life.^ 

The  action  of  various  common  cultural  factors,  the 
comparative  studies  of  legislation  which  seek  amid  all  the 
varieties  those  elements  which  are  common,  and  which 
always  exist  at  the  bottom  of  all  systems  of  law,  and 
upon  which  there  may  be  based  a  harmonizing  structure, 
research  in  the  universal  underlying  stratum  of  ideas  an^ 
principles  governing  our  civil  life,  and,  above  all,  the 
analogy  of  the  interests  which  nationalities  in  this  hemis- 
phere have  in  their  various  juridical  relations  and  particu- 
larly in  commercial  law; — these  factors  seem  to  justify 
our  hope  and  to  stimulate  our  effort  in  the  unification  of 
the  legal  standards  of  America. 

The  most  imperative  need  of  legislative  uniformity, — 
and  the  least  difficult  to  effect, — is  to  be  found  in  the  field 
of  commercial  law.  The  work  of  uniformity  in  this 
branch  meets  fewer  obstacles  than  in  the  other  branches 
of  law,  as  the  civil  or  public  law  more  immediately  and 
fundamentally  follows  the  influence  of  national  individ- 
ualism and  historical  tradition. 

Commercial  institutions  fulfill  economic  requirements 
of  a  general  character ;  it  is,  therefore,  in  this  branch  of 
legal  activity  that  the  task  of  making  uniform  the  law 
of  the  American  Republics  can  most  successfully  be 
achieved.  This  will  be  a  useful  accomplishment.  This 
work  of  uniformity  will  not  only  be  useful  now,  but  it 
will  also  clear  the  way,  in  the  future,  for  a  more  em- 
bracing and  more  profound  unity  of  the  juridical  life  of 
the  nations  of  this  hemisphere. 

'Bertin-Journ  de  Dr.  Int.  Prive,  1892-225,  and  1898.  For  the  oppo- 
site view,  see  Raoul  de  la  Grasserie.  Raymond  Saleilles,  Rev.  trim. 
de  Dr.  Civ. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  197 

The  President  of  the  University,  in  introducing  the 
next  speaker,  said : 

"I  beHeve  the  greatest  force  in  the  cotintry  today  for 
the  promotion  of  harmonious  intercourse  among  nations 
is  the  Pan  American  Union.  It  is  always  ready  to  furnish 
accurate  historical  knowledge  of  all  the  countries  of 
America,  and  it  is  likewise  always  ready  to  correct  false 
history  concerning  those  countries.  It  seems  that  a  man 
to  be  a  successful  Director  of  that  Union  should  possess 
one  of  the  qualities  of  a  great  poet.  He  has  to  be  born 
to  such  a  position  and  cannot  be  made.  The  Union  at 
present  has  a  man  at  its  head  who  certainly  seems  to  be 
born  for  the  position.  He  has  a  wide  knowledge  of  the 
American  Republics,  a  broad  sympathy  with  their  peo- 
ples and  a  geniality  which  is  irresistible.  It  gives  me  great 
pleasure  to  present  him  to  you  this  evening  in  the  per- 
son of  the  Honorable  Leo  S.  Rowe,  Doctor  of  Laws,  Di- 
rector of  the  Pan  American  Union." 


Closing  Remarks  by  the  Honorable  Leo  S.  Rowe, 

LL.D., 
Director  of  the  Pan  American  Union. 

Gentlemen  of  the  Special  Delegation  from  Venezuela, 
Members  of  the  Board  of  Regents  and  Faculties  of 
Georgetown  University,  Students  of  Georgetoum 
University,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen  : 

One  would  be  poor  both  in  mind  and  spirit  were  he 
not  to  be  stirred  by  an  inspirmg  occasion  such  as  this.  It 
is  on  these  occasions  that  we  are  able  to  measure  the 
progress  that  has  been  made  for  that  closer  relationship, 
not  only  between  the  governments,  but  between  the  peo- 
ples of  America,  which  means  so  much  to  the  present  and 
to  the  future  of  our  civilization. 

It  is,  therefore,  Mr.  Minister,  with  a  deep  sense  of 
privilege  that  I  bring  to  you  the  warm  greetings  and  con- 
gratulations of  the  Pan  American  Union. 


198  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

We  realize  that  in  honoring  you  Georgetown  Univer- 
sity has  honored  itself.  We  greet  you  as  the  representa- 
tive of  that  spirit  of  continental  co-operation  which  both 
you  and  your  country  have  done  so  much  to  develop. 
Statesman,  philosopher,  educator,  you  have  ever  held  be- 
fore your  students  and  before  the  people  of  your  country 
the  highest  standards  of  international  right  and  justice. 
Beyond  the  personal  tribute  which  this  occasion  means  to 
you,  Sir,  we  desire  to  thank  you  and  the  members  of  the 
distinguished  special  mission  that  accompanies  you  for 
the  honor  you  have  done  this  country  in  paying  us  this 
visit.  Your  presence  here  means  much  to  us,  as  it  means 
much  to  the  other  republics  of  the  American  continent, 
because,  aside  from  the  great  outpouring  of  national 
feeling  which  the  occasion  of  the  presentation  of  the  stat- 
ue of  the  Liberator  has  brought,  there  is  a  significance 
to  these  demonstrations  which  I  am  sure  you  will  carry 
back  with  you  to  Venezuela,  and  which  will  also  re- 
sound to  the  utmost  confines  of  this  continent. 

The  great  national  hero  whose  memory  we  have  hon- 
ored during  the  ceremonies  of  this  last  week  stands  forth 
in  the  history  of  this  continent  as  the  pioneer  of  interna- 
tion  co-operation,  the  first  to  appreciate  the  importance 
of  unity  of  policy  and  unity  of  effort  as  between  the  re- 
publics of  the  American  continent,  the  first  to  realize  how 
much  such  unity  of  effort  means  to  the  peace  of  America 
and  to  the  peace  of  the  world.  Bolivar's  call  for  the  as- 
sembly of  the  First  Pan  American  Congress,  which  met  in 
Panama  in  1826,  indicates  his  large  vision,  his  power  to 
visualize  the  future  and  his  keen  sense  of  the  important 
part  which  the  republics  of  America  were  called  upon  to 
play  in  the  history  of  modern  civilization.  The  high 
standards  which  he  set  during  the  early  years  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  have  required  a  long  time  of  painful  effort 
to  find  acceptance  throughout  the  continent,  and  it  is  only 
the  present  generation  that  is  beginning  to  reap  the  fruits 
of  the  great,  statesmanlike  vision  of  your  distinguished 
countryman. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  199 

And  we  congratulate  you,  Sir,  as  well  as  those  who  are 
accompanying  you,  that  it  has  been  vouchsafed  to  you  to 
continue,  and  to  express  in  your  own  pubHc  poHcy  those 
high  standards  and  ideals  for  which  Bolivar  stood,  for 
which  he  struggled  and  for  which  he  made  the  great  sac- 
rifice. 

The  Pan  American  Union  greets  you,  Sir,  not  only  as 
the  worthy  representative  of  a  great  country,  but  as  a 
staunch  promoter  of  those  ideals  of  international  justice 
and  fair  dealing  which  should  ever  characterize  the  rela- 
tions of  the  republics  of  America  with  one  another  and 
with  the  world  at  large. 


Latin  America  as  a  Factor  in 
International  Relations 


LATIN  AMERICA  AS  A  FACTOR  IN 
INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

I 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  AMERICAN   HISTORY 

The  attempt  to  formulate  the  basic  principles  govern- 
ing the  unfolding  of  history  has  been  the  major  purpose 
of  every  system  of  philosophy.  Historians  of  every  epoch 
have  concerned  themselves  with  the  presentation  of  facts, 
not  because  of  their  interest  in  the  happenings  of  a  par- 
ticular period,  but  rather  for  the  purpose  of  reaching 
some  conclusion  with  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  forces 
that  have  determined  economic,  social  and  political 
development. 

The  treatment  of  the  history  of  the  Latin  American 
countries  furnishes  a  curious  and  rather  significent  excep- 
tion to  the  general  rule.  While  the  salient  facts  of  their 
history  have  been  presented,  little  attempt  has  been  made 
to  present  a  philosophical  interpretation  and  explanation 
of  these  facts.  The  result  is  that,  especially  here  in  the 
United  States,  the  history  of  the  Latin  American  peoples 
is  regarded  as  a  succession  of  cataclysmic  changes  having 
little  relation  to  one  another  and  devoid  of  that  larger 
significance  which  is  usually  given  to  the  events  of  Euro- 
pean history. 

For  the  philosophy  of  American  history,  using  the 
term  American  in  its  broadest  continental  sense,  we  must 
look  to  the  utterances  of  the  great  leaders  of  thought 
and  action.  An  analysis  of  their  writings  discloses  two 
major  tendencies  representing  two  distinct  schools  of 
thought,  one  advocating  national  isolation,  and  the  other, 
international  co-operation,  especially  as  between  the  re- 
publics of  the  American  Continent. 

203 


204  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

In  our  own  history,  the  contrast  between  these  two 
schools  of  thought  is  most  clearly  set  forth  in  the  writ- 
ings of  Henry  Clay  as  contrasted  with  those  of  John 
Quincy  Adams.  During  his  entire  career  and,  especially 
during  the  period  that  he  served  as  Secretary  of  State, 
Clay  advocated  the  closest  co-operation  between  the  re- 
publics of  America.  In  fact,  there  lurked  in  his  mind  a 
plan  which  was  never  definitely  formulated, — to  bring 
about  some  form  of  political  affiliation,  or  at  least  unity 
of  policy  between  the  republics  of  the  American  Conti- 
nent. Adams,  on  the  other  hand,  looked  upon  affiliation 
or  anything  approaching  thereto  with  distrust,  and  re- 
garded any  such  plan  as  a  departure  from  the  settled 
policy  of  avoiding  entangling  alliances.  It  is  a  curious 
fact  that  in  spite  of  this  wide  difference  of  viewpoint, 
Henry  Clay  became  Secretary  of  State  under  Adams 
and  that  the  documents  attributed  to  these  two  statesmen, 
expressing  their  views  on  this  basic  question  of  foreign 
policy,  were  issued  soon  after  the  Inauguration  of 
Adams.^ 

Clay  did  not  hesitate  to  go  so  far  as  to  advocate  an 
actual  confederation  of  all  the  republics  of  the  American 
Continent,  and  with  a  vision  prophetic  of  subsequent 
efforts,  proposed  that  this  union  "should  wield  the  force 
of  the  confederated  states  in  defense  of  any  member 
that  may  be  attacked.     .     .     . 

"This  scheme  of  a  general  confederation  of  the 
Americas,"  he  said,  "  is  submitted  to  the  public  as  a 
means  of  securing  peace  and  power  abroad,  peace  and 
happiness  at  home.  Every  argument  of  humanity, 
policy  and  reason,  calls  upon  us  to  rivet  the  bonds  of 
fraternal  affection  between  the  inhabitants  of  the  same 
continent,  and  to  guard  with  a  sacred  vigilance  against 
the  rupture  of  a  single  link. 


'See  article  attributed  to  Henry  Clay,  appearing  in  the  Democratic 
Press  of  Philadelphia  and  reproduced  in  National  Intelligencer,  Wash- 
ington, April  26,  1825 ;  also  see  Register  of  Debates  in  Congress,  Vol. 
I,  Part  II,  page  2363. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  205 

"A  confederation  alone  is  competent  to  this  duly, 
and  without  it  we  must  submit  to  the  ordinary  fate  of 
other  nations — jealousy,  discord  and  war — whenever 
any  nation  thinks  itself  strong  enough  to  wage  one 
with  impunity." 

Adams,^  on  the  other  hand,  cautious  and  more  con- 
servative than  his  Secretary  of  State,  deprecated  "any 
departure  from  that  cardinal  principle  in  our  foreign  in- 
tercourse which  distrusts  and  rejects  alliances  with  for- 
eign nations,  for  any  purpose." 

II 

LATIN    AMERICAN    IDEALS^    BOLIVAR 

Long  before  Clay  and  Adams  had  formulated  their 
views  on  American  continental  policy,  Bolivar,^  languish- 
ing in  exile,  wrote : 

"Above  all  means  I  desire  to  see  formed  in  America 
the  greatest  nation  on  earth ;  greatest,  not  so  much  by 
virtue  of  its  extent  and  wealth,  but  by  virtue  of  its 
liberty  and  glory." 
The  broad  statesmanlike  vision,  which  characterized 
the  great  South  American  leader,  led  him  to  face  un- 
flinchingly all  the  political  and  social  difficulties  confront- 
ing the  nascent  republics  of  the  American  Continent.    He 
realized  to  the  fullest  the  obstacles  which  would  have  to 
be  overcome  before  the  peoples  of  America  could  develop 
into  a  truly  democratic  society.     He  never  allowed  his 
vision  to  be  obscured  by  formulae  or  phrases,  and  he 
fully  appreciated  the  fact  that  democracy  means  far  more 
than  a  mere  form  of  government,  and  that  unless  it  has 
its  roots  in  a  truly  democratic  form  of  social  organization 
the  mere  political  expression  becomes  a  hollow  and  empty 

form. 

Throughout  the  thought  and  activity  of  Bolivar  there 


>See  National  Intelligencer.  April  26,  1825.        „...,-.    ^.  ..^ 
2Famous  Kingston  letter  O'Leary  Memorias,  XXVU,  ZVl-Jiy. 


206  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

is  evident  a  deep  and  abiding  faith,  not  only  in  the  future 
of  what  he  designated  as  the  American  poHtical  system, 
but  also  in  the  high  mission  which  this  system  is  called 
upon  to  perform. 

The  philosophy  underlying  his  thought  represents  one 
of  the  two  great  currents  in  international  policy.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  policy  of  isolation,  whose  silent  correlative 
is  force,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  policy  of  co-opera- 
tion, whose  purpose  is  "not  to  restrain  the  forces  that 
make  for  war,  but  also  to  liberate  the  forces  that  make 
for  peace." 

It  would  be  presumptuous  to  attempt  a  detailed  formu- 
lation of  the  part  which  the  republics  of  America  are 
called  upon  to  play  in  the  economy  of  a  civilization, 
which,  until  very  recently,  promised  to  be  progressive. 
It  is  fitting,  however,  that  at  the  close  of  the  first  century 
of  their  independence,  some  attempt  be  made  to  estimate 
the  part  that  they  are  called  upon  to  play  and  which  they 
will  play  if  their  people  and  the  governments  emanating 
from  them  fully  realize  the  magnitude  of  their  obliga- 
tions and  the  possibilities  of  their  privileged  position. 

One  of  the  striking  characteristics  of  the  history  of  the 
peoples  of  Central  and  South  America  has  been  their 
readiness  and  willingness  to  place  themselves  in  the  ser- 
vice of  standards  of  international  right  and  justice  consid- 
erably higher  in  some  instances  than  the  standards  actu- 
ally disclosed  by  the  poHcy  pursued  by  their  respective 
governments.  In  fact  this  trait  has  been  as  characteristic 
of  the  history  of  the  United  States  as  of  the  republics  of 
Hispano-America. 

At  the  time  of  the  promulgation  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, for  instance,  the  documents  of  the  period  show 
that  the  leading  statesmen  of  the  United  States  regarded 
the  promulgation  of  this  Doctrine  as  necessary  to  the 
safety  and  untrammeled  development  of  the  republic;  a 
measure  calculated  to  prevent  the  repetition  on  the  Amer- 
ican Continent  of  the  entanglements,  jealousies  and  rival- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  207 

ries  which  characterized  the  European  international  sit- 
uation. To  the  people  of  the  United  States,  however, 
this  Doctrine  meant  far  more  than  a  measure  of  national 
protection.  It  aroused  enthusiasm  because  of  the  service 
which  it  was  calculated  to  render  to  the  then  struggling 
republics  of  Latin  America.  It  was  the  native  idealism  of 
the  people  that  prompted  them  to  give  warm  support  to  the 
Doctrine,  an  idealism  which  stands  in  marked  contrast 
with  the  more  calculating  principle  of  national  interest 
which  dominated  the  thought  of  the  political  leaders  of 
the  period.  The  generous  impulses  that  led  the  people  of 
the  United  States  warmly  to  sympathize  with  the 
struggles  for  independence  of  the  nations  of  Central  and 
South  America  also  led  to  the  expression  of  sympathy 
with  similar  struggles  in  other  sections  of  the  world.  In 
precisely  the  same  way  we  find  the  nations  of  Hispano- 
America,  not  only  warmly  sympathetic,  but  evincing  real 
enthusiasm  for  the  struggles  of  sister  nations  for  political 
and  civil  liberty. 

We  are  here  face  to  face  with  one  of  the  really  great 
problems  confronting  the  republics  of  the  American  Con- 
tinent. This  native  idealism  of  the  people  must  be  made 
more  efifective  in  international  afifairs.  The  surest  means 
to  bring  this  about  is  through  the  establishment  of  a 
closer  relationship  between  public  opinion  and  govern- 
mental policy ;  in  a  word  to  bridge  that  tragic  gap,  which 
has  been  the  cause  of  such  world  disaster; — the  abyss 
between  the  standards  of  national  opinion  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  so-called  practical  aims  of  political  leaders 
on  the  other.  This  is  the  true  significance  of  the  struggle 
for  the  democratization  of  American  foreign  policy; — 
namely,  to  translate  into  the  real  world  of  international 
relations,  the  idealism  and  generous  impulses  of  the  na- 
tions of  the  American  Continent.  The  difficulties,  while 
great,  are  in  no  sense  insurmountable  and  the  first  step 
toward  the  attainment  of  this  end  is  to  assure  the  freest 
possible  public  discussion  of  every  question  of  foreign 


208  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

policy.  The  real  democratization  of  government  depends 
not  on  the  indefinite  multiplication  of  elections,  but  rather 
on  that  constant  public  discussion  which  crystallizes  pub- 
lic opinion  and  which  makes  such  opinion  effective  in  its 
control  over  every  organ  of  government. 

III. 

SOURCES  OF  POTENTIAL  INFLUENCE 

During  the  century  that  has  elapsed  since  the  promul- 
gation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  countries  of  Latin 
America  have  increased  in  population  from  25,000,000 
to  85,000,000;  their  estimated  national  wealth  (while 
impossible  to  determine  accurately)  has,  roughly  speak- 
ing, advanced  from  $3,000,000,000  to  $50,000,000,000; 
their  position  in  world  commerce  has  changed  from  an 
estimated  total  of  exports  and  imports  of  $250,000,000 
in  1823,  to  a  total  of  $5,200,000,000  in  1920. 

These  figures  indicate  nothing  short  of  a  revolution  in 
their  position  in  the  economy  of  the  world's  affairs.  They 
can  no  longer  be  regarded  as  the  beneficiaries  of  the 
sympathy  and  more  or  less  benign  condescension  of  other 
nations,  but  have  come  to  take  their  position  amongst 
the  powers  of  the  world  with  all  the  duties  and  obliga- 
tions which  that  position  involves. 

In  order  to  make  that  position  as  fully  effective  as 
possible,  it  is  important  that  they  adopt  a  policy  which 
will  bring  about  at  least  three  major  results.  First,  they 
must  endeavor  to  secure  greater  financial  independence 
through  the  development  of  native  capital,  and  this  can 
only  be  done  through  the  stimulation  of  habits  of  thrift 
on  the  part  of  the  masses  of  the  people.  It  is  a  reflection 
on  their  economic  development  that  in  spite  of  marvelous 
resources,  in  spite  of  a  vigorous  and  alert  population, 
the  amount  of  native  capital  that  has  been  invested  in 
their  enterprises  is  comparatively  small. 

As  long  as  the  republics  of  Latin   America   remain 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  209 

wholly  dependent  on  foreign  capital  for  the  development 
of  their  resources,  so  long  will  their  independence  of 
judgment  and  of  action  be  limited  and  they  will  thereby 
be  prevented  from  playing  the  part  in  world  affairs  which 
they  are  manifestly  called  upon  to  play. 

This  does  not  imply  to  the  slightest  extent  any  dis- 
couragement to  the  investment  of  foreign  capital.  It 
means  the  establishment  of  financial  co-operation  rather 
than  the  present  situation  of  financial  dependence. 

A  change  significant  of  what  the  future  has  in  store 
for  us  is  now  taking  place  in  several  South  American 
countries  where,  with  the  combination  of  North  and 
South  American  capital,  new  enterprises  are  being  estab- 
lished and  a  new  spirit  of  international  co-operation 
developed. 

A  second  step — and  one  of  even  greater  importance — 
is  the  elimination  of  the  spirit  of  distrust  and  mutual 
suspicion  which  has  characterized  the  relations  between 
some  of  the  republics  of  Central  and  South  America. 
No  other  factor  has  contributed  so  much  toward  prevent- 
ing the  development  of  anything  approaching  unity  of 
continental  policy.  If  the  American  republics  hope  to 
acquire  a  real  influence  in  world  affairs,  they  must  elimi- 
nate from  their  international  relations  every  trace  of 
distrust  by  solving  the  international  questions  now  pend- 
ing between  them.  An  united  America  is  a  condition 
prerequisite  to  an  influential  America.  When  in  1902, 
after  definitely  settling  their  frontier  difficulties,  Chile 
and  Argentina  solemnly  agreed  to  a  limitation  of  arma- 
ments, an  agreement  amounting  practically  to  a  naval 
and  military  holiday  for  a  period  of  five  years,  they  set 
an  example  to  the  entire  continent,  demonstrating  what 
can  be  accomplished  when  mutual  confidence  and  good 
faith  become  the  guiding  factors  in  international  rela- 
tions. 

In  the  third  place,  the  American  Republics  must  make 
sendee  rather  than  revenue  the  guiding  principle  of  their 


210  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

national  as  well  as  their  international  policy.  By  this, 
of  course,  I  do  not  mean  that  they  need  sacrifice  any  of 
their  budgetary  interests,  or  even  that  they  are  called 
upon  to  reduce  the  burden  of  taxation.  The  principle 
does,  however,  call  for  the  imposition  of  taxes  according 
to  ability  to  pay  rather  than  ease  of  collection,  and  the 
application  of  social  rather  than  purely  financial  or  fiscal 
considerations  in  fixing  the  cost  of  governmental  service 
to  the  consumer. 

IV. 

PAN   AMERICAN   CO-OPERATION 

The  principle  which  I  am  here  defending  was  strik- 
ingly illustrated  in  the  recent  International  Postal  Con- 
ference held  at  Madrid.  At  this  world  conference  the 
contrast  between  the  European  and  the  American  view- 
point was  clearly  and  almost  dramatically  presented. 
European  countries,  in  the  desperate  financial  condition 
which  they  find  themselves,  are  seeking  every  possible 
opportunity  to  increase  their  revenues.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  American  Republics  look  upon  such  services 
as  postal  communication  in  the  light  of  a  broad  social 
service,  designed  to  foster  closer  ties  between  different 
sections  of  the  country  and  to  bring  about,  internation- 
ally, closer  bonds  of  friendship  and  commerce  between 
different  sections  of  the  Continent. 

The  difference  of  viewpoint  was  so  great,  in  fact,  so 
irreconcilable,  that  the  only  satisfactory  solution  was  the 
negotiation  of  a  separate  convention  between  the  repub- 
lics of  the  American  Continent  (to  which  Spain  and 
Portugal  were  also  admitted)  under  which  the  domestic 
rate  is  made  applicable  to  all  classes  of  mail  matter  be- 
tween the  countries  parties  to  this  agreement. 

Viewed  in  its  larger  aspect,  the  action  thus  taken  by 
the  American  Republics  possesses  a  far-reaching  signifi- 
cance, not  only  from  the  standpoint  of  their  domestic 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  211 

policy,  but  also  as  the  indication  of  the  principle  which 
should  guide  their  international  relations. 

With  the  accomplishment  of  these  three  steps  in  their 
national  and  international  policy,  the  republics  of  Latin 
America  will  be  prepared  fully  to  enter  upon  that  larger 
influence  which  they  are  destined  to  exercise  on  the  des- 
tinies of  the  modern  world.  Today  America  is  the  only 
section  of  the  world  in  which  the  peace  spirit  still  pre- 
vails. Signer  Nitti  has  aptly  described  the  situation 
w^hen  he  said : 

"What  is  wrong  with  the  world  is  that  we  still  keep 
the  war  spirit ;  we  do  not  cultivate  the  peace  spirit."  A 
description  of  the  social  conditions  now  prevailing  in 
Europe  even  more  accurate  is  given  by  one  of  the 
keenest  observers  of  our  day.^  'After  as  before  the 
peace."  he  says,  the  temper  has  always  been  the  war 
temper.  The  peace  temper  has  never  been  recovered. 
There  may  be  war  in  the  world  though  not  a  shot  is 
fired.  War  in  action  has  at  least  the  virtue ;  that  the 
warmakers  may  affront  personal  perils.  War  in  its 
new  form  is  utterly  despicable ;  the  people  are  still 
drunk  with  the  maddening  fumes  of  war.  .  .  Peace 
is  not  a  mere  suspension  of  fighting;  ...  it  is  not  a 
negative  but  a  positive  thing,  worth  attaining  by  the 
most  laborious  efforts,  if  needs  be,  worth  many  sacri- 
fices. .  .  The  foolish,  wicked  diplomatic  history  of 
two  years  would  nevertheless  not  have  been  possible  if 
the  soul  of  mankind  had  not  been  in  shadow.  Not 
only  were  the  cornfields  and  the  vineyards  of  France 
ravaged  by  the  war,  but  the  cornfields  and  the  vineyards 
of  the  spirit  were  trampled  under  foot.  The  iniquities 
of  peace  are  bom  of  the  war.  War  has  destroyed 
"elasticity  of  mind,  independence  of  judgment  and 
liberty  of  expression.  We  think  not  so  much  of  truth 
as  of  conforming  to  the  tacitlv  accepted  fiction  of  the 
hour." 
Europe  stands  today  under  the  pall  of  a  great  dis- 
appointment.    People  have  lost  faith  in  their  rulers  and 

*Sisley  Huddleston. 


212  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

give  evidence  of  a  lassitude,  and  a  reversion  to  the  same 
standards  that  brought  on  the  disaster  of  the  Great  War. 
As  Philip  Gibbs  has  well  said : 

"War  to  end  war  now  mocks  at  us  with  jeering 
laughter.  .  .  Nationalism  more  narrow,  more  bitter, 
more  selfish  than  in  the  world  of  1914,  has  replaced  the 
fleeting  hope  of  many  peoples,  that  there  might  be  a 
real  league  of  nations  based  upon  the  common  sense  of 
common  folk.  .  .  We  have  fallen  back  on  cynicism, 
as  nations,  as  classes,  as  individuals.  There  is  only  one 
cure  for  the  woes  of  Europe  and  our  own — not  easy, 
but  bound  to  come  unless  we  are  looking  for  downfall. 
It  is  the  reconciliation  of  peoples,  burying  of  old  hatch.- 
ets,  wiping  out  of  old  villainies  and  co-operating  in  a 
much  closer  union  of  mutual  help.  .  .  Before  that 
can  happen  there  must  come  new  leaders,  new  enthusi- 
asm for  the  ideals  of  life,  a  new  spirit  of  unselfishness 
and  service  for  the  common  weal: — and  just  now,  we 
do  not  see  them  coming." 

V 

THE  ROLE  OF  THE  AMERICAS 

It  is  here  that  a  great  opportunity  presents  itself  to 
the  republics  of  America.  Whether  in  the  accomplish- 
ment of  this  great  world  mission  they  are  to  have  the 
co-operation  of  the  United  States,  still  hangs  in  the  bal- 
ance, but  as  to  the  ultimate  decision  there  can  be  no 
doubt.  Even  without  that  co-operation,  they  are  now 
called  upon  to  give  to  the  world  a  demonstration  of  the 
efficiency  of  the  principle  of  co-operation  as  contrasted 
with  the  principle  of  force.  What  Europe  was  unable  to 
do,  America  must  now  perform.  She  must  not  fail,  for, 
if  she  does,  the  last  hope  of  mankind  for  a  new  order  dis- 
appears. One  cannot  help  but  feel  a  glow  of  enthusiasm 
at  the  opportunity  which  now  presents  itself  to  the 
younger  generation  and  which  must  be  an  inspiration  to 
effort,  combined  with  a  high  resolve  that  this  great  Con- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  213 

tinent  shall  make  a  return  to  the  world  for  the  privileges 
and  blessings  that  have  been  showered  upon  it. 

We  must  ever  bear  in  mind,  however,  that  to  fulfill 
this  mission  our  domestic,  as  well  as  our  international, 
policy  must  be  dominated  by  those  ideals  which  we  in- 
herited from  the  great  founders  of  the  American  Re- 
publics. The  governments  of  America  must  heed  the 
yearnings  and  fulfill  the  desires  of  the  masses  of  the 
people.  They  must  meet  the  demands  of  millions  of  men 
and  women  "for  iinselfish  purpose  and  fine  vision;  for 
evolution  and  not  for  revolution ;  for  peace  and  not  for 
blood/'' 

But,  you  will  ask,  what  part  is  the  United  States  to 
play  in  this  new  world  order,  if  new  world  order  here  is 
to  be?  It  is  at  this  point  that  an  important,  far-reaching 
decision  confronts  the  people  of  this  country.  They  must 
decide  whether  their  policy  shall  be  continental  or 
selfishly  national.  Our  entry  into  the  European  war  was 
a  clear  demonstration,  if  any  further  demonstration  were 
necessary,  that  the  period  of  America's  isolation  was  at 
an  end,  and  yet,  with  the  close  of  the  war,  we  find  large 
sections  of  our  people  attempting  the  manifestly  impos- 
sible task  of  resuming  a  status  of  isolation  which  no 
longer  exists  and  which,  in  fact,  could  not  exist,  given 
the  present  economic  and  financial  influence  of  this  coun- 
try in  world  affairs. 

It  must  be  clear  to  every  student  of  history  that  unless 
the  American  people  are  willing  to  face  the  responsibili- 
ties which  the  force  of  circumstances  has  placed  upon 
them,  disaster  will  follow.  No  far-seeing  vision  is  re- 
quired to  appreciate  that  the  Americas  are  destined  to 
be  the  steadying  influence  in  the  maintenance  and  prog- 
ress of  civilization.  Both  by  that  direct  influence  and 
by  their  example  they  must  impress  upon  the  world  to  an 
increasing  depree  the  constructive  value  of  co-operation. 


Trancis  Hackett  in  The  New  Republic,  May  12,  1920. 


214    ;         HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

as  disting-uished  from  force.  To  the  United  States,  this 
is  a  matter  vital  to  the  further  development  of  our  demo- 
cratic institutions.  Isolation  means  armament;  it  means 
a  state  of  defense  against  every  conceivable  combination 
that  may  be  formed,  and  this  means  a  status  of  milita- 
rism which  is  inherently  antagonistic  to  the  growth  of 
democratic  institutions. 

Co-operation,   therefore,   with  the  republics  of  Latin 
America   in   the   development   of   a   unified    Continental 
policy  is  a  matter  of  interest  not  only  to  the  future  of  our 
civilization,  but  to  the  very  existence  of  our  democratic 
institutions.     More  than  this — a  policy  of  isolation  means 
that  the  United  States  may  become  a  disturbing  factor  in 
the  world   relations.      Such   a   tragedy,   and  tragedy   it 
would  be,  would  be  all  the  greater  because  of  the  fact 
that  the  people  of  this  country  are  essentially  a  peace- 
loving  people  and  that  their  present  insistence  on  isola- 
tion  is   dictated   in  large   measure   by   a   deeply   rooted 
desire   for  peace.      In    other    words,    the    standards   of  "^ 
national  thought,  developed  more  than  a  century  ago,    / 
when  isolation  meant  peace,  have  been  carried   into  a    [ 
period  in  which  the  radical  change  of  world  conditions     f 
makes   this   same    demand    for   isolation   a    menace    to     \ 
America's  peace  and  may  develop  into  a  menace  to  the   J 
world.  .     _  ---^ 

I  doubt  whether  any  other  nation  has  ever  shown  quite 
the  same  capacity  as  the  people  of  this  country  to  close 
their  eyes  to  the  actual  conditions  with  which  they  are 
surrounded.  The  choice  which  they  think  confronts 
them  today  is  more  apparent  than  real.  Whatever  policy 
they  adopt  will  mean  much  to  the  future  of  the  world. 
It  is  physically,  morally,  socially,  and  politically  impos- 
sible for  them  to  isolate  themselves.  The  real  question 
is  whether,  in  unison  with  all  the  other  republics  of 
America,  they  will  assume  their  full  share  of  responsi- 
bility for  the  maintenance  of  the  world's  peace  and  thus 
create  conditions  favorable  to  the  normal  development 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  215 

of  their  own  institutions  and  to  the  fulfillment  of  their 
high  world  mission.  Any  other  course  will  ultimately 
spell  disaster  to  us  and  possibly  disaster  to  the  world. 

We  sometimes  discuss  America  as  if  by  some  in- 
scrutable and  special  ruling  of  Providence  she  is  to  be 
exempt  from  those  inexorable  laws  that  have  governed 
the  rise  and  the  decline  of  other  nations.  It  is  for  this 
generation  to  divest  itself  of  all  such  illusions.  America 
will  be  great  to  the  extent  to  which  she  points  the  way 
and  gives  the  practical  demonstration  of  a  better  life  for 
the  masses  of  her  people  and  of  a  better  international 
order  as  between  her  constituent  parts.  Unless  she  can 
make  that  demonstration,  she  will  be  recreant  to  her 
trust.  To  the  extent,  however,  to  which  she  meets  the 
manifest  requirements  of  the  situation,  she  will  not  only 
be  serving  herself,  but  she  will  save  society  from  the 
menace  which  now  confronts  it.  This  is  the  true  mean- 
ing of  "America  first" ;  the  true  interpretation  of  a  slogan 
divested  of  its  narrow,  selfish,  and  sordid  meaning,  and 
made  the  servitor  of  mankind. 

LEO  S.  ROWE. 


The    Far   East   as   a   Factor  in 
.International  Developments 


THE    FAR    EAST   AS    A    FACTOR    IN    INTER- 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 

CHINA  BEFORE  CONTACT  WITH  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION 

The  great  central  factor  in  the  Far  Eastern  situation 
is  China.  Not  only  is  her  own  established  civilization  in 
itself  of  the  highest  importance,  but  the  temper,  aims  and 
policies  of  this  vast  population  will  deeply  affect  the 
future  development  of  human  history. 

China  has  but  recently  come  into  relationship  with 
the  rest  of  the  world,  and  particularly  with  the  western 
nations.  Up  to  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  she 
was  a  world  by  herself;  the  extent  of  her  territories, 
the  abundance  of  her  resources  and  the  completeness  of 
her  economic  life  made  her  self  sufficing.  She  had  re- 
tained a  high  pride  in  her  civilization  from  the  ages  when 
the  nations  of  the  west  were  still  barbarian.  This  tra- 
dition of  superiority  was  preserved  in  Chinese  thought 
and  expressed  itself  in  action,  negatively  through  a  re- 
fusal to  have  anything  to  do  with  outside  nations.  The 
Chinese  constituted  a  great  autonomous  society  to  whom 
the  outside  world  was  indifferent.  It  was  a  society  in 
which  social  and  economic  activities  were  all  important 
and  which  cared  and  knew  little  about  political  action  in 
the  sense  in  which  it  was  developed  in  the  Western  World. 

When  the  merchant  adventurers  from  the  West  first 
forced  their  attentions  upon  the  Chinese  they  were  treated 
merely  as  a  local  disturbance.  Their  presence  and  their 
activities  did  not  make  any  impression  on  the  Chinese 
people  as  a  whole.  Even  when  the  merchants  were  fol- 
lowed by  diplomatic  agents,  these  too  were  looked  upon 
not  as  the  representatives  of  communities  equal  to  the 
Chinese  in  importance,  but  as  interlopers  to  be  given  as 
little  as  possible  scope  in  Chinese  affairs.     It  was  entirely 

219 


220  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

for  the  reason  that  a  nation  of  political  action  and  po^ 
litical  organization,  as  it  had  developed  in  the  West,  was 
not  understood  by  the  Chinese  that  they  were  ready  to 
commit  themselves  to  so  many  undertakings  that  turned 
out  to  be  highly  disadvantageous  to  them.  The  foreign 
representatives  were  regarded  as  troublesome  individuals, 
disregardful  of  the  social  consideration  customary  among 
the  Chinese,  given  tO'  making  threats  of  brutal  force. 
The  Chinese  negotiators,  having  in  the  past  always  ar- 
ranged affairs  by  temporary  compromises,  which  was 
not  dangerous  as  long  as  the  affairs  were  merely  local, 
applied  the  same  tactics  to-  international  negotiations, 
with  the  result  that  they  gradually  committed  their  gov- 
ernment to  very  onerous  obligations. 

A  dim  but  intense  consciousness  among  the  Chinese 
people  that  their  country  was  being  manacled  led  to  the 
outbreaks  of  1900.  This  popular  movement  of  protest  was 
indeed  originally  directed  against  the  Manchus  as  much 
as  against  the  foreigners,  but  it  soon  was  gone  partly 
through  the  manipulations  of  the  court  and  its  anti-foreign 
character.  The  result  was  the  establishment  of  co-opera- 
tion among  all  the  foreign  powers  interested  in  China 
for  the  defense  of  the  rights  acquired  in  the  past  decades. 
This  solidarity  naturally  tended  to  fix  permanently  upon 
China  all  the  privileges  which  had  been  gained  by  any  one 
of  the  foreign  nations.  They  claimed  them  all  for  their 
own  nationals.  The  more  liberal  powers  were  desirous 
of  making  concessions  to  China  and  strengthening  her 
government  and  preserving  her  independence,  but  were 
confronted  by  the  refusal  of  other  powers  to  give  up 
any  of  the  rights  acquired.  Thus,  it  worked  out  that  in 
any  controversy  the  determining  influence  lay  with  the 
power  determined  to  make  no  concessions. 

PRESENT    DAY    CHINA 

Not  only  on  account  of  her  size  and  continental  posi- 
tion,  but   also   because   of  the  age  and   quality  of   her 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  221 

civilization  and  its  predominating  influence  in  the  life  of 
the  Far  East,  China  is  the  essential  factor  in  the  Far 
Eastern  situation.  Through  persistent  reports  of  revolu- 
tions and  other  internal  trouble,  the  outside  world  is  apt 
to  receive  the  impression  that  China  approaches  a  state 
of  confusion  and  anarchy,  such  as  visited  Mexico  in  the 
worst  days.  Yet  such  is  not  the  case,  and  the  situation 
is  essentially  different.  China  is  just  at  present  subject 
to  the  devastations  of  a  great  natural  catastrophe  holding 
the  danger  of  famine  and  death  of  millions;  yet  aside  from 
this  natural  disaster,  her  social  and  economic  life  is 
sound.  The  political  troubles  which  we  hear  so  much 
about  are  on  the  surface.  They  are  squabbles  between 
politicians  and  military  commanders  which  do  not  reach 
deep  into  the  life  of  the  people.  The  normal  activities 
of  life,  in  agriculture,  industry  and  commerce,  go  on  un- 
interruptedly, and  no  matter  how  w^eak  the  government 
may  be  at  times,  the  social  system  is  strong  and  sound. 
In  fact,  there  is  today  no'  nation  in  the  world  where 
fundamental  social  conditions  are  so  stable. 

China  has  at  all  times  been  non-political.  In  her  life 
such  impersonal,  abstract  ideas  as  sovereignty,  legality, 
corporate  existence,  have  not  played  any  important  part. 
The  relationship  of  Chinese  society  have  all  been  concrete 
and  personal.  Men  have  been  found  with  a  personal  tie 
to  their  fathers  and  brothers,  their  wives  and  children, 
their  clansmen,  their  teachers  and  the  officials,  in  an 
ascending  order.  There  was  never  developed  a  strong 
central  administration.  The  union  of  the  country  was 
one  of  traditions  and  culture,  particularly  literary  and 
philosophical  rather  than  of  legal  institutions.  Politi- 
cally considered,  it  was,  and  still  is,  a  loose  federation  of 
provinces,  in  which  the  localities  manage  their  own  afifairs, 
and  in  which  the  popular  loyalties  are  nearly  all  attached 
to  local,  personal  and  visible  entities. 

The  tradition  from  this  system  of  strong  personal  re- 
lationship to  the  impersonal  ideas  which  underlie  the 
Western  system  of  law,  representative  government  and 


222  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

corporate  action,  involves  very  radical  changes.  Never  in 
history  before  has  any  nation  been  confronted  with  a 
problem  so  complex.  It  is  because  the  old  civilization 
was  so  permanent,  so  great,  and  so  strong,  that  the 
change  to  new  methods  is  sO'  difficult. 

The  youth  of  China  is  at  present  animated  with  the 
desire  to  build  up  a  strong  national  system,  utilizing  the 
methods  of  the  West.  The  national  movement,  which 
was  organized  in  1919  by  students  and  merchants,  seeks 
to  make  the  ideal  of  national  cohesion  a  reality.  In  the 
past,  the  great  strength  of  the  Chinese  people  has  lain 
in  the  management  by  each  local  community  of  its  own 
affairs,  and  the  enormous  power  of  tacit  resistance  to  any 
unwelcome  changes  or  demands  from  above  or  from 
without.  In  China  it  has  been  practically  impossible  to 
put  through  a  change  which  the  people  did  not  accept; 
but  the  people  were  not  organized  for  positive  action 
through  public  opinion  or  through  representative  insti- 
tutions. For  the  first  time  in  Chinese  history  the  attempt 
is  now  being  made  to  organize  a  positive  expression  of 
the  popular  will.  The  actual  power  of  government  in  the 
larger  units  is  in  the  hands  of  the  military  governors  of 
provinces.  There  is  a  struggle  between  this  authority, 
resting  on  corruption  and  force,  and  the  inherited  and 
newly-developed  desires  for  self-government. 

China  has  a  pacific,  ethical  civilization;  that  is,  a  civi- 
lization which  rests  not  on  an  appeal  to  authority  based 
on  force,  but  on  a  universal  sense  of  equity  which  ex- 
presses itself  constantly  in  popular  action,  without  re- 
course to  formal  tribunals.  The  critical  question  of 
today  is,  can  this  ethical  content  of  Chinese  civilization 
be  preserved  while  national  action  is  strengthened 
through  the  adoption  of  efficient  methods  developed  in 
the  West;  or  will  the  people  of  China  be  driven  into  mili- 
tarism by  outside  aggression,  and  through  the  manipula- 
tions of  the  satellites  and  instruments  of  an  outside 
militarist  power?  To  the  outcome  of  this  great  crisis 
America  cannot  be  indifferent.    The  temper  of  the  great 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  223 

continental  nation  of  Asia  and  the  character  of  its  policy, 
are  of  the  utmost  moment  to  us.  Fortunately,  after  a 
relationship  with  China  extending  over  one  hundred  and 
forty  years,  America  enjoys  the  good  will  and  confidence 
of  the  Chinese  in  the  highest  measure.  The  problem  of 
China  is  not  merely  one  of  concessions  and  spheres  of 
influence,  but  one  of  the  essential  interests  of  civilization. 
If  the  just  and  peaceable  traditions  of  Chinese  civiliza- 
tion can  be  preserved  in  Asia,  world  peace  will  rest  on  a 
more  secure  foundation  than  the  ingenuity  of  statesmen 
could  contrive. 

RELATIONS    BETWEEN    CHINA    AND    JAPAN    DURING    AND 
AFTER   THE    WORLD   WAR 

During  the  Great  War  the  neighbor  of  China,  the 
Japanese  Empire,  utilized  every  opportunity  to  strengthen 
her  position  and  interests  in  China.  Immediately  after 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  German  leasehold  at  Tsingtau, 
with  a  railway  extending  into  the  interior,  was  seized 
by  Japan,  with  the  initial  declaration  that  these  con- 
cessions would  be  eventually  returned  to  China.  In 
January,  191 5,  the  Japanese  Government  caused  a  list 
of  twenty-one  demands  to  be  secretly  presented  to  the 
President  of  China.  The  demands  included  both  conces- 
sions of  special  right  in  certain  localities  and,  in  the 
fifth  group,  general  rights  of  participation  in  the  exercise 
of  sovereign  powers  in  China.  The  demands  were  finally 
enforced  in  May,  19 17,  through  an  ultimatum  threaten- 
ing the  use  of  force,  with  the  exception  of  the  fifth  group 
which  was  postponed  for  future  action. 

When  the  United  States  broke  off  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany  the  Chinese  Government,  in  February, 
191 7,  decided  to  follow  the  same  policy.  There  were  no 
demands,  promises  or  urgent  representations,  there  was 
no  haggling  about  advantages  to  be  obtained.  After  a 
brief  but  careful  consideration  of  the  proposal  of  the 
United  States,  it  was  accepted  by  the  free  act  of  the 


224  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

Chinese  Government.  At  the  very  time  when  the  Chinese 
were  making  this  decision,  the  Japanese  Government  ap- 
proached the  governments  of  Russia,  Great  Britain  and 
France  with  the  suggestion  that  it  would  use  its  in- 
fluence to  bring  China  to  the  side  of  the  Allies,  on  con- 
dition that  the  German  rights  in  Shantung  were  assured 
to  Japan.  China  broke  off  relations  with  Germany  in 
February,  1917,  and  declared  war  in  August,  1917.  The 
Chinese  Government  was  ready  to  send  large  bodies  of 
troops  to  Europe,  but  the  transportation  difficulties  at  the 
time  prevented  such  movements.  Had  the  was  lasted 
longer,  China  would  undoubtedly  have  become  an  im- 
portant source  of  men  and  supplies. 

After  the  armistice  the  Chinese  nation  entertained  the 
confident  expectation  that  the  German  rights  in  Shantung 
would  not  be  given  to  any  other  power,  but  would  revert 
to  China  in  accordance  with  equity  and  the  accepted  princi- 
ples of  international  law,  China  being  ready  to  indemnify 
Japan  for  all  her  expenses.  But  the  peace  conference 
awarded  the  ex-German  rights  to  Japan.  China  did  not 
agree  to  this  transfer  and  it  is  therefore  not  legally  valid, 
as,  by  the  operation  of  international  law,  the  Shantung 
rights  had  reverted  to  China  when  she  declared  war  on 
Germany  in  August,  19 17.  The  secret  agreements  made 
by  certain  Chinese  officials  with  Japan,  to^  the  contrary 
effect,  were  not  recognized  by  the  Chinese  nation,  as  hav- 
ing been  made  without  the  consent  of  a  national  repre- 
sentative body. 

Japan  being  in  military  possession  of  Tsingtau  and  the 
railway,  wanted  to  consider  the  award  of  the  Paris  peace 
conference  as  completing  her  title.  The  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment made  a  formal  offer  to  negotiate  with  China 
for  the  return  of  the  German  leasehold.  The  Chinese 
Government  has  declined  to  enter  into  such  negotiations, 
because  to  dO'  sO'  would  be  admitting  the  right  which 
Japan  claims  and  which  China  denies.  Moreover,  it  was 
understood  that  the  Japanese  Government  intended  to 
offer  the  return  of  only  the  German  leasehold,  about  one 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  225 

hundred  square  miles  of  unimportant  land;  retaining  the 
highly  valuable  port  of  Tsingtau,  with  its  steamship  and 
railway  terminals,  the  railway  to  the  capital  of  the 
province,  and  the  mining  rights  taken  from  the  Germans. 
As  these  are  the  really  important  factors  through  which 
the  commercial  and  political  control  of  the  whole  province 
can  be  effected,  the  Chinese  people  are  not  interested  in 
the  proposal  "to  return  the  Shantung  leasehold."  The 
language  used  has  given  the  impression  to  many  that 
Japan  had  seized  the  entire  province  of  Shantung,  and 
was  generously  offering  to  return  it  to  China.  Neither 
Germany  nor  Japan,  however,  at  any  time  had  any  right 
to  the  province  of  Shantung,  outside  of  the  leasehold 
of  Tsingtau  and  the  railway,  with  the  adjoining  mines. 
Should  Japan  retain  the  railway,  it  was  apprehended  that 
a  situation  would  be  created  similar  to  that  which  obtains 
in  Manchuria. 

CHINA,    JAPAN,    AND   SIBERIA 

The  joint  intervention  of  the  Allied  Powers  in  Siberia 
in  19 18  led  to  the  occupation  of  parts  of  Eastern  Si- 
beria by  Japanese  troops,  which  still  remain  there  though 
the  other  allies  have  withdrawn  their  contingents. 
While  government  is  not  strongly  organized  in  Siberia, 
yet  the  authority  of  the  government  of  Chita  being  con- 
stantly extended,  and  it  gives  promise  of  stability.  In  a 
measure  as  its  power  grows,  it  demands  more  insistently 
the  withdrawal  of  Japanese  troops  from  Russian  soil. 
While  the  Chinese  Government  has  not  established  diplo- 
matic relations  with  the  Siberian  Government,  it  has 
found  it  necessary  to  make  certain  arrangements  concern- 
ing commerce  passing  the  common  boundary  between 
these  two  countries.  The  Siberian  Government  has  ex- 
pressed itself  favorable  to  returning  to  China,  concessions 
made  to  the  Czarist  Government  of  Russia;  but  such 
treaty  revisions  have  of  course  not  yet  been  taken  up  in 
actual  negotiations.     There  undoubtedly  exists  between 


226  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

the  Chinese  and  the  Russian  people  an  instinctive  sym- 
pathy, which  would  be  greatly  strengthened  and  would 
become  a  very  important  factor,  were  the  promises  to 
China  held  out  by  the  new  governments  in  Russia  to  be 
embodied  in  actual  agreements. 

International  joint  action  in  China  is  favored  by  the 
creation  of  the  financial  Consortium,  which  has  com- 
pleted its  organization  and  is  now  beginning  to  negotiate 
with  the  Chinese  Government  for  financial  support  tO'  be 
given  constructive  public  enterprises  in  China,  such  as 
the  building  of  roads,  railways,  harbors  and  canals.  It 
is  recognized  that  the  prime  need  of  China  lies  in  the 
direction  of  better  means  of  communication.  Meanwhile, 
both  locally  and  through  the  Central  Government,  the 
Chinese  are  beginning  with  their  own  means  and  in  co- 
operation with  foreign  capital,  to  execute  comprehensive 
improvements  of  this  kind. 

PAUL  S.  REINSCH. 


The   United   States   as  a  Factor  in  the 

Development  of  International 

Relations 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  FACTOR  IN  THE 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL 

RELATIONS 

L 

THE  GENESIS  OF  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

It  is  probably  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  no  single 
event  in  modern  history  has  exerted  a  greater  influence 
upon  the  development  of  international  relations  than  the 
advent  in  1776  of  the  United  States  of  America  into  the 
family  of  nations.  That  event  was  epoch-making  not 
only  because  it  marked  the  birth  of  a  new  world  power, 
but  because  the  principles  of  thought  and  action  upon 
which  our  existence  as  an  independent  nation  was  justi- 
fied created  a  new  departure  in  theories  of  government. 
History  has  been  described  as  the  philosophy  of  hind- 
sight. Reviewed  in  the  light  of  the  facts  which  gave  rise 
to  the  American  Revolution  and  which  dictated  the 
course  of  our  subsequent  career,  no  people  will  be  found 
to  have  adhered  more  closely  to  a  consistent  principle  of 
conduct  both  in  domestic  and  foreign  affairs  than  the 
people  of  the  United  States. 

To  evaluate  the  factors  which  fashioned  the  popular 
mind  in  1776,  and  led  to  the  principles  enunciated  in 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  and  subsequent  expres- 
sions of  national  policy,  it  is  necessary  to  take  into 
account  the  origin  and  circumstances  of  colonial  life  in 
America.  Groups  of  sturdy  pioneers  had  hewed  out  of 
the  wilderness  the  materials  of  civilized  life  in  the  face 
of  dangers  unknown  to  the  inhabitants  of  European  com- 
munities. The  distance  from  the  home-land,  the  democ- 
racy naturally  created  by  subjection  to  common  problems 
and  dangers,  the  self-reliance  and  individualism  induced 

229 


230  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

by  the  very  nature  of  their  effort,  aroused  in  the  colonists 
a  craving  for  freedom  and  independence.  There  was 
born  in  them  a  devotion  to  self-government  which  a 
sagacious  mother  country,  under  what  Burke  called  a 
policy  of  "wise  and  salutary  neglect,"  had  not  sought 
unduly  to  hamper.  But  such  measure  of  local  political 
freedom  as  the  colonists  enjoyed  made  the  more  intoler- 
able the  system  of  commercial  colonial  monopoly  which 
restricted  their  trade  almost  entirely  to  Great  Britain, 
in  ships  of  that  country.  The  feeling  of  dissatisfaction 
aroused  found  nourishment  and  justification  in  the  philos- 
ophy of  the  French  disciples  of  the  doctrine  of  natural 
rights,  with  its  opposition  to  governmental  and  ecclesi- 
astical oppression.  With  this  philosophy  of  freedom 
from  imposed  control,  which  permeates  the  Declaration 
of  Independence,  the  moral  justification  for  political, 
commercial  and  intellectual  emancipation  had  been  found. 
Moreover,  the  colonists  had  been  parties  to  practically 
every  European  war  of  the  eighteenth  century,  of  which 
they  were  on  occasion  the  unwitting  cause  and  usually 
the  unwilling  victims. 

Bearing  these  facts  in  mind,  it  is  readily  apparent 
that  the  American  Revolution  was  a  protest  in  the  name 
of  liberty  against  that  political,  commercial  and  intel- 
lectual bondage  which  was  then  identified  with  the 
European  systems  of  government.  It  is  not  surprising, 
therefore,  that  the  fundamental  and  dominant  principle 
of  our  domestic  and  foreign  policy  has  been  emancipation 
from  European  political  systems. 

It  requires  but  slight  acquaintance  with  history  to 
recognize  that  national  self-interest  is  the  primary  source 
of  any  national  policy.  Of  its  various  manifestations, 
the  instinct  of  self-preservation  or  security  is  the  most 
insistent.  The  measures  for  safe-guarding  this  funda- 
mental interest  are  likely  to  be  dictated  principally  by 
physical  conditions,  notably  geographical  position.  For- 
eign policy,  controlled  by  such  rigorous  and  unchanging 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  231 

conditions,  is  often  likely  to  become  intuitive,  and  in 
proportion  to  its  success,  more  or  less  permanent.  Noth- 
ing is,  therefore,  more  natural  than  that  the  United 
States,  with  its  distance  from  Europe  and  its  deep-seated 
aversion  to  the  European  political  system,  should  have 
adopted  a  policy  of  diplomatic  isolation  or  reciprocal  non- 
intervention. 

The  very  success  of  our  consolidation  as  a  nation  on 
this  continent  and  the  continuity  of  our  growth  in  power 
and  wealth  without  departure  from  that  policy  is  a  stand- 
ing challenge  to  those  who  would,  on  the  provocation  of 
what  seems  to  them  a  divine  inspiration,  and  a  vision  of 
new  necessities,  subvert  perhaps  the  most  fundamental 
principle  of  our  national  existence. 

Consistent  as  our  foreign  policy  has  been  down  to 
recent  years,  it  has  not  been  doctrinaire.  The  complete 
sacrifice  of  expediency  for  principle  has  never  been  a 
dominant  characteristic  of  the  American  mind;  so  that 
an  occasional  variant  from  the  constant  should  not  un- 
duly mislead  the  investigator.  Bismarck  once  made  the 
observation  that  "International  policy  is  a  fluid  element 
zvhick  under  certain  conditions  will  solidify,  but  on  a 
change  of  atmosphere  reverts  to  its  original  diffuse  con- 
dition." Doubtless  the  results  of  our  last  election  will 
be  interpreted  by  the  historian  of  our  foreign  policy  as 
a  return  to  the  constant  from  an  attempted  excursion 
into  the  variant. 

Our  policy  of  diplomatic  isolation,  or  non-intervention 
in  European  afifairs,  is  sometimes  believed  to  have  first 
received  formal  expression  in  Washington's  Farewell 
Address,  a  profoundly  wise  legacy  of  constitutional  pro- 
portions for  the  guidance  of  the  American  people.  But 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  in  September,  1776.  soon  after  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  and  curiously,  at  the  very 
time  the  proposed  and  greatly  needed  treaty  of  alliance 
with  France,  a  variant  from  the  constant,  was  under  dis- 
cussion, John  Adams  said; 


232  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

"Our  negotiations  with  France  ought  to  be  conducted 
with  great  caution,  and  with  all  the  foresight  we  could 
possibly  obtain;  ...  we  ought  not  to  enter  into  any 
alliance  with  her  which  should  entangle  us  in  any 
future  wars  in  Europe;  we  ought  to  lay  it  down  as  a 
first  principle  and  a  maxim  never  to  be  forgotten,  to 
maintain  an  entire  neutrality  in  all  future  European 
wars."   .    .    . 

Yet  Benjamin  Franklin  negotiated  and  signed,  Febru- 
ary 6,  1778,  a  treaty  of  commerce  and  a  treaty  of  alliance 
with  France.  The  fact  that  France  sought  therein  to 
avenge  her  defeats  by  Great  Britain  in  the  Seven  Years' 
War  does  not  detract  from  the  fact  that  the  alliance  paved 
the  way  for  the  success  of  the  American  cause,  nor  from 
our  indebtedness  to  France,  consequent  thereon. 

Yet  the  very  obligations  sought  to  be  imposed  on  us 
by  that  treaty  led,  in  1793,  to  a  reiteration,  in  an  epoch- 
making  proclamation  of  neutrality,  of  our  principle  of 
aloofness  from  European  wars,  furnished  the  motives  for 
Washington's  Farewell  Address,  and  finally  caused  that 
limited  war  with  France  from  1798  to  1800  which  gave 
rise  to  the  French  Spoliation  Claims.  A  proffered  treaty 
of  alliance  with  Spain,  in  which  we  undertook  to  attack 
Portugal  and  offered  various  concessions  in  return  for 
political  aid,  but  indicates,  by  countenancing  so  serious 
a  departure  from  principle,  how  great  was  the  need  of 
the  struggling  colonists.  The  flexibility  of  the  policy 
was  again  demonstrated  by  the  readiness  with  which  the 
United  States  undertook  to  adhere  to  the  Armed  Neu- 
trality of  1780,  proposed  by  Catherine  of  Russia. 

These  variants  each  had  special  motives;  but  nothing 
better  demonstrates  the  inherently  fundamental  nature  of 
our  policy  than  the  prompt  return  to  it  after  momentary 
occasion  for  departure  has  passed. 

On  June  12,  1783,  Congress  passed  a  Resolution  which 
reads  in  part : 

"The  true  interest  of  the  States  requires  that   they 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  233 

should  be  as  little  as  possible  entangled  in  the  politics  and 
controversies  of  European  nations." 

The  consistency  of  our  foreign  policy  is  exemplified  by 
our  application  of  what  is  known  as  the  principle  of 
"non-intervention,"  which  has  been  deemed  basic  in  our 
foreign  relations.  John  Hay  once  said :  "The  principles 
which  have  guided  us  have  been  of  limpid  simplicity." 

In  explaining  the  principle  of  non-intervention  and  its 
natural  corollaries  I  cannot  do  better  than  quote  from  the 
masterly  work  of  John  Bassett  Moore  on  "The  Principles 
of  American  Diplomacy." 

"The    principle    of    "non-intervention,"    says    Mr. 
Moore,  "was  used  in  a  two-fold  sense.     It  embraced, 
in  the  first  place,  non-interference  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  other  nations.     In  this  sense,  while  betokening  the 
revolutionary'  origin  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  it  was  also  intended  reciprocally  to  concede  to 
other  nations  the  right  to  determine  their  form  of  gov- 
ernment and  otherwise  to  manage  their  domestic  con- 
cerns, each  for  itself  in  its  own  way.     In  the  second 
place,  it  embraced  non-participation  in  the  political  ar- 
rangements between  other  governments,  and  above  all 
strict  abstention  from  any  part  in  the  political  arrange- 
ments of  Europe. 

"Of  the  principle  of  non-intervention  the  system  of 
neutrality  was  a  logical  derivative,  as  was  also  the 
recognition  of  governments  as  existing  entities,  and  not 
as  legitimate,  or  as  lawful  or  unlawful,  under  the  local 
constitution.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  itself  was  but  the 
correlative  of  the  principle  of  non-participation  in 
European  affairs.  'Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim,' 
said  Jefferson,  'should  be  never  to  entangle  ourselves  in 
the  broils  of  Europe;  our  second,  never  to  suffer 
Europe  to  intermeddle  with  cis-Atlantic  affairs.'  By 
preserving  these  principles  it  v/as  believed  that  the 
United  States  would  best  contribute  to  the  preservation 
of  peace,  abroad  as  well  as  at  home,  and  to  the  spread 
of  liberty  throughout  the  world." 
The  subsidiary  principles  of  neutrality,  the  recognition 
of  new  states  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  will  be  discussed 
hereafter. 


234    •         HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

II. 

NATURE    OF    EARLY   AMERICAN    POLICY 

It  is  probably  a  fact  that  the  necessities  of  a  united 
front  in  foreign  relations,  as  exemplified,  for  example, 
in  the  Treaty  of  1783  and  the  need  for  its  enforcement, 
exerted  as  much  influence  as  any  other  single  factor  in 
compelling  that  union  of  interests  and  charter  of  common 
action  among  the  states  of  the  Confederation  which  is 
now  embodied  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
Foreign  relations  and  domestic  affairs  have  always  been 
interdependent,  and  it  is  no  accident  that  the  great  names 
of  the  founders  of  the  country  are  identified  as  much 
with  foreign  as  with  domestic  affairs. 

The  cornerstone  of  American  foreign  policy  is  com- 
monly believed  to  have  been  laid  in  Washington's  Fare- 
well Address,  although,  as  we  have  just  observed,  the 
principles  of  that  policy  were  enunciated  and  acted  upon 
years  before  that  celebrated  utterance.  The  salient  para^ 
graphs  of  the  Address,  which  in  the  light  of  present 
events,  seem  prophetic,  are  these : 

"The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us,  in  regard  to  for- 
eign nations  is,  in  extending  our  commercial  relations, 
to  have  with  them  as  little  political  connection  as  pos- 
sible. So  far  as  we  have  already  formed  engagements 
(he  refers  to  the  treaty  with  France)  let  them  be  ful- 
filled in  perfect  good  faith.     Here  let  us  stop. 

"Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests,  which  to  us 
have  none  or  a  very  remote  relation.  Hence,  she  must 
be  engaged  in  frequent  controversies,  the  causes  of 
which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our  concerns.  Hence, 
therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to  implicate  ourselves 
by  artificial  ties  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of  her 
politics,  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  collisions  of 
her  friendships  or  enmities.  Our  detached  and  distant 
situation  invites  and  enables  us  to  pursue  a  different 
course.  .  .  Why  forego  the  advantages  of  so  peculiar 
a  situation  ?  Why  quit  our  own  to  stand  upon  foreign 
ground  ?     Why,  by  interweaving  our  destiny  with  that 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  235 

of  any  part  of  Europe,  entangle  our  peace  and  pros- 
perity in  the  toils  of  European  ambition,  rivalry,  in- 
terest, humor,  or  caprice?" 

While  this  state  paper  clearly  indicates  the  American 
aversion  to  implication  in  the  alliances  and  artificial  ties, 
the  balances  of  power  and  kindred  paraphernalia  of 
European  political  systems,  Washington  had  no  illusions 
that  "extraordinary  emergencies"  might  not  implicate  us, 
and  for  these  he  thought  "temporary  alliances"  would 
suffice.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  extension  of  commercial 
relations  was  definitely  encouraged.  If  my  judgment  is 
correct,  that  the  so-called  "League  of  Nations"  created 
at  Versailles  is  in  essence  little  more  than  a  disguised 
alliance  to  maintain  the  balance  or  preponderance  of 
power,  in  the  time-honored  fashion  of  European  politics, 
then  Washington's  advice,  the  soundness  of  which  is  but 
confirmed  by  the  practice  of  more  than  a  century,  clearly 
points  the  direction  of  the  duty  of  the  American  people. 

III. 

MONROE  DOCTRINE 

Washington's  pronouncement  of  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention in  European  politics,  foreshadowed  its  cele- 
brated correlative  of  a  generation  later,  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. Only  in  the  light  of  the  background  portrayed 
above,  can  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  perhaps  the  most 
notable  enunciation  of  American  principles  of  foreign 
policy,  be  either  understood  or  appreciated.  Its  impor- 
tance for  us  in  determining  the  influence  of  the  United 
States  on  international  relations  and  the  various  niean- 
ings  ascribed  to  it  as  a  justification  for  diplomatic  positions 
assumed  on  occasion  by  this  country  warrant  a  somewhat 
detailed  examination  of  its  origin  and  present  scope. 

When  the  dissensions  in  Spain  foreshadowed  a  pos- 
sible dissolution  of  the  Spanish  Empire,  and  even  prior 
to  the  revolt  of  the  Spanish  colonies  on  the  American 


236  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

continent,  a  natural  apprehension  prevailed  in  the  United 
States  that  the  colonies  might  be  coveted  by  the  rival 
empires,  the  French  or  the  British.  Particularly  was  this 
fear  directed  toward  the  fate  of  Cuba  and  Mexico,  in 
closest  proximity.  In  1808,  Thomas  Jefferson,  then 
President,  the  merits  of  whose  practical  statesmanship 
and  liberal  philosophy  the  passing  of  time  has  but  en- 
hanced, wrote  to  the  governor  of  the  Territory  of 
Orleans : 

"We  shall  be  satisfied  to  see  Cuba  and  Mexico  re- 
main in  their  present  dependence ;  but  very  unwilling 
to   see   them   in   that  of   either   France   or   England, 
politically  or  commercially.    We  consider  their  interests 
and  ours  as  the  same,  and  the  object  of  both  must  be  to 
exclude  all  European  influence  from  this  hemisphere." 
In  1820,  when  the  independence  of  the  Latin  American 
colonies  had  been  substantially  achieved,  Jefferson  spoke 
of  "the  advantages  of  a  cordial  fraternization  among  all 
the  American  nations,  and  the  importance  of  their  co- 
alescing in  an  American  system  of  policy  totally  inde- 
pendent of  and  unconnected  with  that  of  Europe." 

The  occasion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  the  threat 
of  the  Holy  Alliance  to  assist  Spain*  to  recover  her  Amer- 
ican colonies,  and  the  effort  of  Russia  to  extend  her 
northwestern  boundary  in  America.  The  Holy  Alliance, 
formed  by  Russia,  Prussia  and  Austria  to  express  in 
solemn  chastizement,  under  the  name  of  the  "League  of 
Peace"  the  horror  of  God  and  King  against  such  blas- 
phemies upon  law  and  order  as  the  French  Revolution 
and  any  other  revolution,  had  commissioned  France, 
which  had  adhered  to  the  Alliance,  to  restore  the  Spanish 
crown  to  Ferdinand,  from  which  the  people  of  Spain 
had  but  lately  relieved  him.  Canning,  the  British  Sec- 
retary of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  having  been  notified 
by  France  that  her  successful  mission  in  Spain  had  in- 
duced her  to  consider  obedience  to  the  call  of  duty  by 
proceeding  to  restore  the  Spanish  crown  in  America, 
and  realizing  that  the  restoration  of  Spanish  authority  or 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  237 

the  substitution  of  France  would,  by  renewal  of  the  then 
customary  colonial  trade  and  navigation  monopoly,  seri- 
ously injure  the  growing  commerce  of  England  with 
the  new  Spanish-American  states,  approached  Richard 
Rush,  American  Minister  in  London,  as  to  the  possibili- 
ties of  a  joint  declaration  by  the  two  nations  against  the 
intervention  of  the  Allies  in  Spanish  America.  Reputable 
historians  have  stated  that,  aside  from  the  fear  of  French 
aggrandizement  and  the  loss  of  British  trade,  another 
dominant  motive  with  Canning  was  the  realization  that 
the  opening  of  hostilities  between  the  Allies  and  the  South 
American  states  would  cause  a  declaration  of  commercial 
non-intercourse  between  those  states  and  Europe,  which 
would  but  redound  to  the  advantage  of  the  United  States. 
The  British  Cabinet  had,  in  fact,  already  decided  that 
they  would  not  permit  France  to  engage  in  the  heroic 
yet  not  altogether  disinterested  mission  she  contemplated ; 
but  hoped  that  British  action  to  that  end  might  become 
unnecessary  by  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  as- 
suming an  identical  position  discouraging  French  plans. 
The  United  States  had  already  recognized  the  inde- 
pendence of  most  of  the  Spanish-American  states,  when 
Mr.  Rush's  correspondence  with  Canning  and  his  request 
for  instructions  reached  the  United  States,  in  the  fall 
of  1823.  A  profound  impression  was  created.  Never 
was  a  declaration  of  policy  more  deliberately  formulated, 
nor  better  counsel  sought.  The  correspondence  was  Sent 
by  President  Monroe  to  Jefferson  and  ]\fadison  for  an 
expression  of  their  judgment,  and  John  Quincy  Adams, 
then  Secretary  of  State,  submitted  it  to  other  leading 
public  men  of  the  country.  It  was  on  this  occasion  that 
Jefferson  made  his  famous  statement  that  while  inde- 
pendence made  us  a  nation,  this  proposed  declaration 
"sets  our  compass  and  points  the  course  zchich  zvc  are  to 
steer  through  the  ocean  of  time  opening  on  us.  Our  first 
fundamental  maxim  should  he,  never  to  entangle  our- 
selves in  the  broils  of  Europe;  and  our  second,  nez'cr  to 


238  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle  in  cis- Atlantic  affairs."  Jef- 
ferson, Madison  and  Monroe,  feeling  that  the  declara- 
tion sought  confirmed  these  aims,  were  in  favor  of  mak- 
ing the  joint  proclamation  suggested  by  Canning. 
Adams,  however,  opposed  it.  He  entertained  a  suspicion 
that  England's  request  for  a  joint  pledge  that  "we  could 
not  see  any  portion  of  (the  former  Spanish  colonies) 
transferred  to  any  other  power  (than  Spain)  with  in- 
difference," was  directed  equally  as  much  against  the 
interference  of  the  United  States  as  against  that  of  the 
Holy  Alliance.  In  his  Memoirs,  Adams  says:  "By  join- 
ing with  her,  therefore,  in  her  proposed  declaration,  we 
give  her  a  substantial  and  perhaps  inconvenient  pledge 
against  ourselves,  and  really  obtain  nothing  in  return." 
The  formal  answer  to  Canning's  suggestion  and  to  the 
plan  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  which  also  served  notice  on 
Russia,  was  contained  in  President  Monroe's  Message  to 
Congress  of  December  2,  1823.  The  policy  then  an- 
nounced, which  has  come  to  be  known  as  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  was  substantially  formulated  by  Adams.  Its 
principal  sections  read  as  follows : 

"The  occasion  has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting 
as  a  principle  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the 
United  States  are  involved,  that  the  American  conti- 
nents, by  the  free  and  independent  condition  which  they 
have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to  be 
considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any 
European  Powers.  .  .  The  citizens  of  the  United 
States  cherish  sentiments  the  most  friendly  in  favor 
of  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  their  fellow-men  on  that 
side  of  the  Atlantic.  In  the  war  of  the  European 
Powers  in  matters  relating  to  themselves  we  have 
never  taken  any  part,  nor  does  it  comport  with  our 
policy  so  to  do.  It  is  only  when  our  rights  are  invaded 
or  seriously  menaced  that  we  resent  injuries  or  make 
preparation  for  our  defence.  .  .  The  political  system 
of  the  allied  powers  is  essentially  different  in  this  re- 
spect from  that  of  America.  .  .  And  to  the  defence 
of  our  own,  which  has  been  achieved  by  the  loss  of  so 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  239 

much  blood  and  treasure,  and  matured  by  the  wisdom 
of  their  most  enhghtened  citizens,  and  under  which  wc 
have  enjoyed  unexampled  felicity,  this  whole  nation 
is  devoted.  We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor,  and  to 
the  amicable  relations  existing  between  the  United 
States  and  those  Powers,  to  declare  that  we  should  con- 
sider any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system 
to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our 
peace  and  safety. 

"With  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any 
European  power  we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not 
interfere.  But  with  the  governments  who  have  de- 
clared their  independence  and  maintained  it,  and  whose 
independence  we  have,  on  great  consideration  and  just 
principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any  inter- 
position for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  con- 
trolling in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any 
European  power,  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifes- 
tation of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United 
States.    .    . 

"Our  policy  in  regard  to  Europe,  which  was  adopted 
at  an  early  state  of  the  wars  which  have  so  long  agitated 
that  quarter  of  the  globe,  nevertheless  remains  the 
same,  which  is,  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  concerns 
of  any  of  its  Powers;  to  consider  the  government  de 
facto  as  the  legitimate  government  for  us ;  to  cultivate 
friendly  relations  with  it,  and  to  preserve  those  rela- 
tions by  a  frank,  firm,  and  manly  policy,  meeting,  in  all 
instances,  the  just  claims  of  every  Power,  submitting 
to  injuries  from  none.  But  in  regard  to  these  conti- 
nents, circumstances  are  eminently  and  conspicuously 
different.  It  is  impossible  that  the  allied  Powers  should 
extend  their  political  system  to  any  portion  of  either 
continent  without  endangering  our  peace  and  happi- 
ness. .  .  It  is  equally  impossible,  therefore,  that  we 
should  behold  such  interposition,  in  any  form,  with 
indifference." 
The  declaration  made  a  deep  impression  throughout 
the  civilized  world.  In  Latin-America  it  was  hailed  as  a 
guaranty  of  independence  and  of  a  republican  form  of 
government.     In  Europe,  it  served  to  terminate  the  re- 


240  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

actionary  activities  of  the  Holy  Alliance  and  stimulated 
the  growing  movement  for  political  liberty  and  constitu- 
tional government. 

The  doctrine  was  by  no  means  an  altruistic  statement 
of  principle.  Although  expressing  high  moral  tenets  ol 
liberal  thought,  it  is  inspired  essentially  by  the  motive  of 
self-preservation  and  rests  upon  self-interest.  That  in- 
terest was  deemed  to  be  threatened  by  any  further  colo- 
nization of  European  powers  on  this  continent  or  the  con- 
trol or  acquisition  by  them  of  any  additional  American 
territory.  Canning,  although  he  had  invited  it,  pro- 
nounced the  Doctrine  "very  extraordinary"  and  reserved 
Great  Britain's  full  privilege  to  colonize  any  unappro- 
priated portions  of  America.  Curiously,  although  the 
Doctrine,  as  a  unilateral  declaration  of  policy  and  notice 
to  the  world  that  certain  acts  done  by  foreign  countries 
outside  the  borders  of  the  United  States  would  be  deemed 
an  affront  by  us,  could  probably  not,  until  recent  years, 
have  been  maintained  without  the  support  of  Great  Brit- 
ain, it  has  been  most  frequently  challenged  by  that  very 
power. 

IV. 

INTERPRETATION  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

It  will  have  been  observed  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
sums  up  and  reiterates  in  striking  language  the  cardinal 
principles  of  American  foreign  policy — non-intervention, 
neutrality,  recognition.  Non-intervention,  based  on  the 
separation  of  the  two  hemispheres,  was  to  be  reciprocal. 
Our  neutrality  in  European  quarrels  was  to  be  preserved. 
Recognition  was  to  depend  upon  an  objective  standard, 
the  de  facto  nature  of  the  government  in  power. 

With  existing  possessions  of  European  countries  in 
America  the  Doctrine  was  not  designed  to  interfere.  But 
the  extension  of  their  "political  system"  to  America  was 
inhibited.  It  has  been  asserted  that  with  the  termination 
of  absolute  monarchy  in  Europe,  the  form  of  government 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  241 

of  the  members  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  the  raison  d'etre 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  lost.  But  this  is  hardly 
true.  It  is  directed  not  merely  against  particular  ob- 
noxious forms  of  government,  but  against  the  European 
political  system,  by  which  was  meant  the  groupings,  asso- 
ciations and  collective  policy  of  European  governments. 
Any  effort  to  bring  an  American  nation  within  the  sphere 
of  those  groupings  and  thereby  exercise  European  politi- 
cal influence  in  the  Americas  in  new  areas  would  doubt- 
less be  deemed  an  infringement  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
The  League  of  Nations  has  not  yet  seriously  raised  that 
question;  but  its  attempted  intercession  between  Costa 
Rica  and  Panama  in  their  present  dispute  aroused  some 
resentment  in  the  United  States. 

Under  an  accepted  definition  of  the  Doctrine,  first 
pronounced  by  President  Polk  in  1848  in  relation  to 
Yucatan,  a  Latin-American  state  could  not  even  with 
its  own  consent  come  under  the  domination  of  a  Euro- 
pean power.  This  went  much  beyond  the  declaration  of 
Monroe,  who  expressly  asserted  the  privilege  of  American 
states,  whose  independence  had  been  acknowledged,  to 
dispose  of  themselves  as  they  saw  fit.  In  1870,  after 
San  Domingo  had  invited  and  then  rejected  control  by 
Spain,  President  Grant  declared :  "No  European  power 
can  acquire  by  any  means — war,  colonization,  or  annexa- 
tion— even  when  the  annexed  people  demands  it,  any 
portion  of  American  territory." 

Even  in  uninhabited  territories,  non-American  control 
in  effect  is  inhibited.  Clay,  Van  Buren,  Webster,  Polk 
and  Grant  contested  the  power  of  any  European  country 
to  transfer  any  of  its  American  possessions  to  another 
European  power;  the  exceptional  transfer  of  the  Island 
of  St.  Barthelemy  by  Sweden  to  France  in  1877  hardly 
impairs  the  rigorous  application  of  this  rule.  President 
Grant  in  his  Annual  Message  of  1870  anticipated  the 
complete  withdrawal  of  European  countries  from  .Amer- 
ica.    He  said:     "The  time  is  not  probably  far  distant 


242  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

when,  in  the  natural  course  of  events,  the  European 
poHtical  connection  with  this  continent  will  cease,"  and 
his  Secretary  of  State,  Hamilton  Fish,  remarked,  in  an 
accompanying  report,  that  the  policy  announced  by  Mon- 
roe "looks  hopefully  to  the  time  when,  by  the  voluntary 
departure  of  European  governments  from  this  continent 
and  the  adjacent  islands,  America  shall  be  wholly 
American." 

The  exuberance  of  expression  which  is  occasionally 
excited  in  the  American  by  the  uninterrupted  and  suc- 
cessful exercise  of  power  is  not  better  illustrated  than 
by  the  bold  statement  of  Secretary  of  State  Olney, 
usually  considered  a  quite  conservative  man,  at  the  time 
of  the  Venezuelan  boundary  controversy  with  Great 
Britain.  He  then  said:  "Today  the  United  States  is 
practically  sovereign  on  this  continent  and  its  Hat  is  law 
on  this  continent  upon  the  subjects  to  zvhich  it  confines 
its  interposition."  John  Bassett  Moore,  in  commenting 
upon  this  expansive  assertion,  says : 

"Surely  it  must  be  admitted  that  no  declaration  more 
imperialistic  was  ever  made  by  an  American  statesman ; 
nor  is  its  imperialistic  lustre  dimmed  by  the  explanation, 
which  Mr.  Olney  proceeds  to  make,  that  this  paramount 
position  of  the  United  States  on  the  American  continent 
is  due  not  simply  to  its  high  character,  or  to  the  fact 
that  wisdom  and  justice  and  equity  are  its  invariable 
characteristics,  but  also  to  the  circumstance  that  its 
infinite  resources  combined  with  its  isolated  position 
render  it  master  of  the  situation  and  practically  invul- 
nerable as  against  any  or  all  other  powers !     Inciden- 
tally, it  was  this  Venezuelan  issue  which  persuaded 
Admiral  Mahan  to  say  that  he  had  changed  his  mind 
concerning    the    inconceivability    of    war    with    Great 
Britain." 

A  more  recent  extension  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
undertaken  by  President  Roosevelt  in  1907  in  assuming 
control  of  Santo  Domingo  when  foreign  powers  were 
pressing  for  payment  of  their  claims  and  threatening  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  243 

seizure  of  custom  houses.  The  United  States,  by  treaty, 
under  what  Roosevelt  considered  the  responsibihties  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  assumed  fiscal  administration  of 
Santo  Domingo  and  has  since  extended,  for  somewhat 
the  same  causes,  an  even  greater  degree  of  control  over 
Haiti.  Indeed,  Santo  Domingo  itself  has  since  come 
under  police  and  fiscal  control.  The  United  States  now 
exercises  a  quasi-protectorate  over  Nicargua  and  Pan- 
ama. We  own  Porto  Rico  and  some  other  islands.  In 
Cuba  and  several  other  of  the  above  mentioned  states 
supervision  of  their  debt  limits  and  the  reserved  privilege 
of  intervention  for  the  maintenance  of  civil  government 
serve  to  extend  American  control  over  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  Caribbean.  But  it  can,  I  think,  be  fairly 
asserted  that,  aside  from  occasional  unauthorized  trans- 
gressions of  resident  officials,  who  thereby  do  this  coun- 
try grave  harm,  we  have  not  abused  our  position  in  the 
Caribbean  countries,  and  our  imperialism,  if  such  it  be, 
has  not  been  of  an  unduly  exploiting  type.  Whatever 
reserved  control  we  exercise,  the  largest  possible  measure 
of  self  government  should  accompany  these  administra- 
tions. 

Our  expansion  southward  has  given  rise  to  some  fears 
on  the  part  of  Latin-American  countries  of  an  all-ab- 
sorbing appetite  of  the  United  States  for  additional  ter- 
ritory. It  has  brought  forth  bitter  criticisms  of  our 
interpretation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  under  which, 
while  insisting  upon  European  abstention  from  any  con- 
trol in  the  Latin-American  states,  we  decline  to  consider 
the  Doctrine  as  a  self-denying  ordinance  upon  ourselves. 
The  only  answer  to  this  criticism  is  that  the  United 
States  has  not  exhibited  in  recent  years  any  serious  in- 
tention permanently  to  acquire  additional  territory  in 
Latin  America,  and  that,  in  view  of  our  preponderance 
of  power,  the  Cuban  enterprise  manifests  a  certain  na- 
tional self-restraint.  Intervention  in  IMexico  would 
probably  be  unpopular  among  the  American  people,  and 


244  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

if  accompanied  by  any  territorial  accessions,  might  be 
considered  by  most  nations  as  a  moral  stultification  of 
our  professions  in  the  recent  war.  Only  the  moderation 
and  general  acceptability  of  our  conduct  will  obtain 
acquiescence  in  our  enterprise  from  foreign  countries, 
and  "a  decent  respect  for  the  opinion  of  mankind"  will 
be  found  ultimately  as  essential  to  nations  as  to  in- 
dividuals. 

V 

FOREIGN  VIEWS  ON  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

It  may  be  asked  how  such  a  frankly  egotistical  and 
occasionally  arrogant  assertion  of  policy  as  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  has  received  acceptance  by  the  world.  Bis- 
marck called  it  an  "internationai  impertinence."  Euro- 
pean writers  and  statesmen  have  never  tired  of  denying 
that  it  is  a  principle  of  international  law.  I  do  not  be- 
lieve the  United  States  has  made  this  claim.  But  without 
taking  such  a  position  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that 
the  assertion  of  jurisdiction  and  long-continued  acquies- 
cence therein  by  others  is  known  to  establish  a  good  title 
both  in  private  and  public  law.  Contrary  to  President 
Wilson's  recent  statement  that  the  acceptance  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  as  a  "regional  understanding,"  whatever 
that  may  mean,  constitutes  the  first  recognition  by 
Europe  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  may  be  said  that  in 
1903  the  Duke  of  Devonshire  declared,  "Great  Britain 
accepts  the  Monroe  Doctrine  unreservedly,"  and  that  is 
pr.obably  the  official  view,  in  deed  if  not  in  word,  of  all 
the  European  countries. 

Ultimately,  of  course,  its  validity  rests  upon  our  might 
and  power  to  enforce  it.  But  that  is  not  its  only  justifi- 
cation ;  it  is  an  expression  of  one  of  the  most  elemental 
conditions  and  principles  of  international  relations,  the 
balance  of  power.  Few  persons  realize  the  pervasiveness 
of  this  principle  in  human  relations,  for  it  operates  with 
as  unerring  a  precision,  though  sometimes  only  vaguely 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  245 

perceptible,  as  a  law  of  nature.  In  Europe,  with  its  com- 
pact groups  of  enemy  nations,  the  balance  of  power, 
rooted  in  the  sense  of  insecurity,  seemed  to  present  the 
only  hope  of  occasional  periods  of  peace.  In  the  division 
of  our  free  and  slave  states  before  the  Civil  War,  we 
acknowledged,  unconsciously  perhaps,  the  operation  of 
the  principle.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  expressed  an  Amer- 
ican balance  against  Europe,  in  the  maintenance  of  an 
international  equilibrium.  Should  Asia  become  power- 
ful, it  may  require  revision.  Its  maintenance  has  doubt- 
less been  aided  by  European  quarrels — it  was  this  which 
enabled  Seward  to  spoil  Maximilian's  Mexican  adven- 
ture in  1866 — and  by  the  fact  that  an  American  enter- 
prise could  hardly  have  been  risked  by  a  European  power 
in  the  face  of  the  delicate  position  of  European  relations 
in  the  nineteenth  century. 

Our  acquisition  of  the  Philippines  has  been  said  to 
weaken  the  Doctrine,  but,  after  all,  that  assumption  rests 
upon  the  acquiescence  of  the  United  States.  However, 
much  that  enterprise  may  have  trangressed  Washington's 
precept  and  whatever  consequences  it  may  still  have,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  flexible  enough  to  accommodate 
slight  variants,  even  if  we  admit  this  to  be  one.  The 
Lodge  Resolution  of  19 12,  though  not  approved  by 
President  Taft,  which  looked  to  inhibiting  the  acquisi- 
tion by  any  foreign  power  of  any  harbor  or  place  on  the 
American  continent  that  might  threaten  the  safety  of  the 
United  States — Japan  was  then  primarily  intended — is 
an  expression  not  necessarily  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
but  as  Senator  Lodge  said,  of  the  fundamental  principle 
of  self-preservation  upon  which  that  Doctrine  rests.  Ex- 
perience has  established,  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  does 
not  estop  us  from  participating  in  the  affairs  of  Asia, 
although  it  seems  equally  clear  that  it  is  deemed  by  us 
efficacious  to  keep  any  control  by  Asiatic  powers  out  of 
America. 

The  lesson  to  be  drawn  from  this  portrayal  of  the  ex- 


246  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

pansive  capacity  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  that  a  certain 
tolerance  in  international  relations  is  necessary.  It  is 
one  of  the  most  elementary  of  human  weaknesses  to 
identify  your  own  cause  and  interest  with  the  principles 
of  right  and  justice,  and  to  believe  that  your  own  motives 
are  higher  and  purer  than  those  of  others.  Probably 
nothing  has  caused  more  distress  and  suffering  than  the 
reciprocal  action  of  nations  upon  these  assumptions.  For 
although  it  seems  axiomatic  that  no  one  can  fairly  be 
party  and  judge  at  the  same  time,  the  international  legal 
system  is  so  constituted  that  it  authorizes  each  nation 
to  be  the  judge  of  its  own  cause  and  to  act  upon  its  own 
conclusions  in  its  own  way.  International  law  then 
legalizes  the  physical  consequences. 

The  same  growth  in  power  and  function  that  we  have 
seen  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  evidenced  in  the  attitude 
of  the  United  States  toward  an  interoceanic  canal  in  Cen- 
tral America.  When  Senator  Clayton — upon  whose 
ineptitude  as  Secretary  of  State  in  signing  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty  of  1850  Stephen  Douglas  partly  built  his 
reputation  as  an  orator — declared  in  the  Senate  that  the 
United  States  had  no  power  to  build  a  canal  outside  the 
United  States,  he  was  not  contradicted.  Yet  after  the 
Civil  War,  which  galvanized  the  power  of  the  central 
government  into  an  effectiveness  then  undreamed  of,  few 
people  questioned  the  propriety  of  an  American-built 
canal  under  exclusive  American  control.  When  finally 
President  Roosevelt  collaborated  in  the  establishment  of 
the  Republic  of  Panama,  acquiring  in  partial  compensa- 
tion a  strip  of  territory  for  canal  purposes,  the  act  was 
acclaimed  as  a  providential  recognition  of  the  mission 
and  destiny  of  the  American  people.  A  treaty  with  Co- 
lombia, now  pending,  is  designed  to  assuage  injured 
feelings. 

To  those  who  believe  that  the  mission  of  the  United 
States  is  guided  by  Providence  the  rapid  expansion  of  our 
territory   would   seem   to   lend   some   support.      In   any 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  247 

event,  the  acquisition  of  new  territories  seemed  soon  to 
be  accepted  as  the  natural  order  of  things,  for  it  catered 
to  and  nourished  that  sentiment  of  nationahty  which  in 
each  decade  had  been  growing  stronger.  Mr.  Moore 
says  that  ''the  acquisition  of  new  territory  had  become  a 
habit  with  us."  Indeed,  had  it  not  been  for  the  slavery 
question,  it  is  probable  that  there  would  have  been  little 
opposition  to  the  Mexican  War.  Moral  justifications  are 
rarely  hard  to  find,  and  the  doctrine  of  "natural  fron- 
tiers," so  prevalent  in  Europe,  has  been  no  stranger  to  us. 
But  there  is  hardly  any  doubt  that  we  owe  to  good 
fortune  much  of  our  present  territory,  notably  that  which 
we  first  acquired,  and  therein  our  influence  on  interna- 
tional relations  proved  exceedingly  profitable.  We  be- 
came a  nation  just  when  two  large  colonial  empires, 
France  and  Spain,  had  by  continual  wars  so  weakened 
themselves  that  the  conservation  of  their  resources  re- 
quired them  to  draw  in  their  lines.  Our  successful  war 
against  Great  Britain  had  given  us,  besides  a  consider- 
able territory,  neighbors  who  were  troublesome  and  at 
best  uncongenial.  Every  war  in  Europe  was  reflected 
on  our  borders,  and  affected  us.  In  the  treaty  of  1778 
with  France,  Franklin  had  sagaciously  stipulated  against 
the  acquisition  by  France  of  any  territory  in  North 
America,  except  in  the  West  Indies.  To  any  other 
British  territory,  we  were  to  be  the  sole  heirs.  The 
Mississippi  controversy  with  Spain  and  frequent  bound- 
ary disputes  made  it  seem  desirable  to  acquire  the 
Louisiana  territory.  Spain  had  transferred  this  to 
France  in  1800;  but  the  growing  commitments  of  Na- 
poleon in  Europe  made  him  as  anxious  to  dispose  of  it 
as  we  were  to  acquire  it.  In  1802,  for  a  comparatively 
small  sum,  we  obtained  sovereignty  over  an  area  now 
covered  in  whole  or  in  part  by  fourteen  states  of  the 
United  States.  About  fifteen  years  later,  Spain  had 
reached  a  position  where  she  was  willing  to  cede  us  aU 
that  part  of  the  Floridas  which  did  not  belong  to  Mexico. 


248  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

In  1836,  Texas  declared  her  independence  and  in  1845 
was  annexed.  Then  came  the  war  with  Mexico  and  the 
acquisition  of  California  and  New  Mexico,  and  the  Gads- 
den Purchase.  "Fifty-four  degrees  forty  minutes  or 
fight"  ultimately  gave  us  a  northwestern  boundary  at 
49  degrees  without  a  fight.  Finally,  Alaska,  Hawaii, 
Porto  Rico,  and  the  Philippines — whose  acquisition  was 
not  premeditated — and  numerous  islands  in  the  West 
Indies  and  in  other  parts  of  the  globe,  round  out  an  em- 
pire that  widely  exceeds  anything  the  founders  could 
have  dreamed  of.  The  late  Champ  Clark's  optimistic 
prophecy  that  Canada  would  some  day  be  a  part  of  the 
United  States,  although  not  original  with  him,  made 
Canada  so  shy  that  she  disapproved  the  reciprocity  agree- 
ment of  191 1. 

The  responsibilities  of  managing  so  vast  an  estate  are 
possibly  greater  than  any  advantages  accruing  there- 
from. It  is  the  outposts  of  empires  that  have  often  led  to 
collision  with  the  conflicting  interests  of  other  nations. 
One  can  only  hope  that  the  United  States  will  so  use  its 
power  as  to  create  universal  confidence  that  it  holds,  not 
a  prize  for  national  exploitation,  but  a  trusted  mandate 
for  the  civilized  world. 

VI. 

LATIN    AMERICA    AND    THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  did  not  lead  to  close  political 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  countries  of 
Latin  America,  for  diverse  reasons.  Among  these  were 
distance,  insignificant  trade,  and  difference  in  language, 
origin  and  culture.  They  were  far  nearer  to  Europe  in 
all  these  respects  than  to  the  United  States.  Neverthe- 
less, their  independence  had  hardly  been  recognized  be- 
fore the  effort  was  made  to  bring  the  states  on  the  Amer- 
ican continent  into  more  intimate  relations.  In  this 
movement,  Henry  Clay  was  a  dominant  figure.  The  idea 
of   American    solidarity    probably    originated    with    the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  249 

great  Venezuelan  statesman,  Bolivar,  and  his  idea  has 
fructified  into  the  vigorous  movement  now  known  as 
Pan  Americanism.  Clay  was  actuated  primarily  by  his 
devotion  to  the  cause  of  liberty  and  felt  that  since  the 
enunciation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  the  states  on  this 
continent  had  a  common  destiny.  He  therefore  urged 
and  obtained  Congressional  authority  for  the  sending  of 
American  delegates  in  1826  to  the  Congress  of  Panama, 
supplying  them  with  elaborate  instructions.  But  the 
delegates  arrived  unhappily  after  the  adjournment  of  the 
Congress;  a  misfortune  which  seemed  prophetic,  for  the 
United  States  was  unrepresented  at  each  of  the  three 
succeeding  congresses  held  up  to  1864.  The  reasons  are 
not  hard  to  find.  Slavery  had  been  severely  condemned 
by  the  southern  republics — though  not  abolished  in  the 
then  Empire  of  Brazil  until  1888 — and  the  atmosphere 
for  a  discussion  of  common  interests  seemed  under  such 
circumstances  likely  to  be  unpropitious ;  in  addition,  the 
territorial  advance  of  the  United  States  into  Mexico 
created  a  growing  feeling  of  hostility  to  this  country, 
by  no  means  yet  dissipated.  But  now,  where  it  exists, 
it  rests  rather  on  present  apprehension.  The  unstable 
conditions  of  many  of  these  states,  which  under  repub- 
lican forms  of  constitution  had  enabled  despotism  to  hold 
occasional  sway,  had  not  tended  to  make  the  relations 
more  intimate. 

Yet  with  the  advent  of  the  Civil  War,  and  our  realiza- 
tion that  no  government  is  immune  from  revolution,  had 
come  a  more  sympathetic  view  from  both  sides.  The 
unsuccessful  termination  of  France's  efifort  to  control 
Mexico  in  the  sixties  and  of  Spain  to  occupy  the  West 
Coast,  and  the  effective  demonstration  of  the  guaranty 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  served  gradually  to  bring  about 
better  relations.  Secretary  of  State  Blaine  was  an  im- 
portant factor  in  this  effort,  and  while  doubtless  the 
erowth  of  commercial  intercourse  awakened  a  realization 
of  the  need  for  more  wholesome  diplomatic  relations,  the 


250  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

sentiment  for  solidarity  did  not  alone  depend  on  such 
material  basis.  Better  acquaintance  made  North  Ameri- 
cans realize  the  virtues  of  the  Latin  American  culture,  as 
well  as  the  fact  that  their  more  progressive  countries 
had  reached  a  position  to  which  an  attitude  of  protection 
was  utterly  inappropriate.  Under  Blaine's  initiative  the 
first  International  American  Conference  convened  in 
Washington  in  1889;  it  was  succeeded  by  others  at  Mex- 
ico in  1901,  at  Rio  Janeiro  in  1906,  and  at  Buenos  Aires 
in  19 10,  and  only  the  European  War  has  prevented 
others.  The  results  achieved  in  the  form  of  treaties  of 
arbitration,  of  naturalization,  and  on  various  commercial 
subjects  such  as  patents  and  trade-marks,  have  not  been 
negligible ;  but  their  primary  result  was  to  enable  the 
states  on  this  continent  to  discuss  matters  of  common  in- 
terest and  establish  the  necessary  contacts. 

The  financial  difficulties  occasioned  by  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  caused  the  calling  in  191 5  of  the  First  Pan- 
American  Financial  Congress,  and  those  occasioned  by 
its  close,  the  calling  of  the  second  in  1920.  The  most 
noteworthy  event  of  the  first  congress  was  the  establish- 
ment of  the  International,  now  Inter-American  High 
Commission,  which  is  conducting  the  most  effective  work 
in  the  promotion  of  common  interests.  Already  it  has 
obtained  ratification  for  numerous  treaties,  providing  for 
the  establishment  of  an  international  gold  clearance  fund ; 
facilitation  of  the  work  of  commercial  travellers ;  the  ar- 
bitration of  commercial  disputes ;  and  for  the  mutual  pro- 
tection of  patents  and  trade-marks.  The  movement  to 
strengthen  the  solidarity  of  interests,  which  the  build- 
ing of  the  Panama  Canal  has  greatly  enhanced,  is  certain 
to  grow ;  and  the  dominance  of  the  United  States  will  be 
gradually  tempered,  as  it  already  is  beginning  to  be.  by 
the  growth  in  power  of  the  major  republics  of  the  Pan- 
American  Union. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  251 

VII. 

THE    MONROE   DOCTRINE   AND   THE    FAR    EAST 

In  the  Far  East,  the  influence  of  the  United  States 
promises  to  be  portentous.  Long  before  we  had  acquired  v^ 
a  single  possession  in  the  Pacific,  American  traders  and 
vessels  had  become  numerous  there.  The  fur  trade  with 
Canton  and  the  whaling  industry  proved  lucrative.  With 
the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  however,  and  with  the 
decline  in  the  use  of  wooden  ships  for  the  fur  trade  and 
in  the  supply  of  whales,  a  marked  shrinkage  occurred  in 
the  Pacific  enterprise  of  Americans.  Yet  the  advantages 
of  Hawaii  as  a  trading-post  and  stopping  place  had  al- 
ready brought  that  region  within  the  range  of  American 
interest,  and,  as  early  as  1842,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  declared  in  a  message  to  Congress  that  the  United 
States  would  oppose  the  seizure  of  the  islands  by  any  for-  •''' 
eign  power.  The  growth  of  American  influence  in  the 
islands,  with  the  gradual  diminution  in  the  native  popula- 
tion, finally  brought  them  under  American  sovereignty. 
In  Samoa  we  secured  a  coaling  station  in  the  seventies, 
and  later  obtained  a  protectorate  over  parts  of  the  islands, 
shared  until  recently  with  Germany,  and  now  with  Great 
Britain.  By  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Spain  we  acquired 
Guam  in  the  Ladrones  and  the  Philippines,  and  thereby 
became  an  Asiatic  Power.  Until  Dewey's  victory  at 
Manila  there  was  hardly  an  American  who  dreamed  of 
ever  possessing  the  Philippines,  but  with  a  successful 
people,  so  powerful  are  the  urgings  of  "manifest  destiny" 
that  the  deliberation  concerning  their  fate  was  not  as  to 
whether  we  should  "acquire"  them,  but  as  to  whether  we 
should  "give  them  up."  That  event  changed  our  naval  /- 
policy,  stimulated  the  desire  for  an  American  controlled 
canal  at  Panama  and  accentuated  our  relations  with 
China  and  Japan  into  national  problems  of  the  first  im- 
portance.     President    Roosevelt,   prophetically   perhaps, 


252  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

called  this  period  of  the  world's  history,  "the  Pacific  Era" 
(with  a  capital  P). 

In  our  relations  with  China  we  have  followed  a  course 
of  open  dealing  without  seeking  territory  or  a  sphere 
of  influence,  in  marked  contrast  to  the  imperialist  policy 
of  European  nations.  From  the  time  we  forbade  our 
citizens  to  participate  in  the  opium  trade,  we  have  been 
looked  upon  with  special  favor  in  China.  Although  we 
profited  by  the  trading  concessions  wrung  from  the  Chi- 
nese rulers  by  the  English  and  the  French  and  joined 
those  countries  diplomatically,  our  trade  with  China  was 
so  insignificant  that  until  the  late  eighties  the  American 
consular  and  diplomatic  officers  were  engaged  principally 
^  in  the  protection  of  missionaries.  Until  the  outbreak  of 
the  Chino- Japanese  War  in  1894,  the  American  people 
took  very  little  interest  in  Chinese  affairs,  notwithstand- 
ing the  celebrated  Burlingam  Treaty.  But  the  American 
Minister  in  Peking  was  instrumental  in  bringing  that 
war  to  a  close,  and  a  former  American  Secretary  of  State 
represented  China  in  the  peace  negotiations.  While  we 
participated  in  putting  down  the  Boxer  Rebellion,  we  had 
not,  in  spite  of  our  growing  trade,  acquired  a  single  foot 
of  Chinese  territory.  It  was  the  imminence  of  the  break- 
up, by  partition  among  the  European  powers,  of  the  Chi- 
nese Empire,  that  induced  the  United  States  to  take  one 
of  its  boldest  steps  in  Asiatic  diplomacy.  Unable  to  pre- 
vent and  unwilling  to  participate  in  the  proposed  divi- 
sion, Secretary  of  State  Hay  requested  acceptance  of  the 
principle  of  the  "open  door"  in  China.  With  Great  Brit- 
ain's support,  no  European  nation  was  disposed  to  refuse 
its  assent,  and  the  gesture  has  doubtless  saved  China 
from  the  fate  of  other  weak  countries  in  sovereign  con- 
trol of  coveted  resources. 

In  a  sense  we  have  made  ourselves  the  champions  of 
the  "open  door"  policy,  and  any  attack  upon  it  seems  to 
be  construed  as  an  attack  upon  the  United  States.  This 
first  became  apparent  when  Russia  and  Japan,   shortly 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  253 

after  the  conclusion  of  their  war,  sought  to  acquire  con- 
trol over  certain  cities  and  railroads  in  Manchuria.  The 
protests  of  Secretaries  Root  and  Knox  against  what  they 
considered  an  impairment  of  the  integrity  of  China  and 
of  the  principle  of  the  "open  door"  and  equality  of  op- 
portunity enunciated  by  Secretary  Hay — notably  Secre- 
tary Knox's  proposal  for  the  neutralization  of  the  Man- 
churian  railways — created  some  misgivings  in  Japan  and 
brought  the  first  serious  rift  into  what  had  until  then 
been  the  most  friendly  relations. 

Subsequent  large-scale  enterprises  in  China,  requiring 
financial  aid,  were  conducted  on  the  principle  of  joint 
participation  by  British,  French,  German,  American,  Jap- 
anese, Russian  and  other  bankers.  A  sudden  aversion  to 
"dollar  diplomacy"  in  191 3  induced  the  withdrawal  of 
the  United  States  from  the  Six  Power  Loan  to  China, 
President  Wilson  stating  that  there  should  be  "no  en- 
tangling foreign  alliance  even  in  respect  to  arrangements 
for  supervising  the  financial  compacts  of  weaker  govern- 
ments .  .  .  the  responsibility  of  the  United  States 
in  the  Six  Power  Group  is  obnoxious  to  the  principles 
upon  which  this  government  rests."  But  in  1918,  Ameri- 
can participation  seems  no  longer  to  have  been  obnoxious 
to  those  principles,  for  Mr.  Wilson  approved  our  joining 
the  Four-Power  consortium,  committing  this  govern- 
ment to  an  extent  unasked  in  19 13.  The  official  an- 
nouncement of  the  Department  of  State,  published  July 
29,  1918,  reads  in  part:  "The  American  government 
will  be  willing  to  aid  in  every  way  possible  and  to  make 
prompt  and  vigorous  representations  and  to  take  every 
possible  step  to  ensure  the  execution  of  equitable  con- 
tracts made  in  good  faith  by  its  citizens  in  foreign  lands." 
It  would  not  be  easy  to  find  a  more  complete  reversal  of 
foreign  policy  than  is  embodied  in  the  declaration  just 
quoted. 

In  contrast  with  the  position  of  the  United  States  in 
China,  where  we  followed  the  diplomacy  of  the  leading 


254  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

European  powers,  we  led,  through  Commodore  Perry's 
notable  enterprise  in  1854,  in  opening  Japan  tO'  the  West- 
ern World.  The  rise  of  Japan  into  a  world  power  is 
one  of  the  romances  of  the  drama  of  history.  Adopting 
with  marvelous  facility  the  inventions  and  commercial 
system  of  the  western  world,  engaging,  like  their  western 
instructors,  in  successful  wars  of  expansion,  the  psychol- 
ogy and  resources  of  the  island  empire  now  strikingly 
typify  the  "great  power."  Learning  much  from  the 
United  States  and  enjoying  until  recent  years  the  friendly 
interest  of  the  American  people,  the  growing  commercial 
intercourse  between  the  two  nations  had  served  to  pro- 
duce, down  to  1906,  an  almost  complete  identity  of  in- 
terest. Apart  from  Japan's  protest  against  the  annexa- 
tion of  Hawaii,  later  withdrawn,  and  minor  incidents  of 
only  passing  note,  the  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries until  the  termination  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
in  which  President  Roosevelt  played  so  prominent  a  part, 
could  hardly  have  been  improved  upon.  Even  the  ac- 
quisition of  the  Philippines  did  not  visibly  cool  these  rela- 
tions. But  the  pressure  of  a  growing  population  and 
the  successful  outcome  of  a  war  with  one  of  the  great 
empires  of  the  world  brought  changes.  International  re- 
lations are  dynamic,  not  static;  one  of  the  inherent  de- 
fects of  the  various  plans  for  permanent  peace  recently 
formulated  is  that  they  assume  a  static  condition. 

In  1906  the  growing  influx  of  Japanese  subjects  into 
our  western  states  created  the  first  official  signs  of  racial 
hostility.  The  San  Francisco  School  Board  then  made 
a  regulation  which  discriminated  against  Japanese  at- 
tending school.  Japan  felt  the  situation  keenly  and  pro- 
tested on  the  ground  that  the  treaty  was  violated.  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  seemed  inclined  to  agree  with  Japan,  and 
sent  Secretary  Metcalf  to  California  to  investigate;  it 
was  soon  established  that  the  school  discrimination  was 
a  minor  part  of  an  organized  anti-Japanese  campaign. 
Here  again  was  an  illustration  of  the  awkward  constitu- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  255 

tional  position  in  which  the  federal  government  has  fre- 
quently been  placed  by  its  inability  to  compel  unwilling 
states  to  observe  or  enforce  treaty  obligations.  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  had  to  assume  the  position  of  a  mediator 
between  California  and  Japan,  and  finally  obtained  a  re- 
scinding of  the  school  ordinance  in  return  for  a  federal 
immigration  restriction.  To  this  the  Japanese  govern- 
ment agreed,  but  the  extension  to  Japanese  of  the  Chi- 
nese exclusion  act  they  have  sedulously  opposed.  A  gen- 
tleman's agreement  by  which  Japan  undertakes  to  keep 
laborers  from  coming  to  the  United  States  has  worked 
only  moderately  well.  Two  recent  statutes  of  California, 
in  191 3  and  in  1920,  designed  to  bar  Japanese  from 
any  interest  in  land,  have  made  acute  a  difficult  racial 
problem.  In  view  of  the  depth  of  Japanese  feeling 
against  the  discrimination  involved  in  the  exclusion  from 
naturalization  of  Japanese  subjects,  whereas  we  admit  to 
citizenship  Africans,  Turks,  Arabs  and  the  members  of 
other  nationalities  considered  by  them  inferior,  and  in 
view  of  the  general  belief  that  the  discriminatory  legisla- 
tion constitutes  a  violation  of  the  treaty  of  191 1,  the 
moderation  and  self-restraint  of  the  Japanese  is  to  be 
commended.  They  are  skillful  diplomatists.  How  the 
new  proposed  treaty  with  Japan  will  deal  with  this  ir- 
ritating subject  is,  of  course,  still  unknown. 

But  the  real  difficulty  in  our  diplomatic  relations,  if 
such  it  be,  arises  not  in  California,  but  in  China.  Japan's 
growing  population  and  the  need  for  foreign  markets 
has  caused  her  to  penetrate  Manchuria,  and  the  twenty- 
one  demands  on  the  Chinese  government  in  191 5  indi- 
cate a  policy  of  establishing  her  hegemony  in  China. 
This  she  has  endeavored  to  insure,  notwithstanding  its 
apparent  violation  of  the  "open  door"  principle,  by  ob- 
taining agreements  from  the  western  powers  in  the  nature 
of  estoppels.  Why  the  United  States  ever  signed  such 
a  vague  instrument  as  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement, 
which  is  more  likelv  to  create  than  to  allay  trouble,  is  not 


256  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

yet  known;  doubtless  war  exigencies  were  responsible. 
Japan,  significantly  said  Count  Motono,  is  in  a  better 
geographical  position  to  interpret  the  agreement  than  the 
United  States. 

We  have  looked  with  more  than  passive  anxiety  on 
Japan's  penetration  in  Siberia  which,  though  alleged  to 
be  temporary,  may  not  be.  In  view  of  the  British-Jap- 
anese alliance,  and  Russia's  momentary  collapse,  we  seem 
to  have  assumed  the  burden  of  keeping  Japan  in  what  we 
consider  her  place.  The  consequences  cannot  be  fore- 
seen. 

More  recently,  Japan's  efforts  to  assert  and  retain  jur- 
isdiction in  Shantung,  contrary  to  pledges  formally 
given,  have  created  an  unfavorable  impression  in  the 
United  States,  although,  unfortunately,  it  is  courting 
error  or  disappointment  at  any  time  to  test  international 
conduct,  usually  inspired  by  motives  of  national  self- 
interest,  by  the  ordinary  standards  of  morality.  Japan's 
still  more  recent  assertion  of  jurisdiction,  under  a  League 
of  Nations  mandate,  over  the  island  of  Yap,  through 
which  passes  the  cable  connecting  the  United  States 
with  the  Far  East,  brings  to  a  close  a  long  series  of 
contested  issues  whose  sober  consideration  by  both  coun- 
tries does  credit  to  their  mutual  sense  of  tolerance  and 
forbearance.  The  often  repeated  slogan  of  our  "mastery 
of  the  Pacific,"  to  which  Roosevelt  in  an  ebullient  mo- 
ment, once  gave  exultant  expression,  is,  in  theory  and 
ought  to  be  in  fact,  a  myth ;  one  might  suppose  that  the 
Pacific  Ocean  is  large  enough  to  permit  both  nations  to 
exist  and  maintain  interests  there. 

It  will  have  been  observed  that  in  the  Far  East  the 
principle  of  "non-intervention"  is  conspicuous  by  its  ab- 
sence. 

Finally,  it  seems  necessary,  in  discussing  the  United 
States  as  a  factor  in  international  relations,  to  mention 
the  vital  part  played  by  the  United  States  in  the  Euro- 
pean War,  a  part  which  has  materially  affected  the  course 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  257 

of  history.  What  effect  this  intervention  will  ultimately 
have  on  our  own  future  and  that  of  the  rest  of  the  world, 
only  time  can  tell.  In  so  far  as  we  defended  our  rights 
as  neutrals  from  unlawful  invasion  by  German  subma- 
rines, we  followed  the  precedent  established  in  1798  and 
181 2.  This  is  the  ground  of  war  upon  which  the  Reso- 
lution of  Congress  of  19 17  is  based,  and  it  is  the  only 
ground  which  I  believe  will  stand  the  test  of  historical 
criticism.  In  so  far  as  President  Wilson  went  further, 
seeking  to  dictate  and  participate  in  rearrangements  of 
the  map  of  Europe  and  to  create  a  phantom  League  of 
Nations,  ostensibly  for  the  preservation  of  peace,  but 
actually  serving  other  purposes,  he  departed,  doubtless, 
for  what  seemed  to  him  good  reasons,  from  the  funda- 
mental principles  upon  which  the  nation  was  founded  and 
has  since  developed.  Fortunately,  the  American  people 
have  vetoed  that  dangerous  step,  but  the  mere  effort  to 
withdraw  from  the  commitments  he  sought  to  make  will 
render  exceedingly  difficult  the  tasks  of  the  present  ad- 
ministration. In  spite  of  the  fact  that  certain  idealists  or 
moralists  profess  to  have  discovered  recent  changes, 
Europe  is  still  Europe,  the  victim  of  its  political  system, 
with  "a  set  of  primary  interests,  whicJi  to  us  have  none 
or  a  very  remote  relation."  M.  d'Haussonville,  a  French 
publicist,  aptly  compared  the  nations  of  Europe  to  a 
party  of  gamblers  seated  around  a  green  table  grown 
somewhat  shabby  with  age,  where  each  in  turn  takes  the 
bank.  Viewing  the  distracted  countries  of  Europe  in 
192 1,  it  seems  to  me  that  no  one  has  expressed  a  more 
correct  judgment  than  our  own  Thomas  Jefferson. 
"Europe's  political  interests,"  said  he,  "are  entirely  dis- 
tinct from  ours.  Their  mutual  jealousies,  their  balance 
of  power,  their  complicated  alliances,  their  forms  and 
principles  of  government,  are  all  foreign  to  us.  They 
are  nations  of  eternal  war."  It  requires  but  an  impartial 
mind  to  observe  that  the  statesmen  of  Europe  are  still 
History  will  appraise  their  handiwork. 


258  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

In  the  light  of  the  lessons  of  the  past  two  years,  our 
duty  seems  more  plain  than  ever,  namely,  to  keep  as  far 
removed  as  possible  from  their  political  enterprises.  The 
warning  of  John  Adams,  as  a  glance  at  the  daily  news- 
papers will  confirm,  might  have  been  uttered  yesterday: 

''It  is  obvious  that  all  the  powers  of  Europe  will  be 
continually  maneuvering  with  us  to  work  us  into  their 
real  or  imaginary  balances  of  power  .  .  .  but  I  think 
it  ought  to  be  our  rule  not  to  meddle ;  and  that  of  all 
the  powers  of  Europe,  not  to  desire  us,  or  perhaps, 
even  to  permit  us,  to  interfere,  if  they  can  help  it." 

But  Europe  today  is  desperate.  By  every  method  of 
inducement  known,  by  appeal  to  our  sympathy,  generos- 
ity, apprehension,  gratitude,  cupidity,  she  is  seeking  to 
persuade  us  to  liquidate  the  consequences  of  her  unfortu- 
nate system  of  conducting  international  relations.  I  can- 
not blame  her ;  it  is,  t]ie  instinct  of  self-preservation  that 
speaks.  *  But  while  we  cannot,  in  view  of  our  own  vital 
interest  in  the  restoration  of  Euorpe,  assume  that  indif- 
ference which  the  Swedish  Ambassador  in  London  sug- 
gested to  John  Adams  in  1782:  "Sir,"  said  he,  "I  take 
it  for  granted,  that  you  will  have  sense  enough  to  see  us 
in  Europe  cut  each  other's  throats  with  a  philosophical 
tranquillity";  nevertheless,  it  would  be  a  mark  of  national 
immaturity  to  disregard  Washington's  injunction  against 
passionate  attachments  for  some  nations  and  inveterate 
antipathies  to  others.  Our  safety  and  our  self-respect  lie 
in  the  cultivation  of  the  Jeffersonian  precept  of  "honest 
friendship  zvith  all  nations,  entangling  alliances  with 
none." 

VIII 

INDIRECT  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  ON  WORLD 

POLITICS 

The  advent  of  the  United  States  into  the  family  of 
nations  was  not  only  of  immediate  consequence  to  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  259 

world,  in  disturbing  the  balance  of  ix)wer  in  Europe,  but 
it  also  exercised  an  indirect  influence,  the  fruits  of  which 
have  left  a  permanent  impress  on  international  relations. 

Mention  has  been  made  of  the  circumstances,  physical 
and  ideal,  which  dictated  the  principles  espoused  by  the 
nation  then  in  embryo — the  distance  from  Europe,  the 
insistence  upon  freedom  from  the  European  political  sys- 
tem and  its  perpetual  quarrels  and  upon  emancipation 
from  Europe's  monarchical  and  ecclesiastical  theories  of 
government,  the  demand  for  freedom  from  the  system  of 
colonial,  commercial  and  navigation  monoplies.  These 
facts  and  aspirations,  together  with  the  facts  that  inde- 
pendence found  us  with  a  weak  government,  an  immense 
territory,  a  small  population,  a  growing  maritime  com- 
merce, hostile  neighbors  in  Europe  and  on  the  American 
continent,  who  were  less  interested  in  the  permanence  of 
our  existence  or  institutions  than  they  were  in  the  use 
which  they  could  make  of  us  in  their  political  conflicts — 
presented  at  once  problems  which  tested  to  the  full  the 
mettle  of  our  early  statesmen.  The  factors  and  condi- 
tions with  which  they  thus  had  to  deal  gave  birth  not 
only  to  the  major  principles  of  our  life  as  a  nation,  which 
were  outlined  in  the  previous  lecture,  but  also  served  to 
shape  those  collateral  policies  and  politico-legal  doctrines 
which  mark  the  history  of  our  international  relations. 
How  far  these  policies  and  doctrines  have  exerted  uni- 
versal influence  may  be  a  matter  of  opinion;  but  it  can 
hardly  be  doubted  that  many  of  these  principles,  policies 
and  doctrines  have  been  powerful  factors  in  the  history 
of  the  last  century  and  a  half. 

It  is  probably  correct  to  say  that  the  discovery  and 
occupation  of  the  new  continent  of  America  is  the  most 
important  fact  in  modern  history.  It  disturbed  vitally 
the  conventional  groupings  of  Europe.  In  the  two  hun- 
dred years  before  the  American  Revolution.  Spain,  Hol- 
land. France  and  England, — rivals  for  American  domi- 
nation,— had  experienced  all  the  vicissitudes  of  success 


260  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

and  defeat  in  a  series  of  wars  which  from  time  to  time 
changed  the  boundary  lines  of  the  unexplored  continent 
~7"and  impressed  England  with  the  great  lesson  that  the 
possession  of  sea  power  is  the  primary  source  of  interna- 
tional strength  and  influence. 

The  rivalry  of  the  European  nations  aided  greatly  in 
securing  admission  for  the  United  States  into  the  family 
of  nations,  for  France,  Holland  and  Spain  found  therein 
an  opportunity  to  gratify  historic  grudges  against  Eng- 
land. Whether  the  governments  that  thus  in  varying 
degree  welcomed  us  had  no  occasion  for  regret  may  be 
doubted ;  for  the  independence  of  a  colony  in  America 
could  not  leave  Spain  unaffected,  and  the  French  mon- 
archy always  believed,  doubtless  correctly,  that  the  in- 
spiration of  the  French  revolution  was  found  in  America. 
jr  /  The  United  States,  therefore,  grew  to  nationhood,  not 
\^  merely  by  virtue  of  its  inherent  strength,  but  by  reason 
of  the  mutual  distrust  and  conflicts  among  the  principal 
powers  in  Europe.  The  statesmen  of  that  day  knew  how 
to  seize  and  employ  the  opportunities  afforded  by  exist- 
ing conditions;  and  it  is  to  their  foresightedness  in 
evaluating  and  estimating  these  conditions  that  our  suc- 
cessful adolescence  is  primarily  due.  For  the  policies  of 
this  government  down  to  1820  were  fashioned  and  de- 
veloped out  of  the  political  conditions  prevailing  among 
the  states  of  Europe. 

The  birth  of  a.  new  nation  in  Europe  has,  as  z-.  rule, 
little  effect  on  international  law  or  relations;  the  rules 
of  its  conduct  are  prescribed  for  it  either  by  usage  or  by 
the  particular  group  that  sponsors  its  birth.  In  the  case 
of  the  United  States  it  was  different.  The  child  of  a  new 
philosophy  of  government,  at  a  distance  of  thousands  of 
miles  from  the  established  countries  of  the  world,  with  a 
determination  to  remain  free  from  that  European  system 
which  had  made  the  colonists  sometimes  the  cause  and 
always  the  victims  of  the  European  struggles  for  political 
and   commercial   supremacy,   the  new   nation   had   both 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  261 

necessities  and  opportunities  for  developing  new  theories 
and  practices  in  international  relations.  It  is  for  these 
reasons,  primaril}',  that  the  entrance  of  the  United  States 
into  the  family  of  nations  has  been  deemed  epoch- 
making. 

This  originality  of  policy  is  evidenced  not  only  in  the 
major  principle  of  non-intervention,  which  gave  rise  to 
its  corollary,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  to  its  natural 
derivatives,  the  system  of  neutrality  and  the  doctrine  of 
recognition  of  governments  de  facto,  but  it  is  reflected  in 
the  provisions  of  our  earliest  treaties  with  foreign  pow- 
ers, in  which  we  find  stipulations  for  liberty  of  conscience, 
the  removal  of  important  disabilities  from  aliens,  mitiga- 
tion of  the  rigor  and  evils  of  war,  such  as  humane  treat- 
ment for  prisoners  of  war.  the  privileged  withdrawal 
and  departure  of  alien  enemies  and  the  immunity  of  their 
private  property  from  seizure,  restrictions  on  the  belliger- 
ent privilege  of  visit  and  search,  prohibition,  under  pain 
of  treatment  as  a  pirate,  of  the  acceptance  of  privateering 
commissions  by  citizens  of  either  country  from  an  enemy 
of  the  other,  and  various  limitations  on  belligerent  cap- 
tures at  sea,  including,  in  the  treaty  with  Russia  the 
reciprocal  immunity  of  merchant  ships  in  case  of  war 
between  the  signatories.  Practically  all  these  innovations 
were  proposed  by  the  American  negotiator;  they  reflect 
a  freedom  from  tradition  and  an  initiative  dictated  in 
part  by  necessity,  in  part  by  opportunity;  but  their  sub- 
stantial merit,  not  only  in  promotion  of  our  own  interest 
but  also  in  that  of  the  world  at  large,  is  indicated  by  the 
fact  that  many  of  those  provisions  have  long  since  been 
accepted  among  the  most  settled  of  the  rules  of  interna- 
tional law. 

(a) 

NEUTRALITY 

Not  long  after  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
had  made  us  a  nation  capable  of  assuming  and  carrying 


262  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

out  international  obligations,  the  French  Revolution 
broke  out.  The  reaction  of  the  governments  of  the  world 
was  much  like  that  now  entertained  toward  the  Russian 
Revolution.  The  event,  as  the  Revolution  grew  in  inten- 
sity and  violence,  presented  to  the  new  American  govern- 
ment its  first  great  problem  in  foreign  affairs,  and  the 
solution  adopted  marked  the  future  course  of  national 
policy. 

As  the  Revolution  could  not  be  promptly  suppressed, 
some  of  the  European  governments  felt  it  necessary  to 
intervene,  and  when  England's  entrance  into  the  conflict 
in  1793  made  it  a  maritime  war,  the  American  govern- 
ment had  to  make  its  great  decision.  The  result  but 
reveals  the  high  calibre  of  men  who  then  governed  the 
country. 

The  French  Revolution  had  aroused  mingled  feelings 
in  the  United  States.  The  people  generally  saw  in  it 
the  counterpart  and  response  to  their  own  recent  achieve- 
ment, and  enthusiastically  approved  it.  The  Government 
realized  better  the  responsibilities  attached  to  association 
in  the  French  enterprise.  It  required  statesmanship  of  a 
high  order,  in  the  face  of  the  popular  clamor  for  aid  to 
France,  to  decline  to  yield  the  ultimate  good  for  the 
immediate  popular  demand ;  the  leaders  of  that  day  were 
not  sounding  boards  who  took  their  position  on  public 
questions  and  their  views  of  public  policy  from  the  morn- 
ing newspapers.    To  quote  John  Bassett  Moore : 

"They  understood  that  the  peaceful  demonstration 
of  the  beneficence  of  their  principles,  in  producing 
order,  prosperity,  and  contentment  at  home,  was  likely 
to  accomplish  far  more  for  the  cause  of  liberty  than  an 
armed  propagandism,  which  perchance  might  ultimately 
degenerate  into  military  despotism." 

The  country  was  then  still  weak.  Yet  American  ships 
of  trade  were  to  be  found  in  all  the  seas.  A  false  step, 
inviting  another  war,  might  have  terminated  the  life  of 
the  young  nation.     Prudence   and   patriotism   therefore 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  263 

dictated  a  passive  attitude  toward  the  French  Revolution. 
Circumstances,  however,  soon  made  more  positive  action 
necessary.  England  came  into  the  war  in  1793.  Citizen 
Genet  was  sent  to  the  United  States  by  France  and  con- 
ducted a  triumphal  tour  from  Charleston  to  Philadelphia, 
enlisting  popular  support  for  his  cause,  and  actually  com- 
missioning individuals  and  privateers  for  service  against 
England.  He  also  adopted  a  measure,  since  often  imi- 
tated, of  talking  to  a  people  over  the  heads  of  their  gov- 
ernment, with  results  as  disastrous  to  his  cause  as  the 
effort  was  impolitic.  It  usually  is.  To  prevent  acts  of 
the  people  which  might  precipitate  unhappy  commit- 
ments, and  to  put  a  stop  to  the  fomentation  of  hostile 
enterprises  on  American  soil,  which  Genet,  claiming  au- 
thority from  the  treaty  with  France  and  the  friendly 
sentiments  of  the  people,  was  then  sedulously  engaged  in 
promoting.  Washington  and  his  cabinet  determined  to 
issue  a  proclamation  of  neutrality.  They  hastened  in  this 
course  for  fear  that  hesitation  might  result  in  their  being 
made  a  tool  by  either  France  or  England,  the  principal 
belligerents.  Washington's  personal  policy  became  the 
national  policy.  In  March,  1793,  he  wrote  to  Jefferson, 
then  Secretary  of  State :  "War  having  actually  com- 
menced between  France  and  Great  Britain,  it  behooves 
the  Government  of  this  country  to  use  every  means  in 
its  power  to  prevent  the  citizens  thereof  from  embroiling 
us  with  either  of  those  powers,  by  endeavoring  to  main- 
tain a  strict  neutrality.''  The  remark  of  Oswald,  P)ritish 
negotiator  of  the  Treaty  of  1783.  to  John  Adams,  had 
not  been  lost  on  the  Cabinet :  "Yoti  are  afraid."  said 
Mr.  Oswald,  "of  being  made  the  fools  of  the  powers  of 
Europe/'  "Indeed  I  am,"  said  Adams.  "Uliat  pozvers?" 
said  Oswald.     "All  of  them!'  answered  Adams. 

The  proclamation  of  neutrality  was  published  before 
Genet  reached  Philadelphia.  The  disputes  arising  out  of 
Genet's  efforts  to  move  the  Government  from  the  course 
it  had  adopted,  and  to  violate  the  principles  of  neutrality 


264  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

by  fitting  out  privateers,  and  capturing  and  condemning 
British  vessels  v^athin  American  jurisdiction,  merely  con- 
firmed the  wisdom  of  the  American  policy.  The  claims 
of  Genet  to  employ  American  soil  for  hostile  acts  in 
favor  of  France  against  its  enemies  gave  shape  to  the 
principles  of  neutrality  enunciated  by  Jefferson,  then 
Secretary  of  State.  Neutrality  consisted  of  certain  rights 
and  duties,  founded  primarily  on  the  sovereignty  of  every 
nation  within  its  own  territory  and  its  obligation  of  im- 
partiality between  the  belligerents.  Mr.  Moore  has  sum- 
marized Jefferson's  principles  as  follows : 

"As  it  was  the  right  of  every  nation  to  prohibit  acts 
of  sovereignty  from  being  exercised  by  any  other  within 
its  limits,  so  it  was,  he  declared,  the  duty  of  a  neutral 
nation   to   prohibit   such  as   would   injure   one   of   the 
warring  powers.     Hence,  'no  succor  should  be  given 
to  either,  unless  stipulated  by  treaty,  in  men,  arms,  or 
anything  else,  directly  serving  for  war.'     The  raising 
of   troops   and  the  granting  of   military   commissions 
were,  besides,  sovereign  rights,  which,  as  they  pertained 
exclusively  to  the  nation  itself,  could  not  be  exercised 
within   its   territory  by   a   foreign   power,   without   its 
consent ;  and  if  the  United  States  had  'a  right  to  refuse 
permission  to  arm  vessels  and   raise  men'  within  its 
ports   and   territories,   it   was   'bound  by  the  laws   of 
neutrality  to  exercise  that  right,  and  to  prohibit  such 
armaments  and  enlistments.'  " 
The  neutrality  proclamation  of  April  22,    1793,  was 
epoch-making,  for  it  fixed  what  seemed  until  recent  times 
the  immutable  policy  of  the  United  States  toward  Euro- 
pean wars.     It  did  not  use  the  word  "neutrality,"   for 
Jefferson  believed  that  an  avowal  of  permanent  neutrality 
should  not  be  bartered  away  without  concessions  from 
the  belligerents.     The  proclamation  was  actually  drafted 
by  Randolph,  Attorney  General,  and  announced  that  "the 
duty  and  interest  of  the  United  States  require  that  they 
should  with  sincerity  and  good  faith  adopt  and  pursue  a 
conduct    friendly   and    impartial   toward   the  belligerent 
powers."     Citizens  were  warned  against  joining  in  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  265 

hostilities,  that  they  carried  contraband  at  their  risk  alone, 
and  that  violations  of  the  law  of  nations  within  American 
jurisdiction  would  be  punished. 

The  proclamation  created  a  profound  impression  in 
Europe;  for  it  was  at  least  novel  that  a  people  which  had 
theretofore  been  involved  in  practically  every  European 
war  to  which  England,  France  or  Spain  had  been  parties 
should  now  assert  their  complete  independence  of  Euro- 
pean quarrels.  It  was  a  logical  step  in  the  policy  of  non- 
intervention in  European  affairs,  to  which  utterance  had 
already  been  given  by  some  of  the  leaders  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  foreshadowed  Washington's  Farewell  Address, 
which  definitely  made  non-intervention  a  cornerstone  of 
American  foreign  policy. 

The  enforcement  of  our  neutrality  in  the  face  of  the 
activities  of  Genet,  much  popular  disapproval,  and  the 
weakness  of  the  federal  power,  was  not  always  easy. 
But  a  notable  charge  to  a  grand  jury  by  John  Jay,  the 
first  Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States,  in  May,  1793, 
ranks  among  the  highest  expressions  of  American  policy 
and  has  been  honored  by  its  substantial  incorporation  in 
1 87 1  in  the  Treaty  of  Washington  with  Great  Britain, 
another  notable  step  in  the  evolution  of  the  law  of  neu- 
trality.   Jay  said : 

"The  laws  of  nations  make  part  of  the  laws  of  this 
and  of  every  other  civilized  nation.  They  consist  of 
those  rules  for  regulating  the  conduct  of  nations  toward 
each  other  Avhich,  resulting  from  right  reason,  receive 
their  obligations  from  that  principle  and  from  general 
assent  and  practice.  To  this  head  also  belong  those 
rules  or  laws  which,  by  agreement,  become  established 
between  nations.  .  .  We  are  now  a  nation,  and  it 
equally  becomes  us  to  perfonn  our  duties  and  to  assert 
our  rights.  .  .  The  United  States  are  in  a  state  of 
neutrality  relating  to  all  powers  at  war.  Therefore 
they  who  commit,  aid.  or  abet  hostilities  against  those 
powers,  or  either  of  them,  offend  against  the  laws  of 
the  United  States,  and  ought  to  be  punished." 


266  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

Between  the  open  violation  of  our  neutrality  by  Genet 
and  his  adherents  in  the  United  States  at  home,  and  the 
like  disregard  of  our  neutral  rights  at  sea  by  both  France 
and  England,  the  course  of  the  government  was  difficult. 
Nor  were  we  fortunate  in  some  of  our  diplomatic  ap- 
pointments to  France.  Gouverneur  Morris,  first  sent  by 
Washington,  was  too  cold  toward  the  Revolution  for 
French  taste,  and  his  successor,  James  Monroe,  too  warm 
for  American  neutrality. 

In  view  of  the  vagueness  as  to  what  were  at  that  time 
neutral  rights  and  privileges,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
budding  commerce  of  America  paid  a  heavy  price  for  the 
prevailing  uncertainty  and  the  unwillingness  of  each  of 
the  belligerents  to  permit  American  vessels  to  trade  with 
the  other  except  under  severe  restrictions.  There  was 
no  agreement  as  to  what  constituted  contraband  or  block- 
ade. Between  paper  blockades  and  the  unlimited  exten- 
sion of  contraband  lists,  the  fate  of  the  neutral's  trade 
seemed  precarious.  The  rule  that  enemy  goods,  not  con- 
traband, on  a  neutral  ship,  were  exempt  from  seizure, 
enunciated  by  Frederick  the  Great  under  the  name  "free 
ships,  free  goods"  and  embodied  in  the  Armed  Neutrality 
of  1780  and  in  the  treaty  concluded  by  Benjamin  Frank- 
lin with  Prussia  in  1785,  was  still  far  from  receiving 
general  acceptance;  its  ultimate  persistence  and  inclusion 
in  the  rules  of  international  law  are  in  no  small  degree 
due  to  American  effort. 

The  insistence  upon  our  rights  furnished  a  critical  test 
for  our  diplomacy,  and  the  principles  adopted  in  the  Jay 
treaty  of  1794  with  England  and  the  arbitrations  for 
which  it  provided  constituted  a  marked  advance  in  the 
development  of  international  maritime  law.  The  conces- 
sions gained  therein  for  neutrals  were  much  aided  by  the 
recognition  of  the  obligations  of  neutrals  which  had  been 
embodied  in  the  proclamation  of  1793  and  the  statute 
of  1794  which  carried  those  obligations  into  effect.  In 
substance,  the  Act  of   1794  forbade  within  the  United 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  267 

States  the  acceptance  of  commissions,  the  enHstment  of 
men,  the  fitting  out  and  arming  of  vessels  and  the  setting 
on  foot  of  mihtary  expeditions  in  the  service  of  any  gov- 
ernment or  people  against  a  government  with  which  the 
United  States  was  at  peace.  Compensation  was  provided 
for  in  the  Jay  Treaty  for  those  British  subjects  who  had 
suffered  damages  from  our  failure  to  prevent  French 
privateers  from  violating  our  neutrality,  a  precedent  from 
which  we  reaped  great  advantage  some  eighty  years  later 
in  the  settlement  of  the  "Alabama"  claims  of  American 
citizens  against  Great  Britain.  Hall,  the  well-known 
English  authority  on  international  law,  says  of  the  atti- 
tude of  Washington's  administration : 

"The  policy  of  the  L^nited  States  in  1793  constitutes 
an  epoch  in  the  development  of  the  usages  of  neutrality. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  was  intended  and  believed 
to  give  effect  to  the  obligations  then  incumbent  upon 
neutrals.     But  it  represented  by  far  the  most  advanced 
existing  opinions   as  to  what  those   obligations  were, 
and  in  some  points  it  even  went  further  than  authorita- 
tive international  custom  has  up  to  the  present  time 
advanced.     In  the  main,  however,  it  is  identical  with 
the  standard  of  conduct  which  is  now  adopted  by  the 
community  of  nations." 
Not  long  after  the  proclamation  of  neutrality  of  1793 
began  that  reciprocal  retaliatory  promulgation  of  Orders 
in  Council  and  decrees  by  the  English  and  French  gov- 
ernments which  made  neutral  commerce  subservient  to 
belligerent  expediency.     Only  the  difficulty  of  determin- 
ing which  belligerent  was  doing  us  the  most  injury,  our 
military  weakness  and  the  realization  that  participation 
in  the  war  would  be  more  disastrous  than  helpful  to  our 
commerce,  persuaded  the  statesmen  of  that  day  to  over- 
look the  many  provocations  to  war  and  adopt  negotiation 
instead.     Each  belligerent  acted,  with  little  qualification, 
upon  the  principle  asserted  by  Great  Britain  during  the 
recent  war,  namely,  that  if  one  belligerent  is  allowed  to 
make   an   attack   upon   the  other   regardless   of   neutral 


268  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

rights,  his  opponent  must  be  allowed  similar  latitude  in 
prosecuting  the  struggle  "and  is  not  limited  to  the  adop- 
tion of  measures  precisely  identical  with  those  of  his 
opponent,"  On  this  point,  complete  harmony  seems  to 
prevail  among  belligerents.  Notwithstanding  all  their 
efforts  to  obtain  by  negotiation  more  favorable  treatment 
for  American  commerce,  the  United  States  was,  neverthe- 
less, drawn  in  1798  into  the  limited  war  with  France 
which  lasted  until  1800.  The  Peace  of  Amiens  brought 
a  brief  respite  to  American  traders  and  to  a  much 
harassed  Department  of  State. 

In  1803,  the  great  struggle  between  France  and  Eng- 
land was  renewed.  The  reciprocal  issuing  of  retaliatory 
Orders  in  Council  and  Napoleonic  decrees  again  threat- 
ened the  trade  of  neutral  American  merchants  and  tested 
the  diplomatic  resources  of  our  young  Department  of 
State — this  time  with  less  success  than  in  the  preceding 
decade.  Neutral  rights  were  all  but  blotted  out  by  the  con- 
tending belligerents.  Paper  blockades  were  the  order  of 
the  day.  Fortunately,  we  were  not  then  drawn  into  the 
war,  and  at  least  we  were  able  by  continued  protest  to 
keep  alive  the  claims  of  neutrals,  which  ultimately,  long 
after  the  war,  did  obtain  recognition. 

Embargoes  and  non-intercourse  proving  weak  as  the 
weapons  of  a  neutral,  we  were  finally,  through  the  com- 
plication with  the  question  of  impressment,  drawn  into 
the  war  of  1812  wnth  Great  Britain.  From  France  we 
obtained  a  large  indemnity  by  treaty. 

Until  the  time  when  we  became  involved  in  the  recent 
European  War  the  United  States  had  been  the  consistent 
champion  of  neutrality,  and  had  maintained  its  principles 
through  the  most  difficult  period  of  its  history.  It  had 
the  satisfaction  of  seeing  its  recodified  Neutrality  Act  of 
1818  adopted  substantially  by  Great  Britain  in  the  For- 
eign Enlistment  Act  of  1819.  It  saw  the  main  conten- 
tions of  its  early  days  adopted  as  law  in  the  Declaration 
of  Paris  of  1856  and  later  observed — namely,  that  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  269 

neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods,  except  contraband ;  tliat 
neutral  goods,  except  contraband,  are  free  from  capture 
on  an  enemy  ship,  and  that  legal  blockades  must  be  "effec- 
tive". It  made  important  contributions  to  the  rules  of 
neutrality  adopted  by  the  first  and  second  Hague  Con- 
ferences and  the  London  Conference  of  1908.  How  far 
these  rules  have  been  qualified  by  violation  during  the 
late  war,  it  is  perhaps  too  early  to  say.  It  may,  however, 
be  observed  that  though  the  recent  European  War  began 
with  a  proclamation  of  neutrality  on  our  part,  the  prac- 
tice of  neutrality  was  beset  with  difficulties.  The  condi- 
tions and  the  motives  which  had  prompted  our  declaration 
of  neutrality  in  the  European  conflict  of  a  century  before 
were  no  longer  present;  and  the  diplomatic  skill  of  a 
Washington  and  Jefferson  was  conspicuously  absent. 
How  far  neutrality  as  a  legal  status,  with  privileges, 
rights  and  obligations,  has  suffered  permanent  injury 
only  the  future  can  tell;  the  apparent  effort  embodied  in 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  make  every 
war  hereafter  a  universal  war  would  seem  to  indicate  a 
belief  that  the  law  of  neutrality  had  exhausted  its  use- 
fulness. I  venture  to  differ  with  such  an  opinion.  On 
the  contrary,  I  believe  that  the  task  of  the  immediate 
future  is  to  strengthen  rigidly  the  law  of  neutrality  by 
doing  away  with  much  of  the  difference  between  pro- 
hibited and  permitted  acts  of  individuals  and  restricting 
those  privileges  of  the  neutral  individual  in  the  form  of 
loans  and  other  aids  to  belligerents  which  ultimately 
make  of  neutrality  either  a  mythical  status,  a  precarious 
privilege,  or  an  unwelcome  and  distrusted  obligation. 

(b) 

RECOGNITION' 

Equally  consistent  with  the  doctrine  of  neutrality  as  a 
derivative  from  the  fundamental  American  principle  of 
non-intervention  has  been  the  policy  governing  the  recog- 


270  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

nition  of  new  governments — at  least  down  to  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Wilson  administration,  when  so  many  of  the 
traditional  principles  of  our  foreign  policy  were  aban- 
doned or  modified. 

Recognition  is  not  a  legal  right  of  the  new  gwremment 
or  state,  nor  is  it  altogether  a  matter  of  favor.  It  is  a 
question  of  policy,  which  is  influenced  by  such  factors  as 
historical  precedent,  conceptions  of  national  tradition  and 
interest,  the  desire  for  harmonious  international,  com- 
mercial and  political  relations,  and  the  necessity  of  ac- 

")C^  knowledging  facts.  Nothing  is  more  neutral,  therefore, 
than  the  policy  adopted  by  the  United  States  in  Wash- 
ington's administration  of  recognizing  new  governments 
created  by  revolution.  Our  own  national  origin,  our  con- 
ceptions of  liberty  and  self-government,  our  dissociation 
from  the  monarchical  principle  of  legitimacy  of  govern- 
ments, which  we  had  but  lately  proved,  our  determina- 
tion not  to  intervene  in  the  political  affairs  of  other 
nations,  our  desire  to  keep  open  the  channels  of  com- 
merce, our  respect  for  practical  facts  rather  than  ancient 
theories — all  combined  to  persuade  the  new  American 
nation  to  recognize  promptly  any  new  government  dem- 
onstrating its  capacity  to  hold  for  a  reasonable  period 

y  the  reins  of  government.  De  facto  control  was  the  test 
of  government,  rather  than  the  legitimacy  of  the  means 
by  which  it  was  acquired.  Revolution  is  always  uncon- 
stitutional, yet  most  of  the  states  of  the  world,  includ- 
ing the  Great  Powers,  owe  their  existence  to  such  un- 
constitutional origin.  The  epigram  "whoever  has  the 
archives  is  the  government"  has  a  very  practical  conno- 
tation. 

The  French  Revolution  was  responsible  for  the  estab- 
lishment both  of  our  policy  of  neutrality  and  of  recogni- 
tion. In  an  instruction  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  Secretary 
of  State,  to  Gouverneur  Morris,  Minister  to  France, 
March  12,  1792,  there  was  embodied  what  has  since 
been  deemed  a  classic  expression  of  our  national  policy. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  271 

"We  surely  cannot  deny  to  any  nation,"  said  Jeffer- 
son,   "that    right    whereon    our    own    government    is 
founded — that  everyone  may  govern  itself  according 
to  whatever  form  it  pleases,  and  change  these  forms  at 
its  own  will ;  and  that  it  may  transact  its  business  with 
foreign    nations    through    whatever    organ    it    thinks 
proper,  whether  king,  convention,  assembly,  committee, 
president,  or  anything  else  it  may  choose.     The  will  of 
the  nation  is  the  only  thing  essential  to  be  regarded." 
Jefferson  prescribed  no  particular  tests  by  which  this 
national  will  was  to  be  ascertained,  whether  election  or 
acquiescence.     The  mere  continued  existence  of  the  new 
government  for  a  reasonable  length  of  time  and  its  ful- 
fillment of  the  functions  of  administration  within  a  con- 
siderable portion  of  its  territorial  limits  was  presumably  a 
sufficient  demonstration  of  its  ability  to  express  a  na- 
tional will. 

Down  to  the  Civil  War  it  had  been  a  boast  of  our 
national  tradition  to  be  the  first  nation  to  recognize  a 
new  government  that  had  manifested  its  capacity  to  main- 
tain the  spark  of  life.  The  precedent  was  laid  with  the 
revolutionary  governments  of  France,  beginning  in  1792. 
and  was  acted  upon  in  South  and  Central  America  and 
in  various  countries  of  Europe,  even  with  respect  to  new 
monarchies.  We  were  among  the  very  few  governments 
to  recognize  Don  Aliguel  as  King  of  Portugal.  Reasons 
for  recognition  rather  than  excuses  for  not  recognizing 
de  facto  governments,  were  sought.  A  revolution  arous- 
ing international  concern  was  not  denominated  a  "domes- 
tic  question"  of  the  parent  state.  President  Pierce  in 
his  message  to  Congress  of  May  15,  1856,  in  explaining 
the  reception  of  a  new^  minister  from  Nicaragua,  summed 
up  a  long  line  of  distinguished  precedents  when  he  said : 

"It  is  the  established  policy  of  the  United  States  to 
recognize  all  governments  without  question  of  their 
source,  or  organization,  or  of  the  means  by_  which  the 
governing  persons  attain  their  power,  provided  there 
be  a  government  dc  facto  accepted  by  the  people  of 


272  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

the  country,  and  with  reserve  only  of  time  as  to  the 
recognition  of  revolutionary  governments  arising  out 
of  the  subdivision  of  present  states  with  which  we  are 
in  relations  of  amity.     We  do  not  go  behind  the  fact 
of  a  foreign  government's  exercising  actual  power  to 
investigate  questions  of  legitimacy;  we  do  not  inquire 
into  the  causes  which  led  to  a  change  of  government. 
To  us  it  is  indifferent  whether  a  successful  revolution 
has  been  aided  by  foreign  intervention  or  not ;  whether 
insurrection  has  overthrown  existing  governments  and 
another  has  been  established  in  its  place,  according  to 
pre-existing  forms,   or   in  a  manner  adopted   for  the 
occasion  by   those  whom  we  may  find   in  the  actual 
possession  of  power.     All  these  matters  v/e  leave  to  the 
people  and  public  authorities  of  the  particular  country 
to  determine;  and  their  determination,  whether  it  be  by 
positive  action  or  by  ascertained  acquiescence,  is  to  us 
a   sufficient   warranty   of   the   legitimacy   of   the   new 
government." 
The  Civil  War  produced  many  changes  in  the  spirit  and 
the  constitutional  development  of  the  United  States,  the 
effects  of  which  cannot  yet  be  fully  established.     Among 
the  earliest  and  most  obvious  effects,  however,  was  the 
change  in  attitude  assumed  toward  the  recognition  of  new 
governments  and  states.     The  unprecedented  effort  of  a 
large  section  of  the  country  to  establish  an  independent 
government  shook  to  its  foundations  some  of  our  most 
cherished  theories.     Seward  saw  in  this  attempt  no  prin- 
ciple of  self-determination,  but  a  treasonable  and  seditious 
effort  to  subvert  the  constitution.     He  at  once  exerted 
every  endeavor,  by  contesting  the  legality  of  the  Con- 
federate  Government,   to  prevent   foreign   governments 
not  only  from  recognizing  its  independence,  but  even  its 
belligerent  character.    We  now  find  the  curious  historical 
freak  of  Europe  acting  on  the  American  theory  de  facto 
possession  of  power  as  the  criterion  of  recognition,  and 
Seward  supporting  the  European  theory  of  legality  or 
legitimacy.     The  diplomatic  controversy  resolved  itself 
into  an  issue  as  to  the  de  facto  existence  of  the  Confed- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  273 

erate  government,  and  it  was  not  without  incurring  seri- 
ous dangers  to  our  international  relations  that  Seward 
was  finally  able  to  avert  the  recognition  of  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  South  by  Great  Britain  and  other  powers. 

The  event  was  bound  to  exert  important  influence  on 
our  recognition  policy.  The  obvious  practical  test  of 
de  facto  authority,  which  had  so  long  been  a  part  of 
our  tradition,  could  not  be  readopted  without  important 
qualification.  Thus,  we  find  Seward  in  1866.  after  our 
great  danger  of  dissolution  had  been  successfully  averted, 
conditioning  the  recognition  of  new  governments  not 
merely  on  their  de  facto  character,  but  on  the  consent  of 
the  people,  evidenced  either  by  sanction  of  the  legislature 
or  by  a  formal  election.  Consistently  therewith,  but  en- 
tirely out  of  harmony  with  our  national  traditions, 
Seward  refused  to  receive  the  representatives  of  revo- 
lutionary factions  in  foreign  countries  seeking  to  estab- 
lish their  independence. 

But  again  conditions  were  found  more  imperious  than 
theories.  Revolutionary  governments  in  South  America 
which  established  de  facto  authority  without  formal  con- 
sent of  the  people  had  to  be  dealt  with,  and  we  find  down 
to  1890  a  partial,  and  after  1890,  a  complete  departure 
from  the  conditions  of  legitimacy  which  Seward,  im- 
pelled by  the  crisis  through  which  he  had  passed  and 
the  requirements  of  consistency,  had  sought  to  attach  to 
our  recognition  of  new  governments.  The  precedent  of 
making  recognition  conditional  had  several  important 
effects.  It  served  to  encourage  the  exercise  of  a  power, 
by  withholding  recognition — though  earned  by  objective 
standards — to  interfere  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  foreign 
countries,  contrary  to  the  national  tradition.  When  thus 
used  as  a  political  instrument  to  exert  our  will  over  that 
of  other  nations,  it  subverts  the  principle  of  recognition 
and  the  theory  of  the  independence  of  states. 

As  the  element  of  express  consent  of  the  people  receded 
in  importance  as  a  condition  of  recognition,  it  was  re- 


274  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

placed  by  the  more  modern  criterion  of  capacity  of  the 
new  government  to  perform  the  international  obligations 
of  a  state.  Possibly  this  condition,  applied  subjectively, 
still  enables  a  recognizing  state  to  exact  terms  in  the 
extension  of  recognition,  contrary  to  our  original  theory. 
/  7"  But  while  the  departure  of  Europe  from  the  criterion 
of  legitimacy  to  that  of  de  facto  authority  exerted  an 
influence  upon  us,  the  development  of  imperialism,  which 
seems  difficult  to  dissociate  from  growth  in  economic 
power,  militates  against  a  disinterested  attitude  toward 
the  free  political  development  of  other  states.  The  enter- 
prise which  resulted  in  the  recognition  of  Panama  will 
illustrate  my  point.  But  this  case,  like  that  of  the  Wilson 
policy  toward  the  Huerta  government  in  Mexico  and  the 
Tinoco  government  in  Costa  Rica,  ought  to  be  regarded 
not  merely  as  involving  the  question  of  recognition,  but 
rather  as  a  question  of  intervention,  which  is  always  a 
matter  of  political  opportunism.  In  like  case  are  the 
various  extensions  of  recognition  to  the  new  states  in 
central  and  southeastern  Europe  during  and  since  the 
World  War.  They  rest  on  expediency  rather  than  on 
principle.  This  also  accounts  for  the  withholding  of 
recognition  from  the  de  facto  government  of  Russia. 

President  Wilson,  on  assuming  office  in  March,  1913, 
announced  in  a  statement  of  policy  toward  Latin-America 
a  new  doctrine  of  refusal  of  the  United  States  to  recog- 
nize new  governments  which  had  established  themselves 
by  revolution.  The  object  of  his  administration,  he  said, 
would  be  "to  cultivate  the  friendship  and  deserve  the  con- 
fidence of  our  sister  republics  of  Central  and  South 
America,"  and  to  promote  the  common  interest.  "Cordial 
understanding  and  co-operation  between  the  peoples  and 
leaders  of  America,"  he  said,  was  possible  "only  when 
supported  at  every  turn  by  the  orderly  processes  of  just 
government"  based  "not  upon  arbitrary  or  irregular 
force,"  but  upon  "law,"  upon  the  "consent  of  the  gov- 
erned" and  upon  "the  public  conscience  and  approval." 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  275 

While  the  President  doubtless  had  in  mind  the  govern- 
ment of  General  Huerta,  who  had  incurred  Mr.  Wilson's 
violent  dislike — although  it  so  happens  that  he  was  actu- 
ally the  President  of  Mexico  according  to  the  Mexican 
constitution — the  declaration  was  deemed  to  constitute 
a  policy  of  refusal  to  recognize  revolutionary  govern- 
ments. Under  the  guise  of  promoting  constitutionalism, 
it  embodies  in  effect  a  reincarnation  of  the  discarded 
theory  of  legitimacy  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  to  which  like- 
wise revolution  was  anathema.  Read  in  the  lieht  of  the 
principles  upon  which  this  nation  was  founded,  it  must 
arouse  a  feeling  of  wonder.  But  from  the  fact  tiiat 
President  Wilson  promptly  recognized  recent  revolution- 
ary changes  of  government  in  Peru,  Bolivia  and  Guate- 
mala, in  apparent  disregard  of  his  announced  policy,  one 
may  conclude  that  the  declaration  has  more  oratorical 
than  political  importance. 

While  the  development  of  the  recognition  policy  of  the 
United  States  has  experienced  notable  qualifications,  in- 
duced by  the  events  of  history  and  political  expediency, 
the  policy  has  nevertheless  so  uniformly  reverted  to  type 
after  occasional  variants,  that  it  would  be  safe  to  say  that 
the  de  facto  criterion  of  governmental  authority  is  still 
practically  the  basis  of  our  recognition  policy.  The  more 
frequent,  however,  the  departures  from  principle  the  more 
likely  it  is  that  the  country  will  drift  into  the  paths  of 
opportunism,  with  consequent  dangers  ultimately  to  tlic 
national  welfare. 

(0 

FREEDOM   OF  THE  SEAS 

When  the  United  States  achieved  independence,  tlie 
exorbitant  claims  of  Spain.  Portugal,  Great  Britain,  and 
Denmark  and  other  similar  states  to  sovereignty  over 
parts  of  the  high  seas  had  largely  been  abandone<l.  En- 
listing early,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  struggle  to  safeguard 
the  rights  of  neutrals  against  impairment  in  time  of  mari- 


276  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

time  war,  the  new  nation  also  promptly  challenged  some 
of  the  most  time-honored  restrictions  upon  the  freedom 
of  navigating  the  seas  in  time  of  peace.  In  this,  they 
served  not  only  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  but  of 
the  entire  world. 

The  dependence  of  large  sections  of  the  population  of 
the  new  country  upon  maritime  commerce  made  restric- 
tions upon  its  free  exercise  at  any  time,  and  especially  in 
time  of  peace,  irritating,  expensive  and  sometimes  intol- 
erable. Among  the  earliest  American  efforts  to  secure 
the  freedom  of  navigation  throughout  the  world  was  that 
^(  involved  in  obtaining  relief  from  the  exactions  of  the 
Barbary  States,  Morocco,  Tunis,  Tripoli  and  Algeria. 
The  rulers  of  these  states  had  obtained  the  sanction  of  a 
long-continued  practice  to  exact  tribute  from  the  vessels 
trading  in  the  Mediterranean.  Before  the  Revolution,  a 
considerable  American  commerce  had  developed  with 
ports  in  the  Mediterranean.  As  it  had  to  be  abandoned 
on  the  outbreak  of  war,  one  of  the  early  tasks  of  the 
peace  was  to  restore  it.  It  became  necessary,  therefore, 
to  make  terms  with  the  rulers  of  the  Barbary  States,  who 
had  grown  strong  and  wealthy  in  their  tolerated  occupa- 
tion of  licensed  robbery.  Yet  they  were  but  modern 
examples  of  a  system  which  had  for  centuries  admitted 
exclusive  claims  to  jurisdiction  over  waterways  and  wide 
expanses  of  the  sea. 

Down  to  1806,  Great  Britain  had  exacted  from  foreign 
ships  in  the  waters  of  the  Four  Seas  around  the  British 
Isles  evidences  of  formal  submission  to  British  jurisdic- 
tion; and  the  practice  of  admitting  foreign  ships  to  na- 
tional ports  on  payment  of  special  dues  only  and  exclud- 
ing them  from  colonies  altogether  had  long  been  com- 
mon. As  products  of  their  time,  the  Barbary  "pirates" 
are  not,  therefore,  to  be  too  severely  condemned.  They 
had,  however,  adopted  certain  Oriental  practices  which 
made  the  system  rather  unbearable,  although  the  states 
of  Europe  had  found  it  cheaper  to  buy  them  off  than  to 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  277 

contest  their  claims.  The  rates  they  charged  for  their 
appeasement  were  changed  without  notice,  and  seem 
sometimes  to  have  been  based  on  the  modern  principle  of 
what  the  traffic  could  bear;  and  they  had  the  irritating 
habit,  in  addition  to  capturing  the  vessels,  of  throwing 
into  slavery,  subject  to  ransom,  the  seamen  belonging  to 
vessels  who  would  not  pay  the  price  of  their  friendship. 
Their  appetite  grew  with  what  it  fed  upon.  The  Dey  of 
Algiers  and  the  Bashaw  of  Tripoli,  partiailarly,  were 
afflicted  with  itching  palms,  which  required  much  oint- 
ment, in  various  forms,  to  soothe.  Down  to  1815,  inter- 
mittent war  with  these  pirates  had  temporarily  inter- 
rupted the  exaction  of  their  blackmail,  but  no  final  end 
was  made  of  the  system  until  in  18 15,  Congress,  at  Presi- 
dent Madison's  recommendation,  decided  to  wait  upon 
the  Dey  of  Algiers  with  sufficient  force  to  convince  that 
potentate  of  the  error  of  his  ways.  The  treaty  which  con- 
cluded that  war  brought  to  an  end  every  exaction  of 
tribute  in  any  form  in  the  Mediterranean. 

One  of  the  claims  of  jurisdiction  upon  the  high  seas 
which  survived  the  abandonment  of  extensive  assertions 
of  sovereignty  was  that  of  subjecting  the  merchant  ves- 
sels of  foreign  nations  to  visit  and  search  by  national 
warships,  in  time  of  peace  as  well  as  in  war.  An  incident 
of  this  practice,  in  time  of  war,  was  the  taking  out  of 
neutral  ships  of  fellow-nationals  of  the  belligerent  found 
on  board.  Great  Britain,  during  the  wars  between  1793 
and  181 5,  had  thus  taken  out  of  American  vessels  not 
only  British  subjects,  but  also  naturalized  Americans  of 
British  origin,  whose  American  citizenship  under  the  pre- 
vailing doctrine  of  indelible  allegiance.  Great  Britain  re- 
fused to  concede.  This  practice,  proving  increasingly 
obnoxious  and  harmful  to  American  commerce,  was  re- 
sisted by  the  war  of  1812,  and  although  not  referred  to 
in  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  which  brought  that  war  to  a  close, 
the  practice  has  not  been  renewed.  Final  evidence  of  its 
illegality  is  found  in  the  American  admission  in  1861  of 


278  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

the  correctness  of  the  British  position  in  protesting 
against  the  forcible  taking  by  an  American  warship  of  the 
Confederate  commissioners,  Mason  and  Slidell,  from  the 
British  steamer  "Trent". 

Claims  to  examination  of  foreign  merchant  ships  in 
time  of  peace  had  by  the  nineteenth  century  been  reduced 
to  the  purposes  of  suppressing  the  slave  trade  and  piracy. 
While  the  United  States  sympathized  with  the  purpose,  it 
resisted  tenaciously  every  effort  to  subject  American  ves- 
sels to  search  by  foreign  ships  on  the  high  seas.  Doubt- 
less the  perversion  of  the  privilege  of  belligerent  visit  and 
search  to  include  impressment  had  something  to  do  with 
this  reluctance,  yet  only  by  international  co-operation  can 
such  an  institution  as  the  slave  trade  be  suppressed.  In 
this  movement  Great  Britain  took  a  leading  part.  Al- 
though nearly  every  other  country  was  willing  to  make 
treaties  with  England  conceding  a  reciprocal  right  of 
search  for  this  philanthropic  purpose,  it  was  not  until 
1862,  after  many  diplomatic  efforts,  that  the  United 
States  by  treaty  with  Great  Britain  admitted  the  right  of 
any  foreign  vessel  to  stop  an  American  ship  at  sea  in 
time  of  peace,  and  the  admission  then  was  confined  to  a 
limited  area  around  Africa  and  some  of  the  islands  in 
the  Carribbean.  The  principle  has  since  been  admitted 
within  defined  zones  around  Africa  by  the  Brussels  Slave 
Trade  Convention  of  1890  and  by  a  treaty  of  191 1  for 
the  protection  of  fur  seals  in  Bering  Sea. 

The  protest  of  the  United  States  in  1873  against  the 
stoppage  by  a  Spanish  warship  of  the  falsely  registered 
American  steamer  "Virginius,"  engaged  in  a  hostile  en- 
terprise against  Spain  in  Cuba,  illustrates  the  traditional 
insistence  of  the  United  States  upon  the  freedom  of  its 
vessels  on  the  high  seas  in  time  of  peace  from  foreign 
interference.  Pirates,  of  course,  are  excluded  from  this 
protection. 

The  consistent  effort  of  the  United  States  to  free  the 
channels  of  maritime  commerce  from  artificial  restrictions 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  279 

is  exemplified  in  the  leading  part  assumed  by  this  country 
in  bringing  about  in  1857  the  relinquishment  by  Denmark 
of  her  claims  to  the  exaction  of  tolls  from  vessels  passing 
through  the  waters  connecting  the  North  Sea  with  the 
Baltic.  The  demand  for  opening  the  Straits  of  Magellan 
to  free  transit  encountered  no  resistance  from  Chile. 

A  similar  policy  marks  the  diplomacy  involved  in  se- 
curing the  freedom  of  navigation  in  the  Canals  of  Suez 
and  Panama,  though  it  cannot  be  said  that  unrestricted 
transit  in  the  Panama  Canal  is  assured  for  anything  but 
peaceful  commerce.  The  "neutralization"  of  the  Canal  is 
nominal  only,  since  the  fortifications  enable  the  United 
States  in  time  of  war  to  use  the  Canal  as  national  interests 
may  dictate. 

The  policy  of  opening  the  channels  of  trade  is  similarly 
exemplified  in  the  long  diplomatic  effort  to  secure  the 
freedom  of  navigation  in  international  rivers,  such  as  the 
Amazon,  the  St.  Lawrence,  the  La  Plata  and  the  Para- 
guay. This  was  perhaps  but  a  reflection  in  America  of 
the  universal  effort  to  secure  freedom  in  river  navigation, 
of  which  the  notable  instances  in  Europe  involve  the 
Danube  and  the  Rhine. 

The  demand  by  contiguous  states,  for  monopolization 
of  fishing  in  the  interests  of  their  own  nationals,  has 
induced  the  last  surviving  claim  of  exclusive  jurisdiction 
over  wide  bays  and  marginal  seas,  beyond  the  conven- 
tional ten  miles  and  three  mile  limit.  The  three  mile 
zone,  incidentally,  was  for  the  first  time  officially  adopted, 
in  1793,  by  the  United  States.  The  more  extended 
claims  have  now  been  gradually  limited  by  treaty  or  ac- 
quiescence to  certain  definite  areas,  in  which  the  geo- 
graphical configuration  of  the  land  or  considerations  of 
expediency  or  history  have  justified  their  admission. 
Entire  consistency  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  can- 
not be  asserted,  for  while  we  have  sedulously  resisted 
the  claims  of  Great  Britain,  Russia  and  other  nations 
to  the  exercise  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  wide  bays  or 


280  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

particular  expanses  of  sea,  we  insisted,  on  historical 
grounds,  upon  American  jurisdiction  over  the  Bering 
Sea,  a  claim  which  was  disallowed  after  arbitration. 

The  expression  ''freedom  of  the  seas",  which  has  been 
deemed  an  essential  factor  of  American  foreign  policy, 
has  been  used  in  so  many  senses  that  confusion  in  its 
meaning  is  natural.  In  time  of  war,  the  freedom  of  using 
the  sea  is,  of  course,  greatly,  if  no't  entirely,  impaired  by 
the  belligerent  exercise  of  the  rights  of  capture,  and  the 
enforcement  of  rules  as  to  blockade,  contraband  carriage, 
and  collateral  restrictions,  legal  or  illegal,  which  their 
strength  permits  them  to  impose  upon  neutrals.  The 
United  States  came  into  being  at  a  time  when  war  had 
ceased  to  be  the  normal  and  had  become  the  abnormal 
and  exceptional  relation  between  states.  They  were, 
therefore,  able  to  give  vitality  to  the  principles  of  neu- 
trality which  they  had  championed,  some  of  which  had 
already  received  approval  by  the  European  alliance  known 
as  the  Armed  Neutrality. 

Except  for  a  brief  period,  during  the  Civil  War,  the 
United  States  has  uniformly  advocated  limitations  upon 
the  privilege  of  belligerents  to  interfere  with  maritime 
commerce,  and  corresponding  enlargement  of  the  rights 
of  neutrals.  This,  of  course,  is  consistent  with  its  tradi- 
tional policy  of  removing  restrictions  from  commercial 
intercourse  in  time  of  peace  and  of  war.  Success  in  such 
an  effort  will  depend,  at  any  given  time,  upon  the  strength 
of  the  particular  belligerents,  so  that  it  is  hard  to  say 
how  far  American  doctrines  have  secured  universal  ac- 
ceptance. Thus,  the  United  States  in  the  recent  war 
tolerated,  not  without  protest,  such  practices  b}^  Great 
Britain  as  the  so-called  "blockade",  reminiscent  of  the 
Napoleonic  decrees  and  Orders  in  Council  of  a  century 
ago,  the  blacklist,  operating  between  neutral  countries, 
the  uncontrolled  extension  of  contraband  lists,  new  con- 
structions of  the  doctrine  of  continuous  voyage,  the  seiz- 
ure of  American  mails  at  sea,  nearly  all  in  violation  of 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  281 

pre-war  agreements,  and  such  practices  by  Germany  as 
the  estabhshment  of  war  zones  for  unprecedented  pur- 
poses and  the  use  of  submarines  as  commerce  destroyers. 
These  impairments  of  the  rights  of  neutrals,  the  last  of 
which  finally  persuaded  us  to  enter  the  conflict,  merely 
illustrate  how  mythical  is  the  freedom  of  the  seas  in  time 
of  war. 

From  this  recital,  one  may  judge  how  great  are  the 
chances  for  acceptance  by  the  stronger  naval  powers  of 
a  policy  long  advocated  by  the  United  States,  and  some- 
times identified  with  the  term  "freedom  of  the  seas". 
This  is  the  inhibition  of  the  capture  of  private  enemy 
property  at  sea,  ships  or  goods,  except  contraband,  and 
except  for  blockade.  In  1785,  Franklin  incorporated  this 
provision  in  our  treaty  with  Prussia  and  it  is  found  in 
the  treaty  with  Italy  of  1871.  At  various  times,  our 
Secretaries  of  State,  including  John  Ouincy  Adams,  Clay, 
Marcy,  Fish,  Hay  and  Root,  have  proposed  to  foreign 
powers  this  limitation  upon  belligerent  action — President 
Roosevelt  recommending  it  as  a  matter  of  "humanity  and 
morals."  A  Congressional  Resolution  in  1904  advocated 
general  adoption  of  the  measure  and  the  United  States 
delegates  at  the  first  and  second  Hague  Conferences  were 
instructed  to  propose  its  consideration  and  approval.  Dr. 
Scott  says,  in  his  report  on  the  second  Hague  Conference, 
that  failure  to  obtain  approval  for  it  "was  due  solely  to 
the  fact  that  large  maritime  powers  such  as  Great  Britain. 
Japan  and  Russia,  and  in  a  lesser  degree  France,  were 
unwilling  to  renounce  the  right  of  capture  of  private  prop- 
erty, either  as  a  means  of  preventing  a  resort  to  arms  or 
of  shortening  the  wary  by  bringing  the  enemy  to  terms." 

The  experience  of  the  recent  war  would  seem  to  indi- 
cate that  in  a  war  between  the  great  powers,  not  only  are 
the  rights  of  neutrals  negligible,  but  that  the  conduct  of 
warfare  at  sea  is  subject  to  fewer  restraints  than  the  con- 
duct of  war  on  land.  It  was  the  realization  of  this  condi- 
tion that  induced  the  United  States  to  enter  upon  its  en- 


282  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

larged  naval  program,  which  some  of  the  recent  belHger- 
ents  do  not  regard  with  equanimity.  Instead  of  ameliorat- 
ing the  status  of  private  property  at  sea,  by  assimilating  it 
to  the  immunities  heretofore  enjoyed  by  private  property 
on  land,  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  has  adopted  the  medieval 
practice  of  confiscating  private  enemy  property  on  land. 
So  inconsistent  is  this  measure  with  the  modern  require- 
ments of  international  commercial  intercourse  that  it 
seems  inconceivable  that  capitalists  anywhere  could  have 
supported  it.  Not  only  is  it  likely  to  prove  universally 
unprofitable  to  leave  foreign  investments  in  this  precarious 
position,  but  it  reduces  immeasurably  any  chance  for  the 
early  limitation  of  armaments  and  of  war,  for  the  integ- 
rity  not  merely  of  public  but  of  private  property  now  de- 
(>,  pends  upon  success  in  arms. 

In  view  of  wl'wit  has  been  said,  it  is  easily  comprehen- 
sible why  Great  Britain  refused,  after  it  had  served  its 
moral  purpose,  to  accept  the  second  of  President  Wilson's 
Fourteen  Points,  providing  for  "absolute  freedom  of  navi- 
gation upon  the  seas,  outside  territorial  waters,  alike  in 
peace  and  war,"  except  as  international  action  might  pre- 
scribe. 

The  efifort  to  establish  the  rights  of  neutrals  and  the 
freedom  of  the  seas  generally  is  but  part  of  the  larger 
American  policy  of  removing  so  far  as  possible  all  re- 
strictions upon  the  freedom  of  commercial  intercourse. 
When  the  United  States  became  an  independent  nation, 
the  world  was  fettered  by  the  most  exclusive  restrictions 
in  trade  and  navigation.  The  colonial  monopoly  was  per- 
haps the  most  prevalent.  The  disadvantage  of  the  colo- 
nists in  being  confined,  in  their  European  trade,  to  deal- 
ing with  Great  Britain,  in  British  vessels,  had  been  tem- 
pered by  the  freedom  of  intercolonial  trade;  and  thnt  with 
the  British  West  Indies  had  grown  to  considerable  pro- 
portions. Having  organized  an  independent  state,  Ameri- 
can merchants  were  much  disappointed  to  find  themselves 
excluded,  as  foreigners,  from  the  lucrative  West  Indian 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  283 

Trade,  and  the  effort  of  American  diplomacy  was  directed 
to  securing  a  lifting  of  the  ban.  Not  until  the  'twenties, 
however,  when  the  new  Spanish-American  republics  af- 
forded free  opportunities  for  trade,  and  when  the  growth 
of  the  United  States  in  commercial  importance  gave  them 
a  practical  power  of  retaliation,  in  the  establishment  of 
an  embargo  against  British  vessels  coming  from  a  colony 
closed  to  American  vessels,  was  effective  relief  obtained. 
A  country  without  manufactures  and  exporting  raw  mate- 
rials, the  United  States  sought  freedom  of  trade  in  for- 
eign markets  and  w^as  willing  to  admit  foreign  ships  to 
American  ports  on  equal  terms  with  its  own.  To  main- 
tain the  open  door  abroad,  they  adopted  discriminating 
duties  against  incoming  goods  or  vessels  of  countries  dis- 
criminating against  American  commerce.  But  the  basic 
principle  of  American  commercial  relations  was  reciprocity  ■ 
of  treatment,  embodied  in  the  first  commercial  treaty  with 
France  of  1778.  A  statute  of  1828,  still  in  force,  makes 
a  standing  offer  for  the  abolition  of  all  discriminating 
duties,  regardless  of  the  origin  of  the  cargo  or  the  carry- 
ing vessel,  and  its  provisions  have  now  been  extended  by 
proclamation  and  treaty  to  many  countries.  Thus,  the 
United  States  may  justly  claim  a  prominent  share  in  the 
enlightened  enterprise  of  breaking  the  shackles  of  the 
system  of  colonial  monopoly.  In  the  development  of  re- 
lations with  the  Far  East,  as  already  observed,  the  policy 
of  the  "open  door"  in  commercial  relations  was  steadily 
pursued  by  the  L"rnited  States. 

Yet  the  L^nited  States,  by  considering  commerce  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Philippines,  Hawaii  and 
Porto  Rico  as  coasting  trade,  from  which  foreign  vessels 
are  excluded,  except  by  license,  seems  to  have  revived  one 
of  the  more  objectionable  features  of  the  old  system  of 
colonial  monopoly,  though  these  dependencies  are,  of 
course,  open  to  the  trade  of  all  nations. 

But  while  navigation  is  now  nominally  free  from  arti- 
ficial restrictions,  the  opportunities  for  engaging  in  it  are 


284  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

by  no  means  equal.  The  system  by  which  commerce  is 
subject  to  political  control  operates  to  exclude  certain 
nations  or  people  from  trade,  either  altogether  or  in  given 
commodities,  with  various  parts  of  the  world.  Prefer- 
ential and  discriminating  tariffs  and  tonnage  dues,  the 
effective  monopolization  of  the  resources  of  backward 
areas,  the  creation  of  spheres  of  influence,  the  artificial 
stimulation  of  national  merchant  fleets — as  in  Section  34 
of  the  Jones  Act  giving  a  5  per  cent,  tariff  reduction  to 
goods  imported  in  American  vessels,  as  soon  as  conflicting 
treaties  are  abrogated — the  control  of  coaling  and  oil  s<:i- 
tions  and  of  international  cables,  the  power  of  monopoliz- 
ing trade  arising  out  of  the  investment  of  capital — these 
are  but  a  few  of  the  instrumentalities  by  which  the  com- 
peting commercial  nations  seek  to  secure  advantages  over 
their  rivals.  Much  of  the  practice  lies  within  the  field  of 
what  would  be  unfair  competition  under  any  modern  sys- 
tem of  municipal  law.  Foreign  policy  is  fashioned  to  the 
maintenance  of  supremacy  in  this  continual  struggle,  and 
necessarily  employs  in  its  execution  the  forces  of  di- 
plomacy and  of  arms.  So  long  as  the  system  of  unregu- 
lated and  ruthless  commercial  competition  exists,  inter- 
national friction  is  hardly  avoidable. 

(d) 

MINOR   DOCTRINES,    CONTRIBUTIONS   AND   POLICIES 

In  any  survey  of  the  position  of  the  United  States  as  a 
factor  in  the  development  of  international  relations,  a 
place  must  be  found  for  particular  contributions  and  cer- 
tain minor  doctrines  and  policies  which  mark  our  growth 
as  a  nation.  Among  these  mention  should  be  made  of 
Dr.  Lieber's  code  for  the  government  of  the  armies  of 
the  United  States  in  the  field,  of  the  doctrine  of  expatria- 
tion, of  the  promotion  of  international  arbitration,  of  the 
status  of  treaties  in  our  constitutional  system,  and  of  note- 
worthy special  contributions  to  the  development  of  inter- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  285 

national  law.    Finally,  some  estimate  of  our  present  posi- 
tion may  be  warranted. 

Although  I  think  it  would  not  be  quite  accurate  to 
characterize  the  United  States  necessarily  as  a  peaceful 
nation,  our  wars,  since  independence,  have  usually  been 
short  and  have  not  fastened  on  the  nation  the  customary 
psychology  or  paraphernalia  of  militarism.     Yet  I  fancy 
that  our  diplomatic  correspondence  with  European  coun- 
tries for  the  next  few  decades  will  be  less  patronizing  than 
that  of  the  past  few  in  deploring  their  adherence  to  what 
Ave  have  deemed  the  antiquated  system  of  military  con- 
scription.    Notwithstanding  our  traditional  neutrality  to 
the  arts  of  war,  the  United  States  has  made  one  of  the 
most  notable  contributions  to  the  regulation  of  the  prac- 
tices of  war.     The  code  of  law  drafted  by  Dr.  Francis 
Lieber  in  1862  and  known  as  the  Instructions  for  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Armies  of  the  United  States  in  the  Field, 
General  Orders  No.    100,  has  been  the  foundation   for 
much  of  the  subsequent  codification,  at  Brussels  in  1874 
and  at  the  Hague  in  1899  and  1907,  with  respect  to  the 
laws  of  war  on  land.     Those  instructions  constitute  the 
essential  basis  of  the  existing  Rules  of  Land  Warfare 
adopted  by  the  War  Department  and  have  exerted  con- 
siderable influence  on  foreign  war  codes.    Moreover,  they 
were  observed  in  practice  in  two  wars,  the  Civil  War  and 
the  Spanish-American  War,  v.'hich  is  more  than  can  be 
said  for  the  Brussels  Declaration  and  the  Hague  Conven- 
tions, which  were  either  unratified  or  qualified  in  practice. 
Considering  the  absence  of  precedents,  Dr.  Lieber's  code 
represents  a  remarkable  product  of  technical  skill,  excel- 
lent judgment,  historical  perspective  and  sound  humain'- 
tarian  instincts. 

The  true  relation  between  the  individual  and  the  po- 
litical society  of  which  he  is  a  member  has  troubled  phi- 
losophers more  than  it  has  governments.  Notwithstand- 
ing the  liberal  pronouncement  of  the  Declaration  of  Inrlc- 
pendence  as  to  the  "inalienable  rights"  of  men  to  "life, 


286  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,"  not  only  was  slavery 
tolerated,  but  the  courts  of  the  United  States  with  prac- 
tical uniformity  adopted  the  view  of  the  English  common 
law  that  no  man  could  sever  the  bonds  of  allegiance  to  his 
country  nor  abjure  the  duties  arising  therefrom,  without 
the  consent  of  the  State.  But,  as  immigration  began  to 
increase  toward  the  middle  of  the  last  century,  notably 
from  Ireland  and  Germany,  and  as  naturalized  citizens 
in  increasing  numbers  visited  their  native  countries,  dif- 
ficulties were  presented  to  the  Department  of  State  in  de- 
termining the  effect  of  American  naturalization  in  a  for- 
eign country  which  declined  to  forego  the  claim,  military 
or  other,  arising  out  of  native  allegiance.  James 
Buchanan,  as  Secretary  of  State  and  President,  was  the 
first  and  most  vigorous  of  the  official  spokesmen  for  the 
theory  that  naturalization  in  the  United  States,  predicated 
on  forswearing  allegiance  to  the  native  sovereign,  severed 
completely  the  bond  of  original  allegiance  and  substituted 
a  new  one.  This  not  only  conformed  with  the  national 
ideals  of  liberty  of  the  individual  to  choose  his  own  way 
of  life  and  obedience,  but  was  appropriate  to  a  country 
receiving  large  numbers  of  immigrants.  The  difficulty  lay 
in  getting  foreign  countries  to  accept  our  view,  always 
a  problem  in  international  relations. 

The  issue  came  to  a  head  shortly  after  the  Civil  War, 
wdien  the  Fenian  troubles  in  Ireland  took  to  that  unhappy 
land  some  naturalized  citizens  of  Irish  origin.  They  were 
dealt  with  as  British  subjects,  and  the  resulting  popular 
agitation  in  the  United  States  was  promptly  reflected  in 
an  Act  of  Congress,  July  27,  1868,  which  declared  that 
the  right  of  expatriation  Avas  "a  natural  and  inherent 
right  of  all  people,  indispensable  to  the  enjoyment  of  the 
rights  of  life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,"  that 
any  ruling  to  the  contrary  was  "inconsistent  with  the 
fundamental  principles"  of  the  Government,  and  that 
native  and  naturalized  citizens  should  receive  the  same 
protection  abroad.     But  without  the  acquiescence  of  for- 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  261 

eign  governments,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  we  could  en- 
force these  principles  in  a  foreign  jurisdiction.  A  power- 
ful aid  in  this  direction  was  obtained  by  naturalization 
treaties  concluded  with  certain  powers,  of  wdiich  that  with 
Germany,  negotiated  in  1868  by  George  Bancroft,  with 
the  co-operation  of  Bismarck,  was  the  first.  In  these  the 
subscribing  countries  agreed  practically  to  recognize 
American  naturalization,  when  obtained  by  natives  of 
their  countries  as  the  exclusive  warrant  of  their  citizen- 
ship. 

But  not  all  countries,  nor  even  all  the  principal  ones, 
have  been  willing  to  conclude  naturalization  treaties  with 
us.  Some,  like  imperial  Russia  and  Turkey,  deny  the 
right  of  expatriation  absolutely,  others  like  France  and 
Italy  and  other  countries  adopting  compulsory  military 
service,  concede  it  on  condition  only,  and  require  the 
State's  consent.  Thus,  much  of  our  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence is  concerned  with  conflicting  claims  of  citizen- 
ship. Moreover,  not  a  little  difficulty  in  obtaining  ad- 
herents for  our  professedly  liberal  views  is  encountered  by 
the  fact  that  in  practice  we  considerably  qualify  the  "in- 
herent right  of  expatriation"  proclaimed  in  the  Act  of 
1868,  by  denying  the  privilege  of  naturalization,  the  cor- 
relative of  expatriation,  to  Chinese,  Japanese  and  others ; 
by  having  to  admit  that  foreign  countries,  exercising  juris- 
diction over  their  native  citizens,  returning  with  an  Ameri- 
can naturalization  certificate,  could  not  be  compelled  to 
give  to  our  law  precedence  over  their  own ;  and  by  our 
refusal  to  permit  an  American  citizen  to  expatriate  him- 
self in  time  of  w^ar.  While  these  confessed  limitations 
upon  the  freedom  of  expatriation  weaken  the  principle, 
it  does,  nevertheless,  represent  an  American  aspiration 
which  has  exerted  much  influence  on  international  rela- 
tions. 

The  public  declarations  of  the  United  States,  from  the 
beginning,  and  the  practice  of  its  govemmcntal  depart- 
ments, have  been  noteworthy  for  their  acceptance  of  the 


288  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

law  of  nations,  which  they  sought  to  estabhsh  on  a  definite 
foundation,  as  the  guiding  principle  of  international  rela- 
tions. Their  preference  for  legal  methods  is  exemplified 
in  the  extent  to  which  arbitration  has  been  employed  by 
them  as  means  of  settling  international  differences.  Only 
Great  Britain  has  resorted  to  arbitration  more  frequently. 
From  the  Jay  treaty  of  1794,  which  provided  for  three 
different  arbitrations,  down  to  the  present  time,  arbitra- 
tions have  been  held  with  almost  every  country  of  Europe 
and  with  many  of  the  States  of  Latin  America,  involving 
most  important  questions,  principally  boundaries  and  pe- 
cuniary claims  of  every  description.  The  record  includes 
such  delicate  matters  as  the  "Alabama"  claims  and  the 
century-old  dispute  over  the  North  Atlantic  Coast  Fish- 
eries, settled  at  the  Hague  in  1910. 

Nearly  all  the  Pan-American  Congresses  since  1889 
have  expressed  approval  of  the  principle  of  arbitration, 
though  its  practical  value  depends  on  the  disposition  of 
nations  actually  to  submit  disputes.  The  prevailing  ten- 
dency to  except  from  the  treaty  obligations  of  arbitration, 
questions  of  vital  interest,  honor,  etc.,  but  indicates  how 
cautious  nations  are  in  agreeing  to  the  judicial  method 
for  settling  their  important  disputes.  As  it  is  only  these 
disputes  which  could  normally  lead  to  war,  the  reliance 
upon  arbitration  as  a  means  of  averting  war,  notwith- 
standing the  notable  achievements  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, cannot  be  considered  strongly  justified.  While  the 
United  States  made  valuable  contributions  to  the  estab- 
lishment, at  the  first  Hague  Conference,  of  the  Permanent 
Court  of  Arbitration,  to  which  they  have  resorted  on  sev- 
eral occasions,  the  Senate  has  in  recent  years  manifested 
a  reluctance  to  widen  the  range  of  questions  submissible  to 
arbitration.  By  reason  of  the  Senate's  insisting  upon  the 
privilege  of  passing  on  each  specific  claim  to  be  submitted 
to  arbitration  under  a  general  treaty,  Mr.  Moore  con- 
cludes that  arbitration  is  now  more  difficult  than  it  was 
in  the  beginning,  when  by  executive  agreement  or  under 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  289 

a  treaty,  long-  lists  of  claims  were  submitted  without  su- 
pervision by  the  Senate. 

The  so-called  Bryan  treaties,  of  which  some  thirty  have 
been  concluded  with  different  nations,  may  be  useful  in 
preventing  an  immediate  recourse  to  force  when  there 
occurs  a  particular  incident,  whose  facts  are  doubtful, 
creating  a  dispute  between  the  contracting  nations.  It 
provides  for  an  examination  by  a  commission  and  sus- 
pension of  hostile  action  for  a  year  for  investigation  and 
report.  The  principle,  though  known,  was  not  resorted 
to  at  the  time  of  the  Tampico  incident  with  Mexico,  which 
gave  rise  to  the  Vera  Cruz  expedition  against  Huerta. 
The  Bryan  treaties  do  not  seem  to  have  great  efficacy 
with  respect  to  continuing  injuries  or  issues  arising  out 
of  questions  of  conflicting  principle  or  policy,  which,  after 
all,  constitvite  the  effective  causes  of  hostilities. 

The  recent  effort  to  establish  a  court  in  constant  session 
at  the  Hague  with  fixed  judges  was  promptly  weakened 
by  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  by  removing 
from  it  the  requirement  for  compulsory  jurisdiction,  prac- 
tically the  only  advantage  it  possessed  over  the  existing 
court  established  in  1899,  in  which  the  judges  are  selected 
from  an  appointed  panel  of  four  in  each  country.  Tlie 
latter  method,  jurisdiction  being  voluntary,  will.  I  be- 
lieve, be  more  productive  of  arbitration  than  the  recent 
Hague  proposal. 

The  United  States  was  the  first  modern  country  to 
adopt  the  principle  that  treaties  are  not  binding  until 
ratified  by  a  branch  of  the  legislature,  and  that  they  con- 
stitute the  supreme  law  of  tlie  land  conferring  rights  on 
private  individuals  cognizable  in  the  courts.  The  latter 
principle  is  not  yet  adopted  in  England  and  most  other 
countries.  Possibly  the  fact  that  a  treaty  is  thus  re- 
garded like  a  statute  accounts  for  the  frequency,  not  gen- 
erally realized,  with  which  the  United  States  has  violated 
treaties  by  subsequent  conflicting  legislation,  leaving  to 


290  HISTORY  AND  NATURE  OF 

diplomatic  methods  the  adjustment  of  the  resulting  diffi- 
culty with  foreign  nations. 

Mention  should  be  made,  also,  of  the  peculiar  American 
interpretation  of  the  most-favored-nation  clause,  incorpo- 
rated in  many  commercial  treaties.  Under  the  European 
interpretation,  special  privileges  granted  to  one  nation  are 
at  once  and  unconditionally  extended  to  other  nations 
having  such  a  treaty  clause  with  the  grantor  State,  whereas 
the  United  States  extends  the  same  favors  only  on  condi- 
tion that  such  other  nations  satisfy  the  same  conditions 
under  which  these  privileges  were  originally  given  to  the 
grantee  State.  Without  such  a  reciprocal  concession,  the 
American  view  is  that  the  second  State  would  receive 
gratuitously  what  the  grantee  State  obtained  only  upon 
valuable  consideration.  Notwithstanding  the  criticism  of 
Europe,  the  American  interpretation  has  been  maintained 
and  has  received  the  carefully  considered  approval  of  the 
Supreme  Court. 

The  fact  that  treaties  are  the  supreme  law  of  the  land 
and  that  the  law  of  nations  is  recognized  by  our  Consti- 
tution as  a  part  and  source  of  municipal  law,  upon  which 
the  courts  may  draw  in  determining  controversies,  have 
served  to  give  international  law  a  legal  importance  in  the 
United  States  which  it  does  not  possess  in  many  other 
countries.  Sir  Henry  Maine  pays  a  high  tribute  to  this 
view  of  the  United  States  that  international  law  is  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  law  of  every  member  of  the  family  of 
nations,  without  legislative  adoption  or  formal  agreement. 
This  undoubtedly  accounts  for  some  of  the  remarkable 
state  papers  which  have  issued  from  our  Department  of 
State,  constituting  universally  acknowledged  authorities 
on  the  principles  of  international  law  they  expound.  It 
has  also  served  to  endow  the  decisions  of  our  courts, 
notably  of  the  Supreme  Court,  with  an  international  im- 
portance entirely  disproportionate  to  the  case  under  con- 
sideration. The  names  of  Marshall,  Kent  and  Story  will 
forever  be  identified  with  these  judicial  contributions  to 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  291 

the  growth  of  international  law.  It  has  also  encouraged 
American  pubHcists  to  give  a  concrete  legal  setting  U)  tlieir 
views,  not  usually  found  in  the  writings  of  continental 
authorities  on  international  law.  With  these  contribu- 
tions the  names  of  Kent,  Wheaton,  Dana,  Woolsey,  Field, 
Wharton  and  Moore  are  prominently  identified.  I  regard 
John  Bassett  Moore,  since  the  death  of  Westlake  and 
Renault,  as  the  greatest  contemporary  authority  on  inter- 
national law  and  relations.  Combining,  as  he  does,  tech- 
nical knowledge  of  the  highest  order,  a  sound,  critical, 
yet  tolerant  judgment  of  men  and  events,  genuine  nobility 
of  character,  to  which  sincerity  is  axiomatic,  a  profound 
appreciation  of  the  principles  and  philosophy  of  American 
government,  and  a  large  practical  experience  in  intimate 
association  with  our  foreign  relations,  it  seems  incon- 
ceivable that  any  American  administration,  least  of  all 
the  last,  could  afford  not  to  profit  by  his  wise  counsel  and 
judgment. 

And  now  the  United  States  is  at  the  cross  roads.  While 
not  the  greatest  crisis  of  our  history,  the  recent  World 
War  has  created  problems  and  developed  policies  which 
may  have  a  profound  and  lasting  effect  upon  the  future 
of  the  country.  Fortunately,  there  appears  now  to  be  a 
disposition  to  return,  so  far  as  possible,  to  the  funda- 
mental principles  upon  which  our  national  greatness  has 
been  achieved.  But  one  cannot  escape  the  thought  that 
with  our  change  in  economic  and  political  status  with  re- 
spect to  the  rest  of  the  world,  temptations  to  abandon 
principle  for  opportunism  and  expediency  will  continue 
to  present  themselves.  I  conceive  that  the  maintenance 
of  our  position  as  the  leading  exponent  of  political  lib- 
erty and  democracy  among  a  free  people  will  depend  up<^n 
the  steadfastness  with  which  those  temptations  are  re- 
sisted 

EDWIN  M.  BORCTTARD. 


Appendix 


APPENDIX 
GROTIUS,  SUAREZ  AND  DE  VICTORIA 

While  Dr.  James  Brown  Scott  was  Solicitor  for  tlic 
Department  of  State  in  1906,  he  took  the  first  steps  in 
an  admirable  undertaking-  which  has  since  proved  to 
be  a  great  boon  to  teachers  and  students  of  International 
Law,  the  publication  of  the  "Classics  of  Internaticjiial 
Law." 

"Grotius,"  wrote  Dr.  Scott  on  November  2,  1906,  "is 
universally  considered  as  the  founder  of  International 
Law.  This,  like  many  general  statements,  is  true  enough 
but  likely  to  mislead.  He  was  not  the  founder  nor  was 
he  the  father  of  the  science  any  more  than  Adam  Smith 
was  the  founder  or  father  of  Political  Economy  as  a 
Science.  .  .  .  We  look  beyond  Grotius  and  see  that 
the  international  law  of  today  is  rooted  in  a  more  remote 
past." 

From  that  remote  past,  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
International  Peace  has  reprinted  numerous  classics  in 
excellent  and  convenient  form  for  scientific  study. 
Among  the  precursors  of  Grotius  two  have  been  recog- 
nized by  the  Editor-in-Chief  (Dr.  Scott)  as  of  prime  im- 
portance— Francis  de  Victoria,  the  Dominican,  and  Fran- 
cis Suarez,  the  Jesuit. 

The  influence  of  Suarez  on  international  law  has  been 
well  discussed  by  Dr.  Herbert  Wriglit  in  the  ".American 
Journal  of  International  Law,"  vol.  xiv.,  No.  2,  page  307 
(April,  1920).  In  reviewing  a  new  Spanish  edition  of 
Suarez,  Dr.  Wright  says:  "James  Lorimer.  in  his  "In- 
stitutes of  the  Law  of  Nations."^  calls  attention  to  'the 
extreme  injustice  of  the  manner  in  which,  down  to  our 
own  time,  it  has  l)een  customary  to  speak  of  the  scholastic 
jurists.'  and  a  little  farther  on  lie  continues:  'The  fact  is. 
that  ever  since  the  Reformation  the  prejudices  of  Pro- 

295 


296  APPENDIX 

testants  against  Roman  Catholics  have  been  so  vehement 
as  to  deprive  them  of  the  power  of  forming  a  dispassion- 
ate opinion  of  their  works,  even  if  they  had  been  ac- 
quainted with  them,  which  they  rarely  were.'  The  same 
author,  in  a  footnote,  gives  expression  to  the  belief  "that 
no  more  valuable  contribution  could  be  made  to  the  lit- 
erature of  jurisprudence  at  the  present  time  than  a  col- 
lection and  translation  of  the  portions  of  these  works 
which  have  reference  to  general  jurisprudence  and  inter- 
national law."  But  these  statements  were  made  nearly 
forty  years  ago,  and  the  injustice  and  prejudice,  on  the 
one  hand,  have  largely  disappeared,  while  interest  in 
popularizing  the  translations  of  relevant  portions  of 
the  works  mentioned  has  long  since  been  aroused  by 
Prof.  Ernest  Nys  and  by  the  "Classics  of  International 
Law"  being  published  by  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
International  Peace,  under  the  general  editorship  of  Dr. 
James  Brown  Scott,  and  now  by  a  new  series  of  Clasicos 
jurisdicos  inaugurated  by  the  publishing  house  of  Reus 
with  the  present  volume. 

The  selection  of  the  Spanish  Jesuit,  Francisco  Suarez, 
as  the  first  author  in  the  series,  is  a  most  happy  one,  for 
the  echoes  of  his  tercentenary  celebration  have  not  yet 
entirely  died  away.  Attention  which  had  hitherto  been 
confined  to  a  few  historians  of  international  law,  such  as 
Ward,  who  calls  him  "a  writer  of  great  perspicuity  and 
comprehension  of  mind,"'  and  Hallam,  who  regards  him 
as  "by  far  the  greatest  man  in  the  department  of  moral 
philosophy,  whom  the  order  of  Loyola  produced  in  this 
age,  or  perhaps  in  any  other,"'  was  now  more  popularly 
centered  upon  him,  and  especially  did  his  native  country 
hasten  to  make  tardy  amends  for  the  oblivion  into  which 
one  of  the  purest  glories  of  its  history  had  been  allowed 
to  fall. 

This  newly  aroused  interest,  however,  should  by  no 
means  be  permitted  to  be  local,  for  Suarez  should  be  uni- 
versally recognized  as  one  of  the  truly  great  founders  of 
international  law,  second  perhaps  only  to  the  great  Gro- 


APPENDIX  297 

tius,  if  indeed  to  him.  In  fact,  there  is  Httle  or  nothing? 
new  in  Grotins'  general  treatment  of  his  subject;  his  sys- 
tem is  fundamentally  identical  with  the  ideas  outlined  l)y 
Suarez/  It  is  true  that  Grotius  advanced  far  beyond  all 
his  predecessors  in  the  detailed  elaboration  of  his  prin- 
ciples, but  the  fact  nevertheless  remains  that  "Suarez 
has  put  on  record  with  a  master's  hand  the  existence  of  a 
necessary  human  society  transcending  the  boundaries  <>i 
states,''  the  indispensableness  of  rules  for  that  society,  the 
insufficiency  of  reason  to  provide  with  demonstrative 
force  all  the  rules  required,  and  the  right  of  human 
society  to  supply  the  deficiency  by  custom  enforced  as 
law,  such  custom  being  suitable  to  nature.'"  And  there- 
fore, "it  is  rather  remarkable,"  as  Ward  notes,  "that  in 
his  survey  of  the  writers  who  preceded  him,  he  (Grotius) 
makes  no  mention  of  Suarez,  the  clearest  of  all  those 
who  had  attempted  to  discuss  the  law  of  nature,  and  the 
difference  between  it  and  the  Law  of  Nations,'"  although 
it  is  true  that  Grotius  elsewhere'  recognizes  in  him  one 
of  the  greatest  theologians  and  a  profound  philosopher. 

Francisco  Suarez  was  born  at  Granada  on  January  5, 
1548,  not  quite  a  year  and  a  half  after  the  death  of  that 
other  scholastic  glory  of  Spain,  Franciscus  dje  Victoria. 
In  1564  he  entered  the  Society  of  Jesus  at  Salamanca, 
where  he  studied  philosophy  and  theology  from  1565  to 
1570.  Ordained  to  the  priesthood  in  1572,  he  taught 
successively  and  most  successfully  at  Avila,  Segovia,  Val- 
ladolid,  Rome  (1580- 1585),  Alcala  (1585- 1592).  Sala- 
manca (1592- 1 597),  and  finally  Coimbra  (i 597-1616). 
He  died  on  September  25.  1617.  but  in  the  short  space 
of  twenty-three  years  (1590-1613),  he  wrote  and  pub- 
lished twelve  extensive  and  important  works  on  theo- 
logical and  philosophical  questions,  as  well  as  composed 
seven  other  works  published  posthumously,  tlie  last  as  late 
as  1859. 

Although  there  is  much  of  interest  from  the  point  of 
view  of  international  law  in  the  other  works  of  Suarez, 
such  as  his  De  hello'  which  constitutes  Disputati(Mi  XIII 


298  APPENDIX 

of  the  posthumous  treatise  De  charitate,  his  complete 
legal  system  is  to  be  found  in  the  De  legibus  ac  Deo 
legislatorc,  published  in  1612  (five  years  before  the 
author's  death)  at  Coimbra,  where  he  held  the  chair  of 
theology  in  the  university.  The  work  is  divided  into 
ten  books,  of  which  only  the  first  appears  in  this  volume, 
and,  as  the  publishers  say,  for  the  first  time  in  Spanish. 
It  is  presumed  that  the  other  nine  books  are  to  follow. 
An  idea  of  the  comprehensiveness  of  the  entire  work  may 
be  gleaned  from  the  following  titles  of  the  ten  books : 

Book         I — On  law  in  general,  its  nature,  causes  and 

effects. 
Book        II — On  eternal  law  and  natural  law  and  the 

law  of  nations. 
Book      III — On  positive  human  law  in  itself,  and  as 

it  can  be  considered  in  the  pure  nature 

of  man,  which  law  is  also  called  civil 

law. 
Book       IV — On  positive  canon  law. 
Book        V — On    the    variety    of    human    laws,    and 

especially  on  adverse  law. 
Book      VI — On     the     interpretation,     cessation     and 

mutation  of  laws. 
Book     VII — On    unwritten     law,     which     is     called 

custom. 
Book  VIII — On  favorable  human  law,  or  that  which 

grants  privilege. 
Book      IX — On  the  old  positive  divine  law. 
Book        X — On  the  new  divine  law. 

In  his  discussion  of  Victoria's  influence,  the  Editor-in- 
Chief  of  the  International  Law  Classics  writes :  "Tlie 
reasons  for  including  Victoria's  tractates  are  sufficiently 
set  forth  by  Professor  Nys  in  his  introduction,  and  yet 
the  general  editor  is  unwilling  to  allow  the  volume  to  go 
to  press  without  a  tribute  in  passing  to  the  broadminded 
and  generous-hearted  Dominican,  justly  regarded  as  one 
of  the  founders  of  International  Law,  and  whose  two 


APPENDIX  299 

tractates  here  reproduced  are,  as  Tluicydides  would  say. 
a  perpetual  possession  to  the  international  lawyer.  Vic- 
toria's claim  as  a  founder  of  the  Law  of  Nations  must 
unfortunately  be  based  ujwn  these  two  readings  taken 
down  by  a  pupil  and  published  after  his  death,  without 
the  professor's  revision,  and  in  a  very  summary  form. 
They  are  sufficient,  however,  to  show  that  International 
Law  is  not  a  thing  of  our  day  and  generation,  or  of  The 
Hague  Conferences,  nor  indeed  the  creation  of  Grotius, 
but  that  the  system  is  almost  as  old  as  the  New  World." 
Both  Suarez  and  Victoria  have  appeared  in  text  and 
translation  in  "The  Classics  of  International  Law." 

'James  Lorimer,  "The  Institutes  of  the  Law  of  Nations"  (London. 
1883).  Vol.  1,  p.  71. 

•Robert  Ward.  "An  Enquiry  Into  the  Foundation  and  History  of 
the  Law  of   Nations  in  Europe"   (London,  1795),  Vol.   1,  p.  16. 

'Henry  Hallam,  "Introduction  to  the  Literature  of  Europe  in  the 
15th,  16th  and  17th  Centuries"   (London,  n.  d.).  p.  524. 

*Cf.  Thomas  Alfred  Walker,  "A  History  of  the  Law  of  Nations" 
(Cambridge,  1899),  Vol.  I,  p.  330. 

'Cf.  ibid.,  p.  156. 

'John  Westlake,  "Chapters  on  the  Principles  of  International  Law" 
(Cambridge,   1894),  pp.  27-28. 

'Ward,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  614. 

"Hugo  Grotius,  Ep.  154,  /.  Cordesio. 

•This  work  and  relevant  portions  of  the  De  Legibus  will  appear 
in  text  and  English  translation  in  the  Classics  ^f  International  Law. 


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